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THESIS ABSTRACT 
Issues of language are of crucial importance to the doctrinal 
controversies of Classical Patristics. The Fathers, as well as their opponents, 
show a sustained philosophical interest in the nature of language, words, name, 
meaning, changes of meaning of expressions, correctness of name, the purity of 
language, etc. The main attempt of this dissertation is, therefore, to demonstrate 
that the Patristic view of language was not just an eclectic variant of standard 
philosophical overviews (Platonic, Stoic, Peripatetic, etc. ), but a thorough and 
well-conceived treatment of the matter, that should be recognised as an 
independent theory of language. 
The linguistic expertise of, for example, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, 
Basil of Caesarea, and Gregory of Nyssa, is inherited from the grammatical, 
logical, and rhetorical education of their time. But the topics of the discussions 
and investigations seem to arise naturally and often the question was posed in a 
substantially new way. The main point is to clarify that: first, in the course of its 
formation, the Christian theological view of names and language varied, 
depending on the theological school concerned (e. g. the Alexandrian); secondly, 
the Patristic comprehension of language is strongly rooted (and therefore can 
only be explained) in the context of the Christian doctrine of man; therefore, the 
Patristic theory of language is finally defined as a theological anthropology of 
language. 
The four dissertational chapters are set out logically and chronologically, 
each one conceived as (to some extent) an independent study; an attempt is 
made to approach each of the writers individually. The dissertation begins with 
a fresher analysis of the Classical philosophical tradition (the first chapter). Then, 
the examination shifts to the writings of the Apologists, their Gnostic opponents 
(the second chapter), the theologians of the Alexandrian School (the third 
chapter) and, finally, to the famous doctrinal controversy of the fourth century 
between the Cappadocian Fathers on the one hand, and Aetius and Eunomius on 
the other (the fourth chapter). 
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Introduction 
This dissertation is intended to be a contribution to the study of historical 
philosophy and theology of language in the early Patristic period. As follows 
from the title, the examination is concerned with Greek sources; the main task 
of the investigation is to answer the following questions: 
" How did the earliest Christian theologians comprehend the phenomenon 
of language? 
" What was the cause of the Patristic concern with this philosophical 
problem? 
" How does the Patristic comprehension of language sit with the Classical 
philosophical theories traditionally associated with Plato and Aristotle 
and the non-philosophical ideas of Gnosticism? 
" What in the Patristic theory of language was substantially new, in 
comparison with the other theories of the time? 
" What, in the opinion of Christian theologians, is most central and 
important in their view of the nature of language, in comparison with 
their opponents? 
" What are the most influential agencies that affected the Patristic 
comprehension of language? 
Of course, this is only a preliminary list of the questions to be treated in 
the dissertation. Amongst the many subordinate tasks of the dissertation is an 
attempt to demonstrate the context of their speculations, to determine and 
explain the limits of their interests, and to designate their agenda in general, i. e. 
to outline a number of topics or problems that appeared at the very heart of 
their discussion, such as the origin of language, the problem of a primordial 
1 ý`' 
tongue, the variety of language (with exegesis of the relevant texts of the Bible), 
the beliefs related to the number of languages, the nature of words, names and 
naming as such. In the vast majority of instances we shall deal with theology 
rather than philosophy of language. Therefore, my point will be that the 
Patristic preoccupation with linguistic matters is inseparable from such 
questions as: the theological notion of a divine name (or epithet), or to what 
extent human God-language can designate divine reality. As far as this 
theological concern turns Christian philosophy of language into a theology of 
language, the final form of the Patristic view of human language appears to 
have evolved in the sphere of anthropology and thus be attached to biblical 
narratives. Clearly, philosophical speculations over the matter left their definite 
imprints; but to what extent did they determine the agenda? 
To begin with, in all known ancient myths about the origin of 
humankind, language is divinely given; in its complete, perfect, form it comes 
from above, given by deities who either invent it for man, or have given their 
own divine tongue to humans. It is not difficult to realise, therefore, how the 
notion of divine names was determined by this premise. The Ancient Hebrew 
story in the Pentateuch about Adam who names the animals in Paradise is, 
obviously, the sole and unique exception; nevertheless, Christian exegetes 
sometimes gave diametrically opposite interpretations of Gen. 2: 19-20, including 
a concept of the divine origin of words and language. 
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The philosophical problem of 'divine names' had already appeared in 
Plato's Cratylus', but in Christian literature this question was often posed and 
regarded in a totally different way, not as just an interesting attempt by Socrates 
to approach the primordial (or divine) language2, but as a theological theme, 
which is inseparable from the doctrine of man, Christology (the doctrine of the 
Logos), and many other related theological themes. 
It is already well-known that in the early Patristic tradition as well as in 
Greek Classical thought, the notion of a science of linguistics as such did not 
exist: Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics, whose contribution to the 
modern science of language is immense, can only with great reserve be called 
'linguists'. Clement, Origen, Basil the Great, and Gregory of Nyssa, in spite of 
their clear interest in what we now call the philosophy of language, were not 
linguists either. The reason was not that the science of that time did not work out 
a special term to designate the science of language; such a term did not exist, for 
example, for psychology. The main reason was that linguistic issues appeared 
inseparable from ontological, epistemological (and in case of the Christian 
writers) anthropological and Christological questions3. As for the Fathers, the 
problem of language became bound up with a substantially new factor - the 
theological view of man's nature and human ability to apprehend divine 
revelation. At the same time, Basil's exclamation in the epigraph of the thesis 
I For a more comprehensive picture of the problem v. H. Rose, Divine names in Classical Greece, 
HThR, vol. li (1958), p. 31ff. 
2 v. Plato, Cratylus 391d, 396a (Cratylus, ed. J. Burnet, Platonis opera, vol. 1. (Oxford 1900)). 
3 I0.34eAburreAH, 11po6iwia A3blKa 6 n(116 xmmuKaX nampucmuKu', HAY, p. 160. 
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points to the fact that the Christian concern with linguistic matters was a 
significant step forward in the course of the formation of the subject. As far as I 
know Basil is the first to pose the question about the nature of language rather 
than about names; Basil the Great discoursed on language in the way that the 
problem is determined nowadays. 
In the dissertation I shall suggest that an analysis of the notion of the 
divine name or epithet substantially clarifies the Patristic comprehension of 
language. It is what makes it, strictly speaking, theological and truly unique, by 
comparison with the other language theories of the epoch. An attempt will be 
made to demonstrate that this aspect of the Patristic philosophy of language is 
as important as the transition from cataphatic theology to the via negativa, and it 
is of crucial importance to examine these two themes, language and the divine 
name, together. 
§ 1. Methodology 
Despite the fact that the problem has already received some examination 
and has been treated generally, i. e. in relation to some particular aspects of early 
Church doctrines, I shall examine the subject by adopting a new approach. This 
approach takes seriously a number of early Christian writers and their own 
considerations in relation to the philosophy/theology of language. The main 
idea is to regard the problem selectively or individually and thus to reach an 
integral and comprehensive picture. In other words, my approach shall examine 
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the problem systematically, and to do so not by mixing it up with questions of 
minor importance (as e. g. P. Rotta and Y. Edelshtein did), but by an analytical 
comparison of various Patristic views on language. 
Hence I suggest approaching the problem selectively and dealing only 
with a limited number of Christian writers, those who seem to be the most 
important representatives of the different stages of Christian theology. In 
looking at each of these writers I shall try to pay as much attention as possible 
to their individuality and originality. This methodological approach arises from 
the fact that this originality of the Patristic writers (who in their turn belonged 
to different theological traditions) has often been treated in an unsatisfactory 
way or even completely ignored, either for the sake of well-worn topics like the 
Platonism (or Aristotelianism) of the Church Fathers, or for the sake of 
representing the problem in a 'consensus patrum' form. Moreover, even recent 
investigations of the Patristic theory of language and some linked issues often 
seem to overestimate the influence of classical Greek philosophy, or the 
philosophy of Late Antiquity, at the expense of the originality of the Fathers'. 
Of course, philosophical influence on logic, dialectic, rhetoric, etc. has been 
seriously reconsidered and redefined in modern Patristic scholarship, and it 
would be an error either to neglect or to argue against the results. What will be 
41n his recent research on Basil of Caesarea and his interest in linguistic matters, D. Robertson 
emphasises in his abstract the idea that 'the philosophical tradition that is rooted in the Stoic 
dialectical purposes is transformed in the classic Trinitarian controversies of Greek Patristics... ' - v. D. 
Robertson, Grammar, logic and philosophy of language: the Stoic legacy in fourth century Patristics 
PhD thesis unpublished (London 2002), p. 2. In spite of numerous interesting parallels between 
the Stoic school of thought and the ideas of Basil, D. Robertson seem to follow the settled 
opinion of the French school, well summarised by B. Sesboüe in his introduction to SC 299. 
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suggested, however, is not to disregard it, but to accentuate what in the Greek 
Patristic speculations on the nature of language was transformed from 
philosophy and what was substantially new, i. e. what was the real contribution 
of early Church theology in the history of philosophy of language. Therefore, 
my main task will be to demonstrate that in the case, for example, of Basil of 
Caesarea or Gregory of Nyssa, in spite of their indubitable (e. g. terminological 
and philosophical) dependence on the grammarians' schools of the time that 
followed the way of reconciling the two great doctrines of language of the 
Classical past, they were nevertheless original, underived, and independent 
enough to enable us to speak of a philosophy of language of their own. Their view 
of meaning, naming, origin of word and appearance of names, the correlation 
between name and object, name and its meaning and so on, is no less 
interesting or original than e. g. Plato's Cratylus or Aristotle's De interpretation. 
Furthermore, in some of their conclusions, the Patristic authors of the fourth 
century truly surpassed both their opponents in the doctrinal disputes, and, 
what is more, some of the most famous representatives of the Neo-Platonist 
movement. 'Ev Evi AöyW, Patristic ideas about human language are original and 
outstanding enough for their time to have significance not only for Patristic 
scholars, but also for the general history of linguistic theory. 
Another aspect of the examination is the construction of an integral view 
of the problem. This brings together the common features of previous 
monographs on the Patristic vision of language, both old and relatively 
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modern, that will be discussed below in detail. In order to emphasise the most 
original ideas of the Fathers, I shall try to avoid an 'optimistic' representation of 
the problem as a smooth and facile development from some primitive biblical 
impression of language, to more philosophical and sophisticated concepts. A 
claim is made that a detailed analysis of Patristic writings shows that their view 
of the nature of language was not that simple, and the development of the 
Patristic doctrine of language can be represented so to speak chronologically 
only with a number of significant reservations. Despite the fact that there is 
evidence to affirm that the early Christian theological view of human language 
was specific enough to contrast with the teachings of Late Hellenistic linguistic 
science, its development was sometimes spasmodic and uneven. To some extent 
I intend to argue against J. Danielou's representation of the problem, so 
influential on further studies of the subjects. Thus, for example, the ideas of 
Irenaeus, whose views on human language and the divine name were formed 
in the course of controversy with Gnostic, appear substantially different from 
those of Clement of Alexandria, who in the books of the Stromaties 
systematically appeals to Platonic points of view; to sum up, in the attempt to 
represent the Classical Patristic view of language, it is important to avoid 
oversimplification. 
5 J. Danielou, Eunome l'arien et 1'excg se nýoplatonicienne du Cratyle, REG 69. (Paris 1956), pp. 412 - 
432. 
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§ 2. Importance of the research 
As D. Robertson rightly remarks in his recent thesis, 'with a few notable 
exceptions (e. g. Augustine), there has been remarkably little research on the massive corpus of 
Patristic writings on language'6. This lack of studies has had an effect upon the vast 
majority of monographs on the history of linguistic theories and even on 
encyclopaedic literature on ancient grammar7. As for the history of the ancient 
philosophy of language and grammatical theory, the situation is similar: e. g. R. 
Robins8, S. Everson9, R. Harris and T. Taylor10, G. Lepschyl' and many others 
exclude the Patristic period completely from the agenda, leaving a kind of 
chronological gap, as if in the fourth-century controversies the treatment of 
language was insignificant or relatively small. Clearly, this dissertation is not 
meant to contribute to the study of ancient grammar or grammatical aspects of 
patristic exegesis12, because our concern is restricted to the theoretical (i. e. both 
philosophical and theological) treatment of language in early Christian 
literature. 
6D. Robertson, op. cit., p. 4. 
7 cf. Ineke Sluiter, Ancient grammar in context. Contribution to the study of ancient linguistic 
thought (Amsterdam 1990), pp. 168-171. 
8 R. Robins, Ancient & Mediaeval grammatical theory in Europe (London 1951), A short history of 
linguistics (London 1967). 
9 S. Everson, (ed. ) Language (Cambridge 1994). 
lo R. Harris, & T. Taylor, Landmarks in linguistic thought (London, New York 1989). 
11 G. Lepschy, History of Linguistics (London, New York 1994). 
12 In a way the problem is examined by German scholars; v. for example, the works of Ch. 
Schäublin, Untersuchungen zu Methode und Herkunft der antiochenischen Exegese (Köln, Bonn 
1974), and his disciple B. Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe, in Schweizerische Beiträge zur 
Altertumswissenschaft (Basel 1987). 
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On the other hand, in modern scholarship the question of a Patristic 
philosophy of language has not been answered in a satisfactory way. With the 
exception of Origen, Augustine, Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa, there 
are only a few works that one way or another attempt to scrutinise the subject. 
One should point out, however, that for Patristic studies our problem is even 
more important for several reasons. In the first instance, the question of the 
nature of human language is central in discerning the nature of theology, to what 
extent human words can describe the divine reality, to what extent an 
expression or comparative parallel is correct13, why one word fits the profession 
of faith better that another, etc. Whichever Trinitarian or Christological question 
was the focus of the disputes, it should be noted that the main preoccupation of 
the Fathers was often not simply with some specific terms, but with language in 
general. Nevertheless, the question of language was often ignored in 
monographs on the philosophical ideas of Patristic literature14 as well as in 
special investigations relating to apophatic theology15. Therefore, the 
dissertation is conceived as a contribution to the study of the Greek Patristic 
philosophy of language; for the sake of focus and precision, I shall not address 
the question of how exactly the philosophical attitude to language was reflected 
elsewhere, for example in Christology, Eschatology etc., except where I find it is 
too relevant to omit. 
13As, for example, the notorious Gnostic parallel between the johannine Logos and 6 A6yoc as a 
word of man's language. 
'4 e. g. H. Wolfson, Philosophy of the Church Fathers (Cambridge, Massachusetts 1956). 
1s e. g. R. Mortley, From word to silence: the way of negation, Christian and Greek, 2 vols (Bonn 1986). 
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§ 3. Review of the bibliography 
It has already been mentioned that the problem of language in early 
Christian literature has not yet been satisfactorily examined. There are several 
limitations that should however be made. The first attempt to regard this 
question systematically appeared in 1909 with a publication of P. Rotta16. Oddly 
enough, amongst Western monographs this rare book still remains the most 
comprehensive attempt to answer the question of how the phenomenon of 
human language was regarded in Patristic theology. In spite of the number of 
disadvantages caused by the condition of Patristic scholarship of the time, and 
an old-fashioned approach17, P. Rotta reached correct conclusions18. 
The main idea of his research is to demonstrate that for the Christian 
writers, the phenomenon of language was to be seen in the context of 
theological anthropology. For this reason, P. Rotta dedicates an entire chapter to 
showing how the problem of language is closely linked with the Christian 
doctrine of the human soul and mind; next, he regards Scholasticism in a 
similar manner and reaches the same conclusion19. 
One should not criticise P. Rotta's book for some obvious superficialities; 
its main disadvantage is that the monograph is extremely descriptive. Clearly, 
16P. Rotta, Lafilosofia del linguaggio nella Patristica e nella Scolastica (Torino 1909). 
17 P. Rotta begins with an overview of Pre-Socratic philosophy, gives too much attention to Neo- 
Platonism, finally dealing with Patristics only in the third chapter, while the following chapters 
are dedicated to the psychology of Patristics, and the 
disputes over the Universals in 
Scholasticism. 
18 P. Rotta, op. cit., pp. 245-248. 
19 P. Rotta, op. cit., pp. 183-244. 
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his work does not claim to present an exhaustive examination, but just to trace 
the problem. Thus, he proposed to regard the problem in the form of a number 
of secondary questions. Consequently, having considered the topic in general20, 
he turns to the Patristic exegesis of some relevant passages of the Pentateuch21, 
the question of the ultimate number of languages'l, etc. Although P. Rotta 
sometimes oversimplifies the matter and even makes errors, his general 
comprehension of the problem is remarkable in every respect, and it should be 
remembered that he was the first to pose our question. 
Surprisingly, another important investigation of our problem appeared 
in Soviet Russia in the late seventies of the last century. It is necessary to point 
out that during the Soviet era almost all kinds of Patristic studies were 
abandoned, and were only possible under cover of 'Medieval' or 'Byzantine 
studies'. Y. Edelshtein prepared a thesis titled 'The Early Medieval doctrine of 
language'21. In fact, he deals with the Classical Patristic period, and finishes his 
research with some references to the Byzantine theological literature of the 
eleventh century. His dissertation can be better described as a substantial 
20 P. Rotta, op. cit., pp. 67-74. 
21 P. Rotta, op. cit., pp. 76-78. 
22P. Rotta, op. cit., p. 75. 
2310.9Aenbu reHH, Pannecpedneeexosoe ycenue o si. 3Wxe (Moscow 1976). The dissertation remains 
unpublished. Nonetheless, Y. Edelshtein published two very valuable articles that are in effect a 
resume of his thesis: 'The problem of language in the Patristic writings' (Ilpoduma xmrnxa 6 
na. Mmmnuxax nampucmuxu, MAY: CpeAHesexosas EBpona (Mocxsa 1986) pp. 157-207; and 
'Early Medieval doctrine of origin of language' (Pannecpe&neeelcosoe y'enue o npoucxozaenuu juuKa, 
3I3bzxo3HaHMe B aHTrs'IxocTm (Mocxsa 1976), p. 176ff. It should be mentioned that the former 
article was prepared by Y. Edelshtein as a chapter for a multi-volume monograph on the history 
of linguistic doctrines that remains the single work of this kind to deal with the Patristic period 
(the article of Y. Edelshtein) and with the linguistic interests of the Byzantine theologians (an 
article of A. Gavrilov, The linguistic studies of the Byzantines (in Russian) - HAY, ibid., pp. 109-156. 
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extension of P. Rotta's third chapter; moreover, Y. Edelshtein applies a similar 
method of investigation to the massive corpus of Patristic literature. He divides 
the problem into a number of questions, and thoroughly scrutinises the 
opinions of the Fathers on concrete questions like the origin of language, the 
number of languages, the correlation between word and name, its sense, 
meaning and finally the thinking process. Although Y. Edelshtein appears to 
depend heavily on P. Rotta's monograph, his work is not without originality 
and value. 
Hence, he examines the problem much more extensively, and touches 
upon a number of questions that P. Rotta left aside. For example, Y. Edelshtein 
pays much more attention to the Patristic exegesis of the crucial passages of the 
Old Testament, and gives special treatment to the problem of the origin of 
languages in relation to Patristic anthropology and teaching on the creation of 
man, etc. Even though he evidently repeats some mistakes of P. Rotta (they both 
misinterpret Clement of Alexandria), his investigation should nevertheless be 
regarded overall as a substantial contribution to the subject. First, he covers a 
wider range of Patristic writings. Unlike Rotta, who often makes questionable 
and unconsidered remarks, Y. Edelshtein undertakes a more detailed and 
systematic examination of the topic. 
As for the disadvantages of Y. Edelshtein's monograph, it is necessary to 
note that they were caused by the aims of his investigation. First of all, his main 
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aim was to call the attention of Soviet scholars to Patristic studies24, to attract 
their interest to the matter as such. At the same time, even a superficial view of 
his work reveals the conditions under which the investigation took place: in the 
late seventies of the last century he quotes Greek texts according to the 
Patrology of Migne and only deals with the Patristic writings that had been 
translated into Russian by the Russian Orthodox Theological Academies before 
1917, and therefore repeats the textual mistakes of those old translations. 
There is another sphere of scholarship in which some interesting aspects 
of our problem have been examined. In the course of the so-called Imyaslavie'5 
controversy a number of investigations were produced in an attempt to analyse 
the biblical and Patristic theology of language and name26. Although both sides 
of the controversy turned to the authority of the Fathers, and a number of the 
articles appeared27, their relevance to Patristic studies was relatively small. The 
defenders of Imyaslavie, for instance, followed the methodology of the German 
24 1 should mention that in the course of his studies this Jewish scholar turned to Orthodoxy, 
and became a priest; inevitably, he had to abandon his academic career. 
Also known under names onomatodoxy or onomatolareia. 
For complete bibliography v. en. LlnapHOH (An4ees) Ce iuiexniaA maüna I4epueu: eeeaefue e 
ucmopuio u npo&emamuuy u. tsicaaecxux cnopoe (St. Petersburg 2002), vol. 2, pp. 216-269. 
27 cf. for instance, npor. C. ByAraKoB, CMac. k yuenuA fpuzopux Huccxozo o6 u. enax (S. Bulgakov, 
Gregory of Nyssa and his doctrine of names) in H-rom 12-13, (Moscow 1913) and the reply of his 
opponent S. Troitskii - C. TpoHqu dl, Y+cenue ca. FpuzopuA Huccicozo o6 umenax Sozuux u 
u, mx6oxuuxu. Omeem C. H. SyAzaxosy (S. Troitskii, The teaching of St. Gregory of Nyssa on the 
divine names and the ononiatolatreia: respond to S. Bulgakov (St. Petersburg 1914)). 
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school', while their opponents were often influenced by the old-fashion 
approach inherited from the semi-Scholastic period of Russian theological 
education. 
Nevertheless, this theological movement inspired a number of relevant 
works of a general character such as, for example, the books of I. Hausherrn 
and H. Alfeyev30. Both works mostly deal with the problem of the name 'Jesus'. 
The work of I. Hausherr begins with a brief but interesting examination of the 
problem in the Patristic writings. In the first volume of his research, bishop 
Hilarion Alfeyev dedicates the first two chapters to the analysis of name- 
theology in the Bible (first chapter) and in some Patristic traditions (Greek and 
Syriac) together with some references to the late Byzantine period (second 
chapter). A common feature of these two works is that owing to the agenda of 
the investigations, the question of language is touched upon very briefly. 
Special attention should be paid to some modern papers that treat the 
problem of language in relation to a particular Patristic author. J. Danielou's31 
article on the background of the issues of language touched upon in the course 
28 e. g. R. Hirzel, Der Name. Ein Beitrag zu seiner Geschichte im Altertum und besonders bei den 
Griechen (Leipz. 1918); B. Jacob, Im Namen Gottes. Eine sprachliche und religions geshichtl. 
Unersuchung z. Alten und Neuen Testament (Berlin 1903); J. Böhmer, Das biblische "im Namen". 
Eine sprachwissenschaftliche Untersuchung über das hebräische beschem und seine griechischen 
Äquivalente (Giessen 1898); F. Giesebrecht, Die alttestamentliche Schätzung des Gottesnamens und 
ihre religionsgeschichtliche Grundlage (Köningsberg 1901); W. Heimüller, Im Namen Jesu. Eine 
sprach- und. Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zum Neuen Testament, speziell zur altchristlichen 
Taufe (Götting 1903). 
I. Hausherr, The name of Jesus. The names of Jesus used by early Christians. The development of the 
'Jesus prayer' Cistercian Studies 44 (Kalamazoo, Michigan 1978). 
30 H. Alfeyev, op. cit. -'The Holy Mystery of the Church' (in Russian). 
31 j. Danidlou, Eunome l'Arien, pp. 412-432. 
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of the Eunomian controversy is still of great value. Mainly focused on Gregory 
and Eunomius, J. Danielou's paper deals with numerous issues in both the 
Patristic comprehension of language and Neo-Platonic theories derived from 
the doctrines of Proclus and Iamblichus. In the final chapter of the thesis I shall 
return more specifically to some of J. Danielou's ideas. What should be pointed 
out here is the fact that his article has determined further studies of the subject 
for almost thirty years and strongly influenced, for example, the investigations 
of Th. Kopecek, R. Mortley, B. Sesboüe, etc. 
But at present the most satisfactory treatment of the philosophy of 
language in the Greek Fathers was given by B. Salmona in his extensive article 
on Gregory of Nyssa32 and by D. Robertson in his recent thesis, where he 
compares Stoic linguistic interests with what appears in Basil of Caesarea. B. 
Salmina has attempted to examine all the major works of Gregory that deal 
with language: in his extensive article he sets out the philosophical and 
ontological implications of Gregory's thought in the context of the opposition 
between human and divine nature; his scope is impressive. In my section on 
Gregory's Contra Eunomium I rely on the results of his analysisTM. 
The work of D. Robertson is of special interest for our purposes as well. 
The main aim of his thesis is to argue that 'Patristics is relevant to contemporary 
philosophical concerns, on account of the Patristic preoccupation with linguistic 
32B. Salmona, Ontologia e logica il tema del linguaggio in Gregorio di Nissa. in Il linguaggio nella 
patristica. " Gregorio di Nissa e Agostino (Tilgher, Genova 1995), pp. 9-58. 
33B. Salmon, op. cit., pp. 10-29. 
34B. Salmona, op. cit., pp. 29-56. 
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matters'35. His approach to the subject consists mainly of limited investigations 
of narrow philological issues. He shows how Greek learning was relevant to 
linguistic concerns in Basil, but as he concentrates on the Stoics, regards Basil in 
a rather partial way. In the course of my own studies, the research of D. 
Robertson was of substantial help and interest. He significantly clarifies the 
question of Basil's philological background. In the first and fourth chapters of 
his dissertation (entitled 'Proper Names' and 'Language and Thought' 
respectively) D. Roberson treats Basil too briefly. Nevertheless, a great 
advantage of his research is that he outlines very persuasive arguments for 
Stoic influence; his analysis of Basil's 'linguistic' terminology is very precise. He 
endeavours to show exactly which notions were used by Basil in a strict Stoic 
sense, and where Basil differs from this grammatical tradition. Obviously, D. 
Robertson approaches Basil as a classical scholar. Thus, for example, he regards 
Basil's view of language either per se or in the context of the classical tradition 
(Stoic grammatical science and philological studies of the Neo-Platonist school), 
while for some unclear reason he deliberately leaves aside the theory of 
Eunomius. Although in what follows I shall try to give a distinctive treatment 
of Eunomius' view in order to delineate an exact form of Basil's doctrine of 
names, some results of D. Robertson's studies should be spelled out here. In his 
most successful first chapter, 'Proper Names', he concludes his analysis that 
m D. Robertson, op. cit., p. 4 (of the Introduction). 
36D. Robertson, op. cit., p. 45 n. 25. Although in his comprehension of Eunomius' doctrine he 
relies on J. Danielou and his followers (K. Uthemann and M. Troiano), D. Robertson, has, I 
think, arrived at a very interesting and correct understanding of Basil the Great. 
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Basil's view of the nature of proper names differs from what can be found in the 
Stoic tradition. I have to admit that I am not in a position to estimate adequately 
D. Robertson's further suggestion that 'Basil is an ancient forerunner of the modern 
description theory of names'37, because of my ignorance of J. Searle, H. Putman, S. 
Kirpke, etc. Frankly speaking, my own interests in the matter were originally 
inspired by two Russian books entitled 'Philosophy of Name'39; but I have to 
note that in my opinion, despite the fact that both of these Russian philosophers 
investigated the Eunomian controversy, the final theories of A. Losev and S. 
Bulgakov posed the question in an absolutely different way from that found in 
Greek Patristic writers. 
Turning back to the work of D. Robertson, I should point out that 
although in the course of his research he proposed a number of fresh ideas and 
showed the theory of Basil, as a matter of fact, cannot be reduced to Stoic 
linguistic speculations, he seems to deal with the subject in a preliminary way. I 
believe that in the works of the two Cappadocians we come across not only an 
original teaching (by comparison with the Stoics), but an absolutely new 
doctrine of language, which has no relations to Plato and Aristotle. 
37D. Robertson, op. cit., p. 53. 
38 cf. D. Robertson, op. cit., p. 57 n. 55. The scholar expresses his gratitude to a number of modem 
theorists of the proper name. 
39A. AoceB, (Punocog5un u. & enu (Philosophy of name) (Moscow 1927), npor. C. ByAraKoB, 
CPu. kocoOua umexu (Philosophy of name) (Paris 1953). The latter work of S. Bulgakov was at once 
his last, and as he used to say, 'the most philosophical' work that was, unfortunately, not 
completed. L. Zander undertook a substantial examination of Bulgakov's archive and published 
it in Russian within ten years of the author's death. French translation of C. Andronikoff, S. 
Boulgakov, La Philosophie du Verbe et du Nom (Lausanne 1991). 
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An interesting discussion was opened by J. Dillon's article on Origen's 
comprehension of language and divine names40. I have found that his main 
point about the deep Platonic influence on Origen is in every respect correct; in 
what follows, however, I shall demonstrate that Origen's Platonist position 
becomes even clearer when the matter is considered in the context of the 
Alexandrian theological school that in respect to linguistic speculations seemed 
to follow Philo. At the same time, J. Dillon has ignored a very important aspect 
of Origen's speculations about the divine name 'Jesus' in relation to martyrdom. 
Clearly, this brief overview of the bibliography is not intended to be 
exhaustive or complete; rather, it is conceived as a small addendum to the work 
of G. Hewes41. There are many instances when our problem one way or another 
was touched upon in some monographs and articles42. But since their concern 
with the problem was in some sense secondary, for the sake of focus it does not 
seem reasonable to undertake a special treatment of these works here. 
To sum up, the question of human language in Patristic thought has not 
received an adequate treatment that can satisfy the requirements of modern 
10 J. Dillon, The magical power of names in Origen and Later Platonism in Origeniana Tertia (Rome 
1985). 
41 v. G. Hewes, Language origins: a bibliography (The Hague, Paris 1975). 
42e. g. a monograph of V. Nesmelov, Doctrinal system of Gregory of Nyssa (in Russian) - B. 
HecMeAOB, Aoz. MamutecxaA cucmema c6. l'puzopust Huccxozo (Kazan 1887), whose pioneering 
analysis of the 'linguistic' aspects of the controversy between Gregory of Nyssa and Eunomius 
still remains very valuable. An interesting treatment of the problem can be found in the 
dissertation of A. Meredith, Studies in the Contra Eunomius of Gregory of Nyssa (Oxford, 
unpublished DPhil. 1972), in the comprehensive monograph of Th. Kopecek, A history of Neo- 
Arianism (Cambridge 1979), and in the research of R. Mortley. One should also mention the 
works of R. Vaggione, Eunomius: the extant works (Oxford 1987) = Eunomius' apologies and L. 
Wickham Syntagmation of Aetius the Anomean, JThS, vol. xix, pt. 2,1968 as well as to the articles 
of S. Need, Language, Metaphor, and Chalcedon: a case of theological double vision, HThR 8821995; R. 
Williams, Te logic of Arianism, JThS, vol. xxxiv, pt. 1,1983. 
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scholarship. To all appearances, a number of the issues of language were 
investigated, but there is still room for a systematic examination of the problem 
in order to fill some gaps and to suggest a clear idea for a better understanding 
of some allied questions such as the theology of negation, the theology of 
liturgical symbolism, the doctrine of the 'Jesus prayer', etc. 
§ 4. Strategy of the research; some important limitations 
The dissertation begins with an introductory chapter on the background; 
it starts with an analysis of two theories of language proposed by Plato and 
Aristotle. As these issues have already been thoroughly researched, there is 
need to limit our scope. For the purpose of the work our main concern is not 
only to analyse the linguistic doctrines of Plato and Aristotle, but also to 
demonstrate how these two great Classical theories of language were 
understood in the period of Late Antiquity. After the publications of, for 
instance, T. Baxter, D. Charles", M. Larkin, and, finally, S. Everson', the 
principal aspects of these two theories of language are ably clarified. But in my 
examination a special emphasis will be placed upon the comprehension of these 
two theories of language in Christian literature and in the philosophical schools, 
43T. Baxter, The Cratylus: Plato's critique of naming (Leiden 1992). 
" D. Charles, Aristotle on meaning and essence (Oxford 2000). 
4s M. Larkin, Language in the philosophy of Aristotle (The Hague, Paris 1971). 
46S. Everson (ed. ), Language (Cambridge 1994). 
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which were chronologically close to the Patristic writings. It should be pointed 
out that the material is regarded descriptively; therefore, such sources as, for 
example, In Platonis Cratylum commentaria of Proclus and In Aristotelis 
metaphysica commentaria of Alexander Aphrodisiensis are regarded for the sake 
of a relevant comparison that seems to be interesting rather than by way of a 
detailed analysis, which is, of course, beyond our scope. From Clement of 
Alexandria and Origen, Patristic speculations on the nature of language and 
words often refer (sometimes directly) to the works of Plato and Aristotle; but 
their interpretation of the Classical theories of language is very specific, so it 
seems essential for the subject to undertake a limited elaboration of these 
Classical theories. 
In like manner I shall give a brief treatment of two important theories of 
language worked out by the Stoics and the Epicureans. The reason for this is 
clear: Origen, for example, showed a remarkable competence in these theories; 
his response to Celsus contained a special accusation of Epicurean and 
Aristotelian comprehension of names; his own theory, in spite of some 
noticeable influences of the Stoic school, was mainly based on the Cratylus. An 
interesting treatment of the Epicurean and Stoic theories appears in the 
controversy between Eunomius and the Cappadocians, when both sides 
accused each other of using Aristotle's and Epicurean ideas of language, while 
it is only Basil and Gregory who seem to have real knowledge of these theories. 
In addition, the suggestion to give an overview of the Stoic and Epicurean 
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theories of names is conditioned by the fact that chronologically these two 
theories were extremely close to what was finally worked out by Gregory and 
Basil, and undoubtedly impacted some of their purely scientific considerations 
about grammatical matters. 
The problem of Gnostic comprehension of language is the most 
sophisticated topic of the subject that, as I believe, must become a theme of an 
independent and thorough investigation. Taking into account the variety of 
modern opinions about what constituted Gnosticism, I shall not enter the 
dispute at a1147. In relation to our concern, the main problem is caused by the 
fact that there is no more or less stable view on language and names: in the 
corpus of the Nag Hammadi library the matter appears in a very mythological 
form, partly influenced by an ancient intuition that names are imprinted by 
things. 
In their second century apologetic writings, Justin and Irenaeus came 
across somewhat slightly differently: for their Gnostic opponents, names, 
numbers and sounds became in some measure tools for the cognition of divine 
realities, while Origen already faced the Gnostic comprehension of names in a 
totally different way. His theology of martyrdom reflects that in the Gnostic 
47 My general comprehension of Gnosticism, however, is that it was a mysterious and enigmatic 
movement; in spite of some reflection and even the use of philosophical notions, Gnosticism 
was a non-philosophical religious trend. The vast majority of their ideas, including their treatment 
of names and language should not, therefore, be considered as derived from philosophical 
sources. I believe that any rational attempts to explain Gnostic exegetical and theological ideas 
is as futile as an allegorical interpretation of new-'messiahs' Syon Mehn Muhn or Syokoh 
Asakharah between the separation of the ancient Hebrew state and the division between 
Northern and Southern Korea. 
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circles of his time the theological apprehension of name 'Jesus' was what he 
classified as Aristotelism: the name is arbitrarily given, so it is theologically 
ridiculous to die for a name in the course of the persecutions. Therefore, in my 
dissertation this complicated issue is only touched on. I exemplify some 
attractive ideas of the Gnostic impression of language and names by looking at 
the Valentinian school. Marcus' theory of divine names is considered together 
with Irenaeus' argumentation against the Gnostic numerical interpretation of 
names and theological terms. The analysis of Gnostic writings, and Irenaeus' 
reports about them is given briefly. An overview of Valentinian ideas is 
undertaken in order to demonstrate how biblical intuitions of language and 
divine name reflected upon early Christian literature, while Marcus' 
mythological interpretation of names and number is regarded, only for the sake 
of clarity of Irenaeus' points of view. Therefore, instead of discussing the 
general scholarly suggestions about Gnostic movements, I shall only try to 
discover to what extent these ideas affected early Christian opinions. Since my 
main interest will be to represent Irenaeus' refutation of Gnostic teachings, the 
examination tends to regard Gnostic material in the manner it emerges in 
Church literature: Gnostics are regarded as religious-philosophical movements 
that on the one hand endeavoured to adopt some attributes of Christian 
theology, but in general they differed from Christianity considerably. 
In the second chapter of the dissertation the writings of Justin Martyr 
and Irenaeus of Lyon are analysed. An effort will be made to demonstrate that 
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in contrast to Irenaeus, whose interest in language is motivated by his dispute 
with the Gnostics, Justin's remarks about word, its meaning and correctness are 
of a general philosophical character. In spite of a good acquaintance with Plato, 
Justin's ideas about word, title and name are totally different from Platonic 
theory. It seems that Irenaeus showed much more interest in the problem; he 
poses the question philosophically, and gives remarkable definitions of how 
word is produced by the human soul. Overall, Justin and Irenaeus arrive at the same 
conclusion and propose a 'carnal' explanation of the mystery of language: it is 
intriguing that already at this stage of Christian theology the notion of man's 
language was bound up with anthropology. This section of the second chapter 
is to shed more light on what will be found in the theory developed by Basil 
and Gregory. In particular, I shall demonstrate that there are some definite 
structural parallels between the argumentation of Irenaeus against Marcus, and 
the arguments set forth by Gregory against Eunomius'8. 
The third chapter is devoted to the representatives of the Alexandrian 
school: Clement of Alexandria and Origen, and some interesting ideas of 
Eusebius of Caesarea about divine names. The elaboration of the Alexandrian 
school is of a special relevance for the problem. In the first instance, I shall 
demonstrate that their acquaintance with secular theories of language was 
remarkable, but the impact of this philosophy varied. In the section on Clement 
48 In the opinion of the Rev Prof. A. Louth it is likely that both Basil and Gregory were 
acquainted with the writings of Irenaeus; nonetheless, I have avoided the discussion of this 
problem here. 
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of Alexandria I shall argue that notwithstanding the fact that he argues 
enthusiastically for the intellectual, cultural and spiritual priority of the 
'barbarians' and 'barbarian philosophy' (i. e. Hebrews and the Bible) over the 
Greeks, he shows a purely Platonic comprehension of language. Some of his ideas 
reveal his dependence on Philo, who endeavoured to reconcile Plato's teaching 
about the name-maker and the Pentateuchal narration on Adam naming the 
creatures. 
Origen's understanding of names was already touched upon by J. 
Danielou, H. Crouzel (in his monograph on Origen) and J. Dillon in the above- 
mentioned article on the magical power of names. Origen is an interesting 
instance in every respect. His general comprehension of the problem is still 
close to Clement: his view of language is certainly a variant of 4üvic-theory, 
but unlike Clement, who merely appeals to the Cratylus, Origen. proposed a 
much better settled theory. He posed such questions as the existence of a 
primordial tongue, the further development of human dialects, the adequacy of 
Greek and Latin name and prayers in comparison with Hebrew, and finally 
bound up his views on language with eschatological issues. In this section I 
shall mainly focus on his Contra Celsum. Origen was certainly at variance with 
Philo and Clement; I shall try to show that unlike them, his theory of language 
was influenced not by Plato, but mainly by Stoic philological science as already 
pointed out by B. Neuschäfer. Origen's studies of languages strongly reflected 
his theological views. 
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The agenda of the fourth chapter on Aetius, Eunomius, Basil of Caesarea 
and Gregory of Nyssa is determined by the recent monograph of R. Vaggione49. 
In the section dedicated to Aetius I will discuss some ideas of J. Danielou and R. 
Mortley that were not touched upon by R. Vaggione. My main point will be that 
the so called Anomean theory of names emerged in Aetius Syntagmation in a 
determinable form, and Eunomius did not modify the doctrine of his master 
substantially, but just applied force to its exposition. In my reconstruction of 
Aetius' theory I will question one of the most settled opinions about the 
comprehension of phoneme; my point will be that in the syllogisms of the 
Syntagmation, Aetius puts forward a very special (or more precisely, strange) 
linguistic model when name becomes a vehicle of meaning regardless of 
phoneme; the emphasis is laid on its semantic content. My analysis of the 
Syntagmation will be based on logic. I shall argue that in the Syntagmation one 
can hardly find elements of Neo-Platonic doctrine as J. Danielou, Th. Kopecek, 
and R. Mortley supposed. Finally, I point to the fact that Aetius' view of names 
and human epinoia follow from his main methodological standpoint that is 
based on logical truth. Eunomius' elaboration of the theory was predominantly 
an attempt to find support in biblical texts. His theory of names is just an 
elaboration of the Syntagmation without a substantial philosophical 
contribution. In the course of analysis I shall try to examine a number of 
questions: to what extent Anomean theory is directly derived from Plato's 
49 R. Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus. The Nicene revolution (Oxford 2000). 
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Cratylus, and what role the Anomean theory of naming played in the general 
way of argumentation. Overall, I shall argue that in the case of the Anomean 
theory, traditional references to Platonism or Aristotelism should be 
substantially reconsidered. As a result, I will propose to pay more attention to 
some definite parallels between the treatment of names in Gnosticism, and 
Eunomius' explanation of the divine name agennetos. 
Next, our analysis will shift to Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa. 
Although traditional studies of the Contra Eunomium on this account 
satisfactorily represent the Cappadocian theory that was set off against 
Eunomius, there are still many questions that remain open; in comparison with 
Gregory of Nyssa, Basil's Adversus Eunomium was overlooked. I will pay special 
attention to Basil's treatise, and reconsider some of Gregory's themes in order to 
clarify Gregory's real contribution to the problem, and what was inherited by 
him from Basil. At the same time, my idea is to organise the material in a more 
comprehensive way. Basil's view on linguistic issues was often analysed 
regardless of Eunomius' theory. Ph. Rousseau, for example, in his fourth 
chapter titled 'Eunomius' begins with a declaration that he has 'tried to avoid 
turning this account into a treatment of Eunomius himself 50; D. Robertson follows the 
same way51; his remarks about Eunomius' theory are deeply influenced by J. 
Danielou. In the dissertation I propose to distinguish Aetius' Syntagmation and 
Eunomius' first Apology, and to scrutinise them by comparison with Basil's 
50 v. Ph. Rousseau, Basil of Caesarea (Oxford 1994), p. 106 n. 35. 
51 D. Robertson, op. cit., p. 45 n. 25. 
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Adversus Eunomium; then, I shall turn to the three books of Eunomius' Apologia 
Apologiae and the Contra Eunomium, where the Greek Patristic view of human 
language is perfectly spelled out. 
The conclusion of the dissertation summarises all aspects of the Patristic 
philosophy of language. The central point will be to show that the Fathers of the 
Church stress an anthropological comprehension of the matter. Moreover, the 
Christian view of the nature of language appears as a relatively new suggestion, 
so one cannot agree that in the Hellenistic period the Stoics and Epicurus were 
the last philosophers who paid attention to the philosophical aspects of 
language, while the linguistic studies that followed were, par excellence, 
dedicated to grammar without any interest in philosophy52. Although some of 
these anthropological motifs were already observed in Classical (e. g. Aristotle) 
and Hellenistic philosophy (e. g. Epicurus), the Patristic comprehension of language 
treats human agency as a central factor in the origin, formation and development of 
language. At the same time, the Patristic theory of language is shown to be 
foreign to any kind of oversimplification: human tongues remain an important 
characteristic feature of man's nature, the power of speech is a result of the 
power of thought. One should speak of language as a mystery, but the 
enigmatic nature of language is caused by the inscrutability of man's 
intellectual action. To demonstrate it, I shall give a brief overview of some later 
opinions about the nature of language in order to illustrate that in the 
u As, for example, I. Perelmuter thinks -14. flepeAbMyTep, (Pu)OCOOcxue uwxoAa 9AAWOM. a, in 
HAY: 4pe'mM gyp, pp. 156-179, esp. p. 207. 
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theological development that followed, the idea of the mystery of language was 
well grasped. 
Chapter I: Classical philosophy on the nature of language 
Amongst the many doctrinal and philosophical issues that emerged in 
the Patristic theology of divine names, there is one which is seen as 
fundamental and which will, therefore, be specially treated in this section. 
Whatever the concept of divine names is conceived to be, it inevitably raises the 
question about human language, its origin, nature, etc. In the focus of ancient 
thought it emerged as the question of names - the notional units of human 
speech. It is the theories of names, which happened to be an important element 
of what we now call ancient theories of language developed from Pythagoras53 
to John of DamascusM. Inasmuch as this problem always enjoyed significant 
popularity in classical Greek and later Hellenistic philosophy, an examination 
of some major Greek theories of language seems to be essential. 
-9 Proclus, In Platonis Cratylum commentaria, 16: 1- 22. (ed. G. Pasquali, Procli Diadochi in Platonis 
Cratylum commentaria (Leipzig 1908) pp. 1-113). 
S4 Joannes Damascene, Dialectica sive Capita philosophica, 571. ti -11(recensio fusior), ed. B. 
Kotter, Die Schriften des Johannes von Damastlaos, vol. i in Patristische Texte und Studien 7 (Berlin 
1969), pp. 47-95,101-142. 
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This section, therefore, is devoted to an account of the Greek linguistic 
theories, each of which happened to be touched upon by some theologians of 
the ancient Church: either by themselves or by their opponents. Another 
question concerns the nature, origins, and epistemological value of human 
speech, and it was in the focus of the classic philosophy and the scholarship of 
the late antiquity. Since the time of Homer and Hesiod, almost all significant 
philosophers treated these problems. However, in the limits of this chapter it is 
impossible to give a comprehensive picture of the rise and development of the 
Greek philosophy of language; moreover, it is the authority of a different 
discipline called history of linguistics. It seems more reasonable to focus on 
several theories the importance and significance of which is beyond question. 
This will allow us to identify and accentuate only those hypotheses and 
teachings, which were the most influential and which were often used and 
abused in the course of doctrinal controversies and discussions. 
" One of the recent bibliographies on the history of linguistics v. Baxter, T. 
The Cratylus: Plato's 
critique of naming (Leiden 1992), p. 191ff. 
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1.1 Plato and his elaboration of the (bvatc-theory 
Historically, the beginnings of philosophical theories of language are 
associated with Plato and two linguistic concepts treated in the Cratylus56. 
Although this viewpoint per se is sufficiently controversial, this dialogue is 
simultaneously a resume of all preceding Pre-Socratic speculations on the 
nature, origin, and theory of language, and in a sense a programme for the 
concepts that followed. As a matter of fact, the later theories, for example, the 
conventionalist theory of Aristotle, the theories of the Stoics, Middle and Neo- 
Platonists views on language, in many respects repeated, followed and 
developed this original opposition of hypotheses spelled out by Plato. In what 
follows, I shall try to examine only major antique philosophical concepts of 
language; our main purpose in this section is to give a brief outline of the 
selected theories. Inevitably, some important methods and contemporary 
opinions adopted by modern scholars will be omitted. Taking into account our 
main concern, the focus of our interest here is not on an account of the modern 
interpretation of Plato's Cratylus, but on the understanding of how ancient 
theories were understood in the epoch of the Fathers and their opponents. 
Special attention, therefore, will be paid to the later commentaries, such as the 
% Thus, Cratylus is a traditional reference point in e. g R. Robins, Ancient & Mediaeval grammatical 
theory in Europe (London 1951), A short history of linguistics (London 1%7), and S. Everson (ed. ), 
Language (Cambridge 1994). 
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works of Proclus, which seems to be more helpful in our case, rather than a 
multitude of modern interpretations and hypotheses. 
I. 1.1 An attempt of dialectical balance 
One might ask why Plato devoted a special treatise to the problems of 
linguistic theory and philosophy of language, and attached a large quantity of 
naive 'etymologies', when he was neither rhapsode nor grammarian. 
Furthermore, why is it that in spite of the fact that the Cratylus is the only 
treatise where the problem of language appears at length, Plato has not 
managed to spell out his own teaching and left for both ancient and modern 
readers various possibilities for speculation and interpretation? Evidently, these 
are difficult questions. In the opinion of a Russian scholar, who seems to 
reinterpret and define more exactly the suggestion of Proclus57, the Cratylus is 
an illustration of Plato's enthusiasm for one of the most controversial 
philosophical issues of all - the interrelation between the human thought 
process and objective reality: 
'... having postulated the world of Forms, Plato was faced 
with the great difficulty and partly incoherence of what 
goes on in the subjective consciousness and thinking of the 
human being. It seems that Plato wanted to analyse all this 
mess and confusion. The world of Forms remained 
everlastingly well-organised... after looking for some kind 
v Proclus, op. cit., 1; 1 - 2; 13; 2; 2540- 
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of stable formation in the human consciousness, Plato was 
faced with the problem of name, because some sort of 
distinctness and some sort of nexus with objective reality is 
fixed in every name... 'm 
Thus, Plato turned to the problem of names and scrutinised two linguistic 
theories: the first (ultra-conventionalism) was developed by sophists; the 
second (ultra-naturalism) was suggested by a representative of the Heraclitean 
School. Remarkably, neither of these theories was fully shared by Plato himself, 
although he is traditionally associated with qi nc-theory; as will be illustrated, 
this point needs to be specified. As is typical of his dialogues, Plato was so 
involved in critique that instead of putting forward his own theory, he just left 
many occasional remarks, comments and gibes. 
Taken in the context of the general development of Plato's 
philosophising, the Cratylus is strongly associated with the epistemology put 
forward in the Theaetetus59: in the latter Plato scrutinises the nature of 
knowledge and outlines his own concept of cognition, whereas in the former he 
tries to find the nature of being, to establish a philosophical nexus or dialectical 
transition from epistemology to ontology. In the Cratylus he raises the question 
of names in human language, whether they are ontological manifestations of 
things, or mere conventions. Plato gingerly experiments with these complicated 
issues (this uncertainty might be a reason for the seeming inconsistency) and 
puts his thoughts into the mouth of Socrates. 
A. Aoces, Kpumu+tecxue Ja. evaHuR rc auaAozy KpamuA in Claamon (Moscow 1999), vol. 1. p. 830. 
A. Aocea, Chepuu anmu+cwwzo cun(eoAu. a u)4Uoawzuu (Moscow 1993), pp. 410-417. 
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The participants in the discussion are not random: before meeting 
Socrates, Plato used to be a disciple of Cratylus and then devoted to him the 
dialogue60, which is conceived as a critical examination of the doctrines of both 
his previous teacher and his opponents. As J. Barnes rightly points out, there 
are two major problems involved in the discourse: 'the first question concerns the 
origins of language', while 'the second concerns the relation between language and the 
world-'61. In the context of what was noticed above, it would be more preferable 
to consider these issues in reverse order: the latter problem is, in fact, the 
question of inference from epistemology (given in the Theaetetus) to ontology. 
Compared with the Theaetetus, Plato evolves his theory in the reverse direction. 
His intention is to consider the ontological relationship between the nature of 
things and their verbal manifestation; the problem of the origin of words or - as 
Greek classical thought preferred to call them -'names', was merely an attempt 
to indicate which of the possible concepts worked better for the basic premise. 
§ 1.1.2 Hermogenes and ultra-conventionalism 
The theory proposed by Hermogenes is to a certain extent the least 
sophisticated, by contrast with the other participants. Thus, he holds the view 
60 Olympiodorus, In Platonis Alcibiadem commentarii, 11,86f (ed. L. Westerink, Olympiodorus: 
Commentary on the first Alcibiades of Plato (Amsterdam 1956). Aristoteles, Metaphysica, 9870 29f 
(ed. W. Ross, Aristotle's metaphysics, 2 vols (Oxford 1953)). 
61 J. Barnes, The Presocratic philosophers (London 1982), p. 466f. 
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that there is no correlation between name and essence of thing - names are the 
result of 'convention and agreement' and whatever we decide to give each 
particular thing is its name. Thus, if we give a name to thing A and 'agree' that 
it is its name, it will be a correct one (e. g. A); further, we are free to give up the 
name A and change it for the name B (cf. 384d2-6: an example with servants), 
the name B will no be less 'correct' than the previous A. In fact, the very notion 
of correctness of names, which plays so significant a role in the discourse of both 
Cratylus and Socrates, emerged as irrelevant for Hermogenes - he prefers to 
accentuate the legislation: 
'... and (I) cannot come to the conclusion that there is any 
correctness of names (Tic 6QO6Tfc 6v6patoS) other than 
convention and agreement (auvOrjxrj xai OpoAoyia). [... ] 
For I think no name belongs to any particular thing by 
nature (Of) yäp ciQ¬i EKäQTW rc& wiEVat ovopa), but only 
by the habit and custom of those who employed it and who 
established the usage (ämä vöpm Kai E6¬i TWV E6ia0[vT(&)v 
TE Kai. KaAoÜTCJV)'. 
384d62 
Obviously, this ultra-conventionism concerning the origins and usage of 
words is an inference from a major premise, viz. absolute linguistic 
subjectivism, which, apparently, was the most popular theory amongst 
62 Irans. of H. N. Fowler from Crahlius, Parnn'nides, Greater Hiphias; Lesser Hippias, The Loeb 
classical library, 167 (Cambridge Mass. 1992). 
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sophists63, which Plato indicates by reference to the famous preamble of 
Protagoras. Reluctantly supported by Hermogenes, the conventional theory of 
origins of names is presented in an odd and caricatured form. The impression is 
given that Plato intentionally exaggerates the teaching of his opponents (i. e. 
Democritus and the sophists) and turns it into an easy target for the all- 
knowing Socrates: if names are arbitrarily attached to things and the 
'legislation' is of totally subjective matter and absolutely irrelevant to things 
(either cibos, cix()v, or (ýiais), every name can be attached to any thing. 
Socrates destroys this rigmarole very quickly: absolute convention leads to 
63 This subjective theory of names can by no means be attached to the real Hermogenes. In fact, 
Plato puts into his mouth teachings, which in the early days appeared in Greek philosophy (cf. 
J. Gosling, Plato (London 1973), p. 200ff). T. Baxter (The Cratylus: Plato's critique of naming, 
Philosophia antique (Leiden, New York 1992), p. 17) has indicated Hermogenes' diffidence and 
vacillation as if he is forced to support this nonsensical teaching. Some embryo of this teaching 
must be seen in Xenophanes of Colophon and his sceptical attitude to the Homeric 'language of 
the gods' (v. fr. B 14: and his denial of J)wvrj of the gods). Next, his disciple Parmenides 
followed Xenophanes in many respects (fr. A19); thus, he was also extremely sceptical about 
human cognitive capacities (B 6). Of special importance is the suggestion of J. Barnes (loc. cit. ) 
who argues for Democritus' contribution to the sophists' linguistic theory. It is highly likely that 
the real adversary of Plato here is Democritus, rather then Hermogenes brother of Kallias 
(Theaet., 164e7). Moreover, Hermogenes could hardly belong to the sophists (cf. Xenophon, 
Memorabilia, IV 8; 10 1.8f.; Symposium, 8; 31.2f). Plato's aversion towards Democritus is well 
known, but this assumption is based on other reasons. Democritus was famous for his linguistic 
studies (A 33: some 'philological' works of Democritus, which, unfortunately have not 
survived: II, - i evOp ov Kai bQpovir1S, FIEQi rtoirjrioq, U¬Q. Kcc Aowvflc E7tFwv, IIEpi 
eü([)cL)vwv xai bvor(*vwv ypap 1ätwv, HEQi Oµrjpov 1j 0QO0E7TEIIJS Kai yAwouEwv, FIEQi 
äoibýs, FIEQi OrIpä v, 'OvoµaaT1Kwv. HEQI. 'rwv Ev Baßvllwvi i¬pwv ypappätwv, FIEQi 
xaAAoUVvilc irrr wv. Nevertheless, we can partly render his account of language from B5 and B 
26. Undoubtedly, Democritus puts forward a conventional theory of language and, long before 
Aristotle, he proposed four epicheiremas; Democritus suggests that initially people started to 
discern 'r67toL (A 5 1.45: marks, letters, syllables), gradually they 'established [verbal] symbols of 
each thing' (TLO vTac wpßoAa rtrpi txäaTOV Twv 07coKE1 vwv), and finally reached 
articulate speech. Nonetheless, Democritus did not run to extremes with epistemological 
conclusions; unlike the sophists or the caricatured Hermogenes, he did not hold the teaching 
about absolute arbitrariness of names. His idea of analogy between atom and letter is also of 
special importance; Democritus conceived his atoms as small letters, and this had a crucial 
significance for his ontology - the being is said to be made from the elements (Tä aToiXein) as a 
manuscript is made from the letters (TCi QTOLXEiO - v. Motes, A. 11cmopuA axmu'eHou acmemuxu: 
PaHHAA i. ". +ac"cuxa (Moscow 1963) p. 271. 
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absolute inconsistency, when it will be impossible to tell man from horse, 
because if there is no distinction and everything is conventional -6 Aoyoc 
äA-gOrjc and 6 AöyoS iýwvbrjs (385a9ff) are the same. 
A commentary on this passage made by Proclus is of interest; he points 
to the self-contradiction of the third conventionalist epicheirema (on the 
metathesis of names); 
'The discourse of Hermogenes (384d) is the following: if 
there is a metathesis of names, the names exist by 
convention and are symbols of things; but the former [is 
correct], therefore the second is also [correct]. But Proclus' 
discourse is following: if names-symbols of things exist by 
convention, the metathesis of names is pointless; but the 
former [is correct], therefore the second is also [correct]. He 
[Proclus] adds to the first scheme [a following conclusion]: 
if the metathesis of names exists, therefore, the metathesis 
of names does not exist. '64 
As a matter of fact, the naturalist-conventionalist dispute is an inference 
from a major philosophical problem: whether the essence of a thing (oi aia) is 
what it seems to us, or is in some way everlastingly fixed and independent of 
subjective opinion (386a). Hermogenes argues for the former: inasmuch as 
essence does not exist objectively, but is just what it seems to man, the name of 
a thing can by no means be related to essence; therefore, there is no objective 
regulation (vöµoc) for naming. 
There is no need here to scrutinise this position thoroughly for one main 
reason: the view of Hermogenes is sufficiently far from what the real 
conventional theory was believed to be, and which will be specially treated by 
M I'roclus, op. cit., 30; 1-9. (my transl. ) 
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Aristotle. Let us leave this viewpoint for a while and turn to the much more 
important issues touched upon in the dialogue. 
1.1.3 Naturalist theory of names 
A striking feature of Cratylus' discourse is the objectivist cüaic-theory, 
which has important applications for both ontology and the theory of naming. 
Proceeding from the Heraclitean doctrine of flux and esp. Logos - the objective 
principle of order in the world - Cratylus understands the nature of things as 
something unstable in its everlasting coming-to-be. Cratylus differs from 
Hermogenes in insisting that the substances of things do exist objectively. As 
Socrates puts it, 
'it is clear that things have some fixed reality of their own, 
not in relation to us nor caused by us; they do not vary, 
swaying one way and another in accordance with our 
fancy, but exist of themselves in relation to their own reality 
imposed by nature'65 
386d9-e4 
Philosophically, Cratylus denied the radical subjectivist doctrine of 
Hermogenes that essence is nothing but our fantasies. His point is that names 
are basic features of the existence of things: name in all the complexity of its 
manifestation is assigned by the nature of things. 
65 S11Aov bT ÖTt (WTA CiVTWV OUQILYV FXOVTLt TLV(t ß£ß(XtÖV wit TA 7TQ6ty ctTct, oü rtpöc 1jµhc 
Olýýt i)4)' týpco\' £AKÖp£VR c1VUl KCYI KCXTW T(p TflL£T£QW CYVTLYOf1LYTl, c AAct KLYe QL)TQ 71QOC TIJV 
cYIUT(JV OLU(Tlct\' t XOVTCi 1ý7tEQ Tt£(PL)Ku\'. 
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'Cratylus, whom you see here, Socrates, says that 
everything has a right name of its own, which comes by 
nature ((Ota¬i rcEq)vxuLacv)' 
383a4f 
Again, Plato could not resist caricature, and ascribed absurd remarks to 
Cratylus. In spite of the radical reformulation of method and task, Socrates 
mostly shares this naturalistic hypothesis, and devoted great energy to an 
examination of Hermogenes' theory. 
In the first instance, Socrates explores the question of what essence is. He 
holds that the essence of a thing is wholly objective, independent of what it 
seems to us, and is Tiva (3E(3ai0Ta 'rric of aiaS - 'some stable foundation of their 
own'. Next, Socrates stresses that a thing is ontologically bound up with its 
essence: we cannot cut or burn a thing without having an account of its nature 
and the nature of its action: 
'Then in naming also, if we are to be consistent with our 
previous conclusions, we cannot follow our own will, but 
the way and the instrument which the nature of things 
prescribes must be employed, must they not? And if we 
pursue this course we shall be successful in our naming, 
but otherwise we shall fail' 
387d4ff 
It is by revealing the fundamental features of Plato's teaching on essence that 
we can come to understand his numerous auxiliary ideas; oddly enough, these 
auxiliary ideas did not sink into oblivion, but appeared in a slightly 
transformed but nevertheless recognisable form in the Patristic epoch. 
Although these issues are not important for understanding the dialogue, there 
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is a need to give an account of some, such as the idea of lawgiver, the notion of 
the divine language, and the class of words which is borrowed by men from this 
language. 
1.1.4 The concept of name-maker 
Inasmuch as naming comes to be according to the law it is only the 
lawgiver (voµoOeuis; b'9µ1ovQyös) who was originally the name-maker 
(ovopa-tovQ-yö(; ). This name-maker viewed and knew the eidos of a thing and, 
accordingly, attached a name (389ff); this is how the question about the origin 
of the phoneme is solved: 
'Then, my dear friend, must not the lawgiver also know 
how to embody in the sounds and syllables that name 
which is fitted by nature for each object? Must he not make 
and give all his names with his eye fixed upon the absolute 
or ideal name, if he is to be an authoritative giver of names? 
And if different lawgivers do not embody it in the same 
syllables, we must not forget this ideal name on that 
account; for different smiths do not embody the form in the 
same iron... ' 
89d4ff 
Hence, Plato has solved two problems: the origins of the phonetic aspect 
of name and the genesis of non-Greek languages. But if a human language was 
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invented by a man of outstanding intellectual capacities66who apprehended the 
(ýi tc of things, and incorporated this knowledge in syllables and sound, how 
is it possible for there to be: 
a) homonymy, when two different things are designated by one name 
b) synonymy, when one thing in one language has several names 
c) renaming or metathesis of names, when e. g. Aristocles became Plato (cf. the 
jokes about the name Hermogenes) 
d) the 'semantic' argument: if names are attached by nature, the principium 
'monosemantic verb and noun have to be of the same stem' e. g. 4)eovi ci¬wc - 
cppovciv must work without fail. But there is no similarly-formed verb 
for the noun b1xauOo1 vT1c67. 
66Again, this idea does not belong to Plato. In Heraclitean-style philosophy not only linguistic 
or epistemological intuitions, but also the criterion of truth is said to be a prerogative of the 
super-intellectual man (e. g. driven or enlightened by the Logos). Moreover, this concept is 
sufficiently related to the Homeric epistemology of divinely elected individuals - v., for 
example, E. Hussey, The beginning of epistemology: from Homer to Philolaus in S. Everson (ed. ), 
Epistemology (Cambridge, 1990). Proclus (In Platonis Cratylum commentaria, 161.1ff) makes 
interesting mention of Pythagoras, who is bracketed with the proponents of Cratylus. Thus, 
Pythagoras attributes names to the sphere of the human soul (t oxi ), while intellect (voüc) 
concerns eide and numbers. The soul perpetually imitates intellect and generates names, which 
are, thereby, imitations of the eide of things (which are in the sphere of intellect). Proclus 
concludes: 'Actually, Pythagoras said the name-maker (övoµa rovpyöc) cannot be arbitrary, but 
he must have insight with his intellect into the nature of things that exist ('v (Püviv tv 
övcwv). So, names [are given] by nature (4)üoet c pa r& c vöµatta)'. 
67 In fact, these are four inLXeiQ1l. ata of Democritus set against proponents of the 4)üaL-theory 
(Proclus, loc. cit. );. T. Baxter is right when he argues that there are suggestive parallels between 
some fragments of Democritus and the Cratylus (: bid., p. 157). Moreover, the suggestion that 
Democritus was the main but unspoken opponent of Plato and his dialectical statements to a 
great extent explains the inner logic and the composition of 391 - 429. 
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1.1.5 Divine language and human language 
It is not difficult to see that the major section of the dialogue (the 
discourse of Socrates on the 'correctness of names') is inter alia an attempt to 
resolve these four problems. Socrates notices one intriguing aspect of Homeric 
intuition of language and knowledge, which in scholarly jargon is called the 
dionumia and mononumia68 phenomenon. This problem is associated with a 
number of passages from the Iliad, when the author gives two names for one 
thing: one is from the divine language, the second is from human language 
(dionumia)69 or, in the Odyssey, one name only, from the divine language 
(mononumia)70. 
There are at least two important issues that should be specially treated 
here. First, it is a very old idea that language is of divine origin (cf. deus ex 
machina-joke of Socrates 425d6f). Second, it is an old belief that the gods have a 
language of their own, which is as different from the human language as Greek 
is different from the barbarian languages. The very notion that human language 
is the gift of the gods exists in almost all world mythological systems" and can 
by no means be regarded as exclusively Greek. Admittedly, in the Greek 
68 v. J. Clay, The Planktai and Moly: divine naming and knowing in Homer, Hermes 100 (1972), p. 
131. 
69 See a fuller list of these examples in the M. West, Theogony comm. (Oxford 1966) ad 831, p. 
378ff. It should also be noted that modern scholarship cannot explain this Homeric 
phenomenon - cf. G. Kirk, The Iliad: a comm., vol. 1., p. 
94ff (Cambridge 1993). 
70 v. a very important and full-length analysis of Proclus on the speech of Socrates (391d-e) 
concerning divine names: op. cit., 71. 
n z'. an old but valuable article of W. Allen, Ancient ideas on the origin and 
development of language, 
Transactions of the Philological society, (1948), p. 37. 
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religion Hermes72 was the deviser (and interpreter) of language and speech, but 
what the disputants are observing in the old epic poems is noticeably a later 
view, or to be more precise, a conglomerate of views. Socrates dismisses the 
Hermes-myth as naive, but, nevertheless, poses the question: what does this 
Homeric view of language mean? What is the philosophical explanation of the 
distinction between divine and human language? For modern scholarship, the 
question of the origins of, and reasons for, this belief remain very problematic73, 
but the situation over the former question does not seem to be that hopeless. 
Remarkably, the results of J. Clay's analysis of mononumia-phenomenon in the 
Odyssey are in agreement with the main point of Socrates and Proclus74. J. Clay 
thinks that what Homer seems to suggest with his distinction between the 
language of the gods and the human language is that: 
'the gods possess a language fuller and richer than the speech of 
mortals and clearly indicates a sharp boundary between what 
men and gods can know'75. 
If fact, it is exactly what Socrates is arguing for, and, simultaneously, it is 
one of the strongest arguments of Plato that his theory of the correctness of 
names enjoys the support of Homer. The correctness of names (övöµaToc 
6QO0TS) - the measure of correspondence between phoneme and essence or 
'the quality of showing the nature of the things named' (fjTLC ¬vbE1L¬TaL oiöv 
n Orphica, Hynrni, \\v111,1ff. (ed. W. Quandt, Orphei hymni (Berlin 1962)). cf. Hermes with 
his 
Egyptian counterpart Thoth: Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca historica, 1.16.1; 1- 17.5; 8 (ed. 
F. Vogel 
and K. Fischer, Diodori bibliotheca historica, 5 vols. (repr. 
Stuttgart 1964). 
ß M. West, loc. cit. 
74 e. g. Proclus, op. cit., 71; 165-171. 
75 J. Clay, op. cit., p. 131. 
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kTT1 rr6 rcQäyµa 428e2) - is, according to Plato, entirely objective, because there 
is at least a class of names in human language that is borrowed from the divine 
language, where word is the result of the perfect knowledge of the gods. There 
is such a class of names in the human language, which concern the divine: 
'but we are most likely to find the correct name in the 
nature of the eternal and absolute (rc¬ Tä äEi övTa Kai 
7TE(PuKOTa); for there the names ought to have been given 
with the greatest care, and perhaps some of them were 
given by a power more divine (v7cö OEioTEeac buvä 1E wc) 
than that of men' 
397b9ff. 
These divine names are totally correct, whereas human names can vary 
depending on the extent of their 'correctness' and are more or less 'correct'. It 
should be noted that Plato's hypothesis of the correctness of names has resulted 
in three important statements. First, whether the name is 'correct' or not by no 
means depends on its phonetic representation (393bff); rather Plato holds the 
theory that the correctness of names is conditioned by our comprehension or 
interpretation of a thing, i. e. if a man rightly understands the nature of a thing, 
he will call it by a better name than one who does not. This 'interpretative' 
aspect of the notion of correctness is better seen in two passages, which in fact 
contain the core of Plato's concept of a 'divine name': 
'for the name of Zeus is exactly like a sentence; we divide it 
into two parts, and some of us use one part, other the other: 
for some call him Zf va and others Dia; but the two in 
combination express the nature of the god (brlAoi nv 
(Purnv TO O¬ov), which is just what we said a name should 
be able to do'. 
396a2ff 
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Thus, Plato derives the Greek phoneme 'Zeus' from Criv (life) and b' öv 
(through whom this life was given); but this is what he calls the 'second type of 
correctness' (bEOTEpoc TQörcoc öp067To(; ) and the extent of this 'expression of 
the nature' should not be understood as an absolute epistemological 
manifestation of essence, because to be more correct: 
I... since of the gods we know nothing, neither of their 
names, whatever they may be, which they call themselves 
for it is clear that they use the true names. ' 
400d7ff 
Plato holds the theory of two-types-correctness. The first concerns our 
knowledge and is to defend human cognitive capacities from agnosticism; the 
second is given as negation, which saves the notion of divinity from what V. 
Lossky rightly called 'epistemological optimism'. As can often be observed in 
Plato, the discourse culminates in epistemology, and what Plato seems to 
suggest is a dialectical solution of cognisibility and incognasibility76. In a word, 
the principal function of the Platonic divine name - brIAoi 'n v cvaiv 2ov O¬ov 
(396a5f) - does not signify absolute cognition. Rather, name is a vocal imitation 
(µiµrlµa (ýcov11) of thing, and as with any kind of imitation, it can be realised 
76 cf. Proclus, op. cit., 5: '[What Plato intents to show in the Cratylus is that] if it is impossible to 
unite simultaneously knowledge and lack of knowledge (yvCOanv xai äyvotav), it is also 
impossible to unite two types of rhetoric, for one does not know the good (Tä äYaOA), while the 
other does'. - also v. op. cit. 6-8. In M. Crat., 7 Proclus also emphasises that Plato intends to give 
the dialectical theory of name, and points out the connection between the Cratylus and the theory 
of dialectic given in the Parmenides: 'Likewise in the Parmenides, where Plato, describing the 
universal dialectic, did not expose it separately but together with the theory of being (6j"A 
F1£T(( T1f TWV (\'T(JV Ocuyiac 7Lae£b(JK£v), now he explains the theory of the correctness of 
names together with the teaching of the nature of things (µ£u't Trio T(: )V rrpay ATCOV 
F71LaTTjl. t11 )'. 
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with different degrees of success. Therefore, this imitation cannot provide us 
with a perfect knowledge of thing: 
'It will [... ] seem ridiculous that things are made manifest 
(xacräbrlAa yiyvöµ¬va) through imitation in letters and 
syllable' 
Ibid. 
The correctness of names is therefore not merely phonetic imitation, and 
although names imitate things, this imitation is different from what can be 
found in art (music or painting 423d). 
1.1.6 Plato's attack on ultra-naturalist theory 
Having discussed the theory of name-maker and the Homeric doctrine of 
the divine and human language, the disputants, viz. Cratylus and Socrates 
reach the very core of the naturalist doctrine. They both agree that all names are 
to some certain extant imitations (µiµrjµa) of things, but Cratylus disagrees that 
there can be a different degree of correctness, so that some names will be true, 
while others will be untrue: 
'I think, Socrates, their function is to instruct, and this is the 
simple truth, that he who knows the names knows also the 
things named' 
435d4-6 
To Cratylus all names are correct on account of their correspondence 
with the nature of things; those names which are obviously false or abused, are 
to be classified as 'not names at all'. The name-maker, he considers, was perfect 
or even divine, and his knowledge of the nature of things was undoubtedly 
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perfect. Consequently, the words of the language he provided people with are 
originally perfect, whereas the latest modifications made by men have spoiled 
this perfection. He formulates from this premise a general method of 
philosophical investigation; man can only reach the knowledge of things by 
finding the 'correct name' and considering the nature of any particular thing 
through this name. 
In order to counter these statements, Socrates seems, remarkably, to 
adopt some value suggestions close to the position of Hermogenes. First, he 
argues that imitation, which was the basic principle of how the name-maker 
invented words, on no account designates the perfect representation of essence; 
otherwise, the difference between name and thing would disappear: 
'Surely, Cratylus, the effect produced by the names upon 
the things of which they are the names would be ridiculous, 
if they were to be entirely like them in every respect. For 
everything would be duplicated, and no one could tell in 
any case which was the real thing and which the name. ' 
433d6-11 
Secondly, Plato shows that it is pointless to insist that name can be the 
source of perfect knowledge of essence; otherwise, what could be the source of 
knowledge for the lawgiver, if he was a first inventor of speech? As a result, 
Plato proposes that there is a need to find another criterion of correctness, and 
that it must be foreign to names. Only this criterion can help us tell the 'correct' 
name from the 'incorrect'. 
1.1.7 Philosophy of name as a special case of the general dialectic 
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If names per se cannot be regarded as an adequate source of knowledge, 
what is such a source? If the lawgiver or name-maker received his knowledge 
of things by an immediate inference from the things themselves, we should 
look for the criterion of correctness in the things themselves: 
'How realities are to be learned or discovered is perhaps 
too great a question for you or me to determine; but it is 
worthwhile to have reached even this conclusion, that they 
are to be learned and sought for, not from names, but much 
better through themselves than through names' 
439b4-9 
In what follows, Plato nonetheless tries to give an answer to this 'great 
question'. Before scrutinising names in order to reach knowledge of things, he 
suggests that we formulate what knowledge (TI yvW(7ic) is. Hence, he attacks 
the concept of flux that is used in Heraclitean-style theorising, because to adopt 
the principle of absolute instability in the sphere of epistemology inevitably 
leads to the negation of any kind of knowledge: 
'But we cannot even say that there is any knowledge, if all 
things are changing and nothing remains fixed' 
440a6f. 
This answer is a typical Platonic dialectical conundrum", which, 
however, was left unclear. If the knowledge of things must not be derived from 
names even if they are recognised as images (i ixc')v) of things, but from things 
n A. lloceI3, Ot epKu..., p. 416: A. Losev notes the similarity between the denouement of the 
Cratylus and the Theaetetus 181c - 183c - the dialectic of immobility and motion. 
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themselves, our knowledge to a great extent depends on the mode of being of 
things. What, therefore, is this mode? Plato turns to the notion of the coming-to- 
be of things and examines the cardinal principle of the Heraclitean School - 
universal flux. Although Plato conceives all things as everlastingly coming-to- 
be, he persists in assuming that this coming-to-be is only possible in the 
presence of something that is coming-to-be; this is everlasting stability and 
immutability. Moreover, there must be an immutable aspect of things that exists 
whether it is possible for us either to know or to name them or, which is the 
same, to cause our comprehension of things in this name; otherwise, how we 
can name something that is everlastingly passing away? 
It has been pointed out that Proclus repeatedly underlines the dialectical 
intention of the dialogue and its irreducibility to a simple exposition of the 
language theory. In his opinion, general Platonic dialectic is the key to 
understanding the Cratylus, and as far as can be observed from the fragments 
that have come down to us, Proclus evolves this idea in the course of the first 
sixteen chapters. His main concern is to demonstrate that Plato intends to give a 
dialectical theory of name, and points out the inner dependence between the 
Cratylus and the most fundamental dialectic of FEN and E"T¬QOV given in the 
Parmenides: 
'[Proclus says that] likewise in the Parmenides, where 
Plato, describing the universal dialectic, did not expound it 
separately but together with the theory of being (AAAä 
PET(z T1j'Z T(J\' OVTChv O¬OQL( rrapebc&wKEv), he now 
explains the theory of the correctness of names together 
4 
with the teaching on the nature of things (µ¬Tä Try` T()V 
Tcpay thT(Ov E71ia'ri p q; )178 
'[Proclus says that] that this dialogue (the Cratylus) makes 
us competent in the [theory] of the correctness of names, 
and therefore, that one who intends to become a 
dialectician (TÖV pLMAovTa divas bu&Ex-t1K6v) has to begin 
[his studies] from this theory'79 
One might think that Proclus exaggerates his description of the Cratylus. 
However, the explanation given of Proclus represents an interesting 
interpretation of the final part of the Cratylus, which can be briefly formulated 
as follows. Things have nonfluid, immutable essences, which Plato calls the 
avTO of things (439c-d); This nonfluid essence remains everlastingly the same, 
as opposed to the infinite and numerous attributes (features) of things which 
are undergoing change (440a-e). The immutability of essence is what makes 
possible our knowledge of things, although it would be a grave error either to 
exaggerate its magnitude or to be optimistic about it: the dialectic of yv i nv 
and äyvotav in Proclus op. cit., 5). The conclusion of Proclus therefore, is also 
dialectical; he argues that the opposition between q)vQnc-theory and QuvOT K- 
78 Proclus, op. cit., 7. 
79 Ibid., 6. 
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theory is an artificial imbalance80, and suggests the following dialectical 
solution. 
'Names which have natural origins have also a share of 
convention, and names which are conventional have also a 
partially natural origin; hence one can say that all names 
are natural and all are conventional, and that some are 
natural and some are conventional"' 
What we have to see, therefore, in the Cratylus, is an attempt to give a 
dialectical teaching on names. According to Proclus' interpretation, Plato 
attempts to distinguish phonetic and semantic strata of names and to balance 
two opposite theories of language. It was a first step, which fully explains the 
imperfection of his terminology. 
Indeed, there were quite a few writers amongst Christian theologians 
who were aware of the sophisticated agenda discussed in the Cratylus. A 
traditional association of the (ýiaic-theory with the name of Plato seems to be 
determined by the so called the Seventh letter -a very simple text where the 
natural ontological connexion between name and thing is postulated as 
something that is taken for granted. 
80 v. W. Allen, op. cit., p. 52ff. and his remarks on the similar account of Ammonius, given in his 
In Aristotelis librum de interpretatione commentaries, 28ff. This passage should also be compared 
with Proclus' teaching on the four types modes of the (Ptai(; -theory of names given in op. cit., 17; 
16-23: 'But Socrates states that names exist by nature in to the fourth sense, as being the 
products of a knowledgeable intellect (wc biavoias pv Frcton iovoc Ficyova) and a soul 
endowed with imagination (4)vxrjc (ýavTaCoptvT1c) - not [as generations] of a natural physical 
urge (Kai of, Xi 6QFE. Ewc 4vaLxrjs) - and that in the beginning they were, as far as possible, 
appropriately imposed. And according to the eidos, all names are similar and have one meaning, 
and exist by nature, whereas materially (Kath bF Tjv i"AT1v) they differ from each other and 
exist by convention (K 1i OeaEL ecrriv). Because eidetically (Kath µev ynp Tö eiboc), they 
correspond to things, whilst materially they differ from each other'. 
81 Proclus, op. cit., 12. 
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The above-given analysis demonstrates that the original philosophical 
content of the Cratylus is in every respect much more complex in comparison 
with its depiction in early Christian writings. It seems that as so often when 
parallels can be traced between theological ideas about human language and 
the dialogue, there are only a few Christian authors who appear to have good 
knowledge of its philosophical agenda: Clement, Origen, Eusebius of Caesarea, 
and Gregory of Nyssa. Later on I shall show this reflection more precisely; at 
this stage, I have to mention, however, that the way the Cratylus was 
comprehended and interpreted varied dramatically. For Clement of Alexandria, 
who seems to be the closest follower of Philo, the Cratylus is his sole, principle, 
reliable philosophical source for the treatment of linguistic issues, together with 
the book of Genesis; in the opinion of Gregory of Nyssa the problem of 
language that emerges in the dialogue is posed in a totally wrong way! 
Eusebius clearly distinguished two main theories discussed by the disputants, 
and agreed with the opinion held by Cratylus himself; Gregory, however, 
decisively rejects them both: in his view both propositions were nothing but 
nonsense (i q)AvaQia). 
As the name of Aristotle was often mentioned in relation to his linguistic 
views, let us have a look at his ideas. 
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1.2 Aristotle's 8¬Q«-theory 
Aristotle's account of human language, its form and content, cannot be 
considered as substantially new or independent of other conventional theories 
that existed long before him. However, the contribution of his scientific 
investigations in this area is immense in every respect. First, he has undertaken 
both an elaboration of the conventional theory, and the elimination from it of a 
number of extremes; second, despite his critical attacks on his master, on the 
most fundamental points he strongly depended on him. The significance of the 
proposed theory for ancient scholarship can scarcely be overestimated: suffice 
to mention that the notorious medieval controversy over universals was 
stimulated by the translation by Boethius of the famous Porphyrius' Isagoge to 
the Categoriae. As for the Hellenistic era, Aristotelian investigations into logic, 
rhetoric, and grammar as well as peripatetic philosophy also played a crucial, 
but significantly different role. 
Unlike his master, who left a whole treatise on the problem of the 
interrelationship between names and essences, he did not write a special work 
on this subject. Even though it is not without scholarly controversy, his position 
can nevertheless be satisfactorily reconstructed from numerous passages. The 
aim of this section is to examine Aristotle's conventionalist doctrine, as well as 
certain inferences he made in order to expound his theory of names in the 
context of his general system. It should be noted that Aristotle's theory of 
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names has been substantially clarified since a number of thorough 
investigations have been undertaken from the middle of the twentieth century 
onwards82. In this small section, however, I shall only make a brief sketch of the 
major philosophical issues. 
Inasmuch as the Aristotelian theory of names touches upon his ontology, 
such an important topic as his fundamental disagreement with Plato cannot be 
passed over in silence. In particular, I shall argue that the difference in the 
method of philosophising has had some applications to the formal linguistic 
position of Aristotle and to some of his grammar works, whereas in the most 
essential questions like the ontological aspect of his theory, his teaching on Tö Ti 
ýv ¬ivai of things, a conviction of the adequacy of language, and so forth, he 
shows signs of a Platonic position; and this is why the Aristotelian TÖ TL iv 
¬IVaL later on appreas in such Platonised theologian as Clement. Then, an 
attempt will be made to demonstrate how this dependence on Plato caused 
some difficulties for Aristotle, and was profoundly reflected in his theory of 
names. Finally, I shall make a few remarks about the attitude of some relevant 
later writers to Aristotle's account of names. 
82 c. g. M. Larkin, op. cit.; LI. rlepe. ibMyrep, Apucmomeb, 
HAY: 4peBHHH MHp, pp. 15h-179; D. 
Charles, Aristotle on meaning and essence (Oxford 2000). 
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§ 1.2.1 Aristotle on Platonism. 
The question of the relationship between the systems of Plato and 
Aristotle is a sophisticated one, because any discussion of this issue needs to 
take some account of both theories, each of which may be reasonably 
questioned. Nevertheless, a brief examination of the problem in this section is 
not as arbitrary as one might suppose at first sight; as we shall see shortly, the 
Aristotelian teaching on names has definite ontological implications. Therefore, 
it is fitting that our description of his linguistic account ought to proceed from a 
brief treatment of such a fundamental problem as his disagreement with Plato. 
Aristotle's critique of Plato and his theory of Ideas, and later on essences, 
names etc., can be better understood if we first regard their methodological 
disagreement83. By confining his attention to the method of description, Aristotle 
is often too self-confident and incorrect in his criticism of Plato', whereas the 
latter has not left any apologetic worksI5. 
To begin with, Aristotle's attack on the Platonic theory of Ideas (mainly 
represented in the thirteenth and fourteenth books of the Metaphysica, and in 
83 A. AoceB, Kpumuxa n, kamonu"a y Apucmomeut in Muh, tlucAo, Cyu4nocmt, (Moscow 1994). It 
should be indicated that in this passage I adopt the conceptual accounts given by A. Losev in 
his work Aristotle's critique of Platonism; they are relatively close to what was held later by H. 
Cherniss, and substantially different from that suggested by G. Owen and recently reconsidered 
by G. Fine, in her On Ideas (Oxford 1993). 
84 v. the analysis of their teachings on Number (A. Kloces, ibid., p. 541f. ) and Ideas (Aoces, A. W., 
pp. 541-554) In English scholarship the view that Aristotle purposely misinterprets Plato was 
held by H. Cherniss in his Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and Academy (Baltimore 1944). The 
question whether Aristotle is a reliable interpreter of Plato is arguable; v. an interesting inquiry 
of this dispute made by D. House, Did Aristotle understand Plato? v 
es G. Owen, however, considered the Parmenides as a response of Plato to Aristotle's attack. 
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the short essay De ideis, which has come down to us in substantial fragments 
from the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisiensis86) seems to represent the 
most fundamental disagreement between the disciple and his master. 
Generally, the arguments of Aristotle given in these fragments can be 
conditionally divided into two groups; the first one attacks the Platonic doctrine 
of Ideas as such, whilst the second concerns Ideas in their ontological interplay 
with things or abstract notions87. The following passage is one of the classical 
examples of Aristotle's contention concerning the Platonic theory of Ideas; he 
argues that: 
'... it would seem impossible that substance (i of na) and 
that whose substance it is should exist apart; how, 
therefore, could the Ideas, being the substances of things, 
exist apart (c'oQTE rcc0S äv ai ibeat ovaiat 'rwv 7zeayµäuty 
ovaat Xwwet(; )? ' 
Met. 1079b 36 - 1080a 2m 
Then, Aristotle makes reference to the Phaedo (probably, to 100a-105c), 
which, in his view, demonstrates a self-contradiction of the Platonic concept: 
'In the Phaedo the case is stated in this way, that the Forms 
are causes both of being ('rov ctvat) and of becoming (mU 
yiyv¬uOaL). Yet though the Forms exist, still things do not 
come into being, unless there is something to originate 
movement; and many other things come into being (e. g. a 
house or a ring) of which they say there are no Forms. 
Clearly therefore even the things of which they say there 
86 Alexander, In Aristotelis Metaphysica commentaria, 79.3 - 85.13 (ed. M. Hayduck, 
Alexandri 
Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria in Commentaria in Aristotelem 
Graeca I 
(Berlin 1891): v. the text of the De Ideis in two recensions published 
by G. Fine with her own 
English translation (op. cit., pp. 2- 19). 
87A. Aoces, ibid., p. 553f. 
0 Transl. of W. D. Ross Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford 1928)) 
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are Forms can both be and come into being owing to such 
causes as produce the things just mentioned, and not owing 
to the Forms'. 
Met. 1082a 2ff 
The question of what Aristotle means by these Ideas is the key to 
understanding his attack on Plato. In fact, the Platonic doctrine of Ideas is a 
fundamental constituent of Aristotle's own system; in spite of his seeming 
critique, he does not refute the very notion of Ideas. Thus, for example, he speaks 
6 
about the essences of things and their senses, which by no means depend on 
accidental qualities; furthermore, such fundamental notion of his philosophy as 
the the most Divine Thought (ö OE Lo caToS vov(; )89 is deemed 'the eidos of eide'90 
and sometimes even - 'the location of Ideas'91. Aristotle, as is generally agreed, 
argues that the substance of a thing is inseparable from it: 
Therefore the Forms will be substance. But the same names 
indicate substance in this and in the ideal world (or what 
will be the meaning of saying that there is something apart 
from the particulars - the one over many? ). 
Met. 1079a 28-33. 
But it would be a grave error to share this interpretation of the Platonic 
concept, because the teaching of Plato on the interrelationship between eile and 
things is represented dialectically: Eide participates in things and simultaneously 
89 Met. 1074b 15f: T& bi rzfQt T6v vovv IXeL Ttv&S ä7toQla box cl µkv y&Q etvaL tv (ýatvoptvwv 
OEtö'raTov. 
90 De anima, 432a 1-3: Kai 6 voüc etboc eibwv Kai ý alaOquK eiboc aia6lgT6v. 
(ed. W. Ross, 
Aristotle, De anima (Oxford 1961)). 
91 ibid., 429a 27-28: ... 
xal 6 bf o1 Atyovtcc Ti v 1puxi v elvai tOnov ci&i v. 
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does not. As A. Losev points out, the Aristotelian concept of thing, compared 
with Plato, is manifestly naturalistic and imbalanced: 
For Plato thing and Idea are both distinguished and 
identical; their interplay is conceived as the inference of one 
notion from another and vice versa, i. e. to him thing and 
Idea are equally dialectical categories. According to 
Aristotle, however, thing and Idea are also distinguished 
and identical, but their interplay is conceived as an 
inference of idea from thing92. 
So, it is fitting that for Aristotelian-style philosophising such dialectical 
formulas as we have indicated in the Cratylus (and can be found in the Sophista, 
Timxus, and Parmenides in far better form) should be regarded as foreign, 
because of the difference in the method of philosophising". Logically, and this 
is an important postulate of his edifice, Aristotle proceeds from the principle of 
bivalence, and thereby from the theory of the syllogism with its detailed and 
specifically worked out terminology. Schematically, his reasoning can be 
illustrated as follows: either Idea precedes thing (or notion) and, therefore, is 
ontologically pre-existent of it (he wrongly ascribes this opinion to Plato), or 
thing precedes Idea, as 'primary' substance precedes 'secondary' substance - 
tertium non datur. As a result of the controversy, which M. Heidegger 
somewhere neatly called yLyav'roµaXia 7tEQI S oiciac, Aristotle 
has merely 
misinterpreted the Platonic dialectic of thing and Idea, and ascribed to Plato a 
number of absurdities (e. g. his accusations that the Platonic theory of 
Ideas is 
92 A. Aoces, Aumuurcaü xocaloc u coepeMennax nayxa, in Smmue, Mus, Kocmoc (Moscow 
1993), p. 
468f. 
93 v. J. Evans, Aristotle's concept of dialectic (Cambridge 
1977) pp. 17-30. 
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the synthesis of the Heraclitean concept of flux and Socratic philosophising9'). 
This divergence of approaches of the two philosophers, viz. dialectical and 
logical (apodeictic) has received a defining value in their theories of name. 
1.2.2 Aristotelian doctrine of names 
As language was one of the many subjects which strongly interested 
Aristotle, the question of the nature of names is not just one object amongst 
many of his studies. Also, as was shown by the research of M. Larkin, his 
interest in language is far from being only linguistic; compared with such issues 
as his theory of signification, philosophical proof, judgement, and types of 
reasoning, the role of his philological inquiries is subsidiary. Unlike Plato, 
Aristotle argues against the naturalist theory proposed verbi causa by Cratylus; 
he puts forward some interesting considerations about the 'symbolical' nature 
of human speech. This is from the preamble of the second book of the Organon: 
'Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and 
written words are the symbols of spoken words95. Just as all 
men have not the same writing, so all men have not the 
same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which 
these directly symbolise, are the same for all, as also are 
those things of which our experiences are the images'. 
`4 Met., 1076b 6ff. 
95, VEQTI µFV ()l'ý' TA t \' T1 Cý)(i)\'1ý T(J\' £V Til 
4't'Xlj ýa0ljµciTwv (T1 i 3oýa, xai Tit ypctýöµ£vct T(ý)v 
£V TT1 c)WV1, I. 
5ti 
De interp. 16a 3ff% 
With this straightforward account Aristotle is known as a proponent of the 
conventionalist theory: 
The limitation 'by convention' (re be xa'rä QvvOrjxqv) was 
introduced because nothing is by nature ((ýÜae L) a noun or 
name, for it would become only a symbol (6M ' okav 
yEVr]'rat QvµßoAov); inarticulate sounds (oi äye tarot 
*oq)ot), such as those which brutes produce, are significant, 
yet none of these constitutes a noun9'. 
De interp. 16a 26ff 
Even though the De Interpretatione is conceived as an 'apodeictic' 
investigation, he has in mind the debate taken up by Plato". W. Allen indicates 
that Aristotle manifestly refutes some of fundamental statements of the 
Cratylus99, and notes an interesting parallel between Crat. 388b 13f. and De 
interp. 16b 33 - 17a 2: 
SOCRATES: 'A name is, then, an instrument of teaching and 
separating reality10°'. 
'But while every sentence has meaning, though not as an 
instrument of nature but, as we observed, by convention, 
not all can be called propositionsio''. 
% Transl. of H. Cooke (De interpretation, ed. Minio-Paluello, L. Aristotelis categoriae et liter de 
interpretatione (Oxford 1949), pp. 49-72. 
97cf. De sensu et sensibilibus, 437a 12ff.: ö yäQ Aöyor, atti6c ivtL tS µaetjvean ituoum6r, wv, of) 
ica9' a&r6v a11ä xatä ciu eßrlxös" e& övoµätwv yäQ (7t yKr; vraL, 'n v b' övoµc4Twv i`xaaTov 
ovµßoAbv imm (ed. W. Ross, Aristotle. Parva naturalia (Oxford 1955). 
98 C. Whitaker, Aristotle's De interpretatione: contradiction and dialectic (Oxford 1996), p. 12. 
" W. Allen, op. cit., p. 41. 
100 M. 'Ovoµa dLQa bLbaoxaAuxöv Ti io'rty ÖQyavov Kai bLa KQL ruc6v ij(; oixyiac (NmEQ ueQuk 
Q Toc' 
101 ... fou bt A yoc 
&7tac Riv af AavTucöc, ovx wS 6Qyavov bi, 6M 4)ozceQ eiQrlTal icatä 
auvOt icrly. 
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Furthermore, almost every new assertion that appears in the beginning of the 
De interpretatione is set off against Platonism: names per se, id est while they are 
regarded separately, cannot be either 'correct' or 'incorrect'; the sense appears 
when words are set in a sentence102. Similarly, he argues against 'etymologies' 
as a possible way of attaining the truth, and affirms that not one part of a noun 
(i. e. 'letters') has any meaning apart from a word taken as a whole103. In the 
Ethica Nicomachea he even compares words with money: both came into being 
by convention104, people can easily change (µETa(3aAEiv) the names of things105; 
and Aristotle seems to suggest that this . tETa(3aAeiv will not have a profound 
impact upon our reasoning and discourse. 
In the course of his studies on grammar and rhetoric, Aristotle does not 
show much interest in the crucial problem of the nexus between name and 
thing, for he has a different agenda: the sphere of his scientific investigation is 
with phonetics, theory of parts of speech, syntax, etc. Even though it is not 
without serious errors, his remarks on the various phenomena of language are 
remarkable for his day: he laid the foundations of European linguistics, and 
suggested avenues for further investigation in grammar. This important section 
of Aristotle's teaching on language is nowadays thoroughly scrutinised and we 
'02De interp., 16a 13 -18. 
1° De interp., 16a 20 - 21. 
104 Eth. Nic., 1133a29: Kai btdc To&to Tovvoµa IXtL vöµuaµa, öTn ov 4)6aaL &MA v6p4 M (ed. 
I. Bywater, Aristotelis ethica Nicomachea (Oxford 1962)). 
105 Eth. Nic., loc. cit., 31. 
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ought not to deal with it here106. Our main concern must be with one intriguing 
aspect of his account of human speech, which reveals some inconsistency in his 
a prima facie integral concept. 
As we have just seen, to him, the naturalist hypothesis is totally wrong 
and he categorically rejects it; at the same time, Aristotle's own conventionalist 
position is dissimilar from, and much more sophisticated than, the 'theory' held 
by Hermogenes and demolished by Socrates, i. e. Plato. Hence, for example, 
excluding some passages of the Ethica Nicomachea he did not insist that names of 
things are arbitrarily attached (cf. Crat. 385a), or that we could interchange 'the 
names of man and horse', and so on - it seems unnecessary to adduce all the 
absurdities uttered by Hermogenes. The faculty of speech plays a central role in 
his epistemology, and this is seen from the fact that he attempts to attain 
knowledge of reality through language107. Unlike some occasional remarks of Plato 
(e. g. the Seventh letter), Aristotle is convinced of the absolute adequacy of speech to 
convey thoughts: regulations of thought and regulations of logical reasoning are 
the same. In the treatise Sophistici elenchi this issue was specifically elucidated: 
'No real distinction, such as some people propose, exists 
between arguments used against word (rcpbc Tov'voµa 
Aoyov(; ) and those used against thought (7tp6c tv 
btävoLav); for it is absurd to suppose that some arguments 
are used against word and others used against thought, and 
not the same in both cases' 
106 v. for details M. Larkin, op. cit., pp. 25 - 43., R. Robins, A short history..., pp. 27 - 36, amongst 
recent - R. Harris, & T. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 20 - 35 (on the problem of metaphor), 
G. Lepschy, 
op. cit., vol. 2, p. 29ff. 
107 M. Larkin, op. cit., p. 11, pp. 34 - 44. 
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170b 12-16108 
The main idea of his argumentation is that the truth (a positive knowledge of 
reality) can in potentia be attained and proved by philosophical reasoning, if 
only this reasoning does not break the laws of rational discourse; otherwise, the 
conclusion will be false. Overall, Aristotle appears so optimistic in this belief 
that one might compare his enthusiasm to some conclusions of Cratylus. 
We may now answer the question of the grounds of the illustrated self- 
contradiction between his statements from the De Interpretatione and the Ethica 
Nicomachea on the one hand, and the accounts given in the Sophistici elenchi and 
the Metaphysica on the other. To Aristotle, as many scholars have shown, the 
main evidence against the naturalist hypothesis is based on the fact that in 
different languages the same things or notions have different names. This 
argument was not very strong and several suggestions were proposed (e. g. the 
theory of the gradual corruption of language mentioned in the Cratylus109). But 
the reason why he rates this idea so highly is his poor (if at all! ) knowledge of 
'barbarian' languages. It remains rather bizarre that such a solid, self-confident, 
and encyclopaedic a brain as Aristotle's, who devoted such great energy to 
language studies, should have the most superficial acquaintance with foreign 
toe Sophistici elenchi (ed. W. Ross, Aristotelis topica et sophistici elenchi (Oxford 1970): v. whole 
discourse on the refutation of this sophist's trick: Soph. elench., ch. 10 ad fin. English transl of E. S. 
Forster (Loeb classical library 400 (London 1955)). 
109 cf. Proclus, op. cit., 16,45ff (an argument against the fourth epicheirema of Democritus). 
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languagesllo. Thus, he believed, for example, that the linguistic structure of all 
languages was the same, whereas the difference is reduced exclusively to the 
sound structure of names"' and if one word in Greek has several meanings (e. g. 
Greek äQXrj), the 'barbarian' analogue was similarly presumed to designate 
both of them (e. g., 'beginning' and 'sovereignty'). In his opinion, therefore, 
every nation has invented its own sound for each thing, and each eidos has been 
designated by its own phoneme; this is evidently the foundation for his 
conventionalism, uttered in the De Interpretatione. 
These errant conclusions were by no means random errors, and played a 
crucial role in his concept of the epistemological value of rational discourse. In 
spite of the formal refutation of the natural theory of names in the De 
interpretatione, Aristotle deems logical reasoning to be an instrument for the 
cognition of essences; for example, he was bold enough to claim that 
homonyms designate related substances, and a similarity in naming implies a 
commonality of essences112. The fact that the Aristotelian concept of names can 
hardly fail to recall some naturalist statements proposed in the Cratylus has 
been a difficulty for scholars at all times; one of the commonly held 
explanations of this puzzle is the supposition that Aristotle altered his views13 
110 cf. Ammonius, In Aristotelis librum De interpretation commentarius, 36,1ff, who in treating a 
similar problem shows the acquaintance with Coptic. 
M Tp0HCKI f, H. 11pod ui jua ca s anmu+inoü nayxe (Leningrad 1934), p. 24. 
112 Cat. 1a 2ff. (Categoriae, ed. Minio-Paluello, Aristotelis categoriae et liber de interpretation, 
(Oxford 1949), pp. 3-45). 
113 v., for instance, D. Charles, 'Aristotle on names and their signification' in S. Everson 
(ed. ) 
Language, p. 37. 
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but some ancient commentators, as we shall see shortly, were either more 
radical or very tolerant in their judgements. 
Strictly speaking, Aristotle's theory can scarcely be identified as purely 
conventionalist, which Plato illustrates by the example of Hermogenes, and 
when words are deemed to be totally irrelevant to reality. In order to deduce what 
Aristotle is referring to here, we may fittingly hark back to the account of his 
disagreement with Plato supra. This specificity of Aristotle's concept of name 
and its ontological nexus with the essence of things is a result of his basic 
philosophical premise that uttered logical discourse can perfectly convey or 
reveal correct and disciplined thinking. This idea also left a deep imprint on his 
logic, theory of proof. Unlike Plato, he defines dialectic as a theory of potentially 
possible or probable inferences, which by contrast to the theory of syllogisms (a 
theory of all compulsory inferences), is merely a continuation and development 
of a general science of proof, which in turn is crowned by rhetoric. As can be 
frequently observed, grammar, logic, dialectic, and rhetoric are regarded as the 
links of a chain, none of which is principally distinguished. 
His logic is based on his theory of being, and this is a basis of the 
ontological implications of his conventionalist theory of names. To exemplify 
this dependence, it is interesting to look at his teaching on -r6 ri fiv Elva014, 
which has important applications to many of his concepts, including the theory 
)14 This well-known term of Aristotle's for a typical form of answer to a question 
(cf. 60rv 1 
AQX fi r, iuvT crEwc, to ob Iveia,, Td Ti is tt) was quite properly translated 
into Latin as 
quidditas. 
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of names. It should be noted that despite the fact that the notion of 'r6 -ri fiv 
etval. enjoyed extreme popularity amongst Neo-Platonist and peripatetic 
commentators, early Christian writers did not often employ it15. Aristotle's own 
definition of 'tö TL 'f v Eivat. is not particularly clear: 
'And first let us make some linguistic (Aoyux&c)116 remarks 
about it. The essence of each thing (' Ö 2i i1jv ¬tvat) is what it 
is said to be propter se (xa6' a&TÖ). 
Met. 1029b 13-14 
Thus, 'Co' TL fv Eivag of a thing is what is said about a thing, it is an object 
of (philosophical) definition, a somewhat semantic stratum, which is 
distinguished from the thing, taken as a whole: 
'The formula, therefore, in which the term itself is not 
present but its meaning is expressed, this is the formula of 
the essence (TO' -ri ýv ¬tvat) of each thing' 
Met. 1029b 19-21 
Further, To 2i fjv ctvai, as the semantic totality of a thing is manifested in 
its name (ovoµa); this Tö 'ri ijv ¬ivat is something without which a thing stops 
being itself. Elsewhere Aristotle gives a remarkable clarification: he teaches that 
if we take away ro' 'rL fiv efvai. of house from the house, the building will be 
Iss cf. however, those who ex prorsso had to deal with philosophy; e. g. Philo Judaeus, Quod deus 
sit immutailis, 167.4; Cement Alexandrinus, Stromaties, viii, 6: 17,4.3; viii, 6: 18,2.3; also Joannes 
Philoponus and r6 Ti tiv elvai in the De aernitate mundi (e. g. 25; 8,26,8,32; 22,33; 25,34; 4,11). 
116 The translation of the Aoyuc as 'linguistic' is quite risky; A. Losev argues that the Aoyuäx 
here means neither logical nor rational but 'from the standpoint of sense (äid., p. 536). 
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turned into 'pile of stones and planking'; in other words, Tö Ti fv rival is what 
definition is to define (Met. 1030a 6f). 
The most significant problem for him was in modern linguistic terms the 
polysemanticism of nouns117. In order to overcome it, he applied his logical 
method and reasoned that every name must have only one real meaning; the 
words of our language can have several meanings, but first, they are not equal; 
secondly, a logical analysis can reveal the most profound one; this is what he is 
exemplifying in Met. 1006a 28ff: 
'... if 'man' has one meaning, let this be 'two-footed animal'; 
by having one meaning I understand this: if 'man' means X, 
then if A is a man X will be what 'being a man' means for 
him'. 
But as soon as 2ö TL fjv ¬ivat of the name 'man' can be only one, the 
ultimate and the most fundamental meaning of 'man' is also only one: 
'For instance, we might say that 'man' has not one meaning 
but several, one of which would have one definition, viz. 
'two-footed animal', while there might be also several other 
definitions if only they were limited in number; for a 
peculiar name might be assigned to each of the definitions. 
If, however, they were not limited but one were to say, that 
the word has an infinite number of meanings, obviously 
reasoning would be impossible; for not to have one 
meaning is to have no meaning, and if words have no 
meaning our reasoning with one another, and indeed with 
ourselves, has been annihilated; for it is impossible to think 
of anything if we do not think of one thing; but if this is 
possible, one name might be assigned to this thing' 
117 This topic is well clarified by I. Perelmuter (Li. rlepembMyrep, Aristotle. p. 167), who being a 
professional linguist, draws interesting parallels between 
Aristotelian and modem language 
studies. 
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One might note that the notion of -rö Ti fv EivaL is much more 
sophisticated than as appears in our relatively simplified example. Thus, he 
classifies various semantic modifications of it (2ö 2i fjv civat and TO' 'ri Fait), 
distinguishes it from essence (oiQia) and matter, equates it with eidos, but in 
our case there is no need to explore it in depth. The point that is much more 
relevant for our examination is clear: in the most well considered works of his 
philosophical investigations, Aristotle arrives at a number of Platonic 
conclusions. His idea that a name manifests the unique 'rä 2i tjv czvaL of a thing 
and, therefore, that a name must have only one ultimate and basic meaning 
(and is a foundation and possibility for philosophical reasoning), can hardly fail 
to recall the teaching on the 'correctness' of names'ls. 
We have seen that Plato in the Cratylus experiments with two opposite 
concepts: Socrates refutes both extremists and suggests a possible synthesis. 
Although Aristotle declares himself a radical conventionalist, a more detailed 
examination reveals that he was faced with the same difficulties as his master. 
Armed with dialectic, which in contrast to Aristotle, Plato considered as an 
ultimate method of philosophical investigation, he could synthesise two 
extreme theories (as 'does' Socrates in the Cratylus). For Aristotle, as Proclus 
118 Clearly, 'to Ti fiv ELvaL is just a major aspect of the Aristotelian name-thought-thing conception. 
Two diametrically opposite solutions, are given verbi gratia in the De Interpretatione 
(names 
stand for thoughts) and the Sophistici elenchi (names stand 
for things), respectively. This 
inconsistency has been heavily debated in both ancient and modern scholarship, and several 
interpretations have been proposed; a good discussion of modem opinions is found 
in C. 
Whitaker (op. cit., pp. 20 - 22), but one might find his attempt to reconcile this contradiction 
by 
referring to the ambiguity of the term vi5µpoAov precarious. 
(v. ibid., pp. 22 - 25). The 
supposition of D. Charles that Aristotle 
in his later works reconsidered some issues seems to be 
more reliable. 
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repeatedly points out, dialectic is understood as a craft of dispute""; 
methodologically, he employs logic (which he called analytics), which always 
faces him with one alternative. As a result, he also has to intervene between two 
theories, but, clearly, he does so less successfully. Perhaps the contradiction that 
has been noted in his writings is an attempt to work out a balanced doctrine. 
§ 1.2.3 The self-contradictions in the theory of Aristotle in the light of some 
ancient interpreters 
The thinking of Aristotle was investigated in depth by ancient scholars of 
all kinds: grammarians, philosophers, and rhetoricians. Andronicus Rhodius, 
for example, made a study of the order and structure of the De Interpretatione. 
Even though this treatise does not survive, we are told that he pointed out 
serious contradictions between the teachings on thoughts (von µaTa) given in 
this work and in the De Anima120, and concluded that one of the works should 
be recognised as inauthentic. 
Proclus, whose numerous remarks on Aristotle deserve special attention, 
also believed that his main disagreement with Plato lies in the different 
methods, viz. he points out the Aristotelian misinterpretation of dialectic: 
119 Proclus, op. cit., ii, 1 -5; iii, 1ff; iv ad. fin. 
120 Scholia in Aristotelem (ed. C. Brandis, in Aristotlelis Opera (eds. I. Bekker and 0. Gigon), iv 
(Berlin 1961)). 
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'[Proclus taught] that the Cratylus is a logical and dialectical 
[treatise], and [it is so] not in the sense of primitive 
Peripatetic 'dialectical' methods [of analysing] things... "" 
'But Peripatetic analytics and its culmination (K¬WLov) - 
proof (äröbctýtc) - is clear and available for everyone, 
unless he is completely surrounded by darkness and totally 
imbued by the waters of Lethe'22. 
In his commentaries on the Cratylus, Proclus responds to Aristotle's 
criticism. Thus, he regards the inconsistency of Aristotle as evidence of his 
philosophical errors; he specifically refers to the De Interpretatione 16a 19ff: 
'If, according to Aristotle, names are established by 
invention (6EQEi) and they are symbols of things and 
thoughts (a 43oAa 2cOv rrQaypaTCOv xai tWV vorIµävwv), 
he himself should not hold'23 that uttered judgements 
formed into discourse, ([if we admit] it exists by 
convention), either correspond to thoughts or this discourse 
in its significative capacity is neither true nor false. But, 
being of the substance (oiai wb&S), manifested judgements 
can be true or false not by convention; therefore, names 
exist not by convention"24. 
It is intriguing that a similar estimation of the Aristotelian theory of 
names can be found in some Christian writings. Although one might realise 
that the following passage is not as distinctive as the professional 
argumentation of Proclus, the fact that this remark of 
Socrates Scholasticus on 
Aristotle's teaching appeared in the context of his narration about Aetius and 
Eunomius is of special importance: undoubtedly, he implies the 
Anomean 
121 Proclus, In Crat., 1ff- 
122 ibid., ii, 10f. 
123 cf. De interp., 17a 2-5. 
124 proclus, In Crat., x1vii, 1- 9; v. also i'bid., xlix. 
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theory of names. Socrates intends to show the philosophical background of both 
leaders of Neo-Arianism: 
'After receiving some very scanty instruction at Alexandria, 
he departed thence, and arrived at Antioch in Syria, which 
was his native place, was ordained deacon by Leontins, 
who was then bishop of that city. Upon this he began to 
astonish those who conversed with him by the singularity 
of his discourses. And this he did in dependence on the 
precepts of Aristotle's Categories; there is a book of that 
name, the scope of which he neither himself perceived, nor 
had been enlightened on by intercourse with learned 
persons: so that he was little aware that he was framing 
fallacious arguments to perplex and deceive himself. For 
Aristotle had composed this work to exercise the ingenuity 
of his young disciples, and to confound by subtle 
arguments the sophists who, affected to deride philosophy. 
Wherefore the Ephectic academicians, who expound the 
writings of Plato and Plotinus, censure the vain subtlety 
which Aristotle has displayed in that book: but Aetius, who 
never had the advantage of an academical preceptor, 
adhered to the sophisms of the Categories. For this reason he 
was unable to comprehend how there could be generation 
without a beginning, and how that which was begotten can 
be co-eternal with him who begat. In fact, Aetius was a man 
of so superficial attainments, and so little acquainted with 
the sacred Scriptures, and so extremely fond of cavilling, a 
thing which any clown might do, that he had never 
carefully studied those ancient writers who have 
interpreted the Christian oracles; wholly rejecting Clemens 
and Africanus and Origen, men eminent for their 
information in every department of literature and science" 
125 Socrates, Historia ecclesiastica, ii, 35; cf. also 24: 'But those who derived their name from him 
were subsequently divided into several factions. For first Theophronius, a 
Cappadocian who 
had been instructed in the art of disputation by Eunomius, and had acquired a smattering of 
Aristotle's Categorise and his De interpretation, composed some treatises, which he entitled, 'On 
the Exercise of the Mind". Having, however, drawn down upon himself the reprobation of 
his 
own sect, he was ejected as an apostate' (English transl. 
from NPNF ser. it vol. ii ed. Ph. Schaff 
& H. Wace). 
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Although Socrates in this passage intends to deride the philosophical 
erudition and competence of Aetius, his witness to common scholarly opinion 
about Platonic and Aristotelian epistemology is valuable and reliable. As 
Socrates himself mentions, 126 and as follows from his name Scholasticus, he is 
quite competent to give professional scholarly views. Most probably he 
expresses an opinion, commonly shared by grammarians and rhetoricians of 
Constantinople between the end of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth 
century, viz. that Aristotle's works can scarcely satisfy refined scholarly taste, 
and that his philosophy should be learnt under the supervision of a 
professional, who can reinterpret and explain what Aristotle really meant. 
Otherwise, (and this, according to Socrates, happened to the Anomean) the use 
of Aristotle will result in absurdities and errors. 
In order to clarify what this Christian writer means by 'an academical 
preceptor' and a reliable exegesis of Aristotle, we might briefly examine several 
passages from Ammonius (c. 435 - 517), who left a number of extensive 
commentaries on Aristotle, and who after a narrow escape from Alexandria to 
Constantinople127 (together with his colleague Helladius) used to be a tutor of 
Socrates Scholasticus. 
'26ibid., v, 24. 
127 ibid., v, 16. 
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It is interesting to observe how he industriously attempts to reinterpret 
some linguistically wrong definitions of Aristotle'28, and in every possible way 
tries to find an excuse for the subject of his commentaries. His treatment of the 
notorious naturalist-conventionalist dilemma and a number of problems 
concerning discrepant expressions of Aristotle is one of the most extensive and 
simultaneously intricate parts of the treatise. This suggests that to him this 
dilemma also presented considerable difficulties. Yet Ammonius clearly 
'translates' the expressions of the De Interpretatione into the terminology of 
fourth-century scholarship, and he gives a strikingly accurate analysis of 
Aristotle's arguments129. Unfortunately, it is impossible to give his account at 
length without a special excursus into his philosophical anthropology; in brief, 
his point is (and he argues that it is what Aristotle conceived) that thoughts (Tä 
vorjµata) and things ('rä rtQäyµa'ra) exist by nature, whilst vocal sounds or 
phonemes (at )covai) and their written equivalents, Yeäµµara, exist by 
convention. When, however, he compares the theory of Aristotle to that of 
Plato, his reasoning runs as follows; first, he distinguishes two types of 
naturalist theory, and two types of conventionalist theory (34,20 - 36,20)130: 
'Some of those who think they are 'by nature' opining that 
they are products of nature (cc 4vQectc aütä OO EVOL 
128 Thus, he 'explains' why Aristotle distinguishes only 6voµa and (rlµa (Ammonius, op. cit., 
11,1 - 7), gives patently incomplete teaching on types of sentences 
(ibid., 16,1- 30), etc. 
129cf. ibid., 23,30 - 31,1. 
'30 cf. with a more complicated classification of Proclus (op. cit., 17,1-5), who 
finds four types of 
naturalism: '... 1) as in organisms - oüaiaL 6Jlat Te xai Tä µtQT au'r v; 
2) as in material 
substances - ev yctat xai buväcµEK; 3) 'natural' 
imitations - shades or mirror-like reflections; 
and 3) as artificial imitation of a prototype (ý 
&K ai rc tai cixövec toucbvec eoucviat Toi 
aQXeTf)noK &av'a@v). 
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EIVaI bf uouQyT taTa), as Cratylus the Herachtean thought 
when he said that a fitting name had been assigned by [the 
agency of] nature of each thing, just as we see that a 
different perceptual sense is also assigned to different 
perceptibles131' 
(Trans!. D. Blank). 
'Others say are 'by nature' since they fit the nature of things 
named by them... And they too say that name resembles 
images - not natural ones, but those made by the art of 
painting, which makes different likenesses of different 
models and still strives to copy as well as possible the form 
of each [model], according to which we often analyse 
[starting] from the names in an attempt to hunt down the 
natures of the things named by them, and once we have 
recognised these natures we try to show that the names 
applied to the things are consonant with the natures' 
The conventionalist theory distinguishes those who are of the opinion 
that names are 'by convention' in an arbitrary way and that it is possible for any 
man to name any thing as he desires (as, for example Hermogenes in the Crat. 
384d) from those who believe that names are given by the 'name-giver'. 
Moreover, he argues that Platonic teaching on the name-maker can be also 
comprehended in the conventional way: 
'... he is the one who has knowledge of the nature of things 
and states a name appropriate to the nature of each existing 
thing... It is in this very respect that names are 'by 
imposition', because not nature, but the inventiveness of a 
rational soul established them... ' 
Although this interpretation of Ammonius is far from being cogent, the 
way he reconciles Plato's and Aristotle's theories of names 
is crystal dear. He 
131 In Plato's dialogues Cratylus nowhere makes this claim; perhaps 
Ammonius posits it on the 
basis of Met., 1010a 11 ff. 
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opines that the second sense of 'by nature' coincides with the second sense of 
'by convention', and concludes that Aristotle in the De interpretatione is denying 
nothing but the first sense of 'by nature', which Cratylus was advocating'-32. 
Initially, the theories of Plato and Aristotle were diametrically opposed, 
but in the tradition of the Byzantine scholarship of the fourth and fifth centuries 
both doctrines have received such flexible interpretations that the contradiction 
between these two authoritative philosophers was emphatically effaced. 
Therefore, for those who were well acquainted with these avenues of Neo- 
Platonic interpretation (Socrates Scholasticus is a good example) some self- 
contradictions of Aristotle as well as his disagreements with the Platonic theory 
of name were understood in a radically different way. 
It should be also emphasised in our conclusion that after Aristotle's 
investigations the discussion on the interplay between name and the nature of 
things was far from being closed. From the fourth-century controversy onwards 
this philosophical problem was continuously scrutinised in the context of 
linguistic, grammar, dialectic, and mythological studies, and by the time of the 
early Byzantine epoch it had received a significant elaboration and 
development, complicated by a number of new approaches and ways of 
interpretation. 
132 Ammonius, op. cit., 34,10 - 37 ad. fin. 
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I. 3 The further development of the two classical linguistic theories 
In the following section I shall give a brief overview of how 
philosophical interests in language emerged in the Hellenistic era. Amongst the 
great philosophical schools that were formed in that period viz. the Alexandrian 
philological tradition, Scepticism, Epicureanism, and Stoic, only the two latter 
ones showed a sustained interest in the philosophical issues of language rather 
than merely grammatical studies. Let us now focus on these two schools in 
order to elucidate how the two theories of language of Plato and Aristotle were 
developed and modified by Stoic and Epicurean philosophers. 
1.3.1 Stoic philosophy of language in the context 
The Stoic interest in language and their contribution to the development 
of grammatical theory is immense, while their philosophical concern is, by 
comparison, of much less interest. There is no need here to explore here their 
pioneer consideration of Greek morphology and syntax; we shall concentrate 
instead on the philosophical issues. 
Despite the fact that their insight into the philosophical issues of 
language was not particularly remarkable, the Stoic school had an ample 
influence upon curriculum of the standard education of Hellenistic world. For 
this reason I shall try to indicate some of the more relevant aspects of 
Stoic 
philosophical inquiries. Regrettably, our knowledge of 
Stoic concerns is very 
fragmentary; the overwhelming majority of the sources of information are, in 
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fact, secondary reports (of e. g. Diogenes Laertius, Marcus Varro, and 
Augustine) or some other Greek and Latin grammarians of the later historical 
period. Therefore, there are still a number of important questions that are hotly 
disputed amongst modern Classical scholars, who propose some 
reconstructions of Stoic views on languagel33. 
Before turning to the subject, several introductory remarks should be 
made. Language as such was regarded in Stoic philosophy in the context of 
their logic. The term T 'I introduced by Stoics to designate what 
Aristotle called f) ävaAvTtxä. Their comprehension of logic was remarkable: the 
object of logic was not only judgements, conclusions, deductions and reasoning, 
but also the verbal form of the expression. Strictly speaking, in the Stoic system 
of thought, language was treated in the context of logic, which was a teaching 
about correct thinking and dialecticlm that, in turn, was a theory of the correct 
(verbal) expression of thought (E-'7TL jµrI Ttov 6QOc&S b aAeywwOat' ). Their 
dialectic consisted of two parts: the teaching about the designator (Tä 
ar . taivov-ra) and 
denotatum (i. e. about what is designated or signified - Tä 
-%ta1v%tEva)' . It seems 
irrelevant in which of these spheres of dialectic they 
placed the philosophical aspects of language and in which part they placed 
133 v. R. Robins, Ancient, p. 25; J. Pinborg, Classical antiquity: 
Greece. In Current trends in 
linguistics, vol. 13 (Histioriography of linguistics (The Hague, 
Paris 1975), p. 77). 
134 In the system of Stoics, logic was divided into dialectic and rhetoric; clearly, we are 
concerned in the former, rather than the latter which was merely 
I inwT' VTJ Toü eS Atyeiv - 
SVF ii, p. 18, fr. 48. 
135 SVF ii, p. 18, fr. 48 - Diog. Laert. vii, 42. 
136 H. Steinthal, Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaf t bei den Griechen und 
Römern. 2. Aufl., vol. 1. 
(Berlin 1890), p. 289 - H. Steinthal suggested that this 
distinction was problematic arguable for 
Stoics themselves; therefore, it remains unclear for current studies. 
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grammar137, the main characteristic feature of Stoicism was that the 
phenomenon of language was systematically treated in the context of their 
epistemology. The reason for this approach was entirely philosophical; that was 
the Stoic doctrine of the universal logos. The Stoic theory of the logos is well 
known; suffice to mention that they believed that the human logos is implicated 
with the divine logos; the latter was thought to be approachable for those who 
strive for knowledge through philosophical studies. The supposition that the 
human intellect (i. e. the internal logos - Aöyoc EvbLäOE'roc) is adequately 
manifested and represented in Al yoc rtQo4)op1xöc, obliged them to believe that 
their knowledge of the divine (that is, of course, hidden) can be obtained through 
the investigation of language (that is revealed by, for example, verbal 
manifestation). 
§ 1.3.2 'ETV µoAoYia in search of the ýt Berat 4wvai 
Clearly, for the Stoics the relationship between phoneme of word and its 
meaning was of crucial importance - this relation was 
believed to be natural, so 
they are traditionally associated with (püvK-theory and 
Plato. This premise 
allowed them to assume etymology and etymologising as 
a central instrument 
for the cognition of all the constituents of their philosophy, 
viz. ethics, logic, 
137 v. for details some suggestion of J. 
Pinborg, op. cit., p. 79. 
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physics (cosmology) including 'theology"38. Moreover, the very term 
eTvµoAoyia was introduced by Chrysippus, whose, books on etymology, as I. 
Tronskiy presumes, were prototypes of modern etymological dictionaries'". 
Philosophically, the Stoics held a theory of 'primordial words' - 7tpc rraL 
q)wvai - that was often associated with the Cratylus and Plato. In order to solve 
the problems propounded in Plato's dialogues, they distinguished 7xQ nau 
cpwvai from their later derivatives on the basis of etymological analysis, and 
attributed the notorious natural connection (between word and thing) only to 
the former. By means of etymologising, Stoics attempted to discover these 
7IQdY2aI c)wvai and thus to recognise clearly the original sense of a notion. Of 
course, it is still a matter of vague speculation as to how the Stoics 
comprehended this natural relation between phoneme of 'primordial words' 
and the essence of an object. To illustrate the matter, I propose to look at several 
examples. 
Chrysippus asserts that the centre of human intellectual life, its 
i yc iovuxov, is located in the heart rather than in the head. To reinforce his 
argument he takes the word 'et'ch', and explains that this important word of the 
Greek language points to the heart itself: while pronouncing the last syllable of 
the word 'Tyco', our chin goes down and points to the heart"0. Furthermore, the 
phoneme of the word xapbia, in the opinion of Chrysippus, 
is close to the 
138 P. Gentinetta, Zur Sprachbetrachtung bei den Sophisten und in der stoisch-hellenistischen 
Zeit 
(Winterthur 1961), p. 111. 
139 14. TpoHCiwt, op. cit., p. 27. 
140 SVF it, p. 245, fr. 895. 
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words Ke Tog and xveý. oc141. Speaking of Zeus, he notices that accusative case 
of o ZEtc - 'röv Dia - is close to a Greek preposition btä (that incidentally takes 
the accusative) and means 'through', 'by aid of, 'because of , etc.; consequently, 
he thinks, it demonstrates that Zeus is a supreme deity, because 'bt' avröv EtvaL 
Ta rcäv ra' 142. 
Origen reports that the Stoics regarded names as bestowed by nature 
(I)vaei); so, the first words being imitations of things, in accordance with which 
names were formed, and in conformity with which they introduce certain 
principles of etymologyl43. Augustine, in his De dialectica throws more light onto 
the Stoic understanding of primordial words; he tells us that, in opinion of the 
Stoics, primordial words and the things they signify affect our perception in a 
similar manner; Augustine brings to the forefront imitative words"«: 
They (the Stoics) thought this to be somewhat like a 
cunabula verborum (cradle of words), where the sense of the 
thing concorded with the sense of the sound and that the 
license of naming proceeded from there to the similarity of 
the things among themselves: e. g., for the sake of the word 
itself crux 'cross' was said (originated), since the harshness 
of the word itself concords with the pain which the cross 
brings about, but 'crura' (limbs) not because of the 
harshness of pain, but because they, of all the members, are 
141 ibid., fr. 896. 
142ibid., fr. 1063. 
I43Origenes, Contra Celsum I, 24:... 46uti, . LLµovµtvCOV T@V fQ(: ra" (04rv6v tä TQäyµa ta, 
xae ' c5v Tä övöµa'ra, uaO6 xai (rtoLXdd t va tft ftuµoAoyiac Eiadyova v. It remains 
unclear, however, why Origen, who in this passage outlines his main philosophical view on the 
relationship between övopa and nQäyµa, mentions Aristotle and Epicurus 
by name, but 
ascribes 4)6aEL-theory to the Stoics, rather than Plato himself (ed. Borret, 
OrigEne. Conte Cdsa, 4 
vols. - SC, vols 132,136,147,150 (Parisl967-1969)). 
144A good example of an imitative word is a Greek verb na räaaw -'to crash' or 
ßA(TVQL - 
'strum, thrum'. 
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most similar to the wood of the cross in length and 
sturdiness145. 
(Trans. of J. Marchand'6) 
Hence, Stoics thought that all words in the human language were 
derived from ancient primordial words of an imitative character. Unlike Plato, 
who argued for the divine origin of these primordial words, the Stoics believed 
that the words were introduced by ancestors who were excellent in every 
respect, including their relationship to the divine logos. 
1.3.3 The Stoic theory of naming 
There is a special interest in their ingenious theory of naming, for which 
Augustine is our sole source. According to Stoic speculation, there is an 
ontological connection between name and thing, between names themselves, 
and between things themselves. Thus, if one thing is related to another, and the 
former has a primordial name, the latter can also adopt this primordial name 
with some slight (but recognisable and determinable) phonetic modifications. 
They assigned three types of ontological connection between categories or 
notions that can interchange their phonemes; since there is only Augustine's 
report, the matter is illustrated by the example of Latin words: 
9 resemblance (e. g. crus 'shin' -crux 'cross'); 
M Augustinus, De dialectica, vi. 
146 http: //ccat. sas. upenn. edu/)*od/texts/dialecticatrans. htmi. 
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" contiguity (e. g. orbis 'circle' - urbis 'city'); 
" contrast (e. g. bellus 'nice' - bellum 'war')147. 
Overall, this teaching of the Stoics can be described as making minimal 
progress from Plato and Aristotle. Unlike their purely grammatical 
investigations, in which they surpassed Aristotle dramaticallyl48, they were 
mostly concerned philosophically with the semantic aspect of words rather than 
anything else. If Plato in the Cratylus speaks about etymologies with a great 
deal of irony, Stoics place etymologising on the most important theoretical 
footing, but their contribution to what now is call phonetics was relatively 
small: most of the etymological surveys of the Stoics are fabulous or even 
ridiculous from the modern point of view. Moreover, distrust in their 
etymologising was already remarked on by their contemporaries149. 
§ 1.3.4 Notional aspect of human speech: Stoic theory of AEltöv 
It must be understood, however, that in spite their obvious sympathies 
with Platonic zinc-theory, the Stoics elaborated a number of Aristotelian ideas 
147 Augustinus, loc. cit. 
1+8 Concerning the Stoic analysis of grammatical categories I rely on the following works: 
14. 
TpoHCxMK, Ocnoeu cmou+iecicoü zpa. M. Mamuxu (Foundations of the Stoic grammar - 
in Russian) in 
Poxaxo-zepMancKaJ 5ummozuA: c6opnux cmameü e'ecmb axaöe. «uxa B. O. Mau&Mapeaa 
(Leningrad 1957); 14. Ko6ia, TpaMMamu'iHa mepMunoaozil cmoixoe (Grammatical theory of 
Stoics - 
in Ukrainian) in IHosemHa 4iaoAoria (Kiev 1970), NO 8, uin. 20 of Ilumawxa xxacuwnoi 
55uaoAozii; B. Kapaxynaxos, K eonpocy o coomHecefuu uacmeis pe'cu cmouxoa c ux 
AozuwcxuMu 
xamezopw. fu (To the question of relationship 
between parts of speech and logical categories in Stoic 
thought - in Russian). in Studii 
Clasice, 1964, NO 6. 
149 cf. ironic remarks of Cicero (De natura deorum, 
3; 63). 
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about language; moreover, they showed a sustained interest in the theory of 
signification, and contributed a lot to Aristotelian theory. 
Let us now turn back to the notorious Stoic distinction of two aspects of 
speech as an act (viz. orb FFiov and oT µauvö tEvov) which is the most relevant 
aspect of their teaching. In relation to the human speech, Stoics developed 
Aristotelian view that the sounds of human speech are not just sounds. Thus, the 
immediate sound of human speech (i Ocwvi) was classified as vqµaiov150. 
Unlike sounds produced by inanimate things or by animals, etc., which are 
merely a percussion of air brought about by natural impulse, the sounds of 
speech are organised in a unique way. Diogenes of Babylon in his book IIF-Qi 
Owvf 2Exvn described these sounds as qwvi EvaQOQoc - articulate sound (of 
speech). An important characteristic feature of these articulate sounds is that 
they can be written; human speech, therefore, is now 4covrj EYYQappaToc151. A 
combination of these articulate sounds is AE&tc; but it remains obscure how they 
regarded this AE '4; in the context of their etymologising. According to 
Diogenes of Babylon, although Tl Al , ic (if it follows the phonetic regulations of 
language) is correct, it is not speech (A1 yoc) yet, because: 
There is a difference between AW&c and Al yoc, because 
Aöyo; always signifies something (6E 'L b Al yoc äu i 
arjµavTLxös EaTL), while Ae&t as such remains unclear 
(AW& c be icai c orb toc), for example the word ßAitup4 but 
speech never is (Al yoc be o0aµcc)152. 
"° SVF ii, p. 48, fr. 166, line 6. 
is' SVF iii, p. 213, fr. 20. 
152 Because of the terminological apparatus adopted for the English translation, 
I purposely do 
not use here the work of R. Hicks. 
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SVF, iii, p. 213, fr. 20. 
I would like to underline that this distinction is remarkable in every 
respect. Of course, Diogenes Laertius' report is vague, but there is evidence that 
the Stoics not only distinguished the sounds of human speech from sounds in 
general, but they also insisted that the meaning of a word that is taken 
separately is somewhat limited, for it does not act as an alive all-sufficient word 
of human speech; perfection of meaning can only be achieved in full sentences 
of discourse: 
There is a difference between pronouncing something and 
speaking it out; for vocal sounds are uttered, things are 
spoken out, and [it is these things that] are matters of 
discourse [rather than sounds that are uttered]'-". 
's3 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, vii, 57; 8f.: bta4tQEL be mi Tö 
Myrty roü 
nQo4)EQFaOai" nQo( QovtaL µev yäQ ai ava(9 
iye'cat bC tä nQd yµata, & b' xai Aßä 
TuyXävet. (ed. Long, Diogenis Laertii vitae philosophorum, 
2 vols. (Oxford 1964)). 
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§ 1.3.5 Stoic terminology for human thinking process 
Now we are in a better position to understand the Stoic concept of 
Aex2öv - 'sayable"-4, and their use of the terms Erdvota, EvvoLa, &volqµa, 
buzvota, etc. It was observed above that in his philosophical analysis of words, 
Aristotle distinguished three main agencies: phoneme, human comprehension 
of an object, and the object itself. The Stoics introduced a fourth category, 
namely, the semantic aspect of speech, something that is meant 
(u tatvöµ¬vov), which they called AEKTöv. Ammonius, in his commentaries on 
the De interpretatione, attempts to explain Aristotle's point by comparison with 
the Stoics. Hence, it the notion of cq iaivöµcvov that differentiates Aristotle 
from the Stoics; Aristotle regards things as some rational presentations (Tä 
vorj µa ra): 
Aristotle first uses these lines to teach us what are 
principally and immediately signified by them (Un' avu&v 
ugftaLvOpEva) [i. e. by names and words- sc. UnO' uov 
jxovc&v], that <these are> thoughts (vOTI pata), and through 
them as intermediates, things, and that one must not invent 
anything else beside these between the thought and the 
thing (xal ovbev ETeQov bci rtaQa Tav'ra ertvoeiv µ&vov 
'rov TE voi. tatoc xai 'rov 7tQayµaToc), which is what the 
men of Stoa posited and thought they should call the 
154Ammonius, On Aristotle 'On interpretation' 1-8, transl. by D. Blank (London 1996), p. 26. I 
follow D. Blank, who translates this complicated adjectivum verbale of AEy i as 'sayable' (this 
variant seems to be commonly shared in modern scholarship) rather 
'verbal expression' - V. 
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of eminent philosophers (transl. by R. D. Hicks) in The Loeb classical library 
(London 1981), vol. 2, p. 173. A. Roberts and J. Donaldson translated the category of cä 
Atx'ta as 
'dicta' - ANF, vol. At p. 509. 
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'sayable' (ö7, EQ of ä7T, 6 Tr q iroäS 671TLO41EVOL AEKTÖV 
1j&iovv 6voµ6tCELv)155. 
(Transl. D. Blank) 
Thus, if for Aristotle there were only two spheres that are to be 
compared to each other (i. e. an object and human mind), the Stoics introduced a 
new category, intermediate between object and subject; A. Losev formulated 
Stoic A¬x'öv as 'a cognitive predicate of speech and thinking process''56. This 
'sayable' is something that corresponds to some rational presentation157; A¬ crov 
is always complete in itself, while others are defective, because their 
enunciation is unfinished. Diogenes Laertius clarifies how the Stoics 
distinguished AEKTov from a defective 'sayable' (2ö F. mFb; AEK'öv): thus, 
'I"QaOc ' is defective for it remains unclear who writes; but 'TQe c eL 
EcWxpä c'15s is complete and self-sufficing (avro'r Ar ). Therefore, under the 
head of defective expressions Stoics ranged all parts of speech, while under the 
head of 'complete in themselves' they considered judgements (Tä ä tc . tata), 
syllogisms, questions (ra EQw rr µa ra), and inquiries (2ä 7vuµaTa). 
I-% Ammonius, In Aristotelis librum De interpretatione comme ntarius, 17; 20ff. (ed. Busse, in 
Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 4.5 (Berlin 1897), pp. 1-272). 
1M A. Aoces, Doctrine of verbal objectivity (Aacr6v) in Stoic linguistic studies (in Russian) - Naw: 
us6patcnue pa6omu, nepe , 6eceöb, uccA&oeauust u apxuenue . MamepunAu (St. Petersburg 1997), 
p. 344ff. 
'57 Diogenes Laertius, vii, 63; 6f: <Mal be [T6] AFKTdv etvat Tb icatä 4avTaa(av Aoyucdv 
644M6Lµevov. 
'n Perhaps, this classical example reflects the Stoic idea that 'sayable' remains being 'sayable' 
irrespective of the criterion of truth, for Socrates never wrote. 
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To sum up, in Stoic dialectic, AF-x'röv is an abstract notion; if sounds of 
speech (as well as objects) are of a material nature159, 'sayable' is denotatum (T6 
o-g . taivöµ¬vov), therefore, it is immaterial and only emerges in concrete 
rational discourse. At the same time, the Stoics emphasise its abstract nature; for 
them it is relatively unimportant whether this 'sayable' is true or wrong - 
AEK'tÖv is manifested in both cases; they only made a distinction between 
deliberate expressions (where AEKTov is present) and catatonic sound, 
unconscious raving, incoherent (or abstract) expression, etc., where there is no 
'sayable' at all, or it is defective. 
A characteristic feature of human beings is the appearance of rational 
presentations (cavTaQiaL Aoyu at); 'sayables' correspond to these rational 
presentations, because AEwröv is a human thought that is organised in a special 
way, and is expressed in the course of rational discourse or speech. At the same 
time, JIEwrov is different from (ýavtauia AoyLxä, but has an existence of its 
own. Although H. Steinthal argues that the Stoics did not work out a clear and 
satisfactory distinction between language and the thinking process160 there is 
evidence to infer that this distinction nevertheless existed. I. Perelmuter, who 
compares this aspect of Stoic science with Aristotle, pointed out that the former 
159 SVF ii, p. 48, fr. 166 = Sextus Emiricus, Adversus mathematicos, viii, 11ff: '... amongst these 
elements (i. e. thing, phoneme and Aextöv) two former are material (boo µßv elvat a . taTa), 
namely phoneme and object ('v wvi v xai T8 Ttryxävov); but one of them 
is immaterial (1v 
be äad, atov), viz. denotatum (Td oi1µaLv61Aevov 7päyµa) or AeicTöv, that can 
be either true or 
wrong'. It should be mentioned that overall, Sextus seems to oversimplify the 
Stoic concept of 
Aeic'rÖv, that is why the passage was not analysed in full; however, his report about the 
immaterial nature of AeiTöv is very relevant. 
160 H. Steinthal, op. cit., p. 338. 
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worked out some methods of distinguishing the thinking process as such from 
semantic aspects of rational discourse, while Aristotle could not overcome the 
sphere of phonetics161. 
The Stoics, however, had an elaborate terminological apparatus to apply 
to the phenomena of the human thinking process in its relation to the power of 
speech. Thus, the Stoics classified different types of perception: a senseless and 
irrelevant fantasy (merely 4av rao ia); an immediate result of (e. g. visual) 
perception of an object (Evvoia or Evvör)µa). Plutarchus makes an interesting 
comment on how the Stoics classified these various phenomena; fantasies are 
appropriate to all kinds of perception, but in the case of human beings and gods 
these fantasies can become rational concepts (vöq ia): 
A rational concept is a perceptible notion that appears in 
the mind of a rational being. For when a perceptible notion 
emerges in a rational soul is called F-vvoq pa -a rational 
concept, because it receives its name from the word reason 
(voüc). Therefore, perceptible notions (with semantic 
substance) are unusual for other beings. Those perceptible 
notions that appear in our minds and in the mind of gods 
are notions in general (xavtäQµa ra); those presentations 
that appear to irrational animals are mere phantasms 
((ýavtäQµaTa), but the ones that occur to gods and to us 
are both presentations in generic kind and specifically 
mental concepts (Evvo ijia)'62. 
161 LI. IIepenbMyrep, cPuitocog5cxue uixaAu 9 uHzw a, MAY, p. 189f. 
162 Plutarchus (pseud. ), Placita philosophorum, (Stephanus 900, C): Ia'r b' evvöµa 4i cvraapa 
buxvoias Aoyucoü Cccou 'cö yäQ 4äv'aoµa, inabö v Aoyu«j nQoaninTrl 4vxtl, r6Te 
ivv6r pa 
uaAei'tat, eLAii Toüvoµa naQ& Tov vov. OL67teQ'rois 
&MyoK rc)ots boa TtQovrti7tWCL 
(pav'l a tats, avTl c7 Lata'dhvov 
iarly> öaa bt 1Cal Ocoic Kai 1j v ye,, rairca [(pav'c c7 iata 
µövov iativ boa bt AR-tv, rainaJ uai'av rd%Lata Km r& ytvoc icai 
evvc4a ra icar' etbK". 
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Thus, qiavTaapaTa are results of perception; they are not related to the 
intellectual activity of human reason. But according to Stoic classification, 
jav2ävµa2a relate to it'-vvoi rata as genus to differentia specifica'63. As for 
AEw2öv, however, it is neither the former, nor the latter, because both of these 
categories (when taken abstractly) do not contain (and are not) 'sayable' yet; 
they are merely mental or psychical phenomena, which the Stoics 
comprehended as some kind of imprint of things in the human mind: 
A notion or object of thought is a presentation to the 
intellect, which though not really substance nor attribute is 
quasi-substance or quasi-attribute. Thus, an image of a 
horse may rise before the mind, although there is no horse 
present'TM. 
(trans!. R. Hicks) 
At the same time, the very nature of perfect (in comparison with 
defective) AEwröv is that this 'sayable' is conceived as something that exists only 
in relation with another A Lq. It should be pointed out, therefore, that for the 
Stoic philosophy of language it is impossible to operate with abstract categories 
(as Plato and Aristotle did). 
Of course, our treatment of the Stoic 'sayable' is incomplete; suffice to 
mention that at the next stage the Stoics analysed AEK rr v in its relation to the 
criterion of truth, and introduced an interesting distinction between i 6ArOEia 
and Tö äATIOtc, which differed from each other by essence (oüaia), organisation 
163 i. e. as rd yivoc and r6 etboc - cf. Diogenes Laertius, vii, 
61; 4f. 
164 Diogenes Laertius, vii, 61f: 'EvvdTIµa be Corn 4ävtavµa biavoiac, of re Ti 6v Dine not6v, 
wvavei be TL 6v icai 6aave1noubv... 
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(n rraatg), and meaning (bvvaµtc)165; finally, they attempted to describe the 
mode of existence of AExTÖv by introducing a new category - 'energy' (TO' 
Evp-M ta; i eveQyeta)166. This dissertation will not focus on these interesting 
issues of Stoic teaching, but will look instead at their use of the terms btävoia, 
Ercivoua and others. 
There is evidence to show that in Stoic philosophy these expressions 
were used as synonymic convertible terms in order to designate the human 
thinking process167. The term btävota, for example, emerges when there is a 
need to indicate a transition from sensation on the one hand, to apprehension 
and thought on the other. Diogenes Laertius quotes an interesting passage from 
the Synopsis of philosophers of Diodes the Magnesian: 
The Stoics agree to put in the forefront the doctrine of 
presentation and sensation ('röv ItEQL 4)av'raaiac Kai 
aiaOrjvecwS kl yov), inasmuch as the standard by which the 
truth of things is tested is generically a presentation (xa"rä 
yEvoq (ýav'rac [a eaTi) and again the theory of assent 
(ovyw, ra0evtc), and that of apprehension (xatällqiPtc) 
and thought (vörlvuc), which precedes all the rest, cannot be 
stated apart from presentation. For presentation comes first; 
then thought (bi. vota), which is capable of expressing 
itself, puts into the form of a proposition that which the 
subject receives from a presentation' 61. 
(transl. R. Hicks) 
'65v. for details Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes, ii; 81ff. 
166 SVF, ii, fr. 318; iii, fr. 31 et alii. 
167 Inasmuch as these two words are synonyms, I shall analyse only the term buavoia; cf. use of 
the word enLvoia in Diogenes Laertius, v% 135. 
M Diogenes Laertius, vii, 49; 1 ad fin. 
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Then, Diogenes explains that the Stoics distinguished (ýavtaQia (process 
of manifestation) and (ýävtaQµa (outcome of manifestation). Thus the 
'outcome of manifestation', is a phenomenon related to the human mind 
(btävota); ý)ävTacµa is similar to our dreams, while (PavTacf. a is the act of 
imprinting something on the soul ((ýavTacia bE Fail TvrccwaiS Ev IPuxi) - of 
course, this association of 'imprint' was not comprehended literally. By the term 
btävota Stoics designated an intellectual sphere of the human mind that deals 
with abstract notions: 
According to them some presentations are data of sense 
and others are not: the former are the impressions 
conveyed through one or more sense-organs; while the 
latter, which is not data of sense, are those received through 
the mind itself, as is the case with incorporeal things and all 
the other presentations which are received by reason'69. 
But this intellectual sphere itself is not an abstract thing; it is in fact 
buzvota that produces an articulate sound of human speech10; moreover, in the 
Stoic system a word of human language (A1 tc) differed from a logos, because 
AiýLc is merely (ýcwvfj EyyQäµµa roc, while a logos (a complete statement or 
sentence) always signifies something, and issues from the mind (4wvt 
rnlµavTLxq äicö btavoiaS bxreµrcoµevI, otov `Hµepa Ea'ri. )"'. Evidently, in the 
Stoic thought biäovoLa is not only a philosophical category; they also use this 
... ovu aia0q rucaü 
b' ai btd tS btavoiac xaOA7xeQ Twv ävwµät wv icai ccäv äAAwv rc, v 169 
A6yc1 Aa tpavoµtvwv. - Diogenes Laertius, vii, 51; if. 
'70 Diogenes Laertius, vii, 55; 5: the notorious 'articulate sound' (f lvaQOQoc 4 
ý) of human 
speech is an utterance of reason (drnö buavoiac 
EK7teµnoµUv1). 
171 ibid., 56; 5f. 
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notion in their anthropology to specify the intellectual faculty as such. In their 
division of the soul, they distinguished five senses, the faculty of speech (TO' 
"Tuxöv µöQLov), the intellectual faculty (rö btavorITUcov), and what they 
called the generative faculty (To' yEvvrIT1xöv); by Tö bl1XVOTlTLKÖV they 
comprehended nothing but buzvoLaM. 
To sum up, the Stoics proceeded from the Platonic theory of language 
that assumes a natural connexion between word and thing, and the premise of 
parallelism between thought and vocal expression. Overall, Stoic views on the 
philosophical aspects of language are a good example of how I)vatc-theory of 
language could be developed into a consistent systematic teaching. Of course, 
their speculations met the same problems that we have already observed in the 
Cratylus and in Aristotelian criticism - ý)ÜQtc-theory in no sense was developed 
coherently. In fact the Stoics struggled with some classical arguments'" that 
demonstrate the inconsistency of the most central premise that name and thing 
are related ontologically. For this reason, Chrysippus proposed a special 
theory174 that considered a number of semantic irregularities such as 
ävco taMai; from what we know about this interesting solution is that the Stoics 
could only note these anomalies as an established fact, but they failed to find a 
satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon. Nevertheless, their progress 
by 
172 ... uai c6 buxvotytucöv, 
ö7teQ to riv aü't btAvota, -- Diogenes Laertius, vii, 110; 7. 
173e. g. names for Athens and Thebes in the Greek language are plural - 
AOf vat, EMPat - while 
in reality these names signify just only one city. At the same time, words 
of µoc, XoQ6r. 
although singular, signify many people. 
14SVFii, p. 6; ii, p. 45, fr. 151,152. 
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comparison with Plato was immense: unlike the disputants of the Cratylus, the 
Stoics seem to be aware that the cause of these anomalies is related not to the 
phonetic sphere, but to what is now called semantics: in the Stoic theory of 
anomalies they analysed the variance between thing and grammatical category 
(rather than merely phoneme). 
§ 1.3.6 Epicurean ideas about human language 
It has been often pointed out by scholars that language did not receive a 
comprehensive examination in Epicurean philosophy 15. Nevertheless, there are 
some fragments which are of interest to our studies. The extreme sensualism of 
Epicurus exerts an interesting influence upon his vision of language. Unlike, for 
example, the Stoics, with their sympathy with rationalism, Epicurus rejects 
rational discourse as an instrument for cognition of the apparent world; rational 
reasoning (o Aoytvµöc) plays an insignificant role in his speculations. 
Epicurean epistemology is based on perception; any further rational analysis of 
perception, in his opinion, is the source of delusion and error. His 
comprehension of the world and human beings is extremely materialistic. Even 
the human soul he regarded as Qcgµa, i. e. a material substance: 
We must next take into account the fact that the soul is a 
body composed of fine particles (t 4iuxli mb pd that 
are dispersed throughout the entire organism, and that it 
bears the dosest resemblance to breath with a certain 
173 cf. H. rlepenbMyrep, IUxaºa 9. uunu. ea, p. 204. 
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admixture of heat, being similar in some ways to the one 
and in some ways to the other. [ ... ] This is all clearly evidenced by the functions and affections of the soul, by the 
ease of its movements and thought processes (ai 
btavoi c ¬ic), and by the privations that cause our death16. 
(transl. G. Strodach) 
Epicurus applies this 'somatic' comprehension to everything that exists, 
because in his philosophical system there is no essence that is not at the same 
time ro ai . ta; there is only an abstract 'emptiness' (-rö KEvöv) that can be 
thought of as an 'incorporeal' (äat to rov) thing. Thus, he infers: 
Hence those who maintain that the soul is incorporeal are 
talking nonsense, because it would not be able to act upon 
or be acted upon if it were of such a nature' 77. 
Epicurus does not distinguish (like Stoics did) between (Pav Tama and 
ävTaaµa; for him, 
The mental images ((ýavtävµata) of madmen and dream 
images are reality (äAi1Oý), since they activate the mind, 
whereas the nonexistent does not thus activate it ('tö bi 
ÖV OÜ KLVEL). 178 
(transl. G. Strodach) 
Epistemologically, all the types of our notions (irivoLaL) are derived 
from perceptions, either by actual contact or by analogy, or resemblance, or 
comparison with some aid from reasoning (b AoyLapoc); but they are all true. 
176 Epicurus, Epistula ad Herodotum, 63; 1-10. in G. Strodach, The philosophy of 
Epicurus: letters, 
doctrines, and parallel passages f rom Lucretius; translated with commentary and an 
introductory essay 
on ancient materialism (Northwestern University 
Press 1963). 
177 Epicurus, Epistula ad Herodotum, 67; 6f. 
in Diogenes Laertius, x, 32; 13f. 
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According to Diogenes' report, the perception of an object always takes priority 
over any rational operation with names or words: 
We could not even have named anything without having 
first leaned of its appearance through the concept. Hence 
concepts are clear and distinct evidences of truth"9. 
(transl. G. Strodach) 
In relation to the nature of words, Epicurus decisively refutes the Stoic 
doctrine of AEw rov; for him there are only two things that do exist, namely 
phoneme (that is clearly corporeal) and an object that is designated by the 
word. Plutarchus subjects this Epicurean point to sharp criticism; he argues that 
by rejecting the sphere of AEKTov (To' Tcov AEK'r V yF-voc), Epicureans 
thoroughly confused the matter, because Aewröv is nothing else but the essence 
of human speech (71 oiaiac TW Aöycp). To deny this AEKTÖV means to leave only 
sounds ('rag 4coväc) and objects (2ä 2vyXavovta) and to consider denotatum 
(ark ta1vö tEva) as non-existentl80. 
Epicurus' seeming opposition to the Stoic philosophy of language was, 
nevertheless, based on the same fundamental premise, viz. the (ýüvic-theory of 
language: name and thing are interrelated ontologically; the difference with 
179 ibid., x. 33; 12f: ovb' äv cbvoµäaaµty Tu µr17tQ6TEQov aütoü Ka T& 7TQ6Afl )Lv 'rbv Tünov 
paOÖvTES. evaQyEic ovv eiauv at 7tQoA1 4)ELc. 
180 Plutarchus, Adversus Colotem, (Stephanus 1119 E; 110: Tairra y&Q ä7zTrTau tv KUot&nArwv 
xai .t yiatwv 
iv 7zQäypaaLv lXov'ra'r v ä7äßv, ov rceQi 4x väc Tu. vac oubC AFKTwv 
aüvtta&u. v ovb' bvoith'rwv auvt Oaav. c' El ye xai. Taüta Tbv ßiov i vatQe7ta, -rives µdl ov 
* u, v ItJ\1µLEAO L 71EQ'L T1v 
NAAa rov, of TÖ T(WV Aactc, v ytvoc ouaiav T(' AOy(, 7LaQtXoV 
dLQbtlv d vatQtitE, Täs qwväs xai Tä Tuyxävov ra p6vov 6noAun6vrEc, Tä be µetatü 
at tau. v6pEva nQdtypara bL' &v yiyov-rat µaOt'aEK btbaancaAiau. r<QOAII)FK vmjo¬K 
dpµai 
auyK ataeicEK, Tö naQ/Cnav ovb' Etvat AMyovTrc;. 
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Plato and the Stoics consists in the comprehension and further interpretation of 
this ontologism. What is a characteristic feature of the Epicurean approach? 
Formally, he argues against the Aristotelian theory of convention: 
Thus, the names of things were not originally created by 
convention. On the contrary, the various ethnic groups of 
mankind, on experiencing their own peculiar emotions and 
sensory impressions, uttered sounds conforming to these 
various emotions and impressions18', each in its own way, 
corresponding to the geographical differences of the 
groups. 
According to Epicurus, there was no kind of primordial language; in his 
opinion, various human languages emerged simultaneously. The appearance of 
new words reflected the individual feelings and sense-presentations of 
primitive people. If in classical Platonism the emphasis is placed on the 
ontological relationship between phoneme and object, Epicurus brings to the 
fore anthropological reflection - cf. his appeal to the 'geographical differences' 
that causes diversity of sounds and, consequently, variety of languages. For this 
reason he even rejects the Platonic theory of övoµa'rovQyöc as absurd: 
It is foolish to suppose that any one person at that time 
allotted names to things, and that mankind learned its first 
words from him. For why should this person have been 
able to designate things by words, and utter the tongue's 
divers sounds, when it is assumed that others were unable 
to do the same? 182 
181 ... Tä 
dvöµaTa it äex is µßj O ci¬t yeviaeat, ä1U' ainäg Täs 4waeL uv ävOQc nwv uaO' 
ixaaTa e vr)... - Diogenes Laertius, x; 75; 9ff. 
182 ibid. 
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An important feature of Epicurus' speculations about language is a 
question about his devotion to the (ýiaK-theory. To all appearances, it was very 
specific; P. Gentinetta has suggested that Epicurus' naturalist comprehension of 
words in relation to things is very close to pre-Socratic philosophyt83, and his 
criticism of the Platonic name-maker-concept is a good example of the fact that 
his comprehension of naturalism was quite original. One can hardly agree with 
I. Perelmuter, who thinks that this was just an attempt by Epicurus to reconcile 
Aristotle and Plato, or to find a kind of synthesis of these two opposite 
doctrines of language. Some passages from Epicurus' letter to Herodotus are 
evidence of the fact that Epicurus was concerned with the problem of language 
origin more systematically. First of all, he speaks about the ontological relation 
between word and object, but his emphasis is laid on human perception, and 
therefore it emerges as a more anthropological vision of language: a number of 
objective agencies influenced the formation of words (phonemes). Epicurus 
interprets this ontologism as follows: primitive people were in fact forced 
(ävayxaaOývat) by nature (ý)vatc), or more concretely, by circumstances 
themselves (v7cö av2wv rcov 7rQaypaTOV) to produce their first sounds; and 
these prehistoric tribes uttered special cries under the impulse of special 
feelings and the special presentations of sense. Next, Epicurus understands that 
this view fails to explain the problem of the development of 
language; 
therefore, he assumes that at the next stage of the origin of language, 
human 
183 P. Gentinetta, op. cit., p. 107. I. Perelmuter, however, emphasises that the 
Epicurean 
philosophical standpoint was much better defined - v. 
Perelmuter, op. cit., p. 206. 
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reason (Ao-ytaµöc) develops human speech. His teaching on the further 
development of language by human reason is truly remarkable; the passage is 
worth quoting in spite of its length: 
Subsequently whole tribes adopted their own special 
names, in order that their communications might be less 
ambiguous to each other and more briefly expressed. And 
as for things not visible (Ttva bE 'Kai oü uuvoeco teva 
7tQäyµa-ra), so far as those who were conscious of them 
tried to introduce any such notion, they put in circulation 
certain names for them, either sounds which they were 
instinctively compelled (ävayxaa6EVTac äva of uat) to 
utter or which they selected by reason on analogy 
according to the most general cause there can be for 
expressing oneself in such a way'&'. 
(Transl. R. Hicks) 
Hence, in the opinion of Epicurus, the ontological connexion was just an 
impulse that caused the utterance of words; moreover, his comprehension of 
this ontologism is substantially different from Plato, and as a result his 
philosophy of language refutes an idea of original 'divine' tongue, or even one 
primordial tongue. The variety of languages, therefore, is caused by the variety 
of agencies that had an impact on the perceptions of various prehistoric human 
tribes (climate, main vital functions, etc). At the next stage, however, it was 
human reason that caused the development of languages; Epicurus notices that 
not all languages developed in a similar way: some of them are possessed of a 
better philosophical apparatus to operate with abstract notions (invisible things 
- oü auvo*w tEva Tcpäypa-ra) and to express 
thoughts with more perfection. 
184 Diogenes Laertius, x; 76; 1-8. 
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This phenomenon is caused by the different intellectual capacities of the best 
representatives of this or that tribe. 
Overall, the philosophy of Epicurus, in spite of its simplicity, is in every 
respect distinguished in comparison with other philosophical trends. It is 
relatively unimportant that the most interesting of his considerations follow 
from a sensualist premise. A crucial conclusion of Epicurus is that ultimately he 
puts the human factor to the fore, and regards human nature as a central 
agency in the formation of human speech. 
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Chapter II: Issues of language and names in early Christian theology 
Obviously, the problem of name entered early Christian theology mainly 
through biblical and liturgical texts. These themes have been comprehensively 
examined in modern biblical theology; some studies of the matter in relation to 
early Christian texts are given by H. Alfeyev and I. Hausherr. The name of God 
has already emerged in the corpus of the NT as an important Christological 
theme. The idea of 'the Name of God' is used to designate the nature of the Son 
in its relation to the Fatherl85; in Paul, however, other motifs are reflected, viz. 
the Name of God designates the personhood of the Son. It has been shown that 
the Name has some characteristics of appellation - it can be given, published, 
called upon, etc. 186; at the same time, the Name of God acts as something that 
does not necessarily imply (or according to some sources totally excludes) an 
idea of phoneme i. e. it cannot be specified as a concrete word or noun, because it is 
said not to be merely a title or epithet. In other words, since Christ is preached 
as the Name of the Father, the Name designates a person different from the 
Father; 'Christ manifests the Name of the Father (In. 17: 6), but this manifestation is his 
own person'187. One must take into consideration that the validity of these two 
distinctions should reasonably be questioned: since we are dealing here with 
185 cf. C. Dodd, The interpretation of the Fourth Gospel 
(Cambridge 1953), p. 96. 
186 J. Danielou regarded this aspect of the name-theology as merely 
'an allusion to baptism and the 
invocation (epiclesis)' (J. Danidlou, Gospel message and Hellenistic culture 
(London 1973), p. 150). But 
taking into account the formative role that this archaic theology played 
in the genesis of liturgy 
and Creeds, such a limitation seems problematic. 
187 J. Danidlou, Gospel, p. 149. 
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archaic mythological thinking, which does not necessarily distinguish or even 
identify these aspects'88. 
11.1 Gnostic interest in names 
The next important step is to see how these elements of name-theology 
appeared or were elaborated in the earliest Christian writings. It should be 
mentioned that in the twentieth century this problem was enthusiastically 
investigated in the context of 'Jewish Christian' studies189. This expression used 
to be an umbrella term for various doctrinal trends amongst early Church 
communities of the first two centuries, which, it was suggested, should be 
technically classified as 'orthodox' Jewish Christianity, 'quasi-orthodox', 
'heterodox', etc. Although nowadays this terminology is very much subject to 
dispute, some results of these studies, especially particular source-studies, are 
still valuable and important. 
In this section I intend to make a detailed analysis of the most influential 
writings of early Christianity, in an effort to determine what particular 
information concerning our inquiry can be derived from each document. The 
first source to be considered is the Valentinian Evangelium Veritatis (EV) from 
the Nag Hammadi Codex, whose discovery in 1945 made revolutionary changes 
188 For special historical and philosophical research on naming 
in mythical thinking and the 
relationship between name and myth, v A. Aocea, 
Q>uwcog$ui u. Me"u (Moscow 1927), esp. 
recently discovered Muo - pa. weprcymoe Maru'ecxoe umji 
in HxA (S. Petersburg 1997) and more 
generally A. AoceB, 4uaAexmuxa Muta (Moscow 
1930). 
189 For a general account v. for example J. Dani4lou, 
Gospel, p. 147-163, R Longenecker, The 
Christology of early Jewish Christianity (London, 1970), pp. 41-46. 
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in our views of some aspects of early Christian theology, in particular on the 
Name of God. Another reason for a thorough analysis of this source is the fact 
that teaching on the Name of God is the central issue of the document, and 
there are no surviving Christian works in which the topic has received such 
detailed attention. 
I should say in advance that I am aware of how divergent Gnostic 
systems appear from various documents of Codex Askewianus, Codex Brucianus, 
Papyrus Beroliensis 8502, Jung Codex and from reports made by Justin, Irenaeus, 
Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Tertullian, Eusebius, Hippolytus, Theodorite, 
Epiphanius, and Augustine. In this section there is no need to consider this 
massive corpus of sources in order to suggest a satisfactory classification of all 
Gnostic theories of names, or divine names. Rather I shall mainly focus on the 
Valentinian Gospel of Truth and its theory of the Father's Name, that in 
comparison to the other Gnostic wrings has receive the most detailed 
elaboration; some interesting parallels with other sources will also be drawn. 
The EV presents a special problem for our inquiry, because several 
passages from its final section strongly remind us of a number of Christological 
expressions we have already encountered. This has caused some scholars to 
believe that the EV 
... contains a 
Christology of the Name more explicit and 
more fully developed that any other, while its Gnostic 
'ý,;; 
ý .,. '"i 
ý ý: 
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character is so little discernible that it provides evidence of 
a very pure Jewish Christian theology190. 
In what follows I shall claim that despite the fact that the author of this 
Gnostic homily undoubtedly made use of some early Christian definitions of 
the Son, a more complex examination of this teaching demonstrates that one 
should not be so confident about these similarities. 
There is a need to explain why such an examination of the Gnostic 
doctrine is important for our inquiry and why the EV in particular seems to be 
the best example for this purpose. Our interest in the Gnostic mythological 
teachings can by no means be restricted only to the attack undertaken by e. g. 
Justin or Irenaeus and the resulting appearance of the first systematic 
expositions of faith in the second century. The problem of the Gnostic 
movement is much more significant. Suffice to say that the writings of Clement 
and Origen show a very good acquaintance with Gnostic ideas. The famous 
Gnostic definition of the relationship between the Father and the Son as being 
between Unbegotten and Begotten seems to reflect the agenda of the Eunomean 
controversy. Furthermore, in 367, i. e. at the very time when somebody decided 
to conceal the library in Nag Hammadi, Athanasius in his thirty ninth Easter 
epistle condemns those Christians who 'dare to compile books called mysterious (tä 
'90 J. Danielou, Gospel, p. 157. R. Longenecker slavishly follows J. Danielou and even concludes 
triumphantly that the Name of Jewish Christianity is the equivalent of the 
Greek oi)via - op. cit., 
p. 46. 
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ik yö tEva ä tz xev(ýa) and to confuse them with -rrj Oeorrv¬vcTOcw ypa4» 191)'. 
This epistle was shortly afterwards translated into Coptic by Theodorus, the 
head of the Pachomian monasteries in High Egypt, and distributed amongst the 
monks. 
§ 11.1.1 Valentinian theology of the Divine Name: 'Christology of the Name' 
or mythology of paradox? 
It is not impossible that EV was already known to Irenaeus, who reports 
that the treatise entitled the Gospel of Truth was composed in Valentinian 
circles192. The masterpiece of the EV was almost certainly written in Greek'93, but 
the text only survived in Subachmimic and, extremely fragmentarily, in Sahidic 
dialect. The language of the document is sometimes remarkably Christian; at 
the same time the general teaching of the EV194 contains many Valentinian ideas, 
combined with numerous motifs common to many schools of the Gnostic 
movement195. 
191 Athanasius, Epistila festalis xxxix. 
'92Irenaeus, Adversus haereses, lib. iii, 11,9. B. Layton argues for Valentinian authorship - The 
Gnostic Scriptures (London 1987), p. 250 ff; for more specified reasons for Valentinian authorship 
v. J. Helderman, A Christian Gnostic Text. The Gospel of Truth, 
Gnosis and Hermetism: From 
Antiquity to Modern Times, ed. by R. van den Broek and W. Hanegraaf (New York 1997), pp. 53- 
68. 
193 For a Greek retroversion of the text v. J. E. Mdnard, L'Evangile 
de Virite: Retroversion Grecque et 
Commentaire (Paris 1962), pp. 31-71. 
1% for an analysis of the theological system of the 
EV v. H. Jonas, Evangelium Veritatis and the 
Valentinian speculations, StPt 6, pp. 96-111; H. Ringgren, 
The Gospel of Truth and Valentinian 
Gnosticis, StTh 18 pp. 51-65; H. Attridge NHC xxii, pp. 71-76. 
I" H. Ringgre in his comparative analysis claims that one could 
hardly determine in which 
particular school the EV was produced (op. cit., p. 
65). 
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The formal organisation of the EV is far from being satisfactory or 
systematic: the major themes are given in the form of paradoxical and 
metaphorical definitions, while the impression of conceptuality is made by 
constant vague allusions to a number of different topics. The concept of the 
Name of the Father196 is, in contrast to other Gnostic speculations over names, 
an important element simultaneously employed in the teaching about the Sonl97 
and soteriology, while in the final section of the document it is presented in an 
independent form. Before turning to these famous passages about the Name, let 
us now consider the doctrinal context of the teaching on the Father's Name and 
the general concept of name. 
§ 11.1.2 The Father, cosmos and beings 
The teaching about the Father is, perhaps, the clearest theme of the 
treatise. He is perfect, (18.33), he is also kind, sweet, and good. But more often 
the exposition insists on apophatic definitions of the Father'": He is infinite 
(31.19), he is the absolute that is above all needs or limitations (42.6ff), 
196 The supreme absolute is always called the Father; the word 'God' (pnoute) appeared only 
once, in 37.33. 
197 In fact, the relationship between the Son and Jesus Christ is very unclear. In the EV 
Jesus 
Christ is only a 'hidden mystery of the Father', who 'enlightened those who were 
in darkness 
through oblivion. He enlightened them; he showed (them) a way; and the way 
is the true which 
he taught them'. (18.15ff). 
1% For an analysis of Gnostic apophatic terminology v. S. Laeuchli, 
The language of faith: an 
introduction to the semantic dilemma of the Early Church (London 1962) p. 23f. 
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incomprehensible, beyond any thought (37.27ff), unbegotten (38.33), and finally 
the Father does [not] have a name at all (38.34) or as is said in the Allogenes (47,18; 
54.36) the Father is the Unnameablel99. 
The question about the relationship between the Father and creation is of 
special interest; in fact it is given in an integral form of two paradoxes. The 
totality of the apparent world was within the Father 'and the totality was in 
need of him'; then, the totality emanated from and was fashioned by the Father, 
but simultaneously is still within his Godhead (19.1ff). Such ideas as 'need of 
the totality' and the everlasting presence of the totality within the Father is 
merely one of many circularities of the EV doctrine: 
... the Father, from whom the beginning came forth, to 
whom all will return who have come forth from him200. 
37.35ff 
This can be interpreted in the sense that the totality everlastingly 
proceeds from the Father and everlastingly returns to him. All beings including 
human beings are his emanations (rQo(3oA1); the character of these emanations 
is described as a father-child relationship: 
199 The definition of the Father as 'Unnameable' (atonomaze mmo) often appears in Gnostic (and 
esp. Valentinian) works and is also very frequent in the Nag Hammadi texts: e. g. 
I Ap. Jas 4.20. It 
should be indicated that in Gnostic writings overall we are not dealing with a concrete and 
well-conceived apophatic theology. Very frequently the Father or 
God is initially said to be 
unnameable (because name is an attribute of created being). But then the 
Father's name is said 
to exist in its unrevealable form (Egypt. 43.19), his name cannot 
be uttered (Egypt. 40.14) and 'his 
unrevealable name is inscribed, on the tablet' (Egypt. 43.20), 
it is called an invisible symbol 
(Egypt. 44.1). Finally, however, it is still possible for Gnostic theology to ascribe many names to 
the Father (or the Mother) that are both masculine and feminine respectively. 
It is highly likely 
that these are just apophatic metaphors; thus, for example, the aeons can also 
be unnameable 
(Egypt. 54.7), the Spirit is unnameable and uncallable (Egypt. 44.11f). 
200 References to the EV are from the translation by G. MacRae in NHC vol. xxii. 
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They have known that they came forth from him like 
children who are from a grown man. 
27.9ff 
Thus, all beings were within the Father; this original condition should 
not be understood as saying that they did not exist at all or existed as ideas. 
Rather, they existed in potentia: although they did not know the Father, they 
knew that 
... they had not yet received form (MOp4 H) nor yet 
received a name (PEN), each one of which the Father 
begets. 
27.16ff 
Thus, the Father willingly brings a being into existence by giving it a 
form (sometimes the Latin forma -4 OFMH) and name (37.29ff). Inasmuch as 
the Coptic for 'being' - 'M&C IT' - can mean both animate and inanimate 
object, according to the EV words (the names of things) are of divine origin"'. 
This opinion, according to Clement of Alexandria, was held by Theodotus, who 
for these purposes adopts the Pythagoreans' teaching about onomaturgos2; 
Theodotus affirmed that the Holy Spirit 'imprinted his mind' ('rt v a&rov 
btävoLav bx'rvrwaäµEvov) with words and expressions. 
201 cf. some similar conclusions of J. Fineman (J. Fineman, 
Gnosis and the piety of metaphor: the 
Gospel of Truth, Rediscovery (Leiden, 1989), pp. 297-301. 
In a later variant of the Valentinian 
teaching, the view on names is the opposite: cf. Gos. Phil. 53.25 ad 
fin. 
= Clemens Alexandrinus, Eclogg propheticz, 32 ad fin. 
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II. 1.3 The Word and the Spirit. 
The principal emanation of the Father is not the totality, but the Word 
that comes forth from the Pleröma, i. e. the divine world. The Word is also said to 
be 'in the thought and in the mind of the Father' (16.35ff), but nevertheless it is 
still at the top of the ontological hierarchy. However, the mode of its 
manifestation is twofold: it goes forth in the totality as an impression of the 
Father's will; 'it supports the totality'; simultaneously, the soteriological process 
of purification and perfection of the true Gnostics by bringing them back to into 
the Father ontologically modifies the Word, which in its turn also receives the 
impression of this totality (23.33ff). In the EV the relationship between the 
incarnation of the Word and Jesus Christ is more than uncertain. The 
appearance of the Word in the body has caused world catastrophe; the author 
plays with two different meanings of the term 'Word', he prefers the term 
CWM& to Johannine C64' (J. -E. Menard argues that this is Platonic acilµa Tov 
xö(7µov - Tim. 32d203) 
When the Word appeared, the one that is within the heart 
of those who utter it - it is not a sound alone but it became 
a body -a great disturbance took place... 
26.4ff 
The EV attaches a number of titles to the principal emanation of the 
Father; to some extent there are no cardinal differences between these 
203 J. _ J... Menard, op. cit., p. 
126. 
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numerous epithets, because they always appear as interchangeable synonyms: 
the Word of the Father is the Son, the Mouth, the Will, the Truth, the Saviour, 
etc. and the finally - the Name'4. There is only one epithet, as has been 
mentioned, that presents a problem viz. the name 'Jesus Christ'. In the 
contrast with another Valentinian work, The Treatise on the Resurrection, where 
Jesus Christ is called the Lord, the Saviour (Treat. Res. 43.35), the Son of Man and 
the Son of God that existed in flesh (C& PI) (44.13ff), in the EV the role of 
Christ's passion, death and the resurrection for the soteriological process is 
regarded as secondary, or even as a series of random historical events: Jesus 
Christ merely revealed the Book of living at the cost of his life, because since the 
Book was written within the Father's incomprehensibility, the one who takes it 
must be slain (20.1ff). 
Much less interest is shown in pneumatology. The role of the Holy Spirit 
is very different from other Gnostic theories206; thus, it is not a spirit imprisoned 
in matter, but the revealed 'bosom of the Father' (24.9ff), 'the Tongue of the 
Father' (the Word is sometimes called 'the Mouth of the Father') and his 
revelation to his aeons (26.34ff). More specifically, the Holy Spirit seems to be a 
mediator between mankind and the Father, and an instrument of the revelatory 
activity of the Son (34.16) 
m cf. Interp. Know., 12.30. 
2 for a different Gnostic view of the name 'Jesus Christ' v. Valentinian 
Gos. Phil. 56.5ff; 62.10ff; 
64.25ff. 
w6 H. Ringgren op. cit. p. 57. 
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§ 11.1.4 Names of true Gnostics in the book of life 
At the next stage, the soteriological process turns into a manifestation of 
the Book of life. In the EV, however, this Book is said to be written in the 
thought and the mind of the Father; W. Attridge suggests that 'the Book is thus 
like revealing the Word itself and the totality'207. The concept of the Book as 
Revelation is bound up with unclear speculations about the names of people 
(that are written in this Book - 21.26-22.20)208. The main idea is that the Father 
knows the name of a true Gnostic, because he has uttered these names himself; 
the ignorant person, by contrast, has no name and has no call. This divine 
utterance of a name, now also said to be written in the Book of life, is a reason 
for both the existence and perfection of the true Gnostic that is from above 
(22.4), whereas the miserable ignorant person does not have a name at all. 
It is highly likely that in the EV we are frequently dealing with an 
attempt to integrate two different concepts. Thus, there are two different 
notions of 'name' and 'word' which appear at different stages of the 
speculation. In the final section about the Father's Name, the author attempts to 
synthesise them, but does so in a very unsafe way209. On the one hand, name 
and word remain the same as the Greek ovo ta; in this very sense it is a 
constituent of human language. The names of beings appeared in the course of 
NHC, vol. xxii p. 87; cf. also 23.1ff. 
is cf. Gos. Phil. 54.6 ad fin. 
cf the points of Plotinus and Porphyrius who bring similar accusations against a similar 
manner of thought in the Gnostics v. Enneades, 1 
9, Vita Plotini, 16. 
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creation, or 'emanation of the totality'; beings have been emanated by the 
Father who has fashioned and named them: name, as has been mentioned, is an 
attribute of a creature. This is a reason why the speculations about the Son in EV 
are so rich in language associations: the Son is the Word of the Father, the Word 
is the Truth and the Mouth, the Spirit is the Tongue, whereas the Father as the 
Supreme Being is above the sphere of naming. 
Simultaneously, this comprehension is combined with a completely 
different intuition of the naming process. For the first time, these motifs emerge 
in the teaching about the names of true Gnostics; in contrast to the idea that the 
Father brings forth all beings by giving them form and name and that nothing 
can exist otherwise, the author elaborates a theory that true Gnostics have 
received a unique and mysterious name (21.26ff). The Father knew these names 
in advance and has then uttered them. Next, this name is a key instrument in 
the process of salvation, because it allows a true Gnostic recognise the Father, 
and these names allow the Father to reveal himself to the elect: one who has 
knowledge about the Father is one whose name has been uttered; he whose 
name has not been spoken is ignorant. The speculations about salvation (as 
salvation from the darkness of ignorance) are given in the following way: the 
distinction between a name that was uttered by the Father and a Gnostic 
himself disappears. A revealed or emanated name everlastingly comes back to 
the Father and thereby brings back to the Father the possessor of this name 
1 10 
(22.12ff)210. One should bear in mind that this kind of circularity is a striking 
feature of the EV: it has been observed in cosmology and in the teaching about 
the emanation of the Word. 
This mysterious concept of divinely uttered names is strongly associated 
with such common Gnostic ideas as the Seed that is inseminated in the soul of a 
true Gnostic, and yields the fruit of knowledge of the way of salvation. This 
concept is of special interest to us, because something very similar is to be 
found in the writings of Eunomius. The author is not concerned with clarity, 
and does not attempt to resolve the cascades of contradictory definitions; an 
attempt to clarify this twofold concept of name appears only in the section 
dedicated to the Father's Name. We are now in a better position to understand 
the famous passages on the Name of the Father. 
11.1.5 The Name is the Word and the Son 
The section about the Name begins with a similar paradoxical formula; 
the author makes play of two different senses of the word 'name'; it 
is necessary 
to quote the whole passage in spite of its length: 
And they (the things that created) have appeared for the 
glory and the joy of his name. Now the name of the 
Father 
is the Son. It is he (i. e. the Father) who first gave a name to 
the one who came forth from him, who was himself, 1°and 
he begot him as a son. He gave him his name which 
210 According to another Gnostic hymn (Disc. 8-9 61.8) the name of the 
Grace 'is hidden inside of 
man'. 
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belonged to him; he is the one to whom belongs all that 
exist around him, the Father. He is the name; his is the Son. 
It is possible for him to be seen. The name, however, is 
invisible because it alone is the mystery of the invisible 
which comes to ears that are completely filled with it by 
him. For indeed, the Father's name is not spoken, but is 
apparent through a Son. 
In this way, then, the name is a great thing... 
38.5-24. 
The context goes on to elaborate the idea that the Word is the Son, and 
the Son is now the Name of the Father21. In the EV the Word and the Name of 
the Father are interchangeable synonyms; the name 'Jesus Christ' does not seem 
to be important212. Having defined the Son as the Word of the Father (and vice 
versa) the author is forced to explain his doctrine of the Name. 
The Father, who is first said not to have any name (the latter term clearly 
designates title, epithet, word of the spoken language), is now said to have a 
Name, and this Name is the Son. The second part of the paradox has been hotly 
discussed by scholars213. It is commonly held that the idea of designating the 
Son as God's Name is related to biblical theology and the personification of the 
Divine Name. Some similar associations are common for New Testament 
theology214 and early Church writings215. The Gnostic authors undoubtedly 
make use of New Testament Christological expressions, but this element is 
211 cf. I Ap. Jas 4.22. The Son is also unnameable, but is said to receive many names and 
two of 
them from the Father. 
212 In the Gospel of Thomas, for example, apart from the given name 'Jesus 
Christ', the Lord has 
a true name that an ignorant person cannot hear. 
213 v. for details and bibliography NHC, vol. xxxiii p. 117ff. 
214 e. g. Phil 2: 9-12, John 12: 28,17: 12, Heb 1: 4, Acts 2: 
21. 
215e. g. Hermas, Sim. 8.10.3,9.13.2f, 9.14.5f, I Clem. 
58.1,60.4, Did. 10.2. cf. for details the 
investigation of H. Alfeyev, on whom I rely in relation to this question: op. cit., vol. 
i, pp. 59-70. 
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foreign to the author's system, and he is forced to adopt this theme and to 
provide his audience with further explanations: 
Since the Father is uncreated, it is he alone who has brought 
him forth for himself as a name, before he set in order the 
aeons, that the name of the Father as lord should be over 
their head, which truly is the name, secure in his command 
(and) in perfect power. For the name is not one of words. 
and his name is <not> appellations, but it is invisible2'6. 
38.34-39.5 
To what extent the suggestion that this passage as 'evidence of a very pure 
Jewish Christian theology'217 is correct is relatively unimportant. But what we are 
facing here is a crucial process into which the author dares to enter. He attempts 
to explain the archaic name-theology using the language of the period, and 
does so against the background of other thought forms. The author of the EV is 
keen to adopt the New Testament definition of the Son as the Name of God, but 
in his use of this term there is a conflict: name in Scripture and name in the 
Valentinian sense are actually two different words; he now attempts to solve 
the problem. S. Laeuchli emphasises that 'this desire to establish a certain relation 
of speech to the world of the New Testament is by no means a peripheral concern'218. 
But to what extent is this attempt successful? 
216 transl. from NHC v. ii, p. 67; cf. K. Grobel, The Gospel of Truth (New 
York 1960), p-184: 'For the 
(concept) of "Name" does not belong to the class of words, nor 
His Name (to that) of 
appellations'. 
217 J. Danielou, Gospel, p. 157. 
218 S. Laeuchli, op. cit., p. 21. 
113 
The above-quoted passage seems to have an interesting parallel with EV 
23.1ff, which illuminates the problem from another angle: 
This is the knowledge of the living book which he revealed 
to the aeons, at the end, as [his letters], reveal that they are 
not vowels nor are they consonants, so that one might read 
them and think of something foolish, but they are letters of 
the truth which they alone speak who know them. Each 
letter is a complete <thought> like a complete book, since 
they are letters written by the Unity, the Father having 
written them for the aeons in order that by means of his 
letters they should know the Father. 
Who, therefore, will be able to utter a name for him, the 
great name, except him alone to whom the name belongs 
and the sons of the name in whom rested the name of the 
Father, (who) in turn themselves rested in his name? Since 
the Father is unengendered, he alone is the one who begot 
him for him(self) as a name, before he brought forth the 
aeons, in order that the name of the Father should be over 
their head as lord, that is the name in truth, which is firm in 
his command through perfect power. 
38.25-39.1 
To sum up, in the Gnostic literature we come across something 
substantially different from the standard treatment of the matter. The treatment 
of name or divine name is taken by the Gnostics in a totally non-philosophical 
way. The standard questions so characteristic of any scientific discussion are 
omitted completely. It is highly likely that the original sources for Gnostic 
speculation about names were inspired by magical practice, biblical name- 
theology or even the general treatment of name in a mythological world 
outlook. At the same time, it is evident that the 
Gnostic authors did not feel 
obliged to correlate their 'name-theology' with any of 
the established sources 
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they were inspired by. From this point of view it becomes clear why Gnostic 
views of names, as well as their numerical interpretations, varied so 
dramatically from one school to another, and therefore provoked constant 
accusations of inconsistency and self-contradiction. We shall return to this issue 
later on in this section, when considering Irenaeus' preoccupation with the 
system of Marcus. 
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11.2 Tustin the Martyr 
Our special concern is with Justin and his ideas about words of language, 
together with his comprehension of the divine titles. J. Quasten once wrote: 
'Analysing the theology of St. Justin, we must remember that we do not possess a complete and 
exhaustive description of the Christian faith from his pen'219. At the same time, there is 
still serious dispute amongst Justin scholars about 
a) the principal influences on the agenda and method of his theology 
b) the extent to which one should consider Justin an apophatic thinker. 
As M. Edwards pointes out, 'it seems for many scholars that there were two Justin': one, 
who produced the Dialogue, can be truly identified as a biblical theologian, who 
evolves his doctrine on the basis of allegorical exegesis of the Scriptures; while 
'the other Justin' appears rather as a Christian philosopher, who often 'leaves his 
Bible at his back'220, shows more interest in the rational representation of Christian 
faith, and claims that Christianity is 'µövjv (ýtlovo4 iav ko4 aAfj rE xal 
ni 4OQov'. 
Since P. Widdicomb& has recently disputed the point of R. Mortley 
who claims that 'Justin Martyr is the first Christian thinker to argue 
in any depth that God 
can be characterized in negative terms only'm and the proposal of 
L. Barnard that in 
219 Quasten, J. Patrology (Westminster 1950), vol. i, p. 
207. 
220 Edwards, 
n' P. Widdicombe, Justin Martyr's Apophaticism, Stet. 26 (2001), p. 
313. 
2n Mortley, R. op. cit., vol. 2, p. 33. 
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Justin's mind two concepts of God (Middle Platonic transcendent Supreme 
Being and the biblical immanent Deity) are unreconciled, a number of 
important problems like the question of revelation through the Son as a formal 
epistemological topic, and the extent to which Justin is concerned with analogy 
methodologically, has been reconsidered in a relatively new way. 
In relation to our question, the remark of J. Quasten is more than true: 
perhaps, the absence of the original works of Justin on the one hand, and quite 
fragmentary224 and disputable evidence about our issue derived from the works 
that survived on the other, seems to force some scholars to think that it is a 
profitless task to look for his account of language and name. In spite of the fact 
that in the writings of Justin we come across one of the earliest inquiries into the 
validity of the divine titles that are commonly applied to the Deity, in Justin's 
scholarship this aspect was mainly treated in the context of his 'apophaticism'225 
or his theology of divine names226. Justin's general teaching on the nature of 
name and language in the monographs dedicated to the history of mediaeval 
linguistic theories is, with very rare exceptions, traditionally ignored227. 
The need for this kind of analysis is, however, indisputable. Thus, for 
example, S. Laeuchli, who seems to make a great play of the idea of 'unreconciled 
W L. Barnard, Justin Martyr: his lifte and thought (Cambridge 1967), p. 83. 
224 for a discussion of the structure and argumentation consequences of the surviving authentic 
works of Justin v. T. Homer, Listening to Trypho: uncovering the subtext of Justin's Dialogue in 
StPt. vol. 36, pp. 249-255. 
W as, for example, R. Mortley does in his From Word to Silence, vol. 2, ch. 2. 
226 e. g. en. M lapuoH (AA4eea). op. cit., vol. i, pp. 61-70. 
m Only Y. Edelshtein makes a casual remark about Justin's view on the relationship between a 
subject and its title - v. 10.34eAbUMAH, 
Ilpo&wmw x3axa, p. 202f. 
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concepts in Justin mind', in his semantic analysis of Justin's theological terms 
advances the opinion that 'Justin is the classical instance of the semantic conflict arising 
from a Christian conversion's and classifies Justin's theological methods as 'the 
schizophrenia in this linguistic situation'229. 
In this section, however, I shall attempt to answer the question as to 
what Justin really thinks about the words of human language; I shall argue that 
Justin's general teaching on the words of human language is not isolated from 
his theology of divine titles, while he already appears to be aware that the 
mystical theology of the name 'Jesus' should be examined separately as a very 
special phenomenon of early Church liturgical life, and shows remarkable 
accuracy there. I shall suggest that although one can scarcely reconstruct his 
original system in full, it is at least not right to regard his theory of the divine 
titles as something that emerged unsystematically or 'schizophrenically' from 
his philosophical background. 
= S. Laeuchli, op. cit., p. 178. 
2n ibid., p. 184. 
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§ 11.2.1 Language: word, name, sense, and essence 
In the Dialogue when Justin speaks about the nature of the Logos230, he 
resorts to an analogy between the manner of the Logos' origin and the origin of 
words231 that is often ignored by the scholars who analyse Justin's line of 
argumentation about the status of religious language and his apophaticism. The 
following paragraph is of special interest: 
But do we not see that this is much the same as takes place 
within ourselves? For when we put forward any word, we 
beget a word, not putting it forth by scission, as though the 
word within us was diminished. 
Dial. 61.2232 
The suggestion with which I start my analysis of this section is a simple 
one: as will be shown, for Justin all titles that describe the divine are without 
2I shall purposely leave aside here this central aspect of Justin's system in order to look at it in 
full later; suffice to say that at the earliest stages of Patristic theology the comprehension of the 
Son as the divine Logos, as well as the exegesis of e. g. Gen 1: 3ff (icai Ftltev 6 Oehc yevtei 'rw 
caws Kai eyevvro 1)(DS) takes on a special 'non-linguistic' nature of the Logos and non-verbal 
character of 'the creation by word'. 
231 There are many similar examples in the literature of the time: Tertullian, Apologia, 21; Prax., 8; 
Lactantius, Inst. div., iv. 29.; Irenaeus, however, is already more precise concerning such kinds of 
parallel - AH, ii. 13; cf. Theophilus Apol. Ad Autol., i. 3 and his explanation of the names AöyoS, 
, 4p6vrlauc, etc. Theophilus' account is an interesting instance of how these kinds of 
analogies are related to the sphere of the cataphatic definitions of the divine. Justin, however, 
do not seem to use analogy as a systematic method (as will be observed in Clement of 
Alexandria). Justin seems to attach importance to this comparison between the manner of the 
Logos' origin on the one hand, and words of human speech and fire on the other. Tatian, who 
was his disciple, repeats his analogy verbatim - Tatianus, Oratio ad Grxcos, 5: 'I myself, for 
instance, talk, and you hear; yet, certainly, I who converse do not become destitute of speech 
(A yoc) by the transmission of speech, but by the utterance of my voice I endeavour to reduce 
to order the unarranged matter in your minds. And as the Logos begotten in the beginning, 
begat in turn our world, having first created for Himself the necessary matter, so also I, in 
imitation of the Logos, being begotten again, and having become possessed of the truth, am 
trying to reduce to order the confused matter which is kindred with myself . 
2M trans. of A. Lukyn Williams from ANF vol. i. 
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fail words of our language; it is, therefore, important first to make clear what 
Justin really thinks about the words of human language. 
The passage, however, is a difficult one; Justin, of course, is far from 
confusing the Logos and words of human language; his only point here is that 
the manner of the Son's origin does not 'lessen' the nature of the Father, just as 
human speech does not somehow 'lessen' or 'exhaust' human reason. The word 
logos in relation to human beings signifies here both the thinking power of man 
or his reason (ö Ev i iiv Al yoc)m which produces ideas, and the manifestation 
of these ideas that are the words of human language (oi Al yot'rLvES); in fact, 
Justin passes from one meaning to the other2m. Although he speaks about the 
words of human language in their totality, special attention should be paid to 
his emphasis on pronunciation, i. e. on the phonemic manifestation of words. 
Literally, the phonetic representation (t rrQopavL; ) of words (oi Al yoL TLvES) is 
a result of their genesis ('rö yEvvrlµa) in the depth of man's reason (b Ev tj µiv 
Aöyoc); literally, men beget the words (yevvcj 7Lv roils AOyovc) without any 
'quantitative change' of the voüc. 
Before turning to a more detailed examination of this idea, it seems 
reasonable to scrutinise some of his other theories. It 
has been pointed out by Y. 
w or more specifically 6 voüs. (Greek text acc. to ed. of 
E. J. Goodspeed, in Die ältesten 
Apologeten (Göttingen 1915)). 
2N cf. transl. of A. Roberts & J. Donaldson, and their comment 
ANF vol i. n223. 
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Andia2 that Justin makes a distinction between ovo to O¬'röv i. e. 'a given' or 
'proper name' (just as tbta övopa amongst the Grammarians) and ovo to 
xotvöv (or rteöQprlQtr,, rrQoaayoQ¬vµa, xAýQtc, etc. ); the latter group of terms 
can be better translated as 'a general notion', 'title', or 'epithet' in the broad 
sense of the word. In the first instance, Justin would strongly object to any idea 
of divine language: his line of reasoning is that the gods of the Greek pantheon 
are nothing but demons, who deceived people, usurped the title 'Oeöc' (i. e. a 
word of human language already in use), and appropriated different proper 
names according to their desire and choice'. Undoubtedly, both ovoµa Oetc v 
and ovoµa xotvov belong to the sphere of human language - they are begotten 
by reason, but the difference between these two notions is fundamental. 
Let us consider now what Justin really thinks about human words. The 
words of our language designate a subject or, in his elegant philosophical 
reservation, a class of subjects237. For Justin the genesis of words is restricted to 
the sphere of human nature only because, as has already been mentioned, 
language for Justin cannot be an original divine invention or a supernatural gift. 
It is especially interesting that he does not follow the Philonic tradition that 
attempted to synthesise the Jewish idea of a perfect primordial language (i. e. 
235 v. Y. Andia, Jesus, Seigneur et Christ. Trinite et Christologie chez Irene de Lyon et Basile de 
Cesar* 
in Paper at the International encounter of Patrologists of East and West on the Theme 'Christ 
according to the Greek and Latin Fathers of the First Millennium in Europe' (Vienna, 7- 
10.06.2001). 
Ap., 5. 
2N cf. Dial., 42: Such a thing as you may witness in the body: although the members are 
enumerated as many, all are called one, and are a body. For, indeed, a commonwealth and a 
church, though many individuals in number are in fact as one, called and addressed 
by one 
appellation ( µL4 is t aet)" Here and infra trans. of A. Roberts & 
J. Donaldson (ANF vol. 1). 
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Hebrew) with the Platonic concept of the notorious rcpc, -rat (Pcovai that were 
later spoiled. It is indicative as well that in his dispute with Hellenistic-minded 
opponents, Justin does not show much interest in the phoneme and etymology 
of words that, as we have seen, was extremely popular in the Hellenistic science 
that followed Stoic philology: whenever he deals with a foreign word, he 
merely gives a translation from Hebrew (or Syriac)239. 
In the First Apology, Justin accuses Roman prosecutors of prosecuting 
Christians only on the basis of their title (i. e. övoµa xoLvov or KAM ms 
'Christians') and endeavours to demonstrate philosophically that this state of 
affairs contradicts not only the general principles of justice and Roman law, but 
also logic and common sense. Strictly speaking, this is not an original idea: the 
reasons for the persecution, and the reason why the name 'Christian' was 
hated240 were different and Justin is entirely aware of that. It seems that he 
undertakes a philosophical treatment of word in its relation to its meaning (t 
n iliac a) to make a smoother rhetorical transition from the argumentum ad 
absurdum (the persecution of Christians on the basis of their title only is 
ridiculous and absurd) to the argumentum ad hominem (the goverrunent instead 
of protecting and looking after them, puts to death its best and most law- 
2m In contrast, for example, with some Church writers, Justin in his treatment of the word 6 
Oeöc says that it is 'not a name but incomprehensible knowledge that is implanted in the nature 
of man' (Ap. sec., 6) does not resort to the Stoic-like etymology of the word: cf. Theophilus, Ad 
Autolycum, lib. i, 4; 2ff: 8e6s bk AeyETal btä T6 TeOtLKtval Tä 7t6LvTa ini'n eauToü ßa4 aMa, 
Kai Wt Td 6f ¬LV" Tb bi BEEN E('TLV TÖ TQkX, cLv Kai KIVEN Kai &EgyEiV Kal TQt4)FIV, Kai 
nQovoeiv Kai KV EQVäV Kat &Wonoleiv Tä nävta. 
2" cf. Justin's explanation of the word 'Satan' - Dial., 103. 
20 cf. Theophilus, Ad Autol., lib. i, 1: Theophilus convinces Autolycus that the title 'Christian' is 
not an outrage. 
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abiding citizens). His point, however, is that as there is no ontological or natural 
relationship between a subject and its title, the fact that a thing bears a 
particular title, or a subject (a class of subjects) appropriates a particular ovopa 
xoivov, cannot be regarded as a criterion for judgement either juridical or 
dialectical. To articulate his point in the language of Plato, Justin does not 
believe that the notorious o'QOö 2ä Tiva 'rWv övopavcav are somehow related 
to words themselves, and, therefore, the criterion for judgement can be derived 
neither from a phonetic (etymological) analysis, nor from the i rnq tavia of a 
word (Christians) that is uncritically associated with them in the popular 
mind241. Words are determined by man, and are an artefact of human nature, 
but what is the nature of this determining, a merely Aristotelian xa tä 
QuvOrjxrjv? I think that it would be a grave error to assume that in the case of 
Justin's treatment of language one comes across any adoption of Aristotle. To 
all appearances, Justin goes much further, stressing a very important aspect of 
word: 
By the mere application of a name, nothing is decided, 
either good or evil, apart from the actions implied in the 
name and indeed, so far at least as one may judge from the 
name we are accused of, we are most excellent people. 
For from a name neither praise nor punishment could 
reasonably spy unless something excellent or base in 
action be proved. And those among yourselves who are 
accused you do not punish before they are convicted; but in 
our case you receive the name as proof against us, and this 
although, so far as the name goes, you ought rather to 
punish our accusers. 
241 cf his joke in Ap., 4 based on a pun on Xpwrtavoi and icp aTOL 
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I 
Ap. 4 
Certainly, ovoµa xolvov cannot be a criterion for judgement; 
furthermore, the fact that a subject bears no name cannot be of absolute 
significance. Originally, the övoµa xotvov, being produced by human reason, 
has its fixed meaning (i ug4aaia) that is associated with the phoneme, but a 
title as such can be applied to a subject in a proper and improper way. If, 
therefore, the ovoµa xotvov is applied properly, the ij cmjiaaia of a title 
correctly determines the subject or the group of subjects, and distinguishes it 
from other subjects or groups; but if it is attached by error the title is misleading 
and deceptive. What, therefore, can be regarded as a safe criterion for 
judgement? Answering this question, Justin points out that the criterion for 
determining whether a subject bears or appropriates a name or title correctly is 
only related to the sphere of o Ev rj tiv Al voS, i. e. to the same organ or agency 
that begets words. 
He exemplifies this idea in full: the title O¬ös designates an 
incomprehensible concept of the deity that is supernaturally implanted into the 
human mind242, but demons have usurped and appropriated this title; the title 
'philosopher' might be applied to the really wise and to those who pretend to 
be wise; finally, 'ro' övopa xoLvov 'XQLuTLavoi' is appropriated by both true 
members of the Church and some Gnostics; the former bear this title correctly 
U2 It is important to underline that for Justin it is not a word that is somehow imprinted in the 
human mind, but the concept! Thus what is prima facie a small philosophical difference will later 
be of crucial importance for our final formula of the Christian view on names. 
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for they act as Christians by following the teaching of Christ, while the latter have 
usurped the title and are called and considered to be Christians by mistake2"3. In 
order to persuade his opponents Justin recommends them, in the first instance, 
to look at Christian doctrine (this is why Justin attaches a brief exposition of 
Christian faith and liturgical practice), and then to make themselves acquainted 
with his Qvv'ayµa xaTä 7caQCiv tcOv yEyevrJ t vwv aiQEQECwv in order to learn 
more about heretics and to distinguish them from true members of the Church. 
Let us now return to Justin's idea that the words of language are 
begotten by human nature. As a name or word (when it is taken abstractly) 
cannot be a criterion for judgement, unless one regards the actions by his own 6 
ev i µiv Al yoc (Justin appeals to 'rä Epya, Tä rreäyµa2a)244 or to the way of 
social life -i rtoAuTEia), it seems that his idea of the genesis of words comes 
from following a dialectical paradigm: the generation of word is caused by two 
agencies. First, it is the subject in its manifestation; second, it is human reason. 6 
ev t µiv Al yoc - or o voüc - grasps the subject by 
dint of perception (bt' 
aiaOi c ECKS e'-Jla(3ev245), comprehends its 1 Qq taaia from the coming-to-be of 
the subject and gives out or begets Tö ovoµa xotvov in accordance with this 
sense. Unlike in Aristotelian theory, the phoneme of word is not arbitrary or 
random; its genesis takes place in the sphere of human nature 
(later on this 
243 cf. Dial., 35: Gnostics are confessors of Christ in name only 
(avdµa ru µövov), just as pagans 
inscribe the divine name 8Eös upon the works of their own hands. 
244cf. Dial., 103:... the devil, and by Jesus is addressed as Satan, showing that a compounded 
name was acquired by him from the deeds which 
he (the devil) performed. 
H5 Dial., 4. 
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general standpoint will be reinforced by appealing to the corruption of the 
man's nature) and to some certain extent the phoneme bears imprints of both 
the subject and human nature. 
The passage, unfortunately, is somewhat opaque and one should go 
through it with care: his use of pr&sens suggests that he speaks about the power 
of speech; perhaps, Justin does not divorce the generation of word and 
speaking. Special attention now should be paid to the epistemological 
implication that he mentions in Dial., 4. Everything that can be grasped by the 
human senses or, in relation to abstract matters, 'by learning, or by some 
employment'246, can be designated by name. Human nature, however, does not 
have 'such, and so great power of our mind' that it can perceive, cognise, and 
name the divine unless - Justin's reservation - 'it is instructed by the Holy 
Spirit'247. 
§ 11.2.2 Justin on divine epithets 
Inasmuch as the capacity of human language to define God is limited, 
this limitation extends to all divine titles without exception. Justin expresses the 
idea of the transcendence of the Deity by using many negative titles: God is 
2" Dial., 3: &x µaP1jc¬wc nQocrtvovtai 1 piv ý bIa rQtßr)s Ttvoc. 
247 Dial., 4: Tmty o*)v, (Pqvý'r4) v4 1i &v TotaOTq TK xat Toaafrni bvva . ac, I µßj 
6v bi' 
aiaOt'jaecc b kaßty; I Tbv 9E6v ävOQc; )7tov voüs 
6*vrai my re µr1 Ay(Q 7 vt patt 
KCWaPTjµivos; 
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äyEvv1'roc, anaOrjs, äeerIToc, äTQEr os, ävcvvopaQ2oS, 1CTA24. His positive 
characteristics of the Father are traditional, and most of them are taken from the 
Bible e. g. 0 OEÖS, o roü 7Tavrov rcatQO; xai brIµtovQYOq, ö bEQrröT9i;, 0 
rcotfl'rT S, ö1 ßi c'v, KTA249. A more recent analysis of Justin's apophatic approach 
to describing the Father, undertaken by P. Widdicombe, shows that Justin does 
not give strongly pronounced preferences to any group of titles. Even R. 
Mortley, who endeavours to represent Justin as the first Christian apophatic 
theologian, has to admit that he is not concerned with any systematic use of the 
via negativa: 
Language fails in the effort to describe God the Father, but we do 
not find in Justin the systematic use of this failure that we find in 
later Platonism, or the step by step method which we shall see in 
Clement, and which is already familiar in Middle Platonism'0. 
For Justin, therefore, all the titles are approximately of the same value. 
Even when he makes an attempt to compare the divine names and to choose the 
best, he resorts to the title o6 EöS rather than one of many apophatic definitions 
like dCyEVVTITOS or even avwv%Lamcos251. 
In his theory of divine names Justin bases himself on the same distinction 
between proper name and general notion. He often points out that strictly 
248 P. Widdicombe argues for the Middle Platonist influences here, and in particular points out 
similar characteristics of the divine transcendence in Alcinous (Didascalicus, 10.3ff) - P. 
Widdicombe, op. cit., p. 316. 
249v. for details E. Goodenough, op. cit., pp. 123-138. 
2w Mortley, R. op. cit., vol. 2, p. 33. 
231 Did,, 6. 
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speaking the Supreme Being is namelessness. What kind of namelessness does 
he mean in the following passage? 
... He accepts those only who imitate the excellences which 
reside in Him, temperance, and justice, and philanthropy, 
and as many virtues as are peculiar to a God who is called 
by no proper name (% tiib¬vi ovoVaTt OuTC, xaAov2Evw). 
Ap. I, 10252. 
Very often this assertion concerning the unnameability of the Father was 
reduced by Justin scholars to the following categorical syllogism: 
(every A is B) (C is not A) 
(C is not B)'- 
Thus, for example, R. Mortley'-m and E. Goodenough suggest that the 
concept of God's or the Father's namelessness in Justin's theory is related to the 
äyevvrl'roc-principle: God is unbegotten and therefore he is unnameable. P. 
Widdicombe, however, treats this suggestion more carefully. Although there 
is a passage in which Justin seems to identify the divine namelessness with this 
superior principle, nevertheless, he nowhere considers the title dry vq roc as a 
fundamental term. In other words, Justin does not seem to infer the divine 
namelessness from the premise that he is unbegotten. 
252 v. also Apol., 61. 
253 i. e. every generated creature (A) has a name and is nameable (B) the Father (C) is 
ungenerated (is no B). The Father is unnameable; the Father is not nameable; the Father 
does 
not have a name (C is not B). 
Mortley, R. op. cit., vol. 2, p. 34. 
2" E. Goodenough, op. cit., p. 130. 
' P. Widdicombe, op. cit., p. 316f. 
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What Justin means when he speaks about the namelessness of the Father 
is any 'given' or proper name - ovoµa OeTÖV? God has many titles, but they are 
all 2ä öv%ta'a xoiva; what, however, he does not have (and, unlike gods and 
goddesses of the Greek pantheon, cannot have) is ovoUa OETÖV. The famous 
passage (Apol. sec., 6) should be seen in this context; first, Justin argues that the 
very fact that the Greek gods have proper names means (e. g. o IIoJ¬L& IV, 6 
flAovTcwv, etc. ) that they cannot be regarded as deities, because the action of 
naming implies a master who names and a slave who is named; secondly, he 
demonstrates that, philosophically speaking, the Christian monotheist 
theologising makes more sense: 
But to the Father of all who is unbegotten there is no name 
given. For by whatever name He be called, He has as His 
elder the person who gives Him the names'. 
Nevertheless, for Justin the divine namelessness is much more an independent 
premise (which is similar to, for instance, a7zaOrj ,ä 1'roc, &rQ¬noc, x'rA. ) 
rather than a formal corollary of his unbegotten nature. The title äyevvq roc, 
therefore, is just one of many appellations and has relatively equal value; that is 
why in his list of the most common epithets for the Father Justin even leaves 
ctyivvrI'roc out: 
But these words 'Father', and 'God', and 'Creator', and 
'Lord', and 'Master', are not names, but appellations 
derived from His good deeds and functions2m. 
237 voila be rQ'äv rwv itaTQi 9ET6v, &YEv 4%) övti, oinc &(rtLv 
c) YäQ &v Kai bvoµh tL 
7tQoaayoQevrjTat, 1TQCCFP&TEQov CXet Töv 94LFvov r6 övoµa. 
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loc. cit. 
Having considered the titles of the Deity, Justin rejects them, for they all fail to 
serve as a special proper name for God. In his teaching about divine epithets 
Justin follows his general dialectic of -rä övöµaTa xotva: all the available and 
appropriate locutions for God do not refer to himself (as to some extent övoµa 
Ovrov could do), but to his deeds, functions, powers or to his activity in relation 
to the Logos (the Father) or to the creation (the Creator). Moreover, when Justin, 
as previously stated, examines the most sacred of all divine titles, he chooses 
the word 'OEÖS', but still treats it as TO' övoµa xoLvov, which must be an artefact 
of human nature: 
... also the appellation 'God' is not a name, but an opinion 
implanted in the nature of men of a thing that can hardly be 
explained259. 
loc. cit. 
The word o 6EÖs is not, therefore, a proper name for God (resembling 
the Greek o floaEtb&v or o Movrwv), but still Tö ovoµa xoLvov that, clearly, 
has its fixed meaning and, thereby manifests a human concept of the Deity that 
is supernaturally revealed to man or, following Justin's expression, mystically 
implanted into human nature (ij (ýücK). One should note that Justin shows 
remarkable accuracy here: the idea of God is implanted into human nature (the 
258 ovK 6v6patä iotLv, duA ' 
tic TCov a)nod JV Kai TWv fgywv 7nQoaQ1aag. cf. Theophilus, Ad 
Autol., i; 5: Täv bi 9F6v Of) ß01AEL a vod0at btd lQyWv Kai buvä tEwv; 
239 8v 'tQÖnov Kai Tb 6e(n nQooayöQeupa ouic övo th taTLv, dtAA npäyµatoc 
bucie iy tjTov 
Iµ4 oc Tij 4 act Twv civ6Qc rnwv b6 4a. 
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revelatory activity of the Logos), but the possession of this concept cannot be 
considered as totally safe and reliable knowledge of God, due to the corruption 
of human nature. Human beings can access the true teaching about the divine, 
and even see God if they are prepared by the Holy Spirit260, but what God really 
is remains everlastingly incomprehensible for human beings261. 
In order to understand Justin's account of titles applied to the Logos, it is 
important to bear in mind that according to his exegesis of the Scriptures, the 
God of the Old Testament epiphanies who revealed himself to the patriarchs, 
who spoke to Moses and thereafter established the Covenant with Israel, was 
the divine person that is different (E-r¬poc) from the unbegotten Father (or the 
Creator - ßrä rcävra rcour]aavroc OEov) in number (aQtOpCD)262. For Justin the 
Lord of Old Testament history is necessarily the Son: 
Therefore neither Abraham, nor Isaac, nor Jacob, nor any 
other man, saw the Father and ineffable Lord of all, and 
also of Christ, but [saw] Him who was according to His will 
His Son, being God, and the Angel because He ministered 
to His will; whom also it pleased Him to be born man by 
the Virgin; who also was fire when He conversed with 
Moses from the bush. Since, unless we thus comprehend 
the Scriptures, it must follow that the Father and Lord of all 
had not been in heaven when what Moses wrote took place: 
'And the Lord rained upon Sodom fire and brimstone from 
the Lord out of heaven... ' 
Dial., 127 
260 Dial., 4: r' Tdv 9e6v äv9Qwntov vows ö1v ra( no'r IA} drytct 7rvcvµa'i ictxoupq 
dvoW4 
26, P. Preobrazhenskiy translates buac4 M-ror, as'unexplainable' (HeM c 1MbK) - Co'iuneaiw 
ce. Iycmuua (PuJocoOa u My' etcuxa, nep. II. IIpeo6pazeHcxoro 
(Moscow 1892), p. 110. 
v. e. g. Dial., 56, '86; 129. 
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Justin's exegetical principles are, of course, beyond our scope', but in 
the course of his controversy against Jewish diaspora-theology he argues 
against their exegetical methods, and classifies them as entirely unacceptable 
superstitions. Thus, for example, he emphasises that the name o wv is one of the 
Son's titles2M; he regards it as blasphemy to state that the God of biblical history 
is the Creator, or that the Royal psalms are dedicated to King Solomon rather 
than to the Son. Justin uses many names265 to speak about the Son: some of them 
are clearly taken from the Scriptures, while others (such as ij teQa, xI c) may 
have been in liturgical use in his time. Although he nowhere calls the Logos 
roAvchvvµoc there can no longer be any doubt that in his account of the titles of 
the Logos Justin follows a Philonic tradition266. The epithets he attributes to the 
Logos are mainly cataphatic; Justin says that the Logos received all these titles 
from the Father: 
He Himself received from the Father the titles of King, and 
Christ, and Priest, and Angel, and such like other titles 
which He bears or did bear. 
Dial., 86 
The Logos is addressed with these titles because all these appellations 
designate various activities of the Son in relation to the Father and to creation; 
W For a special investigation of this question v. W. Shotell, 
The biblical exegesis of Justin Martyr 
(London 1965). 
264P. Widdicombe is correct in refuting the suggestion of L. Abramowski that 
in the baptismal 
formula (Ap., 61) Justin has in view the divine name Yahweh - P. Widdicombe, op. cit., 
314. 
20 For a detailed analysis of the titles Justin applies to the 
Logos, v. E. Goodenough, op. cit., 
p. 168ff. 
2" Philo, De cont. Ling., 146. Drummond argues for a Stoic origin of 
the term no uv upoc v. 
Philo, v. 1,88,2,206,270. 
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Justin's exegetical principles are, of course, beyond our scope261, but in 
the course of his controversy against Jewish diaspora-theology he argues 
against their exegetical methods, and classifies them as entirely unacceptable 
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is the Creator, or that the Royal psalms are dedicated to King Solomon rather 
than to the Son. Justin uses many names265to speak about the Son: some of them 
are clearly taken from the Scriptures, while others (such as Tjµepa, S) may 
have been in liturgical use in his time. Although he nowhere calls the Logos 
7coAvc)vvµos there can no longer be any doubt that in his account of the titles of 
the Logos Justin follows a Philonic tradition266. The epithets he attributes to the 
Logos are mainly cataphatic; Justin says that the Logos received all these titles 
from the Father: 
He Himself received from the Father the titles of King, and 
Christ, and Priest, and Angel, and such like other titles 
which He bears or did bear. 
Dial., 86 
The Logos is addressed with these titles because all these appellations 
designate various activities of the Son in relation to the Father and to creation; 
263For a special investigation of this question v. 
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265 For a detailed analysis of the titles Justin applies to the 
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p. 168ff. 
2% Philo, De conf. Ling., 146. Drummond argues for a 
Stoic origin of the term noAuwvuµoc v. 
Philo, v. 1,88,2,206,270. 
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as soon as all these titles are words of human language, the Son 'has received 
these epithets from the Father' in the sense that he has received from him the 
power to act in accordance with the Father's will, and according to different 
aspects of his activity the Logos appropriates certain titles. These titles, 
therefore, are not literally of divine origin, but are words of human language, 
and are used by analogy with some phenomena of the created world. In 
explaining why the Logos is addressed by particular titles, Justin follows his 
original logic: the divine epithets for the Son are still Tä ovopaTa xoLvä. Their 
significance is relative rather than absolute, because they do not refer to the 
very nature of the Logos, and one cannot totally comprehend the divine nature 
of the Son from these names. 
God begat before all creatures a Beginning, [who was] a 
certain rational power [proceeding] from Himself, who is 
called by the Holy Spirit267, now 'the Glory of the Lord', 
now 'the Son', again 'Wisdom', again 'an Angel', then 
'God', and then 'Lord' and 'Logos'; and on another 
occasion He calls Himself 'Captain', when He appeared in 
human form to Joshua the son of Nave (Nun). For He can 
be called by all those names, since He ministers to the 
Father's will, and since He was begotten of the Father by an 
act of will. 
Dial., 61 
Next, he distinguishes those divine names of the Son that are applied by 
analogy (Ev 7tapapoý) with some objects of the created world (e. g. ý µtpa, , 
AWWoc, etc. ) from the titles which are in fact proper names of Old Testament 
history (e. g. 'Iaxwß, la ar'A); he classifies the latter group of names as 
267 Justin, clearly, speaks about the titles attributed in Scripture. 
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appellations in the figurative sense (E-'v TQ07TOAo-yia). This methodological 
distinction, however, does not affect his general mode of interpretation: as each 
of the groups of names has meaning (bvvaµtc)268that emphasises various deeds 
of the Logos, Justin resorts to allegories based on the interpretation of these 
various meanings. The name 'Israel', for example, is originally one of the titles 
of the Logos; in Hebrew (as Justin thinks269) it means 'a man that overcomes 
power', because that is what Christ would do when he became manr'°. The 
method of interpretation applied to the Ev 'rQonoAcyia-group of titles is similar 
to what has been observed above in the Dial., 61 when Justin deals with epithets 
that are applied ev rraeaßoA1j. 
Every name has meaning; there are no meaningless words. R. Mortley is 
incorrect when he says that for Justin the word 'God' does not have any 
meaning271. The word 'Christ' means 'an anointed one'; the proper name 'Jesus' 
means 'saviour'. In Ap. sec. 6. Justin draws a parallel between the word 'OEöc' 
and 'XQLU'öc'. The word 'OEöc' fails to cast light on the divine reality; the title 
itself merely arises from the impression that is supernaturally implanted into 
the minds of men and designates the notion of the Deity. Similarly, the word 
'XQtvrröc' has an ordinary meaning ('an anointed one'), but when applied to the 
Son its meaning (m1 µaci a) becomes unknown or rather, incomprehensible: 
20 e. g. Dial., 125:... 'ric 1 büvaµu; ToO IaQat A dv6µatoc. 
M On Justin's acquaintance with Hebrew v. J. Kaye, Some accounts of the writings and opinions of 
Justin Martyr (Cambridge 1829), p. 19. 
VO loc. Cit. 
m Mortley, R. op. cit., vol. 2, p. 35. 
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... the Word who also was with Him and was begotten 
before the works when at first He created and arranged all 
things by Him, is called Christ, in reference to His being 
anointed and God's ordering all things through Him; this 
name itself also contains an unknown significance 
(äyvw(y'rov rnq µaaiav); as also the appellation 'God' is not 
a name, but an opinion implanted in the nature of men of a 
thing that can hardly be explained... 
In the case of the name 'Jesus', however, we, says Justin, are dealing with a 
proper name. His idea is that övoµa OETov differs from an ordinary word, so to 
speak, semantically. A proper name has an etymological meaning ('saviour') i. e. 
the Hebrew meaning of the word itself; simultaneously, it points to the person: 
'I71aoüc be xai avOQc3rrov icai awiflQoc övoµa xai 
,y U%lavIav EXEL. 
Ibid. 
The word 'Jesus', therefore, means that the Lord Jesus Christ is the 
Saviour and became man. The reason why, in contrast to the Father who does 
not have a proper name, the Son has the name 'Jesus', that is only related to the 
act of the incarnation: 
But 'Jesus', His name as man and Saviour, has also 
significance. For He was made man also, as we before said, 
having been conceived according to the will of God the 
Father, for the sake of believing men, and for the 
destruction of the demons. 
Christologically, the name 'Jesus' points to the human nature of the 
incarnated Logos; and only in this sense is the name 'Jesus' truly the 
divine 
name. We are now perhaps in a better position to understand 
Justin's teaching 
on the name 'Jesus'. 
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§ 11.2.3 The divine name 'Jesus' 
The numerous quotations from the Old Testament that Justin makes in 
the course of his controversy with Tryphon and his companions contain a great 
many name-theology Hebraisms. Justin's theological language is definitely 
influenced by these Semitic expressions: Jacob was blessed by one of the Logos' 
titles; a number of special and important characters of the Scriptures were 
renamed by God himself (by the Logos); the spiritual life of the Church is 
inseparable from the unique name 'Jesus'. 
According to Justin's interpretation of the Old Testament, the theology of 
the divine name is the theology of the divine name 'Jesus'; his allegorical 
constructions for the names of the biblical characters are subordinated to the 
idea of the mystical manifestation of the divine name 'Jesus' in the history of 
humankind. His theological view on history, therefore, is based not only on the 
concept of the manifestation of the Logos, but equally on the mysterious 
revelation of the name 'Jesus'. Thus, the God who revealed himself to the 
patriarchs and to Moses is the divine Logos who was to become man; the divine 
name that according to the book of Exodus was announced to Moses was 
'Jesus'272. God revealed the name 'Jesus' in order to let Israelites enjoy it by 
offering sacrifices; and now Christians worship the Father through the name 
2n Dial., 75: 'Moreover, in the book of Exodus we have also perceived that the name of God 
Himself which, He says, was not revealed to Abraham or to Jacob, was 'Jesus', and was 
declared mysteriously through Moses'. 
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'Jesus'273. Therefore the Jews, who commonly hold that Moses spoke with an 
unnameable God, make a grave mistake, and show their absolute ignorance 
about the matter274, because they do not distinguish the Father from the Son. 
His account of names in general when used for teaching the Father's 
unnameability is clear, but when Justin advances a theory in the Dialogue that 
the Logos who is equally God has a proper name 'Jesus', he feels a need to 
discuss this idea explicitly. The reason why, in contrast with the Father who is 
unnameable, the Son has the proper name 'Jesus' is the fact of the incarnation: 
everywhere in his writings the Logos is Jesus Christ. This sort of transition can 
also be traced in the First Apology: the name 'Jesus' has the meaning 'saviour', 
and apart from pointing to the human nature of the incarnated Logos 'of whom 
every race of men were partakers'275 it designates his soteriological activity in 
relation to humankind. 
The key to understanding his doctrine of the divine name 'Jesus' is to 
some extent related to his general distinction between the 'proper name' that 
points to a person and the 'general notion', 'title' or 'word', that merely 
designates a subject or group of subjects. For Justin, for example, the biblical 
custom of renaming makes very important sense in the light of his doctrine of 
the name 'Jesus'. Having elected Abram the Lord changes his name and the 
273 Dia1., 110; 116. 
v. Ap,, 63. 
: 75 Ap., 46: ... ov 71äv ytvoc 
ävOQcwntwv . LEttc W. 
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name of his wife276; next, he changes the name of Jacob and blesses him with the 
title 'Israel', which in turn is one of the Logos' names27; the meaning of all these 
actions is the following: 
And when it is said that He changed the name of one of the 
apostles to Peter; and when it is written in the memoirs of 
Him that this so happened, as well as that He changed the 
names of other two brothers, the sons of Zebedee, to 
Boanerges, which means 'sons of thunder'; this was an 
announcement of the fact that it was He by whom Jacob 
was called Israel, and Oshea called Jesus (Joshua), under 
whose name the people who survived of those that came 
from Egypt were conducted into the land promised to the 
patriarchs. 
Dial., 106 
Similar principles of interpretation appear when Justin turns to a number 
of biblical passages in which the names of the biblical characters are spelled in 
the text of the LXX as 'IrlQoüc278. The son of Nave (Nun) was renamed by Moses 
and received the name 'Jesus' (Joshua) in order to symbolise the eschatological 
kingdom of Christ (Dial., 113)279. The manifestation of the name 'Jesus' takes 
place long before the incarnation of the Logos. The name 'Jesus', according to 
Justin, is a mysterious symbol of the divine oikonomiam. In battle against the 
Amalekites, the Israelites were under the command of the son of Nave, who 
was renamed beforehand, receiving the name 'IrlQoüS. Therefore, the name 
'Jesus' was mysteriously 'in the forefront of the battle', whereas Moses who 
276Dial., 113. 
277cf. Dial., 106,125. 
28 for the details of the spelling of these names in the Hebrew text v. en. 1ßnapfOH (A 4)eea), 
op. cit., vol. 1, p. 62f. 
2" cf. Dial., 115. 
M cf. Dial., 120:... xa-cäv oixovoµiav. 
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prayed to God, stretching out both hands, symbolised the Cross and imparted 
the power of the Cross to the Israelite army. Having the divine name 'in the 
forefront of the battle' and being armed with the power of the Cross, the 
Israelites defeated the Amalekites: 
For it was not because Moses so prayed that the people 
were stronger, but because, while one who bore the name 
of Jesus (Joshua) was in the forefront of the battle, he 
himself made the sign (TÖ of pE iov) of the cross. 
Dial., 90 
Now this took place in the case of both those holy men and 
prophets of God that you may perceive how one of them 
could not bear up both the mysteries (Tä tunt QLa): I 
mean, the type of the cross ('röv Tvnov Tov mrauQoüTov) 
and the type of the name (TVrtov S 'roü övöµaToc 
ýrcucAi cECwc). 
Dial., 111 
The revelation of these two symbols was an action by which God 
revealed before the proper time the power of the divine name and the power of 
the Cross, in order to confer grace upon Israel. 
Justin's theology of the name 'Jesus' is remarkably close to the New 
Testament. As H. Alfeyev illustrates, this name, according to Justin, is the focus 
of the liturgical life of the Church: this name is the source of spiritual 
enlightenment and divine gifts; in the name of Jesus Christians receive 
absolution and participate in the Eucharist, they are partakers of 
his name and 
thereby are members of his Church etc281. Moreover, Justin goes on to assume 
291 g44eea, 14. op. cit., vol. 1, p. 68. 
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that the power of the name 'Jesus' might act irrespective of the man who 
invokes it: 
For every demon, when exorcised in the name of this very 
Son of God - who is the First-born of every creature, who 
became man by the Virgin, who suffered, and was crucified 
under Pontius Pilate by your nation, who died, who rose 
from the dead, and ascended into heaven - is overcome and 
subdued. But though you exorcise any demon in the name 
of any of those who were amongst you - either kings, or 
righteous men, or prophets, or patriarchs - it will not be 
subject to you. But if any of you exorcise it in [the name of] 
the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of 
Jacob (Justin clearly means the name 'Jesus'), it will perhaps 
be subject to you. 
Dial., 85 
To sum up, in the writings of Justin we come across the first distinctively 
Christian speculation on the nature of language in relation to the theology of 
some particular divine titles commonly used to describe the Deity. In Justin's 
teaching about word, meaning, and divine titles we can trace a number of 
topics that will determine the agenda of subsequent theological discussions. His 
view of words and their meaning has the anthropological aspect of language at 
its head: man's language is an artefact of human nature. It is significant that 
such an assumption appeared in a Christian thinker. The universal character of 
the Christian faith on the one hand, and Christian anthropology on the other, 
has engendered a substantially new concept of language. 
From the time of the Apologists, the Patristic understanding of language 
became anthropological. We can only guess to what extent Justin developed 
this idea, but it is not difficult to see that his premises potentially suggest a 
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whole theory of language. I shall show in the next section that what Justin 
attempts to demonstrate to his opponents dialectically, is already taken for 
granted by Ireneaus. In the Latin West another Christian intellectual utters a 
statement with which linguistic theories will agree only at the end of the 
eighteenth century: human languages are, of course, extremely different, but 
the essence of language is always the same: 
The soul is not a boon from heaven to Latins and Greeks 
alone. Man is the one name belonging to every nation upon 
earth: there is one soul and many tongues, one spirit and 
various sounds; every country has its own speech, but the 
subjects of are common to a11282. 
Tertullianus, De testimonio animw, 6. 
As Y. Edelstein indicates, this idea is formulated in the following way: 
'every language is a variant of the realisation of the one invariant i. e. indivisible 
human language as a phenomenon'283. All words, including divine titles, are 
generated by human reason; it is a profitless task, therefore, to put forward 
some of them at the expense of others: to advance, for example, äyEwqToc or 
ävtwv%Lav-roc at the cost of OEöc and vice versa. Justin does not do so either, as 
he does not stress the ineffability of the Father at the expense of the 
transcendent status of the Logos, neither does he stress the incomprehensibility 
of the Father at the expense of the Son's or the Holy Spirit's ability to reveal the 
282 . propria cuique gents 
loqueta, sed loquelae materia communis. Russian anonymous translators: 
'..., but the essence of language is universal (cy LtHOCT`e A3Wxa sceo6wa)'. 
M 10.94eAbu1Te , 
%1po&*Ama A3lAKß, P. 178. 
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true knowledge of God to created humankind 284. The seeming contradictions in 
Justin's exposition are caused by the fact that the Christian theology of the 
period did not have a proper terminological apparatus to distinguish the divine 
essence from the three hypostases, and to explain the divine unity in the 
presence of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; and Justin is a classical 
instance of that. In his theological epistemology, therefore, he is trying to 
balance the principle of the divine transcendence and immanence, the divine 
ineffability and divine revelatory activity, the doctrine of the everlasting 
generation of the Son by the Father and the Son's divine status. Undoubtedly, 
Justin faces a number of problems and leaves many things unexplained or even 
ignored285. 
His theology of divine names and the name 'Jesus' is a good example. He 
appears to have been unwilling to speculate how the Son who is also called God 
and whose nature is ineffable and incomprehensible, appropriates the name 
'Jesus' (which is in turn a word of human language) and imparts to this unique 
name the mysterious power to act. He indicates only that the mystery of the 
divine name 'Jesus' is related to the inconceivable mystery of the incarnation of 
the Logos; human reason fails to comprehend this mysterious power of the 
name just as it fails to comprehend the mystery of the incarnation. 
's-I P. Widdicombe, op. cit., p. 318 n12,319. 
285 Cf. P. Widdicombe, op. cit., p. 316 n. 12. 
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11.3 Irenaeus of Lyon and his attack on Gnosticism 
The purpose of the next section is to attempt to analyse Irenaeus' concern 
with the problem of language, and to estimate the role that his language-theory 
played in his controversy with the Gnostics. The argumentation of Irenaeus' 
against his Gnostic opponents (Adversus Haeresis - AH, i-ii) as well as his 
positive exposition of Church theology (AH iii-v) is undoubtedly of a systematic 
character. His magnum opus, apart from being a refutation of Gnostic doctrine, is 
at the same time the first known attempt to give a comprehensive description of 
the Christian faith. To all appearances, the AH is the work not only of an 
amazing theologian and apologist, but also an assiduous scholar and talented 
writer. In Irenaeus' theological system set out in the AH and also reflected in the 
Epideixis286, the relation between theology of language and the fundamental 
Church doctrine of God is already more systematic and well conceived than in 
the works of Justin Martyr. It is, therefore, important to analyse his interests in 
the problem of language in relation to Church theology in general, and thus to 
demonstrate what kind of role it plays in the history of patristic thought. 
Taking into consideration the method and purpose of the AH, one 
should bear in mind that in the case of Irenaeus we are not dealing with a 
private, independent or scientific attempt to answer the question of what 
human language really is. In his treatment of the problem of language, Irenaeus 
on the one hand does not go beyond the limits of Tradition, whilst on the other 
286 'E7il()utLtc TOU C: 7tOOTOAtKOIU KT1QUyM TOc. 
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he claims that his concept conforms with common sense; it is important to bear in 
mind this statement from the beginning: in Irenaeus' opinion, there is no 
distinction between a scientific treatment of language, and a theological view of 
its nature and origin. In what follows, I shall try to pay special attention to this 
interesting stance. 
Irenaeus' theory is not conceived as an exposition of his own views and 
ideas - he never claims to be a pioneer in the field - but he seeks to demonstrate 
that the Gnostic 'mythology' of name and language is bizarre and ridiculous in 
every respect, i. e. both theologically and rationally. Next, it is the structure of his 
argumentation that reveals the fact that he does not distinguish the Christian 
comprehension of language as different from the general question of what 
human language is by its nature. At the same time, there is strong evidence 
from Irenaeus' treatment of this general question to indicate that Irenaeus and 
(to a greater extent) his opponents were aware of contemporary philosophical 
disputes only superficially. 
The question of Irenaeus' sources as well as the question of the extent to 
which his description of Gnostic doctrines is historically irreproachable is 
complicated. Clearly, Irenaeus was acquainted with and made use of, for 
instance, some of Justin's ideas and principles'; moreover, his rich use of 
typology strongly suggests dependence on his master. Of course, there were 
20 G. Armstrong, for example, in his analysis arrives at the conclusion that Irenaeus in his 
exposition of Gen. 3. follows Justin almost literally (v. 
G. Armstrong, Die Genesisin der Alten 
Kirche (Tubingen 1962), p. 89. 
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other writings of early Church writers at his disposal, but in relation to the 
problem of language this fact is not of great significance. 
At the same time, the situation with Gnostic sources, especially in the 
light of the discovery of Nag Hammadi, remains more uncertain: there is still a 
suspicion that Irenaeus either purposely or unintentionally distorted some 
aspects of the Gnostic systems in order to represent them in an even more 
ridiculous form. Of course, it would be prudent to treat Irenaeus' reports with a 
good deal of scepticism; but one should bear in mind that AH, according to its 
intention and genre, is neither an encyclopaedia of Gnostic theology, nor it is a 
piece of critical historical research. Since the difference between, for example, 
the Gospel of Truth and the Marcus theory of language that follows from 
Irenaeus' reports is too divergent to be satisfactorily reconciled, one can only 
treat them separately - in this section I shall focus mainly on the latter. 
Since this is not the appropriate place to discuss the general 
philosophical background of Irenaeus and his opponents, or their use of 
philosophy (or, for instance, rhetoric and literary method2u), I shall make only a 
few remarks relevant only to the problem of language. I shall argue in 
particular that Irenaeus deals with the problem of language easily and 
independently: his own theory is well conceived from both the philosophical 
and theological point of view; he shows a remarkable theological competence 
288 cf., for example, the still valuable article of W. Schoedel, Philosophy and Rhetoric in the 
Adversus Haereses of Irenaeus in VCh vol. xiii (1959) pp. 22-32; although W. Schoedel does not 
arrive at any notable conclusion, he suggests an interesting and balanced analysis of J. Lawson's 
and H. Wolfson's treatments of the problem. 
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and intuition, and his general comprehension of the problem in many respects 
anticipates many of the issues touched upon in later patristic controversies. 
In order to understand Irenaeus' theological argumentation related to the 
problem of language against numerous variants of the Gnostic doctrines there 
is no need to describe and analyse all the viewpoints of his opponents; such an 
analysis will not provide us with anything substantially new. He often repeats 
that his opponents 'strive to weave ropes of sand'. In fact, his concern is to refute 
the very method of his Gnostic opponents, their exegetical principles, and 
arbitrary treatment of e. g. divine names and some biblical passages. 
It has already been pointed out that the mythological perception of 
language played a very important role in Gnostic doctrine: undoubtedly, they 
were attracted and therefore made great use of a truly enigmatic aspect of 
language; their, so to speak, 'mythological epistemology' was in addition based 
on a specific interpretation or rather impression of language. Some of the most 
obvious aspects of this impression are related to the Hellenistic background (e. g. 
cosmogony of Marcus - AH i, xivff), but that, of course, did not completely 
exclude some elements and use of biblical theology, as we have already seen in 
the Gospel of Truth. 
Moreover, it should be noted that from what we know of surviving 
Gnostic works and other passages that have come down to us, in this religious 
movement language never received a satisfactory philosophical treatment, and was 
never approached critically. At the same time, one must note that 
both sides of 
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the controversy seem to have a certain acquaintance with the grammatical 
science of the time: some theories of Gnostics appealed to, for instance, a 
grammatical distinction between vowels (-rä (ý(, )v1 Evýra), consonants (TCh 
ä(ýcwva), and what the grammarians of those days called 'semi-vowels' (rä 
1ý'.. tk wva)289. 
Irenaeus pertinently points out that the Gnostic use of apophatic terms is 
unsystematic and arbitrary: e. g. first the pre-existent Aeon is placed 'in the 
invisible, unnameable and ineffable heights', but later it is called it IleoaQXrj, 
1JQoTCäT(oQ, BvOöS; finally, the Aeon appears comprehensible by 'spiritual' 
men, i. e. the Gnostics themselves (cf. AH I, i: 1, i: 2, vii; 5). Irenaeus does not find 
any consistent and worked-out idea of divine 'namelessness' and 'ineffability' 
in their theory, and it was not an easy task for him to introduce his own point of 
view, because for that he needed some common ground. Intriguingly, the 
theory of language played a special role in solving this problem. 
Hence, there is a need to examine those aspects of Gnostic teaching that 
were scrutinised by Irenaeus, and forced him to delineate his own views of 
human language against what he himself calls 'a motley garment... a heap of 
miserable rags'. 
2S i. e. A, µ, \', Q, (7, Z, &, 4'. 
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§ 11.3.1 Logos, cosmogony, the doctrines of elements and language according 
to the hypothesis of Marcus. 
The hypothesis of Marcus is one of the most striking examples of the 
Gnostic treatment of language. His teaching seems to be the most logical (if one 
can call it 'logic') and provides us with distinctive information about the 
background of the Gnostic use of the notion of language. Marcus' distinction 
between the words of human language and the divine Word is of special 
interest to us: at first sight it is unclear. Let us focus on this seeming vagueness. 
He begins with teaching that suggests that the Word (understood, of course, 
without reference to the Incarnation) is of a twofold nature. The Word in the 
system of Marcus is related to the sphere of language, and is the Revelation of 
the Father: 
When first the unoriginated, inconceivable Father, who is 
without material substance, and is neither male nor female, 
willed to bring forth that which is ineffable to Him, and to 
endow with form that which is invisible, He opened His 
mouth, and sent forth the Word similar to Himself, who, 
standing near, showed Him what He Himself was, 
inasmuch as He had been manifested in the form of that 
which was invisible. 
AH I, 14: 1m 
The way he adopts some apophatic terms here is illustrative; such 
unexpected reservations about 'material substance' or 
'neither male nor female 
show that Marcus' utilises this negative terminology 
in order to link his 
290 Transl of Alexander Roberts & James Donaldson (ANF, vol. 
1). 
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speculations with established traditional language about the divine. Even at 
first sight one can see that this is merely an apophatic rhetoric rather than 
apophatic theology. Thus, for example, the Father needs to send forth his Logos, 
which is 'similar' to him, and in this way he comprehends what he really is. The 
main motifs of his cosmogony and the idea of Revelation through the Logos is 
of course an allusion to the Johannine prologue - later we shall come across his 
acquaintance with, and use of, the Johannine corpus of the NT. Marcus suggests 
an interesting explanation of the relationship between the Father and his Logos. 
According to his theory, the term o Aoyoq is to be understood in a way we now 
would call 'linguistically', i. e. the Al yoc by its nature comes into being in a 
manner that is similar to a human word. Perhaps the original version of the text 
was as vague as the Latin translation that we now have'. Formally, the Logos 
is said to be different from the Name, but it is hardly possible to see the 
difference; rather, it seems that we are dealing with a kind of sleight of hand: 
The enunciation (i EKcjx vT r c) of the Name took place 
thus: The Father spoke (FA1 ArjcTE Aoyov Tov 7tp vov Toü 
ov%La2oS avtov) the first word of his Name, which was 
the Beginning, and it was one syllable with four letters (Kai 
fvi auMaßý aüroü v'roLX¬IC V 2wvväpcov). 
Ibid292. 
29' Thus, for example, the Latin interpreter believed that the initial word pronounced by the 
Father was &Qf ; therefore, he preserved it untranslated (v. n. 175). 
m the texts are from Adversus haereses (libri i, ii), ed. W. Harvey, Sancti Irenaei episoopi 
Lugdunensis libri quinque adversus haereses, vol. 1 (Cambridge 1857); liber iii, ed. A. Rousseau and 
L. Doutreleau, Irende de Lyon, Contre les hJrisies, livre 3, vol. 2 SC 211 (Paris 1974); Adversus 
haereses 5.3-13 (P. Jena), ed. A. Rousseau, L. Doutreleau and C. Mercier, Irenee de Lyon. Contre 
leg h aus, livre v, vol. 2 SC 153 (Paris 1969); Adversus haereses 3.9 (P. Ox. 3.405), ed. A. Rousseau 
and L. Doutreleau, IrEnee de Lyon, Contre its hirtsies, livre 3, vol. 2 (Paris 1974). 
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The pronunciation of the Name was therefore of both a 'cosmogonic' and 
a 'linguistic' character; o Aoyoc of the mysterious name of the Father is dearly 
'a word' - the Father spoke or pronounced it in the way man pronounces the 
words of his language. Thus, for example, the distinction between o AOyoc (the 
word) and r) avAAa(3T ('coocuring acoustic pattern' or merely 'syllable') is also 
very unclear, and that caused a serious problem for translators3; most likely, 
Marcus himself did not distinguish them. Next, according to him, the Aöyoc 
consists of four primordial 'letters' ('tä o"roLxeta), and again, the use of the term 
To Q2o ixE iov presents even more difficulties than the interchange of 6 Aöyoc 
and Yj auAAaßrj. Since in Greek Tö UToLXEIov has many meanings, from 
linguistic 'letter', 'sound of speech' or 'pronunciation of a letter' to 
philosophical 'element', 'foundation', and 'principle', it is difficult to work out 
what Marcus exactly means here: 'letter', 'sound' or 'element'. 
In order to suggest a probable solution to this important problem, I 
propose to go back a little, and look at the passage in the context of the whole 
chapter. First, in AH I, 14; 1 Irenaeus gives an account of Marcus' teaching on the 
creationz" from its origin to the last times, literally to when 'the restitution (v 
6rtoxat crrarnv) of all things will take place, when all things are converted 
3 For A. Roberts and J. Donaldson these two terms were understood as perfectly 
interchangeable synonyms: 'He spoke the first word... He added the second, and this also 
consisted of four letters. Next, He uttered the third... '. P. Preobrazhenskiy 
(Russ. transl. of 1900) 
suggest a slightly more precise version; but in spite of the 
fact that they distinguish 6 Ao yoc 
from ý av Aacp fi ('syllable'), the general meaning of the clause remains similar 
to the old 
version of A. Roberts and J. Donaldson. 
Marcus claims that the Tetrad revealed him 'alone the genesis of everything (t v rCOv 
ndrvTwv yiv¬cnv), which she had not revealed to any gods or men'. 
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into one letter... '. Second, as has already been noted, Marcus often resorts to 
terms like 'Name', 'word', 'syllable', etc. and clearly does so in order to 
introduce a foundation for his further speculations about the number of 
secondary elements (also called 'aeons') and the relationship between their 
natures and names. Therefore, I assume that in spite of some apparent 
confusion, Marcus deliberately or rather intuitively makes play with this 
ambiguity. Therefore, I suggest that in the above quoted passage TO' mroLXEiOV 
equally means 'an element' and 'a letter'; Marcus operates with something that 
we can designate as a'letter-element'. 
With this in mind, let us now look at some interesting issues of Marcus' 
theory, which Irenaeus lists in AH i; 14; 2-9. To begin with, Marcus everywhere 
emphasises that not only 'name' or 'word', but also 'sound' and 'letter' possess 
a twofold nature. On the one hand they act as names, words, sounds, and letters 
of human language, while on the other they act ontologically, i. e. as immediate 
constituents of both the apparent and invisible world (i. e. the Demiurge, the 
seven heavens, etc. ): 
Of these elements, the last letter of the last one uttered its 
voice, and this sound going forth generated its own 
elements after the image of the [other] elements, by which 
he affirms, that both the things here below were arranged 
into the order they occupy, and those that preceded them 
were called into existence. 
According to Marcus, Tö IlM Qwo ta, from which the primordial letter- 
element 'with its special pronunciation descended to that 
below', consists of 
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thirty letters; each of which consists of other letters, 'so that the multitude of 
letters swells out into infinitude'. Irenaeus reports that these numerous 
divisions in the system of Marcus were based on the following grammatical 
interpretation: the letter-element -ro' btkTa consists of five letters: 2ö UATa, rö 
E% Tö Adptpba, TO' Tav, and 2ö äA a; these letters are written by other letters, 
etc. But this suggestion, however, fails to elucidate why Ta MU Qcwµa consists of 
the thirty letters295. 
The Truth herself consists of the all letters of the Greek alphabet -twenty 
four in number; each pair of the letters (e. g. a+w, 13+*, etc. ) represents a kind of 
anthropomorphic part of its 'body' (To' vcgµa). The above-described Gnostic 
concept of 'letter-element' appears far and wide: having described the Truth 
anthropomorphically, Marcus adds that this is a form (TO' a fpa) of this 
element; next, he goes on to say that this element has another name - 
AvOQwrcoc. According to the hypothesis of Marcus the anthropomorphic 
element ÄA1OELa-AvOpcw7toc is responsible for the origin of language (clearly 
Greek, because the Gnostics never mentioned any other language): 
And he calls this element AvOpwnog (Man), and says that 
is the fountain of all speech (tj m yrý rov 7zavTdc Aäyou), 
and the beginning of all sound (t äQXTj rc oc of c), and 
the expression of all that is unspeakable, and the mouth of 
the silent ELyrj. 
Ibid. 
2" Nevertheless, one should hardly regard Irenaeus' interpretation as totally wrong; 
presumably, he gives just one example of a rational explanation. 
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Although the anthropomorphic element in the Gnostic teaching on the 
origin of language is distinct, there are no grounds to suppose that Marcus 
considered language as a phenomenon restricted to the nature of man. By 
contrast, he goes on to speak about the divine origin of language. At the same 
time, Marcus never distinguishes between language as a general phenomenon, 
and a concrete language, e. g. Greek. 
§ 11.3.2 Numerical interpretation of names 
We are now in a better position to understand the real foundation of the 
numerical interpretation of names that was so popular amongst Gnostic 
leaders. Irenaeus lists a huge number of these Gnostic speculations and points 
out that there is no consensus in interpretation amongst them. Gnostic 
conclusions concerning the final number of the elements or emanations can 
vary, depending on the concrete name or a concrete number that happens to be 
the subject of their speculation. But one way or another they repeatedly turn to 
the original presumption about the Greek alphabet: 
Thus, then, you have a clear statement of their opinion as to 
the origin of the supercelestial Jesus. Wherefore, also, the 
alphabet of the Greeks contains eight Monads, eight 
Decads, and eight Hecatads, which present the number 
eight hundred and eighty-eight, that is.. Jesus, who is 
formed of all numbers; and on this account He is called 
Alpha and Omega, indicating His origin from all. 
AH 1.15.2. 
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Interestingly enough, Irenaeus himself did not totally exclude a 
numerical interpretation of sacred names and numbers found in Scripture. He 
applied a similar method of exegesis in the eschatological section of the fifth 
book (AH, v, ch. 28ff), where he was concerned with the interpretation of the 
number of the Beast, i. e. 666. First, he draws a parallel between the number 666 
and some figures of the Old Testament e. g. the age of Noah at the time of the 
deluge (600), the height of the image set up by Nebuchadnezzar (60 cubits) and 
its breadth (6 cubits). Second, he discusses some Greek names that are 
numerically equal to the number of the Beast, e. g. EüävOac, Aa'reivoc, and 
TEI2äv. At first sight the similarity in method of interpretation is obvious. 
Nevertheless, unlike his opponents who emphasise that the relationship 
between names, words and phenomena of the apparent world is ontological, 
Irenaeus' interpretation is of a speculative character - he never speaks about 
ontology. He repeatedly indicates that we may expect Antichrist to choose this 
or that name that fits the number 666, but one should remember that there are 
plenty of names whose numerical sum is equal to 666 and one, therefore, can 
only guess rather than know for certain. Irenaeus here is about to define the 
theological sense of biblical prophecy -a prophecy is given to us to enable us 
recognise the events when they will take place; it is, therefore, plausible and safe 
not to foretell different names, but to expect the fulfilment of the prophecies. 
To sum up, according to Irenaeus' opponents, language is at once an 
ontological and linguistic phenomenon: the 
language of their preaching, i. e. 
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Greek, is of divine origin, and for them all aspects of the language manifest, 
symbolise and reveal the divine. Moreover, language for the Gnostics is far 
from being just a language; it is a reliable source of their knowledge about the 
divine, it is the true source of their gnosis. At the same time, their interest in 
language as such is relatively small. Gnostics so to speak play with 
inscrutability of language, but there is no sign that their concern goes further. 
§ 11.3.3 Irenaeus' theory of language. 
Reading through AH, one might form the impression that for Irenaeus it 
was a task of extreme difficulty to find common ground with Gnostic theories 
in order to establish his own line of argumentation, and to make his point clear 
for both kinds of readers: those who might possibly sympathise with Gnostic 
teachings, and neutral readers. How, for instance, could he argue against the 
Gnostic concept of the silent Etyt who: 
... names Him that cannot 
be named, and expounds the 
nature of Him that is unspeakable, and searches out Him 
that is unsearchable, and declares that He whom thou 
maintainest to be destitute of body and form, opened His 
mouth and sent forth the Word, as if He were included 
among organized beings; and that His Word, while like to 
His Author, and bearing the image of the invisible, 
nevertheless consisted of thirty elements and four syllables? 
AH 1.15.5ff 
Nevertheless, let us leave aside some important aspects of his doctrine of 
God, incarnation and salvation, and focus on his thoughts about language. To 
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begin with, Irenaeus draws a distinction between the words of language (and 
thereby variety of languages) and the sense of these words. Thus, there are 
many languages, but under certain circumstances different words manifest the 
same idea and the same sense. In particular, he appeals to Church theology that 
in different countries of the world is expressed in different languages, but 
whose content remains the same, and agrees with Tradition: 
For, although the languages of the world are dissimilar, yet 
the import of the tradition is one and the same. For the 
Churches which have been planted in Germany do not 
believe or hand down anything different, nor do those in 
Spain, nor those in Gaul, nor those in the East, nor those in 
Egypt, nor those in Libya, nor those which have been 
established in the central regions of the world. 
AH i. 10.2 
In spite of his sarcastic remarks about the barbarian language of the Celts 
(v. AH 1. intr. ) - to all appearances, it is merely a rhetorical figure - 
philosophically, Irenaeus admits that all languages are equal in the sense of their 
power to manifest meaning. This point of Irenaeus implies a more important idea: 
language is a phenomenon of man's nature and man's nature only. In the AH ii. 13 
ad fin. Irenaeus' attack on the various anthropomorphic Gnostic issues is based 
on the elementary dialectic of divine and human: God is one, the divine nature 
cannot be divided according to the letters of the Greek alphabet, but human 
beings consist of body and soul. Hence, the divine thought is incommensurably 
different from the thoughts of man; this is a basic principle of his theological 
Italy or Palestine? 
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view on human language (and its epistemological value) that is to speak about 
the divine: 
For He may well and properly be called an Understanding 
which comprehends all things, but He is not [on that 
account] like the understanding of men; and He may most 
properly be termed Light, but He is nothing like that light 
with which we are acquainted. And so, in all other 
particulars, the Father of all is in no degree similar to 
human weakness. He is spoken of in these terms according 
to love; but in point of greatness, our thoughts regarding 
Him transcend these expressions. 
AH ii. 13.4. 
In the sphere of the human nature, the words of our language (including 
our language about God) originate from man's soul. Irenaeus describes the 
process of the origin of words more than once; this description seems to be the 
most complete and comprehensive: 
The first movement of mind in relation to some objects is 
call 'notion'. When this continues, strengthens, and 
possesses the entire soul, it is called 'comprehensive 
thinking'. In turn, this, when it spends much time on the 
same object and is so to speak tested, becomes 'acceptance'. 
This acceptance greatly amplified becomes 'deliberation'. 
When this deliberation grows and is amplified it becomes 
'interior discourse', from which comes the emitted word. 
AH i. 13.2 
In Irenaeus' opinion, the human voüc reveals or declares its existence by 
producing words; this generation of words he compares with light light reveals 
its source, but does not somehow lessen it. 0 vows, similarly, does not lessen 
itself by any generation of words, but only reveals its presence, because 'an 
emission is the manifestation of that which is emitted, beyond him who emits 
it. 
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Next, compared to man's power of thought, our language is a secondary 
and therefore a carnal phenomenon and that is a reason why our speech is 
divided into sounds (and thereby 'letters' of the alphabet297): 
In fact, the tongue of man, being fleshly, cannot serve to 
match the speed of the human mind, which is spiritual, and 
hence our word is caught within and is produced outside 
not all at once, as it was conceived, but in parts as the 
tongue is capable of serving. 
AH ii. 28.4 
Moreover, the idea that a word is uttered at the bidding of thought and 
mind seems to Irenaeus to be commonly shared by all people; this is something 
that 'all men indeed well understand'. One of Irenaeus' most interesting and at 
once successful polemical tactics was to make play of the dialectic of divine and 
human, and to introduce it into his dispute about the nature of language. This 
line of argumentation, in fact, could make perfect sense even to non-Christian 
readers. In particular, when he deals with the question of the origin and nature 
of language, Irenaeus follows the same logic. Man's language is conditioned by 
the complexity of human nature; therefore, our language per se is imperfect, and 
it affects the manifestation of meaning. In other words, this is a reason for the 
linguistic phenomenon that we now call polysemy: 
For there is among the Greeks one Aöyoc which is the 
principle that thinks, and another which is the instrument 
by means of which thought is expressed; and [to say] that a 
297 In the ancient grammatical science there was confusion 
between what we now call sounds 
and letters (cf. Cratylus): v. for detail an article of 14. 
TpoHcvmik, IIpo6 m x; axa 6 anmu' oü 
itayxe in the Autmuuntxe meopuu .t uxa u cmu. & , ed. 
by 0. Freidenberg (Moscow, Leningrad 
1936). 
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man sometimes is at rest and silent, while at other times he 
speaks and is active. 
AH ii. 28.4 
God is simple, and therefore language can by no means be an attribute of 
the divine nature, because in God there is no such distinction between thought 
and speech: 
But God being all Mind, and all Logos, both speaks exactly 
what He thinks, and thinks exactly what He speaks. For His 
thought is Logos, and Logos is Mind, and Mind 
comprehending all things is the Father Himself. 
AH ü. 28.5 
Moreover, Irenaeus emphasises that the Gnostics make a grave mistake 
when they attach a somewhat supernatural status to language. He insists that 
even our language about God needs a countless number of apophatic 
reservations. The Logos, therefore, cannot be treated as a word similar to a human 
word; the generation of the divine Logos and the generation of the Son is one 
unspeakable phenomenon298. But in both cases, the origin of the Logos and the 
generation of the Son have nothing to do with the ordinary meanings of the 
terms: 
'How then was the Son produced by the Father? ' - we reply 
to him, that no man understands that production, or 
generation, or calling, or revelation, or by whatever name 
one may describe His generation, which is in fact altogether 
indescribable. 
AH ü. 28.6 
2" cf. A. Grillmeier, Christ in Christian tradition (London 1965), vol. 
1,102ff. 
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The generation of the Logos, therefore, cannot be explained by any 
parallel with man's language such as the Gnostics make: 
For that a word is uttered at the bidding of thought and 
mind, all men indeed well understand. Those, therefore, 
who have excogitated [the theory of] emissions have not 
discovered anything great, or revealed any abstruse 
mystery, when they have simply transferred what all 
understand to the only-begotten Word of God; and while 
they style Him unspeakable and unnameable, they 
nevertheless set forth the production and formation of His 
first generation, as if they themselves had assisted at His 
birth, thus assimilating Him to the word of mankind 
formed by emissions. 
Ibid. 
Thus, Irenaeus formulates one of the most important exegetical 
principles that later on will be developed and extended: that the term 'the 
divine Logos' should by no means be considered as or even associated with a 
part of speech. He insists on a decisive rejection of all possible allusions or 
parallels of that kind. 
However, one important reservation should be made. In the fifth section 
of the 'Erib¬iýts 'rov ärrocnoAtxov Qvypawc, unfortunately only preserved 
in an Armenian translation of app. VII - VIII century". there is an debatable 
passage; according to the German translation, Irenaeus in his explanation of the 
relationship between the Father, his Logos and the Holy Spirit resorts to an 
M v. Text und Untersuchungen, XXXI, 1 [3 R. I, 1]: Des 
heiligen Irenaeus Schrift zum Erweise des 
apostolischen Verkündigung. EK tnibEd Lv Toü äTtovTroAucoü xqQ patOS 
in armenischen 
Version entdeckt, herausgegeben und ins deutsche übersetzt von 
Lic. Dr. Karapet Ter- 
Mekerttschian und Lic. Dr. Erwand Ter-Minassiantz. Mit einem 
Nachwort und Anmerkungen 
von Adolf Harnack (Leipzig 1907). 
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analogy with human words and the soul. Ad. Harnack has argued that 
presumably the passage is spoiled301. It should be noted, however, that such an 
analogy was absolutely impossible for Irenaeus, because, as shown above, it 
contradicts the very premise of his discourse. It is highly likely, therefore, that 
the suggestion made by F. Conybear is correct, and the meaning of the clause is 
'thus, since the Logos consolidates, and therefore enlivens and brings into 
existence beings 
... 
'302. 
If the above-going considerations are correct, one must admit that in the 
system of Irenaeus no links can be found between the Logos and man's 
language. There is no need, therefore, to scrutinise here Irenaeus' Christology 
and his arguments against Gnostic divisions between the Logos, Christ, and the 
Saviour; so we can turn to our final issue in attempt to answer the question of 
what both sides think about divine names, and how Irenaeus' teaching differs 
from the view of his opponents. 
300 ... des Leibes Werk ist und die Wesenheit der Emanation verleiht. 
301 Instead of das Leibes Werk Ad. Harnack proposes Fleisch warden lässt. (ibid. ) 
3 F. C. Conybeare believed that this section of Armenian translation is not spoiled and proposes 
the following variant of the possible Greek original version of the text: ineib fi oSv 6A yoc 
crrepeoi, TovTeat awµaTOTtoLei Kai ovaiav XaQE e rat t ÖVTL (or ... % yryov66n) - F. 
Conybeare., The newly recovered Treatise of Irenaeus (Expositor, 1907, July p. 35-44). At the same 
time, his point does not present any problem; he argues that there is no need to translate the 
Armenian eloy as 'emanation', because it is often used as an equivalent of the Greek 6v-row,, 
while the verb awµato7toL co can also mean 'to enliven'. Furthermore, such an interpretation 
agrees with a general doctrine of the Logos found in the Epideixis - v., for instance, Epideixis, 34 
on the consolidational, ontological role of the divine Logos. 
M v., for instance, AH iii. 33.3. 
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§ 11.3.4 The divine name 'Jesus Christ' and the other biblical divine names. 
The comprehension of the name 'Jesus Christ' in the form that according 
to Irenaeus' report should be associated with Marcus' school, can hardly be 
systematised. In general, the Gnostic account of the name 'Jesus' is based on 
speculation about numbers, but at the same time some attempts to attach 
soteriological significance to this name can be traced. As for the former part, 
Marcus stands by his logic: first, he admits that this name possesses some 
mysterious power, as do a great number of 'mysterious' names. Second, this 
mysterious power is only available to those who are dedicated to the numerical 
interpretation of the name, and are aware of these sacred numbers i. e. six (their 
famous trdoi tov), twenty four (Greek alphabet), and 888. Third, Marcus says 
that the name 'Jesus Christ' has a different phonetic (? ) equivalent in the 
language of semi-divine deities - the so called 'ancient name' - angels, 
according to this system, were coeval to Christ; the following passage seems to 
be the one of the best examples: 
When she (the Tetrad) had spoken these things, M1 9c La 
looked at him, opened her mouth, and uttered a word. That 
word was a name, and the name was this one which we do 
know and speak of, viz., Xpwnöv Itlaovv. When she had 
uttered this name, she at once relapsed into silence. And as 
Marcus waited in the expectation that she would say 
something more, the Tetrad again came forward and said, 
"Thou hast reckoned as contemptible that word which thou 
hast heard from the mouth of AM Ocuc. This which thou 
knowest and seemest to possess is not an ancient name. For 
thou possessest the sound of it merely, whilst thou art 
ignorant of its power. For Igaoüc is a name arithmetically 
symbolical (irciagpov), consisting of six 
letters, and is 
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known by all those that belong to the call. But that which is 
among the Aeons of the Pleroma consists of many parts 
(rcoAvµ¬QEq), and is of another form (. to xf c) and shape 
(2vrcov), and is known by those [angels] who are joined in 
affinity with Him, and whose mightinesses (Tä µe-eOTI) are 
always present with Him. 
AH i. 14.4 
To what extent therefore was the name 'Jesus' considered as unique and 
important? Whatever this importance was supposed to be, in the Marcian 
hierarchy of 'divine' names, 'Jesus Christ' is placed on the third level (AH 
i. 15.1); in the sequence of emanations an aeon titled by this name is said to 
appear at the fifth stage. The mystery of the name 'Jesus Christ' is explained by 
an arithmetic operation that leads to 888, and this number is finally alluded 
related to twenty four (Greek alphabet - AH i. 15.2). On the other hand, they 
considered the name 'Jesus Christ' in two different combinations: Jesus the Son 
and Christ the Son (Ibid. ). In the opinion of Marcus' stalwarts the former 
symbolised another unapproachable divine name and before the manifestation 
of its symbol, i. e. Iaoüc ov iöc, 
... mankind were 
involved in great ignorance and error. But 
when this name of six letters was manifested (the person 
bearing it clothing Himself in flesh, that He might come 
under the apprehension of man's senses, and having in 
Himself these six and twenty-four letters), then, becoming 
acquainted with Him, they ceased from their ignorance, 
and passed from death unto life, this name serving as their 
guide (or 'way' - 'rov bvöµatoc airtoic bboü y 9&Tos) 
to the Father of truth. 
AH 1.15.2ad f n. 
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Thus, one should affirm that at the later stage Marcus' school attempted 
to adopt a slightly modified interpretation of the name 'Jesus' that had more 
reference to Scripture (mainly Johannine tradition) and the Christian doctrine of 
the incarnation of the Logos. According to this variant, Marcus' followers 
considered the name 'Jesus the Son' an enigmatic symbol that revealed to the 
elect two important numbers, six and twenty four, and thus put an end to 
ignorance, destroyed death, and led to salvation. But even such an adoption of 
traditional terms and notions did not allow Marcus to overcome his original 
name-theology premise: 
He maintains, therefore, that lr1QoüS is the name of that 
man formed by a special dispensation, and that He was 
formed after the likeness and form of that [heavenly] 
Anthropos, who was about to descend upon Him. After He 
had received that Aeon, He possessed Anthropos himself, 
and Logos himself, and Pater, and Arrhetus, and Sige, and 
Aletheia, and Ecclesia, and Zoe. 
AH i. 15.3ad f n. 
Irenaeus in his refutation does not argue with the sophisticated 
formulation and arithmetic manipulations: he merely reminds the reader that 
the Greek alphabet was invented by man and did not appear at once, but 
gradually (AH i. 14.4); thus he turns the whole discourse of his opponents into 
nonsense. 
But what does Irenaeus think about names and the name of Jesus, and 
how does he treat a theological notion of the divine name? Irenaeus treats the 
biblical theology of names with remarkable accuracy. He does not deny that the 
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various operations with names that can be found in the Bible have a sacred 
theological sense (AH ii. 25.1). His point, however, is that the comprehension of 
these meanings cannot be derived from the names as such by, for instance, 
arithmetical operations. His standpoint can be formulated as follows: the sacred 
theological meaning is primary, names and numbers are secondary; therefore, 
the theological sense cannot be comprehended from names and numbers, 
For system does not spring out of numbers, but numbers 
from a system; nor does God derive His being from things 
made, but things made from God. For all things originate 
from one and the same God. 
AH ii. 25.1 
Unlike his opponents, Irenaeus regards the phenomenon of the divine 
names in the context of the name 'Jesus'. This name in his opinion is in every 
respect unique, but not because of some enigmatic numbers that it might 
designate. His understanding of the name 'Jesus' is in the first instance related 
to the incarnation of the Logos and the soteriological significance of his death 
and resurrection. Undoubtedly, the name 'Jesus Christ' belongs to the human 
language, and its meaning is this: 
And he (Jesus Christ) bears a twofold name: in Hebrew it is 
Messiah Christ, while in our language Jesus the Saviour. 
These names designate some certain that he has done. 
Namely, he is called Christ, for the Father has anointed and 
beautified everything through him... 
Epideixis, 53 
Irenaeus explains another name and attribute of Jesus found in Scripture 
in a similar manner (v. Epideixis, 53-59): names designate his actions. At the 
same time, he shows a remarkable adherence to the original biblical name- 
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theology: Christians who believe in Jesus receive divine grace by partaking in 
the name 'Christ' (Epideixis, 61). Nevertheless, our knowledge of the divine is 
caused by the soteriological activity of the Logos; Irenaeus' theology of the 
divine names is therefore based on Chris tocenticity. This principle appears in his 
exegesis of the Old and New Testament passages related to the theology of the 
divine name e. g. Rev. 19: 11ff (AH iv. 20.11), Eph. 1: 21 (AH iv. 19.2), etc. According 
to Irenaeus, the name 'Jesus Christ' is the most significant amongst divine 
names, because: 
The Father confess the name of Jesus Christ, which is 
throughout all the world glorified in the Church, to be His 
own, both because it is that of His Son, and because He 
who thus describes it gave Him for the salvation of men. 
Since, therefore, the name of the Son belongs to the Father, 
and since in the omnipotent God the Church makes 
offerings through Jesus Christ, He says well on both these 
grounds, 'And in every place incense is offered to My 
name, and a pure sacrifice' Now John, in the Apocalypse, 
declares that. the 'incense' is 'the prayers of the saints' 
AH iv. 17.6 
Another divine name found in the Old Testament designates nothing but 
the Father of all (AH ii. 35.3 ad fin. ) - however, Irenaeus' interpretation of these 
biblical words reveals his poor acquaintance with Hebrew. But nevertheless, 
it is the name 'Jesus Christ' that causes numerous miracles everywhere 
in the 
Christian communities (AH ü. 32.4-5). 
xx In AH ii. 6.2 Irenaeus interestingly remarks that amongst Jews the 
divine name'Almighty' 
was still in use, 'and for this reason 
do the Jews even now put demons to flight by means of this 
very adjuration, inasmuch as all beings 
fear the invocation of Him who created them'. 
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Chapter III. Alexandrian School 
The Alexandrian school is of special interest to our studies. The main 
characteristic feature of Alexandrian theology is that it was the first time when 
theological speculations about the nature of language were evolved in the 
context of the secular linguistic studies of the epoch. Moreover, in the case of 
Clement and Origen, this influence can be very clearly traced, because their 
knowledge of Classical and Hellenistic philosophical literature as compared to, 
for instance, Irenaeus is much more obvious and apparent. As one can infer 
from the extent and number of Origen's descriptions of the philosophical 
opinions shared by the scholars of his time, or the references of Clement, often 
made in the elegant form of 'quotations from memory', quotations sometimes 
several pages long, both of them approached the subject with a full 
acquaintance with all the linguistic theories of the era. 
In the following section the subject is examined in a way that is 
conditioned by previous study; thus, in the case of Clement I shall undertake a 
general overview, because unlike his apophatic theology, his speculations about 
language have not yet received any satisfactory study. As for Origen, his 
account of language and divine names has already been scrutinised 
by J. Dillon, 
who makes some interesting parallels and explanations. 
Hence, I suggest 
revising some relevant passages from Origen in order to argue that some 
remarks of J. Dillon should be redefined. 
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III-1 Clement of Alexandria 
P. Rotta in his brief analysis of Clement's speculations about human 
language (and languages) points out that Clement seems to be the first 
Christian theologian to approach the problem in the context of biblical 
exegesis305. Although Clement does refer to some relevant biblical passages, in 
his exegesis of Scripture (as it is peculiar to allegorical interpretation) he 
appears to be endeavouring to adapt it to his own ideas, which in turn come 
from a different background. At the same time, he does not undertake a 
detailed analysis of these biblical passages (like, for example, Philo) and in spite 
of his general point about the priority of the 'barbarians' (i. e. the ancient 
Hebrews) in both culture (philosophy and art) and in Revelation, his practical 
solution of the problem as well as some of his primary conclusions betray his 
sympathies with Platonism, which he accepts uncritically. The Platonism of 
Philo and Clement, as well as the evidence for Clement's dependence on Philo 
' P. Rotta, op. cit., p. 75. Y. Edelshtein follows P. Rotta uncritically - v.; it should be noticed, 
however, that this standpoint is very arguable. To assume so means to state that Clement's 
principal understanding of language was based on the Bible. In what follows, however, I shall 
argue that although Clement pays some attention to various biblical passages, his general 
philosophy of language stands on an absolutely different footing. 
M6 Amongst earlier studies of this question, one could mention R. Witt, The Hellenism of Clement 
of Alexandria, Classical Quarterly (1931), C. Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria (Oxford 
1913); for a recent investigation, v. E. Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria (Cambridge 
1957), p. 97ff. 
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is given extensively. In our particular case, however, one should point out that 
Philo pays more attention to the exegesis of the relevant biblical passage, while 
Clement does not seem to be very much interested in it. If Philo's speculations 
on language appear in the form of comparison, synthesis and an attempt to 
reconcile the narration of the Pentateuch and (for example) the Cratylus; 
Clement seems to rest upon the latter. This fact calls into question the above- 
mentioned statement of P. Rotta, and requires a number of reconsiderations 
that are going to be suggested in this section. 
Interestingly enough, Clement appears to be the first Christian 
theologian who in his treatment of human language mentions Plato's doctrine, 
and refers specifically to the Cratylus307. As for his knowledge of Aristotle, he is 
an even greater exception to Patristic tradition; in the eighth book of the 
Stromaties he employs the term quidditas (-tö Ti fjv etvat), which was never used 
by the prominent representatives of Patristic literature 
§ 111.1.1 Clement and his general comprehension of names and numbers 
It seems that for Clement, etymologising about words and names is 
normal; on the whole, an educated man would expect to be acquainted with the 
W Such a direct reference to Plato's dialogue is extremely rare. 
Clement mentions the Cratylus 
twice (Clemens, Stromaus, i, 21,143: 7; iii, 3,16: 3); next, the dialogue 
is mentioned only by 
Gregory of Nyssa - Contra Eunomium, ii, 1: 404. 
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craft of etymology. It is relatively unclear to what extent this etymologising is 
precisely Stoic; most probably, this way of treating words is simply intellectual 
speculation fashionable at that time. At the same time, his etymologising is of 
a different nature by comparison with Gnostic speculations about names and 
number. Clement speaks about their ideas, but for him it is all nothing but signs 
of ignorance. Evidently, the Gnostic speculations examined in the previous 
chapter had no connexion with Stoic etymologies. As for Clement, however, his 
discourse strongly reminds us of the etymological principles worked out by 
Chrysippus: the name 'Poseidon', according to its original signification means 
'a moist substance' (i 7Tomq); he assumes that the name AprIS is derives from 
aQQL4 (rising up) and ava(&iic (destroying). The latter suggestion seems to 
follow one of the three types of the classical Stoic etymological principles, 
namely 'contiguity'. Clearly, Clement distinguishes the phoneme of a word and 
its meaning: to name something, or to usurp some titles, does not result in any 
ontological change in the status of a subject. He makes play with this 
elementary axiom when he ridicules pagan deifications310 of great kings and the 
immortalisation of one's own death311. Although Clement stands for the 4)6vK- 
theory of language, his own solution to the question of why in spite of the 
3N cf. Clemens Alexandrinus, Protrepticus, 2; 13.1 ad fin. 
M Clemens Alexandrinus, Protrepticus, 5; 64. 
310 cf. Clemens Alexandrinus, Protrepticus, 10; 97, where Clement gives some anecdotal reports 
about the deification of Alexander the Great. 
311 cf. Clement's joke about Hippo, who ordered the following elegy to 
be inscribed on his tomb: 
Zrnwvoc Vibe rnjµa, Töv dt0av6[toLuL Oeo atv toov ino(gQFv MoiQa xata4)64pevov. 
Clement 
points out that such an ambition is nothing but 
ävOQwntvq nAävrl -- Clemens Alexandrinus, 
Protrepticus, 4; 55.1. 
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ontological connexion between name and thing, this does not work in the case 
of the usurpation of divine titles is based on an interesting approach and 
division of languages into two groups. 
Nevertheless, Clement seems to be extremely interested in the words of 
language; in his theological speculations he sometimes appeals to the linguistic 
phenomena of the Greek language. Overall, Clement as a Christian writer is 
impressive in his acquaintance with contemporary science312. He indicates, for 
example, that Greek word ävOQwrroS means 'man' in the sense of 'human 
being' and, therefore, equally designates a man and a woman. He discovers 
similar things in the word rcaLbäQLov and äpvrlc313. The following passage 
shows well Clement's principal comprehension of etymology and its 
theological use; first, he teaches that the glory of Christians is the Father of all 
and the crown of the whole Church is Christ; next, he turns to some 
etymologies in order to exemplify his idea: 
As roots and plants, so also have flowers their individual 
properties, some beneficial, some injurious, some also 
dangerous. The ivy is cooling; nux emits a stupefying 
effluvium, as the etymology shows. The narcissus is a 
flower with a heavy odour; the name evinces this, and it 
induces a torpor (väQlaly) in the nerves. And the effluvia of 
roses and violets being mildly cool, relieve and prevent 
312 The theological considerations of Clement are often attached to detailed scientific 
speculations - v. for example Paedagogus, ii, 10. Clement speaks about 
human sexuality (to all 
appearances, it was one of his favourite topics). He interprets the Old Testament prohibition 
against eating hares or hyenas, and shows a staggering knowledge of zoology and reproduction 
in the world of animals - suffice to mention that all these passages were discreetly left in the 
Latin translation by A. Roberts and J. Donaldson. This suggests that in his speculations on 
words and their etymologies one should see the highest level of competence. 
313 Clemens Alexandrinus, Paedagogus, i, 4,10: 3 (text, ed. H. Marrou, M. Harl, C. Mond4sert and 
C. Matray, Clhnent d'Alexandrie. Le pedagogue, 3 vols. in SC 70,108,158 (Parisl960-170)). 
171 
headaches. But we who are not only not permitted to drink 
with others to intoxication, but not even to indulge in much 
wine, do not need the crocus or the flower of the cypress to 
lead us to an easy sleep. Many of them also, by their 
odours, warm the brain, which is naturally cold, 
volatilizing the effusions of the head. The rose is hence said 
to have received its name (eobov) because it emits a 
copious stream (e¬Vµa) of odour (6bw&1). 
Paedagogus, ii, 8; 71: 3314. 
A phoneme, therefore, reflects the form and shape of its subject; 
etymological analysis can reveal and explain this reflection by finding a 
correlation between the sounds of the phoneme and the structure of the subject 
(his example is the rose and the narcissus), its sense (cf. his etymology of the 
word M¬oS 'mercy' derived from EActiov 'oil'315), and an action316. Clement 
follows a similar mode of discourse, when he explains why the divine Logos is 
to be called 'Instructor' (o rcatbaycAryoc): 
When, then, the heavenly guide (ö ovQävL Tlyeµcv), the 
Al yoc, was inviting men to salvation, the appellation of 
hortatory was properly applied to Him: his same word was 
called rousing (the whole from a part). For the whole of 
piety is hortatory, engendering in the kindred faculty of 
reason a yearning after true life now and to come. But now, 
being at once curative and preceptive, following in His own 
steps, He makes what had been prescribed the subject of 
persuasion, promising the cure of the passions within us. 
Let us then designate this Word appropriately by the one 
314 Transl. of Clemet's works - A. Roberts and J. Donaldson 
from ANF, vol., 2. Protrepticus, ed. C. 
Mondesert, Clement d'Alexandrie, Le protreptique, SC, 2 (Paris 1949). 
315 Clemens Alexandrinus, Paedagogus, ii, 8: 62. 
316 In Paedagogus, i, 9: 82.2 Clement derives a noun IAroc 'blame' from the imitative verb 
fig: "EA oc ydQ uai int7Cll1l , K, 
6xmep ovv xai Tovvoµa aivime cat, a&rat nAgyai 
4'uxc Five... Obviously, he makes a mistake by confusing etymological pairs: 
ininAfl&K - 
crow and Aeyoc -A yw. On the whole, Clement's use of etymology 
is an individual issue; 
it seems reasonable to look at it only briefly, because 
it is of more interest for linguistics. 
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name Tutor (K¬i 1QBw b'i µiv Evi 7TQOMýv o&TOS 
ov%taTL Tcatbaywyöc). 
Paedagogus, i, 1; 1.3f. 
Clement says relatively little about the name 'Jesus'; the Saviour's name 
was predicted in the Old Testament (e. g. by the name Jesus the son of Nun3v). 
In fact, his interest in the mystical interpretation of names and numbers 
occurring in the Old Testament is minimal. In the sixth book of the Stromaties, 
Clement describes various variants of Gnostic interpretations of names and 
number, including the name 'Jesus'318; nevertheless, Clement's own attitude to 
these speculations is pessimistic: for him these are only the opinions of people 
who are ignorant in theology and exegesis, who bring forward their fantasies 
rather than any professional knowledge of science, or the craft of allegorical 
interpretation. In his theological system divine titles and epithets are of a 
different nature. 
§ 111.1.2`O 7taibaywy6c. 6 o1 QäV Loc t yq tv or via negativa? 
For Clement, 'o rcatbaycryöc' is a favourite term to designate the Logos; 
etymologising about the divine naLbEia and rtaübwv 
äywyrj (Paedagogus, i, 4-6) 
Clement's chief point is that this divine epithet (that is, of course, one of many) 
317 Paedagogus, i, 7: 60.3. 
31e Stromaties, vi, 11; 84.3f; 11; 89.1f. - Stromata, ed. 0. Stählin, L. 
Früchtel and U. Treu, Clemens 
Alexandrinus, vols. 2 in Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller 
52(15), 17 (Berlin1960). 
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determines the relationship between the Logos and people: the Logos leads all 
people to salvation, without, for instance, distinguishing between men and 
women (etymologies of the mentioned words like rzatbaQtov, etc. are to 
exemplify it). In other words, the Logos is to be called 'Tutor' or 'Instructor', 
because the word 'ö rcatbaywy ' expresses the nature of our relationship with 
the Logos and, therefore, serves for the purpose of theology better than other 
terms. This particular choice is nothing but a reflection of his theological tastes; 
Clement does not attach to the term 'o rraibayc-yog' the status of an absolute 
divine title. The role that this term plays in his theology is relatively small. 
Clement's use of the negative term 6cyEvv7lToc is rare3'9; most probably it is 
inherited from Philo320. The negative theology of Clement has been extensively 
discussed by Mortley: for example, W. Völker in his monograph on Clement32' 
attacks the Alexandrian theologian; he argues that the apophaticisms in 
Stromaties are interpolated and unassimilated in the body of the text; another 
objection made by him is that Clement's negative theology seems to be 
inconsistent with his thought as a whole322. As for Clement's interpreters, W. 
Völker claims that they all rest upon an over-simplification of Clement's 
doctrine and tend to stress either the philosophical or the theological aspects of 
Clement's thought. E. Osborn strongly disagrees with W. Völker's theory of 
319 e. g. Protrepticus, 12: 120.2; Stromaties ii, 11: 51.5; v, 12: 82.3; vi, 7: 58.1; vi, 18: 165.5. 
Im E. Osborn points out that Clement uses certain expressions which Philo also used; 
in 
particular he refers to the terms: rdv 6vrcc µövov dvta, Tö äcytvviltov - E. Osborn, op. cit., p. 
185. 
32, W. Völker, Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus (Berlin and Leipzig 1952). 
3 W. Völker, op. cit., p. 95. 
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interpolated passages, and attempts to find a balance between the theological 
and philosophical sides of Clement. There is no need here to enter the 
discussion that inevitably involves textological arguments and the treatment of 
the problem in the context of Christian Platonism and mystical theology. An 
interesting question, however, is to what extent Clement could use cataphatic 
and apophatic expressions; what criterion is safe for an estimation of the 
balance of his sympathies between borrowing definitions from pagan 
philosophy and working out his own terms (like Paedagogus to whom he 
composed a prayer) as a result of theological reflection upon Christian doctrine, 
when Clement with inspiration exclaims: 'Kai µov µrß ik6tßr1aO¬ opoAoyovv'toc 
EyVWKEVa1 2v OF '0V'323. I propose to examine this issue in the context of his 
general comprehension of language. 
The first book of his magnum opus - the Stromaties - emerges as a detailed 
criticism of issues touched upon in the Protrepticus. As already mentioned, his 
refutation of various philosophical opinions rests upon the following idea: 
Greek and Hellenistic culture is secondary to that of the 'barbarians' (i. e. 
Hebrews). A remark of J. Danielou that the apologetic genre of the Protrepticus 
is just a good example of the missionary technique of the time324 should be 
applied to the beginning of the Stromaties with even more force. One of 
Clement's central intellectual tenets in both the Protrepticus and in the Stromaties 
''; Clemens Alexandrinus, Paeclaxooxus, i, 6: 25. 
324 J. Danielou, Gospel, p. 14. 
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is a classical contrast between Greek culture and 'barbarians' ('and of men all 
are Greeks and Barbarians'325). 
We have also demonstrated Moses to be more ancient, not 
only than those called poets and wise men among the 
Greeks, but than the most of their deities. 
Stromaties, i, 21; 107.6 
He argues that there is a unique i PaQ 3apoS 4)tAoao(Pia, and insofar as 
the 'barbarians' surpass Greeks in science, culture, art, etc., they surpass them to 
the same extent in knowledge of the divine. I cannot here go into this issue in 
full; suffice to say that there is evidence to affirm that his general enthusiasm 
seems slightly ostentatious - as so often for Clement, what he really has for an 
object differs from what he seems to have a prima facie326. Nevertheless, this 
premise significantly reflects upon his comprehension of language. 
§ 111.1.3 Language and languages 
As a matter of fact, the idea that 'barbarians' have priority over the 
Greeks and, the proposition that 'barbarian' languages are therefore more 
ancient than Greek dialects was already spelled out in the Cratylus that Clement 
M Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromaties, v, 14: 133.8. 
' It is a characteristic feature of his writings, that contrasts with the general 
literary canons of 
Patristics: cf. his numerous morbid passages on human sexuality, animal reproduction, some 
shady manners of Gnostics (his opponents) or chronological reference points 
like 'the rape of 
Helen by Theseus' and 'the rape of Helen by Alexander' (Stromaties, i, 21). Although it is always 
attached to allegorical exegesis or moral theology, a strong 
impression is that Clement likes 
speaking of these issues. Perhaps, it is his 
literary method to attract more attention. 
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knew so well327. I think that Clement adapts this logic to his own explanation of 
the issue. Under the heading 'barbarians' he often includes Old Testament 
Hebrews; apparently, they are more ancient than the Greeks. The Hebrew 
language, consequently, is older than the Greek. To this point his discourse is 
similar to the rabbinic tradition (Philo and Josephus Flavius are good examples 
of this belief). They hold that the words of the Hebrew language were produced 
by Adam when he named all the creatures in Paradise before the Fall. As 
already demonstrated, Philo makes play of the Platonic name-maker and his 
theory of naming is based on the parallel between the Platonic övopa'rovpyöc 
and Adam328. This premise specifies a theory of natural connexion in an 
interesting way: Adam (being still perfect) produced the primordial language; 
this language is ancient Hebrew. When the confusion of languages followed, 
Hebrew remained unaltered and was inherited by Eber and his progeny3". 
Clement shares a theory that was commonly held, that there are seventy- 
five world languages: Greek historians noted the statement made by Moses that 
there are only seventy-five nations and languages (Gen. 44: 27); according to his 
calculation, however: 
327 This motif often emerges in the dialogue in a clear and unclear form: Plato, Cratylus, 390a, 
397d, 409e, 410a, 416a, esp. - 421cd, 425e-426b. 
328 Clement just mentions that Adam named animals in front of his wife, but his concern is with 
Old Testament prophetic phenomenon - Stromaties, i, 21; 135.3. 
3' This idea sometimes appeared in Patristic exegesis; Theodoretus, when he was asked noia 
yM aac aaQXaLo r Qa; still points to Hebrew, but he does not seem to accept the idea that 
Hebrew is the primordial tongue, and in the next section contradicts his previous discourse (v. 
Theodoretus, Quaestiones in Octateuchum, quest. 60ff. (ed. N. Fernandez Marcos and A. Säenz- 
Badillos, Theodoren Cyrensis quaestiones in Octateuchum in Textos y Estudios «Cardenal 
Cisneros* 17 (Madrid 1979). 
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... there appear to be seventy-two generic dialects (ai 
YEVIKtU 0L6. AEKTOI), as our Scripture hands down. 
Stromaties, i, 21; 142. 
Next, Clement seems to follow the Platonic suggestion that all 
contemporary languages are nothing but 'spoiled' variants of the original 
dialects: 
The rest of the vulgar tongues are formed by the blending 
of two, or three, or more dialects. 
Ibid. 
Observations should be made on Clement's comprehension of the term 
'dialect'. The definition he gives is the following: 
A dialect is a mode of speech which exhibits a character 
peculiar to a locality (AEE, ic ibiov xaQm<T jQa TöTcov 
Eµoaivovaa), or a mode of speech which exhibits a 
character peculiar or is common to a race (i AeEi5 ibtov rl 
xolvöv E6vovs Eýiýaivouaa xapax Qa). 
Ibid. 
But detailed analysis of his use of the word 'dialect' (in relation to 4wvTl 
and yA(-oQQa) shows that most probably Clement took this definition from 
different sources. In this formula an emphasis is laid on the peculiar character 
of a nation in relation to its geographic area. As we have seen, this idea 
appeared in Epicurus, and presumably was popular in the philology of 
his 
days. Clement nowhere directly says that Hebrew is the primordial tongue of 
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the human race. On the contrary, he thinks that there were seventy-two 'generic 
dialects'. 
§ 111.1.4 q)wvtj, btaAeicTOS, and YAWQQa; words imposed by nature and 
'generic dialects' 
Let us now focus on his use of words to designate the notion of 
language. His uses (ýcwvi to designate 'tongue' as the speech of a nation; his 
general use of the words rl 6MExTos and rj yAc i-rTa is standard: Clement 
attributes ai bL. A¬x'tol to various dialects of one language, for instance, to the 
five dialects of the Greek language (Attic, Ionic, Doric, Aeolic, and the fifth the 
Common"'). On the other hand he recognises numerous 'barbarian' tongues 
not as dialects, but as self-sufficient languages331. It remains unclear, however, 
why Clement calls Hebrew TI `EßQaicwv 
bl. aAEKToc 2; I think that although 
Clement gives remarkable definitions, in the course of his long speculations he 
tends to use i buzAExroc and i ýxovrj as synonyms. This is, perhaps, why he 
calls the original seventy-two tongues of the human race 'dialects'. 
330 Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromaties, i, 21; 142.4. 
331 ibid.:... (Y7i£QLAT17TTOl'Z bt OVO(YC T(Y` ßapßäpc. ýv c, ýv(tC ý. uqf 
NaA£KTouz, (tAAc' yA(: )(7aac, 
A y£Qecu. 
332 e. `'. Strwmaties, vi, 15; 129.1. 
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His notion of 'generic dialects' (ai ycvlxai blaAEKTOI) is interesting. 
From this point, Clement adopts Plato's theory, but in a different way from 
Philo: 
But the first and generic barbarous dialects have phonemes 
imposed by nature, since also men confess that prayers 
uttered in a barbarian tongue are more powerful. And 
Plato, in the Cratylus, when wishing to interpret rtve (f re), 
says that it is a barbaric word. He testifies, accordingly, that 
the Phrygians use this term with a slight deviation 
(Cratylus, 410a)ß. 
First of all, Clement shares the theory of natural connexion between 
(primordial or original) words and things. Undoubtedly, for him Greek is 
posterior to the Hebrew language, but Hebrew was not a primordial tongue - 
the subject of the clause (at nQ&r t -Kai yevuxai bt. AcxToi (3äeßapoL) is in the 
plural; so, if my understanding of Clement is correct, he is saying that Hebrew 
is closer to these generic tongues (compared to Greek), therefore, the 
ontological correspondence between phoneme and object is better expressed in 
Hebrew than in Greek. In his belief that prayers uttered in a barbarian tongue 
are more powerful, Clement follows the same logic caused by the same 
premise: the natural connexion between name and thing and the gradual 
aberration of Greek from its original (or generic) dialects. 
Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromaties, i, 21: 143.6: ai bi rtQ&rraL Kai yevucai bLäAFxtoL IMQßaQoL 
µßv, jm5mt be ca 6vöµara CXovvty, end xai'räs ¬vxa(; 
6 oAoyoü7Lv of avOQwnou 
bvvatwjrtiQac rtvat Täs ßaQ 3äQ4) 4wvr, 1 A¬yopivac. xat flAät(, )v bC 
iv KQaTÜAW T6 'm)Q 
CQ L1VEvaaL povAGµ¬voc ßaQßaQLxbv 4rlow etvaL r6 
6voµa. 
&U Stromaties, vi, 15; 130.3:... cbLov ovvtbtiv baaK yevratc Tfic 'E(Qatsv 6 at naQ' 
EAM cn 
µETayEVEatEQaL btdAeicToL ü7r6LQxovct. 
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Evidently, Clement used the Cratylus as a main source of his doctrine of 
language. Moreover, his speculations on the nature of speech appear as a 
unique instance in Patristic tradition. First, there are no signs that Clement 
entered any dispute with the Gnostic treatment of language, like Irenaeus; his 
ideas are free of any doctrinal implications. Platonism is his real footing on the 
question of language. Clement holds Plato's theory without any qualification. 
Clement gives the impression of being eager to adopt everything that can be 
adopted from the linguistic ideas of the Cratylus: 
Plato attributes a dialect also to the gods, forming this 
conjecture mainly from dreams and oracles, and especially 
from demoniacs, who do not speak their own language or 
dialect (oi Trly allTwv ov OOFyyovTa1 x(Ovi v oübE 
blLCAEKTov), but that of the demons who have taken 
possession of them. 
Stromaties, i, 21; 143.1f. 
The question of demons' (and especially angels') language is a special 
individual problem. In the vast majority of instances the Fathers argued that 
language is a characteristic feature of human beings; angels do not have 
language but communicate non-verbally. Clement, however, assumes that 
demons speak their own language; he infers it from the Platonic theory of 
'divine language'; it is not difficult to apply this idea to angels. 
111.1.5 Language and logical definitions 
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The eighth book of the Stromaties is conceived as a practical 
demonstration of how the object of true philosophy and theological inquiry can 
coincide. One who attempts to discover truth must treat words and definitions 
skilfully. Methodologically, Clement makes use of Aristotle i ävaAvTLxä and 
the Stoic 1j AoyL1 2txvr); this use is very evident: Clement refers to Aristotelian 
arguments against the Sophists, and repeats the favourite examples and 
axioms of the Stoics 336. Furthermore, he is so concerned with logic that his 
statements sometimes contradict his general speculation about languages. One 
can easily find a good number of purely Aristotelian ideas that Clement, 
presumably, inherited from the Stoa: if reasoning is kept within the canons of 
logic the meaning always exists. He asks, what better or clearer method for the 
commencement of instruction of this nature can there be than discussion of the 
term advanced, so distinctly, that all who use the same language may follow it: 
Therefore, if one would treat aright of each question, he 
cannot carry back the discourse to another more generally 
admitted fundamental principle that what is admitted to be 
signified by a term by all of the same nation and language. 
Stromaties, viii, 2. 
In fact, Clement leaves aside his central rhetorical opposition of the 
'barbarian' and Greek philosophy and does not introduce a distinction between 
generic languages and posterior ones. On the contrary, he treats 
language and 
m Stromaties, viii, 9; 26.4. 
3m cf. Stromaties, viii, 2; 31: the imitative word ßA(TUQI was a classical 
Stoic example of 'just a 
sound that signifies nothing' (ävrµa) - e. g. Chrysippus, 
Fragmenta logica et physica, fr. 149: 2. 
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the verbal expression of rational discourse (that should, of course, follow 
regulations and norms of logic) equally, because his main preoccupation is now 
with the craft of logic; he expounds classical rules that were already discovered 
by Aristotle and the Stoics; there is therefore no need to outline them here. 
Philosophically, this logic is based on a fundamental principle that 
considers all languages equally: the regulations of logic work in any linguistic 
environment and Clement points this out more than once, and his discourse on 
the whole shows that he takes the principle for granted. My point here is that 
Clement does not feel that the philosophical foundations of logic that he gives 
an account of, and his theory that 'generic barbarian dialects' ontologically 
reflect truth better than, for example, the Greek of the five main dialects of the 
Greek language (that in his theory are nothing but new derivatives) contradict 
each other. Therefore, in this section of the Stromaties, the account of language 
and name is the least related to his theological system. Presumably, Clement 
just summarises the knowledge of logic that he inherited from his secular 
studies. The following passage is a good example: 
In language (4covi) there are three things: Names, which 
are primarily the symbols of conceptions (ovöµata 
c 43oAa ov ra uov vor pth vv), and by consequence also 
of subjects (uOv vncoxeq. tEvwv). Second, there are 
Conceptions, which are the likenesses and impressions of 
the subjects. Whence in all, the conceptions are the same; in 
consequence of the same impression being produced by the 
subjects in all. But the names are not so, on account of the 
difference of languages. And thirdly, the Subject-matters by 
which the Conceptions are impressed in us. 
Stromaties, viü, 8: 23.1 
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His understanding of the Aristotelian TO' TL iv Eivag is unusual; this 
'what it is' of the subject Clement completes by logical analysis i. e. by 
consequent specifying of a genus by various 'differences'. A similar 
simplification can be observed in his remark on the Stoic 'sayable': for him T6 
ýEKTÖV is merely a predicate; he says that Stoic 'sayables' and predicates are 
synonyms: 
... causes belong to the class of predicates 
(KaTfIyoQ1] iäT(Ov), or, as others say, of dicta (AEK'nir') (for 
Cleanthes and Archedemus call predicates Tä A KTa). 
Stromaties, viii, 9; 26.4 
It should be pointed out, however, that his general comprehension of 
logic is predominantly influenced by Aristotle. It is a good question, as to what 
extent Clement realised that the following reference to Aristotle contradicted 
his Platonic theory of language: 
Now Aristotle denominates the name of such things as a 
house, a ship, burning, cutting, an appellative. But the case 
is allowed to be incorporeal. Therefore that sophism is 
solved thus: What you say passes through your mouth. 
Which is true. You name a house. Therefore a house passes 
through your mouth. Which is false. For we do not speak 
the house, which is a body, but the case, in which the house 
is, which is incorporeal. 
Stromaties, viii, 9; 26.4. 
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§ 111.1.6 Irrational creatures and the power of communication 
One of the most intriguing aspects of his philosophy of language is that 
he was concerned with the phenomenon of communication between irrational 
creatures. The idea that the power of speech is a principal characteristic of 
mankind is so crucial for Patristics that it will not be an exaggeration to state 
that for the Fathers this limitation was the most central premise for a Patristic 
theory of language. 
Posing a question about the nature of animal communication, Clement 
repeatedly resorts to Plato: 
He (Plato) thinks also that the irrational creatures have 
dialects (xa . äAoycwv Ccxcov biaA Tovc EZvaL), which those 
that belong to the same genus understand'. Accordingly, 
when an elephant falls into the mud and bellows out any 
other one that is at hand, on seeing what has happened, 
shortly turns, and brings with him a herd of elephants, and 
saves the one that has fallen in. It is said also in Libya, that 
a scorpion, if it does not succeed in stinging a man, goes 
away and returns with several more; and that, hanging on 
one to the other like a chain they make in this way the 
attempt to succeed in their cunning design. 
The irrational creatures do not make use of an obscure 
intimation, or hint their meaning by assuming a particular 
attitude, but, as I think, by a dialect of their own. And some 
others say, that if a fish which has been taken escapes 
by 
breaking the line, no fish of the same kind will be caught in 
the same place that day. 
Stromaties, i, 21; 143.2f. 
3v I could not find a direct passage from Plato to which 
Clement refers. Perhaps, this is why A. 
Roberts and J. Donaldson left these two references to 
Plato without specification -- ANF vol. ii, 
n. 290, n. 291. 
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Irrational creatures are said to have ij btäA¬x'roS on their own. Clearly, in 
the above-going passage his use of the word ýj bL AEKTOS contradicts 
dramatically what he defined before. Now i bL6AexToq is neither 'a dialect', nor 
it is the 'power of speech' (a synonym of ij )ovrj) - in the case of scorpions or 
fish one can hardly use TI xovTj. What Clement really means here is the power 
of communication that is peculiar to a living soul. 
Thus, on the one hand Clement goes on to say that to some extent the 
power of speech is peculiar to irrational creatures; of course, he does not specify 
it, and only points to the enigmatic character of the phenomenon. On the other 
hand, however, in Clement's account of language a problem of animal 
communication is touched upon. Clement proposition is remarkable: he 
suggests treating the phenomenon in the context of human speech. 
His philosophy of language on the whole is Platonised. Unfortunately, P. 
Rotta and Y. Edelshtein do not mention it. Some elements of Aristotelism 
appear only in the sections of secondary importance. It was interesting to 
observe, however, how English translators of Clement were puzzled by his 
uncritical adoption of Plato. Translating some passages where Plato's influence 
was dramatically obvious, the editor commented: 'This assent to Plato's whim, 
on the part of our author, is suggestive'. But this analysis demonstrates that 
Clement's theory of language is Platonic, and his 'assents to Plato's whims' are 
much more than merely 'suggestive'. Clement's Platonism in respect to the 
nature of language is the most conspicuous example in Patristic theology. Even 
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Eunomius' theory of naming fails to fit the main issues of the Cratylus in the 
way that Clement's teaching does. To sum up, his account of language and 
names is, perhaps, the best argument against the 'optimistic' representation of 
the Patristic theology of language, proposed by Y. Edelshtein. 
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111.2 Origen and his view on names and language 
It has been shown above that a central characteristic feature of 
speculation about language at the early stage of Alexandrian theology was its 
deep grounding in the doctrine of Plato. Clement's theological view of language 
was a good example of a tradition that can be traced from Philo onwards. In the 
writings of Origen, the attempt to adopt the (ý vQis-theory of names for the 
needs of Church theology appears even stronger, but in a radically new form. 
First of all he evolves an extensive theology of divine names in general and the 
name 'Jesus' in particular. He shows more originality, and there is evidence to 
affirm that his use of the q)üa is-theory of language is much more systematic 
and comes from a relatively new background. He overcomes a number of 
puzzles in this theory and suggests a number of some interesting solutions. Of 
course, not all of his suggestions appear to be philosophically consistent, but 
one should remember that this seeming inconsistency in form does not 
necessarily mean that his view on names is in fact incoherent. Origen himself 
makes the reservation that he does not aim to represent his views on the nature 
of names in full: 
And much more besides might be said on the subject of 
names, against those who think that we ought to be 
indifferent as to our use of them. 
CCels. 1,25: 44f3m. 
-m transl. of A. Roberts & J. Donaldson ANF, vol. iv. 
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And this is correct: some aspects of his theology of language are kept 
back. Origen's chief claims to originality are related to the fact that his interest 
in a semi-Platonic doctrine of names is not prompted by his philosophical 
sympathies; amongst various hypotheses he has chosen the gvatc-theory, 
because it seemed to agree with the more general premises of his theology. This 
is why his approach to the issue is more theologically accurate. If for Clement or 
Philo the Cratylus is taken a priori, as authoritative and 'correct' scientific 
doctrine, Origen's choice has a different motivation. His main aim is not to find 
a synthesis between the biblical narrative about the Tower of Babel and current 
trends in linguistic teaching, for example. As a matter of fact he enters the 
discussion because his long-life passion for martyrdom for the name of Jesus 
Christ was ridiculed by both Gnostics and secular philosophers like Celsus. 
Whenever he speaks of the nature of names, his central purpose is to explain 
why Christians prefer to die in the course of persecution rather than make a 
sacrifice (even formally) to the names of Zen or Jupiter, why they cannot call the 
Supreme Deity by the terms that are commonly used by pagans, why 
martyrdom for the name of Jesus is nothing but the perfecting of the true 
Christian life. 
In what follows, I shall try to demonstrate how Origen adopts the (ývQg- 
theory and how he binds it up with an allegorical interpretation of the 
Scriptures, and finally how this linguistic position affected his theological 
system. At this stage I shall examine the suggestion of J. 
Dillon who seems to 
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overestimate the significance of the Cratylus for Origen: to what extent does 
Origen depend on the authority of Plato? 
Two aspects of Origen's thought such as his use of apophatic definitions 
and his remarkable theology of divine names and the name 'Jesus' in particular, 
have already received academic attention; however, a general question about 
what Origen thinks human language to be has not yet received any satisfactory 
examination. For the sake of space and for other reasons, it does not seem 
plausible to focus on the numerous passages where Origen gives extensive and 
lengthy allegorical explanations. I shall attempt to analyse the very foundation 
of Origen's view on the nature of language in order to demonstrate what kind of 
linguistic theory is behind his speculations over names and divine epithets. 
Therefore, in this section I shall mainly focus on the Contra Celsum (CCels. ), the 
treatise where Origen approaches the problem of language in the most 
philosophical way. 
To begin with, I shall focus on his theory of language in order to clarify 
to what extent he accepts the Stoic theory of language, and to what extent he 
modifies it for his own theological purposes. An examination of his enigmatic 
beliefs related to magical practice that has already been examined by J. Dillon in 
his valuable article to which I am indebted, will also be dealt with briefly. I 
think (and shall try to demonstrate) that this aspect of his doctrine is not of 
central importance for our problem. Origen's views on the primordial tongue, 
his attitude to the variety of human tongues are of much more 
interest, and 
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provide us with valuable information that substantially clarifies his real 
purpose and interest in magic. Another important task of this section will be to 
trace how his linguistic doctrine and philosophy of names affected some other 
spheres of his system. In conclusion I shall attempt to trace some interesting 
influences of his ideas on the Church theology of the fourth century. 
111.2.1 Origen and his comprehension of language: posing of the question 
Origen's interest in names and divine names is striking; his theology of 
names was examined noAvµcpCoS xai rtoAv rQOncog in the context of his 
apophatic theology and doctrine of divine names9. The question of his 
linguistic views is still unclear: the comprehensive monographs of P. Rotta and 
Y. Edelshtein left Origen almost ignoredTM0. What does Origen think of the 
nature of names? 
One of the most exhaustive explanations is given in the De Oratione, 
where he exposes the meaning of 'hallowed be thy name': 
Now name is a summary designation, indicative of the 
proper quality of him who is named. For example, there is a 
proper quality of Paul the Apostle, a quality of the soul in 
accordance with which his soul is of such and such a kind, 
3N v., for example, R. Hanson, Allegory and event (London 1959) pp. 205-207; H. Crouzel, Origene 
et la "connaisaince mystique" (Paris 1961), p. 253ff; 14. An4ees, , op. cit., v. 1, p. 71ff.; A. Ooom, 
YKenue Opuzena o Aomce u Aozocax luöe. *x), pp. 197-226. 
340 P. Rotta refers to the famous CCels. 1,24 just only once - op. cit., p. 83 - and his interest is 
limited to Origen's opposition to the Epicurean theory of language origin. 
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a quality of the mind, in accordance with which it 
contemplates things of such and such sort, and a quality of 
his body, in accordance with which it is of such and such 
sort.. . 
But in the case of man, when their proper qualities as it 
were become changed, their names also are rightly changed 
according to Scripture. For when the quality of Abram was 
changed he was called 'Abraham'... 
But in the case of God, who himself is invariable and ever 
immutable by nature, the name which is as it were given to 
him is ever one, the 'He who is' spoken of in Exodus (Ex. 
3: 14), or any other name that conveys the same meaning. 
De Oratione, 24; 2M1. 
His considerations about names, their alteration and the 
Tetragrammaton are inspired by Scripture is based on ancient Hebrew name- 
theology. In exegetical works he often reverts to the same logic'42: the name 
'Jesus', which is 'poured chrism'343, attached to the son of Nun, the name 'Jesus' 
designates sacraments of the Lord Jesus, etc. Such examples could be 
multiplied endlessly from his exegetical homilies, but in fact neither his 
commentaries on the biblical passages, nor the above-quoted fragment from the 
De Oratione, make clear the philosophical foundation for such an understanding 
of name. 
34' Transl. of E. G. Jay, Origen's treatise on Prayer (London 1954), p. 154. 
m For his exegesis of the biblical names v. 14. Ampees, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 70-78. 
3a Origenes, in canticum canticorum, 1,4 (PG 13,41 D- 42 A). 
m4 Origenes, In Jesu Nave, 1,1 (PG 12,825 A- 825 A) 
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As H. Alfeyev rightly points out, Origen shows an outstanding 
competence in all settled theories of language of his era-45; arguing against the 
oversimplification of the matter that occurs amongst his opponents (Celsus and, 
presumably the GnosticsM6). He clearly means the followers of Aristotle's 
philosophy of language, who bring the OEot-theory of names to oversimplified 
subjectivism (J. Dillon rightly defines Celsus' position as 'aggressive 
syncretism'm7) and argues that it is philosophically ridiculous to prefer biblical 
divine names at the cost of the names of Greek (heathen) religion. In contrast to 
a tendency to reconcile two opposite classical theories of language, Origen 
rejects the Aristotelian theory in toto. Perhaps the following passage, in spite of 
its length, is the best to shed light on Origen's own philosophical sympathies 
concerning the nature of human words and at once to set the agenda for our 
discussion: 
... we have to remark that this involves a 
deep and 
mysterious subject - that, viz., respecting the nature of 
names (o TCE Q1 (ývcrECwc övoµä'rcvv): it being a question 
whether, as Aristotle thinks, names were bestowed by 
arrangement (O eo Ei 671 Tä övopa'a), or, as the Stoics 
hold, by nature; the first words being imitations of things, 
agreeably to which the names were formed (µgµovµtvcAN 
uOv rcecOrc, v (Pwvcýv ra nQayµa ra), and in conformity 
with which they introduce certain principles of etymology 
(mroLXeia 'rLva tS vrvpoAoyiac Eiaäyouaw); or whether, 
as Epicurus teaches (differing in this from the Stoics), 
names were given by nature, - the first men having uttered 
34514. M4 ees, , loc. cit. 
cf Origenes, Exhortatio ad martyrium, 46; 7f. (ed. P. Koetschau, 
Origenes Werke, vol. 1 in Die 
griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller 2 (Leipzig 1899), pp. 
3-47). 
347 Dillon, J. op. cit., p. 207. Apart from that, Celsus also seems to hold a sensualist epistemology - 
cf. CCels., 7; 36. 
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certain words varying with the circumstances in which they 
found themselves (c cTEt EQTt Tä övoVa-ra, äßc pry&aVTCwv 
TCJV 7TQCJTCJV «vOQc37ccwv TIVGic 4xov(c Kath T6 N 
rceayVaT(wv). 
Contra Celsum, 1,24: 7-163. 
It is obvious that in his comprehension of language Origen is extremely 
close to the Alexandrian tradition; moreover, his refutation of Aristotle's 
position repeatedly appears in the Contra Celsum (CCels. ). Thus, he believes that 
the name of a thing, its phoneme, is bound up with its essence ontologically. 
Although it has already been shown that the character of this ontological 
connexion between name and essence had been always a matter of heated 
discussion, and it was still debatable amongst Stoics, due to the lack of 
information it remains unclear to which variant of pimS-theory Origen refers. 
Moreover, Origen's hints at his scientific sympathies to the Stoic theory of 
language are extremely accurate, so that one can find relatively little 
information about how Origen himself understands this ontological connexion. 
Nevertheless, it is relatively clear that, first, Origen decisively rejects 
Aristotelian or semi-Aristotelian variants of linguistic theory, because they 
contradict his views in every respect. Second, his acquaintance with these 
variants of the Immg-theory was deep enough; he distinguishes, for example, 
the 4 nc-theory of Stoics from a similar variant given by the Epicurean school 
m Contra Celsum, ed. M. Borret, Origene. Contre Celse, 4 vole, SC 132,136,147,150 (Paris 1967- 
1969). 
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and refutes the latter349. Philo and Clement merely adopted Plato's theory of 
names, including some secondary aspects of the theory; in other words, the 
Cratylus should be regarded as their main source and foundation for their view 
on the nature of language and its origin. Even though one can find a number of 
parallels between Origen's theory and the ideas of Plato, it is noticeable that he 
still associates the notorious ý)iaic-theory not with Plato in personam, but with 
Stoic modifications of the theory of language and their etymologies. It is also 
noticeable that he appears to ignore the Cratylus systematically: in several pages 
below (viz. CCels. 1,25: 44 ad fin. ), when he endeavours to reinforce his point by 
referring to the authority of Plato, Origen quotes relatively insignificant and 
uninteresting passages from the Philebus that Socrates' 'fear about the names of 
gods is no small one'350. J. Dillon's proposition that the (ýirnc-theory in this 
instance originally comes from the Cratylus and is just borrowed back from the 
Stoics35' is generally correct, but there is a need to specify Origen's attitude to 
the dialogue. His competence in language matters was outstanding, and it is 
highly unlikely that Origen was unaware of this dialogue of Plato. 
In the first instance, as J. Dillon rightly makes clear in his article, Origen's 
approach to the problem is more practical than theoretical. His ideas about 
language and languages appear in reply to the position of the Sceptic-minded 
349 I believe that his criticism of Epicurus in CCels. 1,24: 22 may be regarded as Origen's rejection 
of Epicurean theory. 
° Perhaps he quoted by memory; I think here and in CCels. 4; 48: 22 he means Philebus., 12c1f. 
351 J. Dillon, op. cit., p. 207. 
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philosophical trend based on the De interpretatione. It is, in particular, his reply 
to Celsus, who argued that: 
It makes no difference whether the God who is over all 
things be called by the name of Zeus, which is current 
among the Greeks, or by that, e. g., which is in use among 
the Indians or Egyptians. 
CCels. 1,24: 4-7. 
§ 111.2.2 Apophatic definitions and theology of divine names 
It is clear that Celsus"pluralism' in relation to the names for the divine is 
based, as Origen repeatedly points out, on the theory of Aristotle. At the same 
time, and this represents for Origen an evident difficulty, Celsus attempts to 
add force to his standpoint by semi-apophatic definitions of the divine. Origen 
clarifies that the incomprehensibility of God in Church theology relates to 
human nature - God cannot be perfectly described by human words: 
I make a distinction, and say that if he means the word that 
is in us (F -'L tvA 
6y4) t4 Ev rj tiv) - whether the word 
conceived in the mind (etrE Evbta6e'np ct'r 7tpoOQLx4)), or 
the word that is uttered - I, too, admit that God is not to be 
reached by word. 
CCels., 6; 65: 7ff. 
His next distinction is interesting. The statement that 'God cannot be 
reached by any word' is different from 'God cannot be designated by name 
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(ovx övoµaQ'röc)'. The former means that God is invisible (a6Qa'roc), 
incomprehensible, 'difficult to see' (bu(3BEdiQryroc) for human intellect (\'ovc) 
and heart (xaQbia); therefore, He is unapproachable by human words (Aöyoc); 
but human word/thought (Aoyo(; ) is different from the divine Logos (! ). He goes 
on to say that the statement about the 'unnameable deity', however, requires to 
be taken with a distinction as well: 
If he means, indeed, that there is no word or sign (Ev 
Aeß¬ai Kai rnqµarvoµevoic) that can represent the 
attributes of God (büvaTai 7TaQaa aal r&; ibiö-rrjTac Tov 
OEov), the statement is true. 
Ibid. 
And on a similar basis, he adds there are many qualities which cannot be 
indicated by words, and one cannot distinguish and set forth in words the 
peculiar qualities of each individual thing (Ibid. ): 
But if you take the phrase to mean that it is possible to 
represent by words something of God's attributes, in order 
to lead the hearer by the hand, as it were, and so enable him 
to comprehend something of God, so far as attainable by 
human nature, then there is no absurdity in saying that 'He 
can be described by name'. 
Ibid. 
Thus, Origen distinguishes Greek theological epithets for the divine from 
proper (Hebrew) names that Scripture attaches to God. This issue receives a 
thorough examination when Origen turns to the problem of divine names. At 
this stage, his line of argumentation against Aristotelism is based on practical 
observations - lie believes that his appeals to 
linguistic realities will make more 
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sense than philosophising rc¬ei oüaiac,. He proposes an interesting category - 
the efficacy of magical formulae amongst heathen nations and the veneration of 
divine names amongst Christians - and gives his own explanation of these 
phenomena. He says that magical practice is not utterly incoherent, as some 
philosophers suppose, but: 
... as those skilled in it prove, a consistent system, having 
words which are known to exceedingly few. 
CCels. 1,24: 22f. 
In his opinion, the efficacy of magical practice is based on the fact that all 
the names and words of human languages are given by nature. What kind of 
languages are the subject of his examination? 
§ 111.2.3 The problem of primordial language: Hebrew is i Oda biäAtivroc 
The problem of the variety of human languages always depends on how 
one comprehends the original (primordial) tongue. In the fifth book of CCels 
Origen turns back to the problem of language, but in another kind of context. 
His concern is now with his doctrine of angels and the historical division of 
human nations, and therefore languages. His speculations are strongly 
reminiscent of the well-known premise of Clement who opposed 'Greek 
science' to 'Barbarian revelation'; Origen similarly turns this idea 
into an 
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opposition of Hebrew and 'other' languages. Thus, he argues against the views 
of Greek and Egyptian historians on the origin of humankind, refers to Gen. 
11: 1-9 and points out that it is neither the struggle of Greek gods, nor the 
'division of the so-called Egyptian homes' that caused the variety of nations and 
their tongues. Originally, humankind consisted of one nation who spoke one 
language; God confounded the language of all the earth, because of the sin 
against him, and there followed the confusion of languages, when the 'division 
of the earth' took place352. His association of sin and corruption with the notion 
of division brightly reminds us of a Neo-Platonic opposition of the superior 
'one' and the inferior 'many'; it is, therefore, clear why he calls the original 
language of human race 'divine' or, according to H. Chadwick's translation, 
'sacred': 
All the people upon the earth are to be regarded as having 
used one divine language (µ&, TLVL blaA£KTGJ OEiq 
XQc) µ £vo L), and so long as they lived harmoniously 
(uu u xuvoüat rrQöc 6 Aovc) together were preserved in 
the use of this divine language (E-'v Ti heia bLaAEKTC)). 
CCels. 5; 30f. 
This transition of humankind from unity to multiplicity, from the 
possession of one language to many, from being one nation to many nations, 
came to pass, in his opinion, gradually. Initially, they remained without moving 
from the Orient (CCels., 5; 30: 6 - '67t6 TWv av0vroAC0v') ; but as soon as they 
39 CCels., 5; 29. 
3w cf j. Danielou, Origen (London 1955), p. 
229 and his comment on the comprehension of this 
term in Patristic theology. 
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wanted to acquire material things (Tä S IbATIi; wvayayEiv' O AovTEc) - 
Origen allegorically interprets the bricks of the Tower and alludes to the 
concept of multiplicity - the people were not 'imbued with the sentiments of the 
'light' (2ä Tov (ýwTÖS), and of the 'reflection' of the eternal light (Kai Toü ärö 
«(ýwTÖS äibiov»)' any longer. 
The builders paid their penalty, and God confounded the original sacral 
language that they used to speak. How does Origen comprehend this ij Otia 
bläAKTos? He believes that this language is Hebrew; furthermore, in his 
opinion, the biblical patriarchs had preserved this sacral language: 
Now, in the next place, if any one has the capacity, let him 
understand that in what assumes the form of history, and 
which contains some things that are literally true, while yet 
it conveys a deeper meaning, those who preserved their 
original language continued (Tovs Týjv Ea äfc bLäAEKTOv 
TE'QflKo rac), by reason of their not having migrated from 
the east, in possession of the east, and of their eastern 
language (dvovtac Ev äva'roArl xai Trl ävaTOALxTI 
bLaAE}-rw). And let him notice, that these alone became the 
portion of the Lord, and His people who were called Jacob, 
and Israel the cord of His inheritance; and these alone were 
governed by a ruler who did not receive those who were 
placed under him for the purpose of punishment, as was 
the case with the others. 
CCels. 5; 31: lff. 
His treatment of biblical Hebrew is both astonishing and perilous: in 
CCels. 3,6-7 he calls Hebrew 'a gift from heaven' (OEob(iQrl'rov b ¬KTOV) and 
adds that the letters of the Hebrew alphabet were invented and first employed 
by Moses while composing the Pentateuch. This attitude to Hebrew is not 
something substantially new amongst Alexandrian theologians, 
but unlike 
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Clement he does not seem to attach an absolute epistemological status to 
Hebrew; moreover, as we have observed in CCels. 6; 65-69 this presumption is 
entirely foreign to him: even this sacral language has limitations. 
The most interesting aspect of his position for our purposes is his 
statement that there is no epistemological distinction between the primordial 
divine tongue and modern languages; the ontological connexion between phoneme 
and essence of thing exists in all languages equally: 
If, then, we shall be able to establish, in reference to the 
preceding statement, the nature of powerful names, some 
of which are used by the learned amongst the Egyptians, or 
by the Magi among the Persians, and by the Indian 
philosophers called Brahmans, or by the Samanaeans, and 
others in different countries (xaO' examrov'ccv F-Ov& v); 
CCels. 1,24: 16ff. 
Origen's concern with the problem of the origin of languages and their 
variety is striking. We now come across one of the most intriguing aspects of 
Origen's view on the nature of human language. Hebrew was called aý 
O Eobc3Qt1Toc or even OE is dialect; at the same time, Origen definitely thinks of 
all languages of the human race as equal, because the 'mechanism' of the 
designation in all languages is the sane. How does he understand the problem 
of the variety of human languages and why, (to develop his reasoning) 
is 
Hebrew to some extent equal to the other languages? 
Turing back to Origen's conjecture about the transition of humankind 
from the orient, i. e. from unity to multiplicity, one of the basic presuppositions 
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of his exegesis of Gen. 11: 1-9, Deut. 32: 8-9, and Wisd. 1: 4, is that the role of angels 
in the distribution of nations is of central importance. After prolix allegories 
about bricks, stones, clay and bitumen (thus, he allegorically interprets the 
different degrees of the builders' complicity in the sin - 'in proportion to the 
greater or less departure from the Orient which had taken place among them'), 
he says: 
... and they (i. e. the builders) were conducted by those 
angels, who imprinted on each his native language, to the 
different parts of the earth according to their deserts-'': 
some, for example, to a region of burning heat, others to a 
country which chastises its inhabitants by its cold; others, 
again, to a land exceedingly difficult of cultivation, others 
to one less so in degree; while a fifth were brought into a 
land filled with wild beasts, and a sixth to a country 
comparatively free of these. 
CCels., 5; 30: 25ff. 
The texts of Origen are not rich in linguistic terms: he treats both 
Hebrew and the 'derivatives' that appeared after the Confusion as dialects. 
Although it is not made explicit, Origen is close to some ideas of Epicurus about 
the impact of climate upon the variety of human tongues. Nonetheless, he 
emphasises that in the course of the confusion it was also a supernatural factor 
- angels - that to some extent conditioned the peculiar features of the various 
human languages. But let us now return to his premise that names in all 
M ... ür<b Twv dryytAwv 
äyiaOcoaav xavrroq Twv Cµnoulvävwwv v oix6av airroic 
btAAE rov irrt TA piQl Tn r, yf c 1Car6L'Trjv tav'uov ä iav... 
355 This issue was partly examined by H. Crouzel, in the context of Origen's terms for'mystery' 
and 'symbolisation': op. cit., pp. 25-46,211-235. 
356 His superficial remark that ancient spells were appropriated by the 'authors of languages' 
(TOis naTQ&aL Twv biaAMx ov), also reminds us of Epicurean ideas. 
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languages are ontologically connected with their objects, because Origen has 
more to add to the theory of names. 
§ 111.2.5 Power of name: the notion of proper names in magic spells and in the 
Christian prayers 
At CCels. 5,45 he returns to the issue discussed at 1,24; once more he 
attacks Celsus' Aristotelianism357, and maintains that: 
For the languages which are prevalent among men do not 
derive their origin from men (ovbE yaQ ant' ävOQcL)Iccwv 
TrIv äjv Exovvty ai ev ävOQ rroLq bLäAEKToL), as is 
evident to those who are able to ascertain the nature of the 
charms which are appropriated by the inventors of the 
languages (TOtc rcaTQäat Twv blaA£KTWv) differently, 
according to the various tongues, and to the varying 
pronunciations of the names... 
CCels. 5; 45: 8ff. 
To make his point, Origen draws the reader's attention to the semantics 
of proper names. When magical formulae, which in a certain language were 
possessed of a natural power, were translated into another, they were no longer 
357CCels., 5; 45: 1ff.: As Celsus, however, is of the opinion that it matters nothing whether the 
highest being be called Jupiter, or Zen, or Adonai, or Sabaoth, or Ammoun (as the Egyptians 
term him), or Pappaeus (as the Scythian entitle him), let us discuss the point for a little... And 
now we maintain that the nature of names (lj Tcirv övogdTwv (6aLc) is not, as Aristotle 
supposes, an enactment of those who impose them (of) Oegtvwv eiai v6pot). 
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able to accomplish what they did before when uttered in their native tongues 
(Ev 2aß oix¬iati; 4c&vais): 
... if we were to translate the name of one who was called 
from his birth by a certain appellation in the Greek 
language into the Egyptian or Roman, or any other tongue, 
we could not make him do or suffer the same things which 
he would have done or suffered under the appellation first 
bestowed upon him. Nay, even if we translated into the 
Greek language the name of an individual who had been 
originally invoked in the Roman tongue, we could not 
produce the result which the incantation professed itself 
capable of accomplishing had it preserved the name first 
conferred upon him. 
CCels., 5; 45: 16ff. 
He asks, therefore, if these statements are true when spoken of the names 
of men, what are we to think of those which are transferred, for any cause 
whatever, to the Deity? In relation to the Deity, Origen adopts the same logic. 
The Bible uses a certain number of names for God. Amongst other names, God 
is called 'the God of Abraham', 'the God of Isaac', and 'the God of Jacob'. The 
names of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob have particular meanings in Hebrew. If 
one translates these into Greek, and addresses God as 'the God of the chosen father 
of the echo' or 'the God of laughter' or 'the God of him who strikes with the heel', the 
mention of the name is attended with no result on the same basis. In other 
words, man's prayer will have no effect. The phoneme ( vrj, (P66yyo(; ), 
therefore, is according to Origen of crucial significance, when addressed to the 
true God: 
And we may say the same also of the pronunciation of 
'Sabaoth' (nepi i Ea pawO rxwvf c), a word which is 
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frequently employed in incantations (Ercc)bcov); for if we 
translate the term into 'Lord of hosts', or 'Lord of armies', 
or 'Almighty' (different acceptation of it having been 
proposed by the interpreters), we shall accomplish nothing 
(of) &v moUlaoµEv); whereas if we retain the original 
pronunciation (iv To-LS ibioi (ý66yyoic), we shall, as those 
who are skilled in such matters maintain, produce some 
effect. And the same observation holds good of Adonai. If, 
then, neither 'Sabaoth' nor 'Adonai , when rendered into 
what appears to be their meaning in the Greek tongue, can 
accomplish anything, how much less would be the result 
among those who regard it as a matter of indifference 
whether the highest being be called 'Jupiter', or 'Zen', or 
'Adonai', or'Sabaoth'! 
CCels. 5,45. 
Despite the fact that Origen insists in the use of Hebrew names for 
Christian prayer (instead of their Greek or Latin equivalents), he does not go on 
to say that human prayer as such will have more effect if it is offered up in 
Hebrew. One should notice that his concern about divine names in CCels. is 
limited; he simply endeavours to explain why God should be addressed as 
'Adonai' or 'Sabaoth', and why such names as 'Jupiter' or 'Zen' are absolutely 
inappropriate, as being the names of demons, who usurped these Greek names 
in order to enjoy being worshipped as deities. We have already observed that 
there is no epistemological discrimination of 'other' human languages. 
Philosophically, Origen admits that the names of these languages also have real 
power that appears, however, under different circumstances. According to his 
theology, the inestimable advantage of Hebrew divine names is related to the 
fact that originally the ancient Jews preserved a true concept of God and unlike 
other nations, who were deluded by demons and had in use some names that 
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misled them, employed concrete divine names to designate and invoke the 
true God of all. 
... then we say that the name Sabaoth, and Adonai, and the 
other names treated with so much reverence among the 
Hebrews, are not applicable to any ordinary created things, 
but belong to a secret theology (E-'7-[L TivoS OeoAo-yia(; 
6crropen12ov) which refers to the Framer of all things. These 
names, accordingly, when pronounced with that attendant 
train of circumstances which is appropriate to their nature, 
are possessed of great power (biö Kai büvaTat -taü'a Ta 
ovöµaTa); 
CCels. 1,24: 25ff 
It is indicative that Origen comprehends language in a way traditional in 
Alexandrian theology; he attempts to make maximal theological use of OüQic- 
theory; he rightly argues that the divine name that came down to us through 
Revelation cannot be interchanged with Greek or the Latin 'Zen' and 'Jupiter'. 
But when he tries to give a theological explanation for why these names should 
remain in Hebrew, he reveals some inconsistency that, in turn, goes back to his 
premise that Hebrew is the primordial tongue. He tries to find a balance, he 
attempts to defend the idea that Greek and Latin translations of 'Adonai' and 
'Sabaoth' fail to represent the original power, and at the same time he argues 
that all languages are equal. He is so keen on the phenomenon of power 
contained in a name that such problems as the role of human intellect in 
3N Other names, he adds, current in Egyptian or Persian (and so on in every individual nation) 
are efficacious against certain demons, they also have corresponding power over other evil 
spirits: 'And thus it will be found that, of the various demons upon the earth, to whom different 
localities have been assigned, each one bears a name appropriate to the several dialects of place 
and country' - CCels. 1,24. 
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relation to the nature of language remain almost untouched. Nevertheless, there 
are several aspects of his 'linguistic theology' that may represent his originality 
in full. 
§ 111.2.6 Christological and eschatological implications 
The eighth book of CCels. gives us important information about the next 
stage of the 'linguistic' controversy between Origen and Celsus. The impression 
is given that Celsus replied to Origen's earlier hypothesis and pointed out new 
'absurdities' of his theology of divine names. His additional accusation against 
the Christian liturgical use of divine names (in his language 'barbarian' names, 
i. e. in Hebrew) was an interesting one. If one considers Hebrew as the perfect 
primordial and therefore sacral language, and only Hebrew epithets for the 
Deity (such as Adonai and Sabaoth) have supernatural power, logically he has 
to admit that human prayer in, for example, Greek or Latin appears to be totally 
inefficient. Origen quotes Celsus: 
'If', says he, 'they who are addressed are called upon by 
barbarous names, they will have power, but no longer will 
they have any if they are addressed in Greek or Latin'". 
CCels., 8; 37: 3f. 
3" Fäv µtv ßaQpQwc airroi'c 6voµhC1) ' c, bvµavty ItovaLv, ¬äv bi Wgvuu bI OcaµaiiwbQ 
oÜKttu. 
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Such an argument could not shake Origen's convictions; first of all, his 
teaching about the sacral quality of the Hebrew language contained a number 
of limitations and reservations: all languages are equal, in all human languages 
names are connected with essence by nature (ontologically), and therefore in all 
languages proper names have power, depending on which tongue is in use. 
Hebrew is sacral and 'divinely given', but this special status of the Jewish 
tongue is not caused by its phonetic structure; nor is it caused by the fact that in 
Hebrew the ontological connexion between name and essence is generally 
'better'. It has been observed that his concern was primarily to explain that the 
Hebrew 'Adonai' and 'Sabaoth' are sacral names (in comparison with Zen and 
Jupiter), but this sanctity is based on the true concept of God that the ancient 
patriarchs inherited after the Confusion. If at the former stage of the dispute 
Origen's intention was to explain and to defend biblical divine names, now his 
main aim is to defend the idea that Christian prayers are effective in all 
languages: 
Any one will be convinced that this is a false charge which 
Celsus brings against us, when he considers that Christians 
in prayer do not even use the precise names which divine 
Scripture applies to God; but the Greeks use Greek names, 
the Romans Latin names, and every one prays and sings 
praises to God as he best can, in his mother tongue (xaicä 
v Eavrov btaA 'rov). For the Lord of all the languages (6 
i oqc bLaA'x'rov xvpwc) of the earth hears those who 
pray to Him in each different tongue (cam pur, S), 
hearing, if I may so say, but one voice, expressing itself in 
different dialects (Tic Ka r& ra arlpaLv6peva äxovcov, 
b7lAovpivi c eK T(Jv TloLKIACJV blaAhcrwv). For the Most 
High is not as one of those who select one language, 
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Barbarian or Greek, knowing nothing of any other, and 
caring nothing for those who speak in other tongues. 
Ibid. 
I suggest that this passage is of crucial importance in understanding 
Origen' theology of language. It is clear that his various ideas and speculations 
about magic practice and the power of names usurped by demons are to some 
extent insignificant and relative. These considerations might be shared or 
refuted, but as soon as one admits that heathen names for gods are 
inappropriate for the Christian profession of faith, the teaching about a sacral 
original tongue fades into the background. Man's sin turned the human race 
from linguistic unity to a multiplicity of tongues; the divine oikonomia of 
salvation is to restore the original unity. For this reason, Origen points out that 
Celsus forgets that Christians, who pronounce their prayers in different 
languages, address God through Jesus-160. This is an interesting Christological 
implication: the problem of multiplicity of languages discovers its solution in 
the divine Redeemer. 
Another illustrative aspect of his view of the problem is that Origen 
understands the variety of tongues as abnormal, inferior; it follows from such 
things as injustice, vain speech, and deceit. Therefore the current variety of 
languages is temporary and transient, and the Word shall prevail over the 
entire rational creature, and change (µvTanotf aat) every soul into His own 
x0 CCels., 8; 37: lf.: Eh' i7uAa86µevOS ört XQwtLavoic AMe4 Tog µbvoK Sec) buk roü 
I1oov FIXoµtvoL... 
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perfection (¬Lc -niv &avTOÜ T¬AE1öTqTa)361. He refers to the notion of the 'pure 
tongue' (yAc)aaa Eic yFvEäv aüýS) in the book of Zephaniah (3: 7-13 LXX)362 
and links it with Gen. 11: 1-7: 
... 'When the whole earth is destroyed, there will be turned 
upon the peoples a language according to their race' as 
things were before the confusion of tongues (äväAo-yov 
Toic rtQo Tic avyXÜQ&(oS rceäyµaai"). Let them (i. e. Celsus 
and others) also carefully consider the promise, that all 
shall call upon the name of the Lord, and serve Him with 
one consent; 
CCels. 8; 72: 48ff. 
Doomsday will bring the restoration of human nature. This central event, 
in his opinion, will have a twofold effect on the linguistic situation. In the first 
instance, it will have a general and mysterious impact upon the corrupted 
nature of the human tongue: there will no longer be 'any injustice, or vain 
speech, or a deceitful tongue'. At the same time, this restoration will turn 
people from the mutual misunderstanding that is caused by a variety of 
languages to their original unity: 
And thus much it seemed needful for me to say briefly, and 
without entering into elaborate details, in answer to the 
remark of Celsus, that he considered any agreement 
between the inhabitants of Asia, Europe, and Libya, as well 
Greeks as Barbarians, was impossible. And perhaps such a 
result would indeed be impossible to those who are still in 
the body, but not to those who are released from it. 
CCels., 8; 72: 57ff. 
CCels., 8; 72: 13. 
m2a. Sir L. Ch. Lee Brenton, The Septuagint version of the Old Testament (London 1844); his Engl. 
trasl. of LXX, Zeph. 3: 9: 'For then will I turn to the peoples a tongue for her generation, that all 
may call on the name of the Lord, to serve him under one yoke'. 
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Of course, one can guess what Origen means by this eschatological 
restoration of languages; it is highly likely that he would associate this 
eschatological 'pure tongue' with Hebrew. His presumption, however, that this 
new tongue will be free from the number of imperfections which cause sins in 
man's speech lead us to think that this guess might be a reasonable one. 
To summarise the various aspects of his views on language, one should 
notice that Origen approaches the problem in a radically different manner from 
Clement. He still depends on the Hellenistic science of the time, but unlike his 
predecessor, who merely included ideas from the Cratylus in his extensive 
Stromaties, Origen attempts to work out a new Christian comprehension of 
names and language. Another question is to what extent this attempt is 
successful. Origen strays from Plato; even though his use of the Stoic variant of 
the (pvvei-theory is unquestionable, he evolves and modifies their teaching; but 
one should classify his linguistic theory as a 'Christian' variant of the Stoic 
doctrine of language. This is why one of the most striking features of his 
approach is that a link between the phenomenon of language and the human 
power of thinking and speech did not receive a satisfactory treatment in his 
writings. 
This kind of solution is typical of Alexandrian theology, but there is no 
evidence of his influence upon later thought. If Origen employs a Platonised 
theory of language with exclusive accuracy and with a number of limitations, 
some later theologians turned back to a primitive oversimplification of the 
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matter. One could find a great number of examples; but let us briefly look at 
this tendency in Eusebius of Caesarea and Severianus Gabalensis who was 
already mentioned above. 
In the opinion of Eusebius, Adam and Moses were name-makers in the 
sense of Plato's övoµaToveyöc, they named creatures, being inspired 'by the 
divine power' (vmö OEtorEpas bvväµ¬cwc) and attached correct names 
according to their nature (xa ra (ývatv). Next, in his exposition of the matter he 
turns everything upside-down, including Plato's doctrine: Adam and Moses 
invented all names in accordance with their nature, Plato borrowed his doctrine 
from Moses; furthermore, in his exegesis of the Genesis Eusebius repeatedly 
refers to and quotes from the Cratylus, and even attributes to Plato a number of 
absolutely irrelevant oversimplifications. 
Severianus Gabalensis represents the apogee of such oversimplification. 
His interpretation of Gen. 2: 19-20 is that: 
God has determined all these names in advance; His 
intention, however, was to demonstrate that Adam is in 
agreement with His divine will. 
PG 56,480-481 
After the Fall he forgot the 'correct' language of paradise; the modem 
tongues of the human race, therefore, are nothing but the result of the inevitable 
spoiling of the original language. 
m3 Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica, 11,6, lff. (ed. K. Mras, Eusebius Werke, Band 8, Die Praeparatio 
evangelica in Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller 43.1 & 43.2. (Berlin1954-1956). 
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Y. Edelshtein remarks that the methodology of Severianus is extremely 
simple, and his exegetical ideas often coincide with Eunomius"'. But even 
amongst orthodox writers of the fourth century such a primitive approach to 
the problem becomes very frequent. Origen, therefore, appears to be the first 
and the last more or less successful attempt of employing the (ýva¬ i-theory of 
language, and none of the attempts that followed seem to reflect his 
achievements. 
Let us now turn to another theological attempt to adopt the OtaE i-theory 
of language. 
3" 10. g4eabwrehH, Pannecp&feeeKO6e y'cemue, p. 191. 
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Chapter IV: The Eunomean Controversy and 
the Cappadocian view of language. 
... Eunomius advances by the device of this terrible 
dilemma a double-edged refutation... 
Gregory of Nyssa, CE, 1; 34. 
In the following chapter our main concern will be to outline an initial 
form of the Anomean theory in relation to linguistic matters, i. e. a form that 
faced the attack of Basil. This theological theme belongs to a more general 
problem, which has already been investigated. These numerous studies, 
however, have arrived at (sometimes) opposite conclusions; so now it seems 
much easier to pose the question than to answer it. After the recent monograph 
of R. Vaggione and his extensive and profitable contributions to the editing of 
Eunomius' extant works, we now appear to be much better informed about the 
personality of the Anomean leaders, as well as his Apologies; nevertheless, in 
modern scholarship the question about the very core of Eunomius and Aetius' 
thought is still a matter of dispute, and as a result there are diametrically 
opposed theories about their philosophical background. Although in my 
treatment of the Anomean leaders I do not intend to examine the entire 
theological system, especially their conclusions, some of the most immediate 
questions will be touched upon. 
The main problem of the historical and theological analysis of the 
Anomean theory of names is related to the following inquiry; Ph. Rousseau is 
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right, Eunomius (and, of course, his master) was 'a predominantly philosophical 
thinker and writer's, but the modern view of their philosophical background 
varies dramatically. The numerous attempts to discover the very core of this 
intellectual controversy still lack a settled opinion about the philosophical 
linguistic implications of both sides, Eunomius and his Cappadocian 
opponents. Although it is impossible here to discuss the problem in full, I shall 
give a brief overview (that opens this section) and make several digressions in 
the course of my examination. 
IV. 1 Aetius and Eunomius: a critical examination of their 'philosophy' 
A prima facie confusion and lack of clarity is caused by the sources 
themselves; Basil accused Eunomius with a use \ misuse of Chrysippus' 
syllogism36', and emphasised that their main method was based on the 
Categoriae of Aristotle. Gregory of Nyssa, who repeated Basil's accusations, 
apart from various philosophical influences, pointed to the dependence of the 
Anomean theory of names on the Cratylus of Plato-369 - this classical passage was 
often taken to point to Eunomius' use of the dialogue, and in what follows I am 
30 Rousseau, Ph. Basil of Caesarea, (Oxford, et. al. 1994), p. 106. 
30 This problem is often noted, v., for example, M. Anastos and his brief overview of the 
bibliography in, Basil's KATA EYNOMIOY, Basil of Caesarea: Christian, humanist, ascetic, vol. i, p. 
118ff. 
361 Basilius, Adversus Eunomium, i, 5: 43f. (SC, 299 (Paris 1982)). 
369 ibid., i, 9: 8f (SC, 299 p. 200). 
30 Gregorius Nyssenus, Contra Eunomium, ii, 1; 404.1f. 
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going to examine this issue critically. Simultaneously, Eunomius in his reply to 
Basil accuses him in almost exactly the same terms; moreover, in his early work, 
whether rhetorically or not, he shows a distrust of philosophy insofar as it is 'far 
removed from Christianity-370. In his reply to the first theological attack he says 
that Basil substitutes 'the doctrine of the Church' for pagan philosophy ( 
cO6Ev OLAoaocia) and destroys divine providence and, therefore, calls him 
atheist371 - the exact accusation against, or better to say, offensive nickname of, 
his master Aetius - more specifically, he assumes that Basil in his view of 
language follows Epicurus and Aristotle372; as J. Danielou pointed out, and we 
observed in the previous chapter, this is verbatim et literatim the accusation 
made by Origen against Celsus. 
Even at the latest stage of the controversy, when Eunomius evidently 
turned to more advanced reading of philosophical and exegetical works in 
order to find more serious rational justifications for his theory of names, the 
central theological formulae remained the same. The eclectic feature of the 
Anomean philosophical background seemed to be evident for neutral i. e. non- 
controversial sources, which unanimously pointed to the purely logical 
character of the Anomean doctrine and his obvious ignorance of the Tradition 
and the Scriptures. A report of Nemesius of Emessa about Eunomius' 
370 Liber. Apol., 19.6. (ed. Vaggione, R. Eunomius' apologies). 
371 CE, J. i, 282,196; 3f. (Contra Eunomium, ed. W. Jaeger, Gregorii Nysseni opera, vols. 1,2 (Leiden 
1960). 
3n CE, J. i, 410-411. 
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anthropological ideas appears to be both illustrative and trustworthy, because 
Nemesius does not speak about linguistic and serious doctrinal issues: 
Eunomius, in accordance with Plato and Aristotle, defined 
the soul as a bodiless essence created in a body (oüaiav 
äaC3µa'ov Ev ac3µa'ri KTLC%tEvov), agreeing thereby with 
both Plato and Aristotle; for though 'bodiless essence' came 
from Plato, 'created in a body' was the teaching of Aristotle. 
And yet, for all his acuteness, Eunomius could not see that 
the things he was trying to reconcile were incompatible373. 
De natura hominis, 2; 446ff 
However, the question is whether this acquaintance with philosophical 
literature was inherited from Aetius or did he turn to advanced studies much 
later? This is not a speculative inquiry as one might suppose at first sight. In a 
number of cases, Eunomius' theory of names and general estimation of his 
philosophical background takes onto account only the last three books of 
Apologia apologiae, and turns both Aetius and Eunomius into something they 
were not. At the same time, such a representation of the theological content of 
the Apologies make difficulties for a clearer comprehension of Basil, who argued 
against first the Apology, where, for instance, the Anomean theory on names is 
only outlined. 
The uncertainty of the sources about Eunomius' philosophical 
background caused a noticeable difficulty for scholars from the beginning. In 
the nineteenth century the general comprehension of Eunomius' background 
including his theory of names (as % ell as the position of their opponents) varied 
m trans!. of R. Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus, p. 119. cf. also Gregory (CE, j ii, p. 227,33: 8) who 
also draws a parallel between Eunomius' doctrine of soul and the Phaedr. 245C. 
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dramatically. Ritter, for example, tried to find a balance between Eunomius' 
Aristotelism and Platonism, but argued for the latter, and determined 
Platonism as a much more influential agency374. Baur, on the other hand, argued 
that Eunomius' view was purely Aristotelian, while Basil and Gregory of Nyssa 
based their argumentation on Platonic philosophical ideas375. Rupp suggested 
that the similarity between the well-known Aristotelian term 2ö TCQ&O2ov 
xotvoüv äidvrl-rov, and the Anomean äyEvvrlToc, is enough to estimate 
Eunomius' philosophical background as Aristotelian376. Thus, the Anomean 
theory of knowledge remained unclear: to what extent did Eunomius attach his 
'perfect' cognition of the divine essence in the name 'unbegotten' to the present 
life37 or to the future life (as Ritter believed)? A Russian scholar, V. Nesmelov, 
in his monograph on Gregory of Nyssa attempted to avoid this classification378; 
although his own attempt to elucidate the matter was not convincing379, some 
results of his analysis make one think of the eclectic character of Anomean 
philosophical sympathies. A similar point of view was proposed by S. 
Troitskiy0, who followed V. Nesmelov. 
374H. Ritter, Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie (Hamburg 1836-1850), vol. vii, pp. 65-79. 
3ß von F. F. Baur, Vorlesungen über die christliche/ Dogmengeschichte, herausgegeben (Leipzig 1865- 
1867) b. i, Abt. ii, p. 106. 
376 Julius Rupp, Gregor's, des Bischofs von Nyssa, Leben und Meinungen (Leipzig 1834), p. 136ff. 
3" v. von j. Kuhn, Katholische Dogmatik (Tübingen 1859-1862), vol. ii, p. 379. J. Kuhn argued for 
the Aristotelism of Eunomius; v. also G. F. Böhringer, Die Kirche Christi und ihre Zeugen (Zürich 
1842-1858), i, Abt. ii, p. 193f.; von D. Thomasius, Die Dogmengeschichte der alten Kirche (Erlangen 
1874). 
378 B. HecMenoB, 4ozMamutecxaR cucmeMa ce. rpuzopu. s Huccxozo (Kazan 1887), p. 132 n. 2. 
379V. Nesmelov draws a parallel between Basil's teaching and Kantian Ding au Sich (op. cit., p. 
133). 
' C. Tpoiiwa1ü, Y'dexue co. rpuropun Huccxoro o6 u. Menax Boxuux (S. Petersbourg 1914) p. lnl, p. 
47ff. 
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In twentieth century Patristic scholarship, in spite of a number of 
impressive investigations of the Neo-Arian movement and the notorious 
controversy over divine names, the very question of the philosophical 
foundations of Eunomius and Aetius seems to be far from any satisfactory 
definition. J. Danielou determined the philosophical environment of Eunomius 
as no less than a Neo-Platonic system, whereas Basil and Gregory, in his 
opinion, based their teaching on the grammatical science of the time, but appear 
to be Neo-Platonic thinkers as well81. In contrast to the German science of the 
nineteenth century, J. Danielou in his article proposed to elucidate the matter in 
a radically new way; in fact, he was the first to indicate parallels between 
Eunomius' (ývaic-theory of names with similar ideas that we already observed 
in Clement of Alexandria and Origen382, and he discussed the possible influence 
of the theories of Epicurus, Stoics and Neo-Platonic tradition on the 
disputants383 on both sides. But his results and suppositions are often very 
uncertain or not adequately exemplified: one allusion to the notion of epinoia in 
Iamblichus' (? ) Theurgia or the Egyptian mysteries (vii, 4) does not prove his 
theory. Despite the fact that a number of his suggestions are interesting, his 
attempts to generalise the subject by introducing pairs of epithets (mysticism 
381 J. Danidlou, Eunome l'Arien, pp. 412-432; v. his conclusion on p. 431. 
382 ibid., pp. 422-424. 
w ibid., pp. 424-428. 
J. Danielou draws a parallel between Eunomius' epinoia as the source of human misleading 
and epinoia in the letter presumed to be by lamblichus. This parallel, however, is impossible 
for 
a number of reasons; in the first instance the treatise begins with the rejection of philosophical 
methods in the cognition of the divine. The Sceptic attitude to human epinoia is caused 
by 
something absolutely different from Eunomius - cf. philosophical analysis of the work in A. 
Aoce8, ilcmopuA anmu'rtoü 3cmemuxu: nociteDuue eeuca, vol. vii, part i (Moscow 1988), pp. 245-275. 
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and scientific character) are confusing; the following passage is a good example 
of the lack of clarity and of doubt: 
'As we can see from the dispute with Gregory, Eunomius' 
use of the Cratylus is clear. The concept of Eunomius is a 
mystical one, and it is remarkable that it is Gregory who 
accuses Eunomius of dependence on Plato... But this kind 
of accusation is obviously a polemical tag. As a matter of 
fact, the theory of language that Steinthaler defines as 
'sophistical' it is exactly what Eunomius himself attributes 
to Basil, and also points out that Basil depends on Aristotle 
and Epicurus. But in fact, a real theory of Gregory and Basil 
is what a common teaching of the grammarians was and 
what we can now call scientific theory of language. 
However, his idea of designating the Anomean theory of language as 
'mystical' (on the basis of the premise that all names are bound up with essence 
'by nature' ((Pna¬t), i. e. ontologically and therefore 'mystically') and the 
Cappadocian theory as 'scientific' (as if Basil and Gregory merely employed a 
commonly shared theory of grammarians) does not elucidate the subject, it 
remains unclear (as I shall show below). Whose 'grammatical theory' does he 
consider them to have in common? His proposition that the Anomean system is 
just a variant of the Neo-Platonic doctrine, and that Eunomius' theory of 
language is presumably based on a Neo-Platonic interpretation of the Cratylus 
strongly influenced further investigations of the matter. 
In another paper J. Danielou arrived at the more 'remarkable' conclusion 
that the controversy between Eunomius and the Cappadocian Fathers was a 
M j. Dani6lou refers to von H. Steinthal, Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und 
Römern (Berlin 1890), p. 332f. 
M Ibid., p. 416. 
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reflection of the philosophical dispute between the Neo-Platonic schools led by 
Iamblichus and Ammonius Sakkas 7. J. Danielou rated highly the relationship 
between Aetius and young Prince and later Emperor Julian, who was himself a 
disciple of Iamblichus. But whether it is enough to state that 'historically, the 
connexion between Eunomius and the disciples of Iamblichus, which finally 
had impacted the doctrine of Proclus, was very possible'm? J. Danielou's main 
claim, however, was far from indicating this historical parallel; he argued that 
that Eunomius' teaching on the nature of language reflects the transition from 
Middle and early Neo-Platonic concepts of name to what was later proposed by 
Proclus in his commentaries on the Cratylus, and maintained that this 
connexion needs to be found. This standpoint has opened further avenues for 
modern understanding of the subject9. 
In the seventies, Th. Kopecek in his History of Neo-Arianism proposed that 
Aetius' theory of theological language was a development of the Christian 
Middle Platonic position present in Justin and Clement'390 and maintained that 
this is 'undeniable'. In the course of his extensive studies, Th. Kopecek paid 
special attention to the appearance of the term äyEvvTl roc in the Patristic and 
philosophical literature of the second and third century and in Middle Platonic 
3v J. Danidlou, Gregoire de Nysse et le neo-platonisme de 1'Ecole d'Athenes, REG 80 (1967), p. 400f. 
J. Danidlou, ibid, p. 428. 
e. g. M. S. Troiano, I Cappodoci e la question dell' origine dei nomi nella polemica contro 
Eunomio' in 
Vetera Christianorum 17 (1980), pp. 313-346. K. H. Uthemann, Die Spracher der Theologie nach 
Eunomius von Cyzicus, ZKG 104 (1993), pp. 143-175. As D. Roberson points out, 
both works 
follow J. Danidlou (Roberson, op. cit., p. 45 n. 25). 
3w Th. Kopecek, A history of Neo-Arianism, p. 
272. For his arguments that Eunomius' theory of 
names is based on Middle Platonic theory of language v. the 
fourth chapter of his monograph. 
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philosophical literature (finally he discovered it in Albinius and argued for his 
influence391). Although Th. Kopecek indicates that for Justin, Clement, Origen, 
or Albinus the term äyF-vvflToc was just an epithet to describe the divine, while 
in the Syntagmation it emerges as a special name of God, his assumption that the 
main premise of Anomean theory of names was derived from Middle Platonic 
philosophy was quite unwarranted. He seems to confound two issues: the 
theological use of the negative term äytvveyToS as such does not necessarily 
imply or determine a stable solution to the problem of language. One might 
also question to what extent his attempt to infer Aetius' äyEvvrlTos O¬64; from 
the Middle Platonic doctrine of the 'first principle'392 is appropriate. I have 
decided to leave Th. Kopecek's theory to one side in respect to the question of 
the origin of the title 'unbegotten'393, and to follow L. Wickham, who stands for 
the purely Christian import of the term394. 
R. Mortley enthusiastically adopted the idea of J. Danielou, and 
attempted to delineate more precisely the way of 'transition'. In his studies of 
39, Th. Kopecek, op. cit., p. 271. 
-m Th. Kopecek refers to Albinus, Epitome doctrinae Platonicae sine AthaaKaALK6c, 
10; 4: 1ff. 
m in the text I use both terms 'unbegotten' and 'ingenerate' as interchangeable synonyms for 
agennetos. 
"4 L. Wickham, The Syntagmation of Aetius the Anomean, JThS (October 1968), vol. xix, pt. 2., p. 
537. 
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the via negativa395 Mortley suggests understanding Eunomius' and Aetius' 
doctrine in the light of what he calls the 'lost generation' of Neo-Platonists, viz. 
Syrianus, Dexippus, and Alexander of Aphrodisias, who 'lie behind Proclus 
and probably behind Aetius and Eunomius as well'3%. His line of argument is 
very complex, but I would like to give an example. First, he indicates a number 
of verbal parallelisms (e. g. oiQiaS hTTi brIilwTuxöv - Synt. 1639' and Deixippus' 
otaiav bACJo-9398); second, he draws a parallel between the function of 
'unbegotten' in the Anomean system and their remarks about privation, 
negation, essence definition and the problem of the epistemological value of 
apophatic terms in Neo-Platonic philosophy39. Overall, his interpretation of the 
problem exceeded the scheme of J. Damclou: Basil and Gregory systematically 
misunderstood and misinterpreted their opponents; the main concern of Aetius 
and Eunomius was to bring forward their advanced Neo-Platonic doctrine of 
language based on the negative term 'unbegotten' taken from 'mystical 
Aristotelianism', 'Aristotelian Neo-Platonism', etc. His ultimate purpose was to 
395 For the sake of space, it seems hardly relevant to discuss it here in full. However, I think that 
the term 'dark insinuations' (cf. R. Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus, p. 17) that is often applied to 
Patristic reports about Aetius and Eunomius is to be treated as much more accurate. Of course, 
Basil in his Adversus Eunomius employed cüa c, äµa"(;, vßQwT (;, eipWv, pAö a µoc, etc. 
(cf. SC 299, AE, i; 1: 49) too much (as Gregory does at the second stage of the dispute), but 
nevertheless, they both paid attention to the content of the dispute. It is therefore remarkable 
that Gregory purposely omits the story (reported more thoroughly by Theodore of Mopsuestia 
- v. Vaggione, R. Fragments 421f. ) that in Constantinople Eunomius was caught 
in a 
compromising situation with his pupils and dismissed - (v. Vaggione, R. Eunomius of Cyzicus, p. 
9). Although it is possible to accuse Theodore of 'dark insinuations' (cf. Vaggione, ibid. ), I do not 
agree that Gregory's interpretation of Eunomius' doctrine is a systematic misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation as R. Mortley does. 
m R. Mortley, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 135. 
3 text and transl. of L. Wickham, ibid. 
NO R. Mortley, op. cit., p. 130f. 
3" R. Mortley, op. cit., p. 135. 
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demonstrate that Eunomius and Aetius 'were much more Platonists than those 
who often pass for Platonist Christians, such as the Cappadocians, or Origen, or 
to some extent Augustine'400. His interpretation of the philosophical content of 
the controversy is fascinating, but also totally unconvincing. He associates 
Aetius' opponents whom he refers to as 'temporists' (XQovi-rat)401 with a group 
of secular philosophers: 'Eunomius and Aetius were defending themselves 
against certain Neo-Platonists' and argues that this is a reason why Basil and 
Gregory were 'unaware of some issues, and seemed to wonder why they are 
having to deal with it'402. I do not intent to criticise his entire analysis, because 
his main interest in the eighth chapter of the From Word to Silence is with the use 
of apophatic definitions in Christian theology. Nonetheless, in his approach to 
the matter he deviates dramatically from the real agenda of the Anomean 
controversy. 
Of course, in this brief overview I do not claim to mention all the 
opinions that appeared after Danielou's article; nor in the limits of this work 
can I represent all the reasons why I do not accept these Neo-Platonic theories 
for the Anomean theology of names. First of all, that would require a thorough 
examination of the issues that would lead us far away from the subject. I also 
think that one could hardly do so after the fresh and well balanced examination 
of Aetius and Eunomius' philosophical background given us by R. Vaggione. 
°° R. Mortley, op. cit., p. 128. 
4°' Syntagm., preamble, 1.11. 
412 R. Mortley, op. cfr., p. 131ff. 
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The general comprehension of the problem proposed by R. Vaggione in 
the course of his studies that began in 1976 with his dissertation403 was not 
always the same; in his publication of Eunomius' extant works he seemed to 
follow the way of J. Danielou and was looking for Neo-Platonic influence 
whenever Eunomius bound up logic and reality'; he suggests too critical an 
approach to the surviving texts of Eunomius, and maintained that we could 
hardly reconstruct his theory on the basis of the extant works. But in the recent 
monograph on Eunomius he arrives at a critical revision of his idea; even the 
question of Eunomius' dependence on the Cratylus was put in the following 
terms: 
'According to Gregory of Nyssa, Eunomius' theory of 
actually came from Plato's Cratylus. This may or may not 
have been true as a matter of fact, but in more general 
terms it was certainly correct... '. 
Methodologically, one can reasonably argue that he takes an overly 
critical approach to Eunomius' theology, based on the condition of the writings 
that have survived. In particular he assumes that what we have does not allow 
us to elucidate Eunomius' thought satisfactorily; we can only guess at the 
403R. Vaggione, Aspects of faith in the Eunomian Controversy. Unpublished D. Phill. (Oxford 1976). 
404R. Vaggione, Eunomius' apologies, p. 45 n. 4: Vaggione argues that Eunomius used Neo- 
Platonist comprehension of ontology as 'the projected shadow of logic' (he refers to the 
exposition of Proclus made by E. R. Dodds). 
46 R. Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus (Oxford 2000), p. 239 n. 260. 
0%#%C 
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content of his letters that are told 'surpass his other works by far'406 and his 
seven volumes of Commentary on Romans. Vaggione concluded: 
We can gauge the extent of our loss if we think how 
different our appreciation of the Cappadocians would be if 
time had preserved to us only their dogmatic treatises and 
we had lost all of their exegetical, ascetical, and mystical 
works407. 
True, Eunomius' writings have not come down to us in a bad condition. 
But the main reason for that could hardly be explained by Arcadius' decree of 
398, which ordered all Eunomius' works to be burnt as R. Vaggione argues408. 
As M. Bulgakov in his Master and Margaret says, 'manuscripts cannot be burnt', 
applied to historical theology, manuscripts (or at least their editions) that are of 
outstanding interesting and significance almost always survive - there is 
evidence to affirm that Arcadius' decree was not effective at all: we are told that 
Eunomius' writings survived and remained available in Constantinople up to 
the ninth century. At the same time, the reports of, for example, Socrates and 
Photius, who read Eunomius' letters and exegetical works force us to believe 
that vanished works of Eunomius would not shed more light upon the matter. 
In what follows, I am going to examine the theme of names as it appears 
in two early works of the Anomean leaders. In the first instance, I propose to 
revise Aetius' Syntagmation, and to demonstrate that this source of information 
4 Philost. HE x. 6. However, R. Vaggione refers to Photius (Cod. 138, Henry ii, 107.17-10821), 
who read forty of these letters and claimed that Eunomius was ignorant of the laws of 
epistolary style - R. Vaggione, Eunomius' apologies, p. xvi. 
R. Vaggione, loc. cit. 
4M ibid., p. xv. 
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give us clear evidence that such an important aspect of Eunomius' thought as 
an objectivist theory of names, specific comprehension of epinoia, and 
epistemological role of the formal logical operations was already in existence. 
Next, I am going to pose a question about the real place of the theory of names 
in the context of the theological agenda; in particular, I shall try to show more 
precisely that the linguistic intuitions that had already appeared in the 
Syntagmation were merely repeated by Eunomius in his first Apology without 
any significant philosophical contribution. At the earlier stage of the dispute his 
intention was only to exemplify the theory of name and epinoia; we shall see to 
what extent he succeeded in doing so. In the later stage of the controversy 
Eunomius definitely undertook a more advanced examination of the matter in 
an attempt to find some philosophical support in Plato and Philo; biblical 
exegesis also played a special role in the Apology for Apology that I shall focus on 
after an exposition of the main accusations of Basil. But in this section, I shall 
concentrate on the initial writings of Aetius and Eunomius; it seems interesting 
to pose the question about his dependence on Plato's Cratylus. Finally, my point 
will be that as can be observed in the Syntagmation and the first Apology, the 
Anomean doctrine of names was not, strictly speaking, a philosophical inference 
from their general premises about Divine ingeneracy. 
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IV. 1.1 Philosophical background: the Syntagmation of Aetius. 
L. Wickham has rightly suggested that external sources do not indicate 
any independent contribution by Eunomius, nor any difference of view 
between him and Aetius409. The teaching about the nature of names together 
with a very specific treatment of the human epinoia already appears in the 
Syntagmation of Aetius. Let us scrutinise the Syntagmation more thoroughly in 
the light of what we are told about Aetius' philosophical background. 
R. Vaggione trusts Philostorgius' report (HE 3.15) about Aetius' early 
interest in logic; undoubtedly, Aetius' studies involved reading Aristotle's 
Categoriae (presumably) along with standard commentators410. But in the 
curriculum of the time Aristotle's treatise on elementary logic was not an 
advanced subject (as Vaggione thinks), but rather an intermediate one that was 
only to exercise students and therefore serve as a kind of introduction. At the 
next stage, students turned to further philosophical studies that normally 
consisted of the interpretation of philosophical, rather than logical or rhetorical, 
works; Socrates specifies Plato and Plotinus411. 
A problem appears when one attempts to interpret the syllogisms of 
Aetius. After the classical article of J. Danielou, the presumption that both Basil 
and Gregory systematically misunderstand (and therefore misinterpret) their 
opponents became fashionable. Amongst various reports about Aetius' 
409 L. Wickham, op. cit., p. 537. 
ao Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus, p. 16. 
4" V. Socrates, HE, 3; 35. 
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philosophical background, several remarks of Socrates Scholasticus are 
helpfu1412. First of all he points out that the very foundation of Aetius' theory is 
determined by an unsatisfactory acquaintance with the craft of rational 
discourse. The following remark is of special interest: 
... he was unable to comprehend how there could be 
generation without a beginning (rc c EUTLV ä-y vvrJTO(; 
yEvvrlQL4), and how that which was begotten can be co- 
eternal with him who begat (xal örcwc TO' y¬vv icvov 
Qvxäibiöv EQTn'a yEvv(cravTi). 
Socrates, HE, ii, 35. 
It is indicative that for Socrates, whose own education was excellent413, Aetius is 
an uninteresting figure in the story. His elementary ignorance disgusts Socrates; 
but Socrates' possession of information is in every respect impressive: after 
eighty years after Aetius' death he could state in a very resolute and decided 
manner what Aetius had not read and not read. Thus, he is absolutely sure that 
Aetius did not read Clement, Africanus, and Origen, and had a very poor 
knowledge of both tradition and the Scriptures414! His point is that Aetius' 
method of rational discourse is nothing but logic; as Socrates says, in the course 
of standard education, this subject was opposed by (ävTeOTlxEv) and followed 
by a further discipline, dialectics. In the sphere of dialectics, he says, it is 
412 v. ch. 1 and above, where the passage is quoted in full length. 
413 v. Socrates, HE, v. 16. 
414 cf. with a assumption of J. Danielou that Anomean theory of language was influenced 
by 
Origen or Clement, op. cit., p. 424; furthermore, Socrates reports that Aetius' knowledge of the 
Bible was very poor. Even his style reflects some kind of arrogance to Aetius' 
ignorance - HE, ii, 
35: `E, tL=oM, q TF auvfxätcut 7tQ6q Tdv pacnAta KwvaT6tv rtov' - 
literally: 'But he scribbled 
useless scraps of paper to the emperor Constantius... 
'. 
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possible to determine generation without beginning - perhaps, his own 
comprehension of the matter is marked by a Neo-Platonic dialectic that roughly 
speaking, goes back to the Parmenides; his immediate reference to Plato may be 
a good indication of this. 
In my opinion, if the final variant of Eunomius' doctrine were entirely 
Neo-Platonic (as J. Damclou and R. Mortley maintained) that would have been 
obvious to Socrates, and would have been at least observable in the 
Syntagmation. So was Aetius was really close to the circles of Iamblichus' 
disciples, and did he derive anything from these contacts? 
Let us reconstruct the scheme of Aetius' logic in order to garner insight 
into the real foundation and origin of his doctrine, and the theological method 
he used throughout these syllogisms. Aetius' initial intention was to represent 
his teaching in the form of very simple 'philosophical' monotheism based on 
the premise that the Deity is superior to all causes (xeddTTwv 7tävgc ai'riac - 
Synt. 2), and therefore nothing can be prior to God, who is ingenerated. 
The question about the origin of Aetius' interest in theology is clear; his 
ecclesiastical career began in about 340 with successful public disputations in 
Antioch and Alexandria415; his targets were Gnostics and Manichaeans; finally, 
as Philostorgius tell us, Aetius made his name through a celebrated debating 
victory over the Manichaean leader Aphthonius at Alexandria416. Perhaps his 
special theological sympathy to the antithesis of 'unbegotten - begotten' can be 
41 R. Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus, p. 24. 
416 Philostorgius, HE, 3.15. 
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better explained by this preoccupation: amongst numerous suitable terms, 
'unbegotten' appears to be the closest to the generally accepted and 
conventional God-language about the Father and the Son. At any rate, the term 
'unbegotten' emerges in the Syntagmation as the self-evident way of describing 
the Deity; any question of the use of other terms is already completely 
excluded: 
If the ingenerate Deity is superior to all causes, he must for 
that reason be superior to origination; if he is superior to all 
causes clearly that includes origination, for he neither 
received existence from another nature nor conferred it on 
himself. 
Synt., 2 
The main postulate of the Anomean doctrine is manifest: Aetius (and then 
Eunomius) does not distinguish 'person' from 'essence' when dealing with 
immaterial beings. R. Vaggione argues that the problem lies in Eunomius' 
inability to distinguish between these two notions417; this distinction was never 
accepted by Eunomius, but was this just because of his 'inability' or his 
philosophical position? 
Evidently, the philosophical method of the Syntagmation is grounded on 
the basic axioms of elementary logic - the principle of determination, which is 
the third law of thought. If A is not B, what makes it possible to distinguish 
them from each other? Formal logic takes for granted that both A and B can be 
determined. If at least A is undeterminable, it means that A is indistinguishable 
417v. article R. Vaggione, Oi) d. c 1v Tc)v ycvv%L6L rwv. Some aspects of dogmatic formulae in 
the Arian Controversy StPt, vol. xvii (1982), p. 185. 
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from any non-A and, consequently, A is indistinguishable from B, and, one 
might say, runs into B. Therefore, it appears that there is no A and B. Logic 
takes A and B to designate two different entities; a philosophical question about 
how A can designate an entity is beyond its scope; the sphere of logic is 
restricted to a definition of the relationship between A and B, and based on the 
immediate categories of the human thinking process that operates with 
principles of identity and contradiction. On the basis that Aetius postulates that 
every essence (oiaia, (ývoru; or v7cöcraai(; 418) is different from one another, and 
therefore, if the Deity causes itself, it must be foreign to origination, the majority 
of his deductive syllogisms appear to be perfectly clear. 
The articles of the Syntagmation are, logically speaking, lemmatic 
inferences, complex syllogisms (opened with ¬t.. ) - produced in accordance 
with simple and complex variants of modus ponens and modus tollens (depending 
on the functional role of the minor premise, etc. ). Aetius seems to understand 
that lemmatic correctness depends on the correctness of conditional assertions 
in assumption and completeness of term of division in the minor premise. 
Although the latter aspect of lemma was an object of discrepancy (the question 
whether the term 'Deity' excludes the Son or includes him), and led the 
controversy away from the sphere of pure logic; but the real disagreement of 
both sides was deeper than that. There are many objections that can equally 
be 
418 It is established fact that these three terms were used 
by Aetius and Eunomius as equivalents 
in any case. cf. L. Wickham, op"cit", p. 552; however, 
R. Vaggione (Eunomius' apologies, p. 165) 
appeared to exclude the term 4 aK from this 
list. 
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applied to the content of the Syntagmation: Aetius does not distinguish 'person' 
from 'essence', the completeness of term of division in the minor premise is 
arguable (as Basil with Gregory will point out), etc. But are we dealing here 
with a logical error or deliberate presumption? 
I believe that Aetius understands very well almost all the logical 
regulations for lemma (he in fact operates with dilemmas and trilemmas). What 
he does not understand is the philosophical diversity between logical truth 
(formal criterion of truth) and a factual/virtual truth criterion. For example, a 
syllogism might be incorrect formally (because of a mistake in one of the 
premises or even all of them), but nevertheless have a correct corollary: 
one premise is incorrect both premises are incorrect 
All athletes are good soldiers. 
Some people are not athletes. 
Therefore, some people are not good 
soldiers. 
Lions are herbivorous animals. 
Cows are lions. 
Therefore, cows are herbivorous 
animals. 
At the same time, deductive reasoning can be formally correct, but be 
inconsistent virtually: 
All volcanoes are mountains. 
All geysers are volcanoes. 
Therefore, all geysers are mountains419. 
The conclusion is formally correct, but factually wrong: geysers are not 
mountains. 
419 I took all examples from my Russian seminary text book on 
logic (t. Lienna, ioa, Y'Ie6HUx 
AOZUKU (Moscow 1994)). 
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With this in mind, the general scope of the Syntagmation and the 
foundation of Eunomius' further teaching become more easily comprehensible. 
His main train of thought is grounded on the formal criterion of truth; from this 
standpoint they are correct; moreover, one can easily multiply the syllogisms of 
the Syntagmation. I therefore suppose that the hundreds of Aetius' syllogisms 
that have not come down to us, would not have shed any more light on his 
logic: the main assumption would still have been the same. This supposition is 
not a risky one, as we shall see below from the first work of his disciple: the first 
Apology does not clarify, but merely repeats those articles of the Syntagmation 
that derive from the sphere of logic. 
Conceived for popular use, the dilemmas of the Syntagmation have an 
interesting form: premise and assumption determine the only possible 
'conclusion', which the reader can make; Gregory will point out that Eunomius 
is using the same method of argumentation. For Aetius and Eunomius the 
criterion of truth was precisely in the correct construction of the dilemma or 
trilemma. 
Up to this point of his reasoning, Aetius does not go beyond the sphere 
of logic; articles 3,5-8 merely repeat the same logical operation. Moreover, 
Aetius clearly understands that these operations per se do not yet prove his 
main point - the refutation of the 'homoousion' and 
'homoiousion' doctrine. 
The transition from pure logic to philosophy appears when Aetius attempts to 
employ a new notion of a hierarchical structure of beings: 
42"34 
If the Deity remains everlastingly (ä'tEAEu'n 'wc) in 
ingenerate nature, and the offspring is everlastingly 
offspring, then the perverse doctrine of the 'homoousion' 
and 'homoiousion' will be demolished; an incomparability 
in essence (T 0' F-v oiQia äthyxeLTov) is established when 
each nature abides unceasingly in the proper rank of its 
nature. 
Synt. 4. 
What he is doing now is not just a logical distinguishing of A, B and C from 
each other, but a postulation of the notions that in logic per se remain undefined; 
logically, A can cause B and C, or A and B cause C, or A includes B and 
excludes C, and so on (in accordance with denotation). Obviously, his main aim 
is to bring forward the notion of 'wholly other', so Aetius suggests or rather 
postulates a hierarchical structure of A, B, and C, but while doing so, he 
understands that he next has to determine the denotation of A, B and C. Thus, 
A is said to be 'unbegotten', A begets B, so B is 'begotten' and B creates C. This 
determination immediately faces the problem of the term 'unbegotten', and 
more particularly the question of what one does when A is called 'unbegotten' 
or, in other words, what in fact one does when one calls something to be 
something? 
Aetius solves this problem by introducing a special philosophical agency 
- naming is in no way an abstract logical operation, but a revealing of essence. 
The twelfth article of the Syntagmation is now of special interest: 
If ingeneracy does not represent the substance of the Deity 
(et µ fi r6 äyEvvrj'rov Trjv i tö rraQty 'roü Owoü 
7taQC=gaLv), but the incomparable name is of human 
imagining (dgl ' i7tLvoiac tvriv drvOpw7ivqS 'rö 
0% 15 r. AADIO 
äQÜyxprTov ovoµa), the Deity is grateful to those who 
thought the name up, since through the concept of 
ingeneracy he has a transcendence of name which he does 
not bear in essence. 
In spite of the ironic character of the dilemma, Aetius' idea is clear; R. Mortley 
rightly interprets the core of it: 'either God's essence causes the name, or the name 
causes his essence'420. Evidently, Aetius argues for the former, and in order to 
reinforce his point he immediately adds: 
If external observation ascribes ingeneracy to the Deity, the 
observers are superior to the observed, having furnished 
him with a title superior to his nature. 
Synt. 13. 
This article of the Syntagmation was a particular problem for L. Wickham, 
whose interpretation of the Synt. 13 is that Aetius rejects the supposition that 
'ingeneracy' might be a non-essential relational property421. But, philosophically 
speaking, this is not an argument, because with this in mind every epithet 
(negative or positive) would equally fit the train of thought of the Synt. 13. 
What Aetius says is far from being a logical inference: the name 'ingeneracy' 
possesses ontological power, and this power is present ontologically, it does not 
come from human intellectual reasoning, but from the divine essence itself". 
420 R. Mortley, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 134. 
421 finally, L. Wickham argues against the conclusion of J. Danielou - L. Wickham, op. cit., p. 558, 
esp. n. 1; cf. -'Eunomius is a representative of Late 
Hellenism, who is not interested in science and the 
apparent world, who is looking for a sacral vision of the universe, borrowed from Oriental religions and 
became a steady defender of this tradition' - J. Danielou, Eunome lArien, p. 432. 
4n cf. with the interpretation of R. Mortley, which up to this point is very well defined, loc. cit. 
01112AC 
4". M 
Aetius next tries to define the term 'ingeneracy' by excluding it from the 
class of privations, abstractions of conditions and non-entity designations423; 
Eunomius repeated this operation in exactly the same way in Lib. Apol. 8.7ff. 
This is a very grave and wise idea which, however can be briefly dealt with: 
God is unbegotten, but he is not such by way of privation (Ka-rä u'rEQrIQ1v), 
because privatives are privatives with respect to the inherent properties of 
something, then they are secondary to their positives. 'But birth has never been 
an inherent property of God! '. This clearly demonstrates the extent of Aetius' 
knowledge of the apophatic principles of definitions. I think that to seek for 
apophatic theology here is like the search for the philosopher's stone in the 
'Harry Potter' film. Our main interest is with his use of the term epinoia. 
Aetius assumes a priori that the names of language belong to two classes: 
some of the names are said to be of human invention (Tä xa'r' Erctvoiav 
AEyöµEva); they do not signify reality. We shall see in Eunomius a complete 
'philosophy' of this class of names. Another class of names that, according to 
Aetius, includes the term 'ingeneracy' is not of epinoia, and ontologically comes 
from an entity determined by itself - R. Mortley does not clarify this important 
distinction, although it seems crucial for understanding Eunomius' theory of 
Q3 v. R. Mortley, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 130-134; he provides a discussion of Aetius' comprehension of 
negation, privation for defining essence. 
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names424. With this in mind, it is not difficult to reconstruct Aetius' train of 
thought: some names are imprinted by essences, other names are invented by 
people and do not represent any epistemological value; if so, and if the only 
way for cognition of things is to find an appropriate name (which is the one for 
each essence), then one who has found the name has at once cognised or 
grasped its essence. The way of cognition is the way of exclusion of the words 
KaT' erctvoiav until we arrive at the final correct name. Having succeeded in 
doing so, we reach the meaning which is imprinted in our mind by the essence 
of the subject of cognition. Therefore, the notorious formula that one can know 
the Deity in a similar manner as God knows himself appears to be 
understandable in a radically new form. At first sight it is, of course, monstrous, 
but in fact it reveals the very core of Anomean thought. 
It is illustrative that Aetius nowhere speaks of phoneme. This aspect of 
his teaching is often ignored by scholars. It should be pointed out that in the 
search for a 'natural' or 'correct' name, neither Aetius nor Eunomius resort to 
something as obvious as an etymological analysis of the phoneme, which is an 
inseparable part of any known 0iaic-theory of language. Why? I think because 
their approach to the problem is totally different from the standard (Pf)vu; - 
theory agenda when one deals with the primary aspect of the word - its sound. 
424 The problem is not only (as R. Mortley thinks) that Eunomius' comprehension of human 
epinoia was that 'words which emanate from this after-the-event conceptualization are clearly after-the- 
event words, and therefore to be dismissed as trivial' - op. cit., vol. 2, p. 151 - but that 
by introducing 
the distinction between words 'from epinoia' and words'uatä 4 nv' Aetius and Eunomius 
suggested a philosophical escape from a number of classical puzzles that appear 
immediately if 
one accepts (015QK-theory. 
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In Aetius' speculations, words are vehicles of meaning; unless they are from 
epinoia, they reveal the sense of essence not by means of sounds, but by means 
of their semantic content. From this point of view all that exists is considered to 
be subordinated to the laws of thought, and correctness in reasoning is reflected 
in fact. Undoubtedly, the theory of Aetius is objectivism based on a specific 
linguistic theory, but to what extent does he endeavour to explain himself? The 
most unclear aspect of his theory is of course his comprehension of epinoia and 
the systematic oblivion of the phoneme. L. Wickham noted that in relation to 
epinoia, Aetius and Eunomius 'broke with the Arians over the use of this 
term'425. However, there is no indication that Aetius is in fact aware of it. 
This linguistic theory is reflected in the Syntagmation in a very limited 
and even unexpected form. First of all, Aetius never uses traditional 
designations for the subject; he does not speak of a xaTä J)vaEt connexion. If 
Aetius was aware of the theoretical disputes about the natural or conventional 
relationship between name and essence, than why, instead of employing the 
settled terminology, does he introduce his own? Instead of saying that the name 
agennetos reveals the divine essence in a sense xa ra 4)6'm, and the sound of 
agennetos reflects and reveals the essence, he formulates it as Tö äycvvqTov 
oiciac evri br Aw'ru öv - the name 'ingeneracy' is revelatory of essence''. The 
reason might be that in Aetius' opinion it is not the sound that serves as the 
425L. Wickham, op. cit., p. 558: 'For Origen, Arius, Basil and Gregory Fnivoia was a legitimate 
means of expressing the inexpressible richness of God'. 
Synt. 16. 
239 
revelatory agency. Was he merely ignorant of the scientific discussion of the 
matter, or was there something substantially different and new from what one 
would expect? The text of the Syntagmation does not make this clear, but the 
sixteenth syllogism contains an interesting hint: 
If ingeneracy is revelatory of essence, it is reasonable for it 
to be contrasted with the offspring's essence. If 'ingeneracy' 
has no meaning a fortiori, 'offspring' reveals nothing. How 
could non-entities be contrasted? If, again, the word 
'ingenerate' contrasted with the word 'generated', silence 
following the utterance of the words, the Christian hope 
turn to begin and stop; it is based on magnificent language 
but not on what the natures really are, which is the 
intended meaning of the names (iv bla(ýöpcp 7xQo()op6, t 
KEL'.. tFEVTJV, äAIV ovK Ev 4üQEQIV oü-rwS EXot (atc c, s i 'cov 
övoµLaTCOv (3oüAE'ral u%taaia). 
L. Wickham in his commentary on this article suggests that for Aetius, language 
has been given by God, not merely the innate concepts but the sounds ( vai) 
which express them427; his reference to CE ii, 546 (J i, p. 386), however, does not, 
prove this supposition. I think that Aetius' comprehension of epinoia is a key to 
understanding his linguistic theory and the further elaboration of this name- 
theology made by Eunomius. 
We are now in a better position to reformulate the question about the 
Anomean system, and to suggest a fresh view of their linguistic theory. 
Speaking about name or word, Aetius' and Eunomius' emphasis is laid, not on 
the phoneme, but on the meaning and sense, and even, presumably, on the 
427L. Wickham, op. cit., p. 560 and esp. n. 1: this mistake caused another significant error, when L. 
Wickham draws a parallel between the Anomean theory of language and the medieval 
nominalist theory of Anselm. 
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silence. In their linguistic theory the sounds of human speech are everlastingly 
secondary matters, while the semantic content imprinted by essence is prior 
and dominates over the phoneme. The words from epinoia are to be excluded: 
they are empty phonetically and semantically. The words, which are said not to 
be from epinoia, allow us to operate with a true and pure sense of essence. If a 
name or a word is apprehended as a vehicle of meaning not by means of the 
phoneme, but by means of the logical or semantic senses that they reflect, and 
these senses are free from imperfection of any kind, then this allows us to 
cognise objects and to go back to the essences. The reason that makes this 
cognition possible is not related to an assumption that the sense is attached to 
the phoneme, and can be revealed by etymological analysis. It would be an 
error to assume that Aetius was so simple as not to observe that the phoneme 
can vary in Greek declension and is different in every language. What he 
perhaps means is that in spite of phonetic variations, the meaning remains the 
same, as it remains the same in the course of logical operations, in spite of 
Greek declensions. But in the Syntagmation he does not speak about the 
phoneme of agennetos, he speaks about its meaning, which dominates over the 
meanings of other words that are from epinoia and therefore false when applied 
to God. Thus, it would be an error to suppose that Aetius deifies the sound of 
the word agennetos, what he deifies is the sense of this word that, in his view, 
reveals the divine essence. 
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There is only one answer to the question of why Aetius could assume 
this; it is related to the laws of thought. In his opinion, what we now call the 
laws of thought are not the regulations that our thinking process follows. For 
Aetius and Eunomius these regulations have universal or ontological 
significance. Thus, the laws of thought appear to be the laws of the apparent 
world and even the sphere of the divine. 
How this philosophical presumption works in the sphere of simple 
notions like 'horse', or 'man', we shall see in Eunomius' later works. The 
Syntagmation gives us only a few examples, 'ingenerated' and 'generated'. Thus, 
Aetius takes the name agennetos; then, he neglects its phoneme and leaves it 
aside. We are not yet told by him how the meaning of agennetos is embodied in 
the phoneme of this word. Next, he draws our attention to the meaning of this 
word; in his opinion it means 'ingeneracy'; the meaning reveals the essence of 
the Deity, because (it is one of Aetius' most interesting ideas) the Deity cannot 
be generate and that is so. If logical truth has ontological status, and what is 
correct in our thinking process is at once correct ontologically and in the sphere 
of the divine, by the name agennetos we comprehend the divine essence in the 
same way as God comprehends his own essence himself, because our thinking 
process follows the regulations, which are the same for both God and man. To 
develop Aetius' point of view, there are no other regulations for the power of 
thinking. 
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What can this philosophy mean? It means that the laws of thought 
appear not in man's mind, because man came into existence by the divine 
power and will. The laws of thought existed everlastingly, from eternity in the 
divine mind. And as word is not a sound, but meaning or sense, language 
coexisted with the divine nature. Although at this stage it is only a guess, this 
guess demonstrates that even a preliminary observation of the above described 
axioms do not allow analytical reasoning to follow another way. 
If my interpretation of Aetius is correct, the most enigmatic aspect of the 
controversy becomes clearer. The theological model of Aetius emerges as an 
extremely attractive one for popular mind; Eunomius truly dedicated his career 
and life to the defence of the doctrine that allows us to state that one who 
admits the Anomean doctrine of the Son, and assumes that God can be perfectly 
comprehended in the name agennetos. But let us now look at the immediate 
reflection of these ideas in the first book of Eunomius. 
IV. 1.2 Eunomius' Liber Apologeticus. 
In order not to jump to premature conclusions in treating linguistic 
issues in Eunomius' early work, one should bear in mind that the Anomean 
doctrine was in the first instance a theological teaching rather than a 
philosophical treatise, even though a preoccupation with logic and such themes 
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as the relationship between time and eternity and language and reality are 
apparent428. Eunomius did not merely inherit the teaching of Aetius together 
with his doctrine of names. True, in the first Apology he does not go beyond a 
philosophical agenda, and is preoccupied with the doctrinal purposes and 
polemical tasks of the Syntagmation; therefore, his ideas as they emerge in the 
treatise are almost inseparable and indistinguishable from the work of his 
master. Eunomius' optimism in the sphere of epistemology causes linguistic 
objectivism. It is not just a random philosophical position that under some 
circumstances could be different. The very core of the Anomean doctrine, and 
at the same time its popularity, was not in 'enthusiasm and epistemological 
optimist' position in relation to names and the Deity. Rather, their optimist 
thinking was rooted in a broad-gauge interpretation of Christianity: both Basil 
and Gregory complained that Eunomius attracts people, because according to 
his interpretation of the Church doctrine, the ultimate sense of the Christian 
religion is to know God by venerating him with the name agennetos429. So, when 
Eunomius argues against the homoousion and homoiousion Creeds, for him it 
is not just a philosophical dispute about name and essence; he is defending 
something much more valuable for him and his followers - the very foundation 
of his faith, when salvation is thought to be a rational acceptance of the title 
4 Ph. Rousseau, op. cit., p. 106. 
4" It is evident from the sources that moral theology was one of the controversial issues. 
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agennetos theos. This is why in Eunomius' opinion 'to seem or to be Christian'`'3° 
is the same, on the condition that one accepts the proposed Creed (Lib. Apol., 5). 
Eunomius' attitude to the phoneme of name in his first Apology is as 
unclear and inconsistent as his master's: the general treatment of such a theme 
as the relationship between language and reality does not go beyond the limits 
traced in the Syntagmation. Just as we have seen in Aetius' work, his emphasis is 
always laid on the semantic content of notion, while the form (phoneme) is 
often left aside. His various expressions about the sounds of human speech or 
the sounds of words are strongly influenced by his rhetoric, so I think that in 
the first Apology his linguistic interests are still quite limited. He is in fact 
repeating the general postulates of the Syntagmation without any substantial 
further contribution. For example, in the following passage Eunomius employs 
the concept of epinoia exactly as it appears in Synt. 12: 
When we say'Unbegotten', then we do not imagine that we 
ought to honour God only in name, in conformity with 
human invention (xa2' ErcivoLav äv8Qw7t vfv); rather, in 
conformity with reality (xa'' &M Oc iacv), we ought to repay 
him the debt which above all other is most due God: the 
acknowledgement that he is what he is. 
Lib. Apol. 8.1031. 
The name agennetos is opposed to the other divine names on the basis of the 
distinction made by Aetius. The following text is illustrative; Eunomius dearly 
' Eunomius, Libor apologeticus, 6.2:, r6 boxeiv i Ta Ftvat XQtcrnavoic... 
431 Vaggione, R. Eunomius' apologies, p. 41f. 
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evolves the doctrinal content of the Syntagmation in a more comprehensive, 
lengthy and popular manner: 
Expressions based on invention have their existence in 
name and utterance only, and by their nature are dissolved 
along with the sounds [which make them up]; but God, 
whether these sounds are silent, sounding, or have even 
come into existence, and before anything was created, both 
was and is unbegotten. 
Lib. Apol. 8.3-8 
There are two themes that are to be taken into account. Firstly, invented, and 
therefore false and imperfect divine titles, which have their existence only in 
pronunciation, disappear together with the utterance; but one could equally 
remark that the name agennetos disappears with pronunciation - it appears that 
he does not see this point, or at any rate, he does not clarify it. In respect to 
epinoia, Eunomius takes this notion to designate a fake and incorrect 
supposition; it is always the source of mistake in logical reasoning. Epinoia leads 
us away from true meaning, and causes error in the course of ascension to the 
true sense of subject. 
If we follow Aetius' logic, and take into account his accentuation of 
significance in name, the second clause of the above example means that the 
human mind has operated with a 'true' name, which meaning has been 
ontologically imprinted in the sense of the word agennetos. Once again, the 
phoneme is almost totally neglected at the cost of the semantic sphere. In this 
case, what Eunomius goes on to say is that word or name does exist regardless 
of its phonetic manifestation. There is only one condition that brings name into 
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being, the actual existence of the object. As soon as the latter comes in to being, 
name as its sense emerges almost automatically. 
Of course, this formula is legitimate for what one might call the first class 
of names of human language, viz. those that are not produced by means of 
epinoia. The second group of names are said to be meaningless in every respect, 
i. e. their sound disappears, whereas no meaning is touched upon. But as for the 
first group of names, every word designates only one essence: 
We call the Son 'offspring', therefore, in accordance with 
the teaching of the Scriptures. We do not understand his 
essence to be one thing and the meaning of the word (TO' 
rn%tatvöµEvov) which designates it to be something else. 
Rather, we take it that his substance is the very same as that 
which is signified by his name, granted that the designation 
applies properly to the essence. 
Lib. Apol., 12.6-10 
The syllogisms of the Syntagmation give us a clear idea of how Aetius and then 
Eunomius were looking for a proper designation of an essence. In his first 
Apology Eunomius is not yet concerned with the issue of name in the full sense; 
at least his preoccupation does not go beyond the scope of the Syntagmation. His 
interest in the issue of names evolves over the name agennetos, in that he 
attempts to explain why this term should be preferred over other divine 
epithets in the Bible. His train of thought is as follows; he excludes the names 
'Father' and 'Son', because of the analogy of begetting among humans; 
similarly, he dismisses the name 'Maker' as imperfect, because it presupposes 
matter for the production of the things made. Although the following passages 
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are, predominantly, figures of speech, the rhetorical opposition made between 
'verbal expression' and 'meaning' is always in favour of the latter: 
But if they reject this and pay no attention to the verbal 
expression of the words, holding rather to the meaning 
appropriate to God... 
Lib. Apol. 16.6f. 
... we need not try to... conform meanings to words exactly 
or try to distinguish those of different expression, but must 
rather direct our attention to the concepts... 
Lib. Apol. 18.5f. 
A characteristic feature of the first Apology is that as we have just 
observed in the Syntagmation, apart from the terms 'begotten' and 'unbegotten', 
Eunomius does not provide us with clear examples of names that are supposed 
to be of non-epinoic origin. His formula that if things have different essences, 
they, should accordingly, bear different names, emerges repeatedly, as well as 
appeals to obey logical reasoning, but even following his sole attempt to explain 
what he really means by a distinction between two classes of words is more 
than difficult: 
What well-disposed person would not acknowledge that 
there are some words which have only their sound and 
utterance in common but not at all their signification (xaTA 
tv of µaciav)? For instance 'eye' is used of both human 
beings and God, but in the case of the one it signifies a 
certain bodily member while in the case of the other it 
means sometimes God's care and protection of the 
righteous, sometimes his knowledge of events. On the other 
hand, the majority of words [referring to God] are different 
in their verbal expression but have the same meaning (Tä 
bi roAJlä icaTa v Ex4xbvr)aLv xcXcoQwv Ltva v)v a&d v 
IXEL of taciav), as for instance, 'I AM', and 'only true 
God'. 
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Liber. Apol., 16.9-17.3 
A striking feature of Eunomius' first Apology is that philosophical issues 
receive rather poor treatment in it. In fact, Eunomius has repeated the 
fundamental principles of his master's work by framing them in almost the 
same order, and representing them in a literary rather than syllogistic form. 
Turning back to the argumentation of J. Danielou and R. Mortley, it seems 
plausible to inquire about such an ambiguous appearance of philosophical 
issues at the early formational stage of Anomean doctrine, i. e. in the 
Syntagmation and the first Apology. Dealing with Eunomius' theological agenda 
at this stage, I would like to draw the reader's attention to the fact that before 
entering serious dispute, the Anomean doctrine of names is extremely 
primitive. As a matter of fact, there is no theory as yet, but something like an 
alloy of incomplete and inconsistent ideas; furthermore, there is not even a 
verbal parallel that could be evident for the use of Plato or some significant 
Christian works. The teaching on agennetos theos and the syllogisms based on 
the premise that nothing is prior to God and that he is ingenerate are, clearly, 
derived from his master; it is not yet enough, however, to take it for a 'Neo- 
Platonist schema' or even 'original doctrine'432. If in the Syntagmation, due to its 
compact syllogistic character, some references to epinoia and the ontological 
correlation between essence and name permit us to expect a settled view, the 
first Apology is rather frustrating. If, as J. Danielou and R. Mortley thought, 
cf. R. Mortley, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 147, who quotes 
J. Dani4lou, Eunome 1'Arien, p. 428. 
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there is Platonic philosophy, one should notice that in the first Apology there is 
no obvious sign of it; R. Vaggione's textual apparatus for the Liber Apologeticus 
points to several verbal parallels to Plato, but two of them belong to a Greek 
proverb, and the last one refers to Eunomius' speculation on time, which 'is a 
certain motion of the stars'433 . This is simply not enough. In the light of our 
analysis of the Syntagmation and the first Apology, R. Mortley's keenness to 
represent Aetius and Eunomius as thinkers who were much more Platonist 
than, for example, Origen is not well grounded`m: there are neither verbal 
parallels nor even any plausible semblance in ideas. Apart from unclear hints 
about meaning that is prior to phoneme, and the imperfection of the words of 
epinoia, we have found no evidence that Plato was ever read by Aetius and, 
presumably, by Eunomius (at least at the stage of the composition of the first 
Apology). 
Our next question is about the possible dependence of Eunomius on 
Origen. R. Vaggione's reference to Origen's De oratione is even less well 
founded 4-15- it is highly questionable whether Eunomius had read anything by 
Origen at the stage of writing his first book. J. Danielou assumed that 
Eunomius' use of epinoia is influenced by Origen''m; in any case, in the first 
Apology we came across an extremely primitive and incomprehensible use of 
433Liber. Apol. 10v. R. Vaggione, Eunomius' apologies, p. 44. Overall, R. Vaggione's apparatus 
contains many totally irrelevant references. 
4N v. R. Mortley, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 128. 
4n R. Vaggione, Eunomius' apologies, p. 195. The references he makes are not in fact persuasive 
that Eunomius really made use of Origen. 
' J. Danielou, Eunome l'Arien, p. 418: 'This is the theory of epinoia held by Oxigen, and Eunomius 
strongly depends on it; it is another interesting argument that Arianism had its roots in Oxigen'. 
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this term: we are told that the implication of this notion is that both Aetius and 
Eunomius divide the words of language into two classes. Theoretically it is an 
interesting and new claim, but practically they do not seem to have anything 
more to say apart from just two words. 
The last theme that should be mentioned to some extent anticipates the 
agenda of the next section. However, I raise this problem here, because it deals 
with something that is not present, as I believe, in the Syntagmation and the first 
Apology. The concept of names that are still words even if not pronounced, 
'silent' words that will later on speak of the pre-existent creation of humankind 
is an interesting theme of Neo-Platonic philosophy. Presumably, this theme 
comes from Socrates' 2ö baL toviov437 who spoke from above. Undoubtedly, this 
baiµoviov spoke 'soundlessly', but it was nonetheless a voicelm. Further, the 
concept of non-verbal voices, meanings, and communication, appears in 
Plotinus439 and in the previously-mentioned De mysteriis of Iamblichus4'0, and 
finally appears in Proclus' In Cratyl. comm. 35; 24-26; 36; 23-37. Nevertheless, in 
my opinion the Neo-Platonic agenda of the above-mentioned passages is very 
different from Aetius and Eunomius; so it seems inconceivable to apply 
Danielou's hypothesis to the matter. 
437 cf. Plato, Apologia Socratis, 31d, 40a-c. 
M e. g. Plutarchus in his De genic Socratis holds that this voice was soundless, he excluded any 
verbal expressions ((Pý) from it - (Stepp. 582b 8). 
4" Plotinus, Enneades, iv 3,18,13ff. 
40 lamblichus, De mysteriis, vii W. It is, however, astonishing that J. Danielou left out this 
parallel. 
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IV. 2 Basil of Caesarea and his Adversus Eunomium 
As it were in a market of dreams, or assembly of the dead 
drunk, where people neither attend nor understand the 
matter, you promulgate your laws with great courage, 
supposing that instead of all arguments, your 'I have told 
you' is enough. 
Adversus Eunomium, ii, 9; 7-10. 
The Anomean theology of the unbegotten Deity provoked an impressive 
response from the Christian writers of the epoch. In the list of R. Vaggione there 
are eight Patristic works, all said to be titled Contra Eunomium441. But even this 
imposing list of names does not in fact fully reflect the adverse reaction against 
Eunomius' works. It would not be an exaggeration to state that in the course of 
the controversy Eunomius' opponents produced an entire library; as is shown 
by the investigation of R. Vaggione, who presented a comprehensive picture of 
what he has named 'the Nicene revolution', the Patristic works titled Contra 
Eunomium are just the tip of the iceberg. Obviously, the reason for this 
remarkable reaction should be related to the extreme initial popularity of 
Anomean theology, and some kind of notable simplicity of the doctrine for the 
popular mind, but the traditional explanation, that Eunomius' position was 
very persuasive in terms of both philosophy and theology, should be 
reconsidered. The problem of language happened to appear in the context of 
the Eunomean controversy in the most remarkable manner. The reaction of the 
441 R. Vaggione, Eunomius' apologies, p. xiii: Apollinarius, Basil, Didymus, Diodore of Tarsus, 
Gregory, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of Cyrus, and Sophronius. 
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Nicenes followed different courses. The fourth and fifth books attached to 
Basil's work provide us with an interesting method of argumentation: the 
response of (presumably) Didymus the Blind consists of numerous lemmatic 
syllogisms (in the manner of the Syntagmation) that demonstrate the Son to be 
consubstantial with the Father. 
Basil of Caesarea, who now will be the focus of our examination, 
followed a totally different way; presumably, unlike Didymus, he felt that 
syllogistic argument was not a secure route to take. Basil of Caesarea, and his 
Against Eunomius, is undoubtedly one of the most important works that 
appeared amongst the Nicenes in response to Eunomius. Anticipating the 
critical edition and French translation of the text, M. Anastos in June 1979 
pointed out that this important treatise of Basil had 'never been published in a 
critical edition or translated into any modern language. Nor had it been widely 
discussed or criticized'443. In his own article, M. Anastos has rendered the content 
of Basil's work very carefully, and his contribution to the study of this 
somewhat neglected work is immense, but the text still awaits an English 
translation. 
µ2 SC vols. 299 and 305 that appeared in 1981 and 1983. 
"3Anastos, M. op. cit., p. 67. To be more precise, Basil's Adversus Eunomium was translated 
into 
Russian by the students and tutors of the Moscow Theological Academy. This translation was 
published in Moscow in 1846, together with other works of Basil published 
by Migne; in 1911 
the revised translation was published by P. Soikin. Of course, the treatise received numerous 
studies in nineteenth century Russia. Taking into account our remit, I cannot give a complete 
bibliography here; as for the subject of my thesis, Basil's work was analysed in the studies of 
Y. 
Edelshtein, and in the article written by a professor of the St. Petersburg 
Theological Academy, 
S. Troitskiy (1878-1972) - for more details v. I4pinie33 (Cepwi i), 
)KuJub u mpyi npo COpa 
C. B. Tpoui4uozo, BT NO 12 (Moscow 1974) pp. 217-219. 
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Basil's concern with the Anomean movement is impressive, and goes far 
beyond his Adversus Eunomium, where his philosophical preoccupation appears 
to be rather limited; but this seeming limitation becomes clear in the light of his 
short works that are going to be dealt with below. His controversy with the 
Anomeans was reflected in a number of his other works, where the treatment of 
linguistic and philosophical issues appears much more clear and distinctive in 
comparison with AE; moreover, some of his early works allow us to assume 
that his interest in the problem was much wider than just a practical need to 
refute Eunomius. 
Compared to the early books of Gregory's Contra Eunomium, whose 
primary criticism was much more restrained and concrete, Basil attacks his 
opponent in every possible way: he is irritated by the title of Eunomius' work, 
its style, structure, rhetorical figures, etc. He scoffs at Eunomius' expectation 
that his Apology will become the common property of Christian people, but a 
theme that received the most scathing criticism was Eunomius' method of 
argumentation itself. In the first book of his brother, who took pains to reply to 
the further Apologies, Gregory assumes that Eunomius makes errors 
unintentionally; he still thinks he can persuade him with theological and 
philosophical considerations. Basil's criticism is not at all tolerant: 
his intention 
is to represent Eunomius as a 'liar, ignoramus, swearer, and 
blasphemer'''" and 
in speaking so, Basil often departs from the central themes. 
In fact both books, 
444 AE. i, 1; 49 
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viz. Adversus Eunomium and Liber Apologeticus are of the same genre; in some 
sense Basil's work fits better the apologetic style, whereas the first Apology is 
merely a general argumentation against 'inconsistent' and abstract homoousion 
and homoiousion followers. Nevertheless, in the work of Basil one can scarcely 
find any sign of a misunderstanding of Eunomius, as is often assumed; in spite 
of numerous offensive and insulting epithets, presumably caused by another 
defeat of orthodoxy in Constantinople"', Basil makes his case with remarkable 
lucidity. Let us now go through those aspects of his criticism that are relevant to 
linguistic issues. 
§ IV. 2.1 The theme of 'mundane wisdom' 
In Basil's reply to Eunomius' First Apology, the theme of logical discourse 
receives an interesting treatment. I think that it partly reveals the controversial 
questions posed in the previous section, namely Eunomius' philosophical 
background in general, and relation to linguistic matter in particular. Taking 
into account Basil's extreme polemical preoccupation, it is illustrative that he 
really cannot find anything worth accusing Eunomius of, but the use of 'secular 
wisdom' (TOV xövµou a04 )(a; ). Apart from a general remark about the 
443 AE., i, 70ff. 
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syllogisms of Aristotle and Chrysippus, which, in Basil's opinion are totally 
useless for the exposition of 'generacy' and 'ingeneracy'4, the only more or less 
determinable parallel that he finds in his opponent's theologising, and indicates 
in AE (and other anti-Eunomean) works, is related to Aristotle's idea mentioned 
in the second book of the Categories, that in the course of definition, a possession 
(WýLq) takes precedence of the privation (Q2eprjQls). As has already been 
observed, both Aetius and Eunomius proposed the totally ridiculous statement 
that the term 'unbegotten' is in no way an alpha-privative epithet, but an 
absolute divine epithet. Basil objects only to the latter, and refers to the 
Categories rhetorically, i. e. without criticising Aristotle himself. His real purpose 
is not to argue about the logical role of substantives in terms of privation- 
possession; moreover, he does not even find anything wrong with Aristotle's 
remark, and later on argues that the name 'unbegotten' is indeed a privation«'. 
All that he is willing to say is just a presentation of Eunomius' doctrine as taken 
'not in accordance with the teaching of Spirit, but from wisdom of the 'princes 
of our epoch' (Ex jc ao(ýiac 'rCOv aQXov'wv Tov ai &voS Tov'rov)'"8. In a sense 
we now see what was already pointed out by Socrates: Eunomius' knowledge 
of philosophical matters was really inadequate. His use of the syllogistic 
method does not yet mean that he had read, for example, Aristotle himself 
when he composed his first Apology. 
446 AE, i, 5; 43f. 
447 AE, i, 9. 
4a AE, i, 9; 12f. 
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There is another important theme that should be taken onto 
consideration as well. Among numerous offensive labels, Basil brings forward 
one that demonstrates his comprehension of the matter in a remarkable way; 
moreover, this comment is a witty aphorism similar to Theodoretus' ironic 
remark that Eunomius turned theology into 'technology'. In the last section of 
the first book, Basil compares Eunomian doctrine with both pagan religion and 
Judaism; in AE, i, 27 this idea is slightly unclear, but in his twenty forth homily 
the same theme appears in an interesting form. In Basil's opinion, Sabellius is as 
diametrically opposed to Anomean doctrine as heathen theologising is opposed 
to Judaism. Remarkably, it is the Sabellian heresy that is identified by Basil as 
pure pagan theology, while the Anomean variant of the monotheist doctrine of 
the one ingenerate Deity is in his opinion a transition to Judaism: 
For those (Sabellians) who at once state the Only-begotten 
[Son] to be God's work and creature, but then worship Him 
and theologise about him, and venerate the 'creature' rather 
than the Creator, introduce Hellenism; while the others 
(Anomeans), having rejected God from God and having 
assumed the Son to be so in word (xai övö taTt µev 
o oAoyovvt¬S Y iöv), refute his [divine] existence in deed, 
and truly recommence Judaism (Ee-y p be xai äAt19tia tv 
vrtap&Lv äOETOVVTcc, Tov lovbadQµöv ItäALv 
ävaveovv2ai)449. 
This passage is of special interest in respect to J. Danielou's idea of 
regarding Eunomius as a Neo-Platonist thinker. Basil does not see any sign of 
philosophy here; for him Anomean monotheism is not a variant of a Hellenistic 
«9 Basilius, Contra Sabellianos et Arium et Anomoeos, PG 31,600,1.47ff. (My transl. ). 
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concept of the Supreme Deity, but a Judaic theological position. Of course, it 
does not necessarily mean that Eunomius really had any knowledge of the 
rabbinic tradition, and in fact Basil does not really mean this. Even at the stage 
of composing his Apology for the Apology his use of Philo, as I shall show below, 
is not significant at all. R. Mortley, however, argued for Eunomius' dependence 
on Philo; so we shall turn back to this assumption in the next section. 
IV. 2.2 Value of logical truth and the sphere of its application 
Undoubtedly, Eunomius' syllogistic method of argumentation 
represented the main difficulty for Basil: to refute the method philosophically in 
front of unprepared listeners was scarcely possible; as with Eunomius, his 
preoccupation was to make his view explicit to the popular mind. In the context 
of the entire work, Basil's remark about Chrysippus' logic appears slightly 
insincere4-'°: in his use of the Stoic logical craft and purely scientific knowledge 
(the nature of time, mechanism of human eyesight, thinking process, etc. ), Basil 
excels his opponent. His general position in relation to Aetius' dilemmas is the 
following: Basil does not intend to refute the method as such by a direct 
450 as well as his over-modest remark: 'If some people call these words privations, it is irrelevant 
to us. We do not know scientific definitions (TtXvoAoyiac Ili&rwv) and do not seek after them' 
- AE, i, 9; 29-31. 
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accusation of inconsistency451, but he points out that in spite of its formal 
correctness, the syllogistic construction fails to define the truth factually. Thus, 
Basil rejects the formal truth criterion as an ultimate epistemological method 
His only response to the logical train of thought is that in spite of the formal 
correctness of the dilemmas, the statement that the Son is 'wholly other' to the 
Father is simply not true. What does he suggest the factual truth criterion to be? 
Basil calls it ö xavc3v, 6 yvc3µcwv and TO' äa4aAl c xei'n Qtov'ý2; his frequent 
'this is not so' in respect to Eunomius' doctrine of the Son is normally followed 
by numerous references to the Bible, which is obviously an external factor to the 
sphere of logic. 
Unlike his master, who seemed to be totally uninterested in the historical 
doctrine of the Church, Eunomius felt a need to adopt some traditional and 
comprehensive forms for the exposition of faith. In AE i, 4 Basil reasonably asks: 
why did Eunomius makes use of an old Creed (presumably, of Cappadocian 
origin4O) if his position is purely rationalist, since the doctrinal content of the 
short baptismal formula is neutral and totally irrelevant to the dispute, because 
it says nothing about the nature of the Son`m? Basil's remark is fascinating: in 
AE i, 5 he demonstrates that though his opponent calls the profession xavcüv, 
this rule of faith on account of its uncertainty in his opinion 'requires to be 
451 In AE, i, 8, however, Basil attempts to do so; he points to the logical distinction between 
relative names and absolute names - cf. I. Hausherr, The name of Jesus, p. 29; his brief summary 
of Basil's view on names is in fact unsatisfactory and incomplete. 
*2 AE, 1,4; 75f. 
49 v. brief discussion in SC 305, p. 240 n 1. 
4" AE, i, 4. 
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explained more precisely'455; nevertheless, for this specification Eunomius 
employs the classical syllogisms of his master Aetius. 
In order to exemplify Basil's own treatment of the truth criteria, let us 
look at one of his homilies. The Contra Sabellianos et Arium et Anomoeos is in fact 
a summary of the AE, and reveals the structure of Basil's train of thought in a 
more comprehensive form. The structure of the Hom. 24 (PG 31,600-617) goes 
as follows: Hom. 24 600,24-601,12 defines the doctrine of the Sabellians and the 
Anomeans; Hom. 24 601,13-604,41 is an outline of the biblical Christological 
passages (John 1: 1, Ps. 119: 89, John 14: 2,14: 7,10: 30,16: 28,8: 16,8: 17-18, Col. 1: 15, 
John 5: 18, Phil. 2: 6); in Hom. 24 604,42-609,8 Basil turns to the divinity of the 
Holy Spirit and refutes charges of dualism, tritheism and polytheism; the next 
passage (Hom. 24 609,8-617,16) contains sixteen biblical quotations about the 
Holy Spirit, and only one appeal to common sense (Basil repeats AE i, 12; 29- 
13; 24). 
Thus, the sphere of logical truth is limited; a syllogistic argument per se 
does not prove the matter. As far as syllogistic deduction appears to disagree 
with the Scriptures and Tradition (i EiaE(31 c rCov IIa-reecov rraQäbovL), 
formal correctness loses its value completely, and turns into nonsense. The 
following passage is perhaps the best to demonstrate his view: 
as AE, i, 5; 4-6:, &L& roü'ro tv avrnjv icai Kavöva A yet icai TEQO" cqc 4 gaiv ancQLßeOTtQac 
bEiaeaL 
4m ibid. 
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But, as for me, I neither invent new sayings, nor do I 
disregard [the] value [of logical correctness in general]457. 
But I cry and lament over those who dare to call him (the 
Holy Spirit) 'creature', because by their scant sophism and 
false corollary they pitch themselves into a chasm. For they 
say: 'As far as our mind grasps these three, and amongst 
things that exist, there is nothing which cannot be 
subdivided [in the following three groups]; hence 
everything is either unbegotten or begotten or created. [The 
Holy Spirit] is neither first, nor it is the second; 
consequently, it is the third'. This 'consequently' makes you 
guilty of eternal damnation. Have you scrutinised 
everything?... Have you grasped everything by your 
intellect?... Do you know what is under the ground? Do you 
know what is in the depth [of the sea]? What a demonic 
vainglory! 'I know the number of the sands and measure of the 
sea' (allusion to Herodotus 1; 47)458. 
Indeed, there is nothing remarkable about the distinction between the 
formal and the factual truth criteria that Basil seems to be introducing here. 
Moreover, this is an elementary principle of rational discourse, and it must be 
clear to anyone who is acquainted with, for example, Plato's criticism of 
sophists and their verbal puzzles, which are based either on a correct dilemma 
that contradicts reality, or on an incorrect dilemma. A general assumption that 
logical truth is of no particular significance to Basil appears to be intellectually 
devastating, as well it might to us. Perhaps one can argue that such a 
representation of Eunomius is an oversimplification of the matter; I think, 
however, that Eunomius' premise is merely a poor variant on a much more 
45' The phrase'ov'rw piv ovv oirre xaLvotoµw OS pats, oink äOetC:, 'jv c iav' is very unclear. 
I think that in the latter clause 'and I do not disregard the value of new sayings' in the context of 
the whole passage should be attributed to logical correctness in general. Basil could not mean 
that he does not disregard the lemma that follow, because it is exactly what he does. 
49 Basilius, Homily 24 (Contra Sabelianos et Arium et Anomoeos - PG 31,612). 
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general position that can be easily traced in the history of philosophy. 
Presumably, from Basil's standpoint the Cartesian philosophical preamble 
cogito ergo sum would be similarly monstrous. 
As observed in the previous section, Aetius and Eunomius' 
comprehension of epinoia is clear; what is unclear is the way it works when 
applied to ordinary words. If it is the most unsuccessful treatment of the notion 
in the history of Greek thought459, and the initial account of epinoia that 
appeared in the Syntagmation and the first Apology is not yet philosophy, 
Eunomius' examples of non-epinoic words are just 'unbegotten' and 'begotten'; 
perhaps 'creature' is nothing but a theoretical oversight, caused by his 
passionate desire to set up the agennetos theos theory. Of course, Aetius' view on 
epinoia is determined by his comprehension of logical truth and its absolute 
value for cognition, but initially neither Aetius, nor Eunomius spoke about 
cognition as such; they spoke only about the cognition of the Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit by means of three proposed terms. 
For Basil there is no philosophy yet. His estimation of Eunomius' 
understanding of the term epinoia is that his opponent makes a distinction 
between so-called epinoic and non-epinoic words, in order to facilitate his 
exposition of the 'Unbegotten Deity'46°. Refutation of the Anomean view on 
epinoia was easy for Basil; let us now turn to his own comprehension of epinoia. 
49 A. Owen, &ELVO C&, bl[VOL and allied words, JThS 35 (1934), p. 375. 
40 AE, L 5; 131ff. 
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§ IV. 2.3 Basil on human epinoia and thinking process 
The concept of epinoia in Basil and Eunomius is crucial for an 
understanding of their disagreement. E. Owen rightly concluded that the term 
is not a technical philosophical or theological term as such46'; rather, epinoia is 
more likely a trivial notion, which covers so many aspects of thought that it can 
hardly be translated as a technical 'abstract concept' or 'analytical thinking', 
though both these meanings are included in the notion. In fact, Basil and 
Gregory made epinoia a notion of anthropological theology. 
By the notion of epinoia Basil and Eunomius both mean the human factor. 
The basis of their disagreement is twofold, and related to the discrepancy in 
their comprehension of the thinking process. First of all, in Eunomius' view, 
epinoia is regarded as secondary to his non-epinoic words, which he employs in 
his lemmas, and which later on he will have to defend by developing this 
standpoint. 
As to the second class of human words, epinoia causes them as an 
afterthought and at once introduces inevitable errors. It would be a mistake to 
assert that for Eunomius the thinking process as such is the source of these 
errors, because it contradicts his method in general. Rather, for him epinoia is 
human inventiveness rather than analytical thinking; so, it is inventiveness that 
causes a kind of arbitrary concept of a thing and as a result, error. Basil, 
4" A. Owen, op. cit., p. 376. 
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however, argues for the philosophical uniqueness of epinoia; it is the 
phenomenon of human nature that allows us to grasp things and designate 
them by words. Therefore, the key to Basil's view on epinoia is related to his 
comprehension of the human thinking process. 
It seems that Basil was interested in this issue as well as in the nature of 
eyesight regardless of his polemical preoccupations. For him these two 
questions are entirely enigmatic, so he supposes that a complete comprehension 
of their nature will be reached only in our afterlife462. 
Even in respect to movements of our mind (-rä 2ov vov 
KLvrj to'ra) who can answer exactly: does our soul (vxi ) 
produce them by creation or by generation (rrö'rEQov 
K'ICELv i yevväv rct4uxcv)? 
AE, iii, 6; 22f. 
His general view on the nature of thinking is better explained in the Homilia in 
illud: 'Attende tibi ipsi'463: 
For our physical actions ('rov cr. . tatoS rceä&EK) require 
time (XQövov), good occasion, efforts, assistants and 
another help; but movements of reason (S biavoiac 
xLvrjcELc) do not take place in time (äxQovwc 
EvEQyovvtaL), they follow without physical impediments 
and efforts, and any time (xatQöv) is suitable for them. 
Hom. 3 (319) 24; 14ff. 
Unfortunately, it is irrelevant here to make any examination of Basil's opinion about human 
eyesight. AE, iii, 6; 5-24 reflects that this theme was an interest of 
his; in fact, Basil expresses his 
deep dissatisfaction with both classical Greek views on the matter - cf. SC 305 p. 168 n. 1. 
Wed. S. Rudberg, L'homelie de Basile de Cesar* sur le mot 'observe-toi toi-mbne' (Stockholm: 
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1962), p. 23-37. 
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He distinguishes the 'movements of reason' from their result -a 
'complete concept' (voilVa or bt; votct); the nature of our thought is said to be 
unknown to us; in Basil's opinion, however, -rä -rov vov x1vrjµa'a have their 
existence in time (xQovoc), but thoughts (btävota, Evvoia) being at some stage 
bound up with movements of reason, are finally of a different modus of 
coming-to-be and exist in ak3v4M rather than in XQovoc: 
... Certainly, this process is not exact in likeness due to the 
interposition of time (bß. ä Trjv -roü xQovov naQä rarnv). 
And it is more suitable to say that the nature of what is 
thought subsists together with the movements of the mind, 
apart from time (6CxQövw(; )465. 
AE, ii, 16; 42ff. 
The nature of the human thinking process is immaterial, because thoughts are 
produced by our soul (rj IPuXij 2äS &voiac EQyäCe'raL). It is the power of 
thinking that differentiates human beings from animals, whose behaviour is 
determined by instinct (äoop ti ), and who turn from harm to good by impulses 
of their nature (tic 0OQEwc). Human behaviour is determined par excellence by 
our intellect, which is an intellectual part of our soul. 
In point of fact, Basil now speaks about human personhood; his attempt 
to answer this philosophical question is that our body just belongs to us - we are 
4" For details about the distinction between in a'i v, xp6voc and Divine eternity v. B. Otis, 
Gregory of Nyssa and the Cappadocian concept of time, StPt 14 (1976), pp. 327-357. 
05 transl. of D. Robertson, op. cit., p. 136. 
4" cf. D. Robertson, op. cit., p. 116-123 for a fuller account of the idea in the context of Stoic 
philosophy. 
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not our body; we are surrounded by arts and sciences, which are caused by our 
intellectual activity, but they are not what we really are. Rather, 
We are our soul and mind (rI t¬ µßv oüv ýQµEV i uxr) xai ö 
voüc), because we are made in the image of the Creator. 
Hom. 3,26; 17 
Visible objects are observed and cognised by our eyesight; this action as 
such is enigmatic and incomprehensible467. But invisible things can be 
comprehended by our 'spiritual' eyes or, as Basil says, by the eye of our soul (2ö 
'sic *'xf (; µµa): 
... 
by the intellectual power of our soul (Týj voEeä Tq, S 
*vXf q bvvaµEL) we can be plunged into contemplation of 
incorporeal things (E7-ILf36tAAELv OF-COQ a uOv 
äaw thTwv). 
Hom. 3,25; 22f. 
Thus, Basil excludes the category of time (XQövoc and, for that reason, 
'occasion' - KcdQoc) from bi. vota and Evvoia and somehow places them 
in 
1 11 aiwv. It should be noted that the application of the term 'timelessly' is not a 
particularly correct translation of his äxQovwc; strictly speaking, what we now 
mean by absolute timelessness Basil attaches exclusively to the Deity. 
A'iwv is 
not an absolutely timeless and spaceless realm; it is just another mode of 
time 
ýý cf. Hom. 3,25; 20ff. 
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and space: in aihv there is no past or future; everything is only in the present''. 
The rapidity of human thought is caused by two factors; first, it is in a sense of 
timeless (äxQövwc) nature; second, its attachment to aid v in terms of the space 
continuum. In other words, human btävoia appears to be beyond the category 
of space (in the sense of our apparent world of the three-dimensional space) as 
well: 
Sometime an arrogant man, falsely chaste and bragging 
about his piety... goes by his thought (är bpa to 
btavoia) back to the place of sin (rcpöc 2öv'iS aVaQTtac 
Töicov) in an invisible movement of his heart (Ev 'r(ý ä(ýav¬i 
S xaQbiac xwrjµa2L)469. 
The notion of epinoia, according to Basil, is not just the inventiveness of 
human nature; it is not, and cannot be, just a verbal result of our thinking. 
Rather, epinoia is a special phase of the human thinking process that can 
immediately follow our perception (and there are two ways to go by) or cannot. 
Might or might not His main disagreement with Eunomius' treatment of epinoia 
461 This problem is too complex to be treated here in full; clearly, my concern is limited by Basil's 
view of the nature of thought. The Greek philosophical apparatus, undoubtedly allowed for a 
distinction between various types of time and space and for the conception of a time that is 
always present cf. Plotinus, Enn. vi, 7; 2-3. B. Sesboüe undertakes a brief examination in SC 299, 
pp. 86-89; however, his suggestion that Eunomius followed Aristotle's Physica in his view of the 
nature of time has little force. Eunomius' definition of XQ6voS as' a certain motion of the stars' 
(Ap. 10; 6f) was evidently just a personal view that has no connexion with Plato, Aristotle or the 
Stoics. It is illustrative that for Basil, who knows the Stoic treatment of biö arrrlµa and a'ic, v (SC 
299, p. 89), the remark about the stars is nothing but the rigmarole of a narrow-minded man (v. 
AE, i, 21). For a general analysis of the problem v. A. Voces, AHmuumiü uoc. toc u coopemennaR 
nayxa (Moscow 1927; repr. 1993) -'Greek cosmos and the modern science', eps. ch. 14 'Category of 
value, time, space, and gravity', pp. 225-228,480-484; for bibliography v. SC 299, pp. 86-89. 
+0 Hom. 3,24; 17ff. The rest of the passage is as follows: in his fantasy, the man has committed a 
sin that remains invisible to the people who praise him for his apparent virtues. This sin of the 
heart will be still invisible until doomsday, i. e. until the termination of Xpövoc and the 
beginning of dwty. 
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is this: Basil contends that epinoia cannot mean an arbitrary idea that causes a 
word, and then disappears with the pronunciation: 
Does the term (epinoia) mean absolutely nothing and is 
merely a sound, which just escapes one's lips in vain? 
AE, i, 6; 2f. 
If so, Basil replies, this is not Em Vota, but rcaQävoia and nonsense. The real 
source of error, falsehood and being misled is in our mind, i. e. in a wrong 
epinoia470; but even a mistaken opinion does not disappear when it is being 
uttered. Basil says that even though our sayings have been spelled out, a 
misleading, wrong opinion does not cease to exist. He sneers at Eunomius' 
statements and says that if, as his opponent thinks, the disappearance of the 
uttered epinoic words means the immediate disappearance of wrong opinions 
((ýavthc tatra), 
It would have been plausible to utter a lie, if the very nature 
of the lie disappears together with its utterance. 
AE, 1,6; 16f. 
In his treatment of human epinoia, Basil adopts the distinction made in Hom. 3: 
in the sphere of soul there is a rational and intellectual agency (To' AoyLK6V xal 
vocpöv tq; 4vxfic) and an unconscious or instinctive agency (To' na0g rucov rE 
tat cAoyov): in the course of spiritual life Christians have to subordinate the 
470 I shall return to the negative aspect of epinoia mentioned by Basil in his first De jejunio. 
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latter to the former47. Epinoia belongs to the intellectual part of the soul (voepöv 
'rº1S UXýic); therefore, it mostly deals with what comes from just 'sense 
perception', and does so analytically. At the same time, however, epinoia is 
responsible for the imaginative functions of the intellect, and therefore potential 
inventiveness. The latter aspect is, clearly, what Eunomius thinks epinoia to be, 
and that alone. Basil argues that although epinoia causes the appearance of 
artistic or poetic imagery, and, for example, although mythological images such 
as centaurs and chimeras do not exist independently (they are Tä ävvrcöQTa ra 
7tav'teAW(; 472), they, nevertheless, exist xa't' Ertivoiav and do not cease to exist 
with the verbal utterance of their names. Furthermore, Basil adds, this aspect of 
the function of epinoia is not at all routine, but exceptional. He accuses 
Eunomius of making great play of the exception, whereas the main aspect of 
epinoia is left aside: 
Having neglected all these important things - whether by 
ignorance or evil intent [one can guess] - he suggested to us 
gave us his philosophising about epinoia only in relation to 
those matters which are of the imagination (itEpi Tr Tc&v 
ävvrräQxTcov ErtvotaS µövT]S i tiv E(PLAoac rjQE"). 
AE, i, 6; 34ff. 
But even in this case, Basil remarks, the functioning of epinoia takes place in a 
different way from Eunomius' understanding - one cannot say that 
'... epinoia means nothing, even a false thing, and therefore 
is always a senseless word (navteA c äarlµov Etvai. Tö 
47, Horn. 3,36; 6ff. 
4n AE, i, 6; 29. 
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ovoµa) that only exists in pronunciation (¬v povl] v 
Fiq)cxvrjvEL'd v vrtöQ'rarnv EXEtv). 
Ibid. 
because the treatment of mythic images is not the main preoccupation of 
epinoia. What in fact Eunomius does is simply to take one insignificant aspect of 
epinoia and misinterpret it. In my opinion, there is no sign in the First Apology 
that Eunomius realises what his statement about the simultaneous 
disappearance of phoneme and epinoia means philosophically, but Basil's main 
argument is not even with that. He points to the fact that the central function of 
epinoia is analytical thinking that can or cannot - depending on the maturity of 
one's intellect - follow the preliminary perception of an object, either abstract or 
concrete. 
However, it is wrong to apply the name 'epinoia' exclusively 
to vain matters or to something that does not exist on its 
own (i. e. not in our imagination - ävvitocr a rwv 
(ýav'raa1& v), because, in the first instance, by epinoia we 
mean a more detailed and precise (Ae7c'ro'r Qov Kai 
aKQLIEcrTEQav) analysis of what comes from perception. 
AE, i, 6; 39f. 
In general, his understanding of epinoia as an analytical option of the 
intellect is well exemplified in AE i, 6: at first sight one might assume an object 
to be simple and homogeneous; but human thought (Al yo(; 
) by epinoia realises 
that it is complex and distinguishes colour, form, material resistance 
270 
(äv' n'rvrciav), size, etc473. Everybody knows what grain is; but in the course of 
analysis we may attach various titles to it: grain can be xapnzöv, UTE Q La, 
2eoO1 v, and further, xaercÖv t¬v CO(; TEAoS viS rcaQ AOoüogc yEcwpyiac, 
% v7t Q . ta 
bE WS aQx1jv tf c µFAAovo-qs, TpoOýv bE cOc xa'räAATIAov dir, 
mQoaOTfly TW -roü 7ceoaRýEeoµEVOV 9c3µaTL, x'rA. 
Each of these predicates is considered by epinoia (xar' 
Ertivolav OECwe£lTal), but at the same time does not 
disappear with verbal utterance (xai 'rQ tpöýw c 
yAc4'x qc ov avvarcuQXe'tal"). Rather, these notions remain in 
the soul of one who was thinking474. 
AE, i; 49-54. 
On a similar basis, in the Scriptures Jesus Christ is called or calls himself by 
numerous names; the reason for this is not because the Son has many names (ov 
rcoAvcivvµöc TLS wv) per se: each name signifies something different. In the 
course of naming the subject ('rö vrroxciµcvov) remains the one (Ev &Ov) and of 
one, simple and non-complex essence (xai µia oüaia Ka Lä rß xai 
äcn v0¬2o(; )475, 
He himself (i. e. the Son) takes these various names in 
accordance with different actions, and in accordance with 
different relations to the objects of his actions476. 
AE, i, 7; 15f. 
473 AE i, 6; 25-29. 
474 ýU% Toü vEvo1ý1ýÖ'[OC, FvlbQuwal wG voi iawa. 
473 cf. I. Hausherr, op. cit., p. 30. 
4' Katä y&Q Týv Te)v evEQy¬L()V b1LZ4oQäv xai wv nQbc Tä wvFQyewoeptva c Xiaty b1d 4OQa 
kaute Kcai'ca övöµawa Ti9ETaL. 
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In the writings of Gregory we shall observe the idea of how names are 
applied xa2' EvepyfLCov b1acoQäv in full. Basil, however, seems to have much 
more to say about human epinoia, as he remarks in AE i, 7; 2. In fact, there is 
another aspect of epinoia which should be briefly mentioned here, as Basil 
himself treated it. In the De jejunio (hom. 1), he says that human epinoia was first 
put in action by original sin; such things as wine-drinking, the slaughter of 
cattle, etc. were invented by humans after the Fall. Originally, when Adam and 
Eve lived in paradise, there their mind (voüc) was free from what was later on 
invented by their progeny by epinoia47. 
IV. 2.4 The nature of language: the communicative function of speech. 
What is the nature of human language and how do words come into 
existence? These questions are answered by Basil in one of his non-controversial 
works. Let us look at his homily 'Take heed to thyself, which is brief, but rich in 
philosophical issues478. I suggest that this sermon reflects an entire theory of 
language usually associated with Gregory of Nyssa; intriguingly, the most 
477 PG 31,168; 14ff: MAä Kai rl iv TtapabEia4) &aywyý vtprfiac Fativ ¬ixwv, of) µövov xa06TL 
To c äyytAoK bµobiattoc cwv 6 ävOQwnoc, bir TrjS 
6AryaQxiac t)v ItQ6; airroüc 6 toiwaty 
xat6QOov, dm' &tL xai Boa iX rnQov rj Fnivoux Tc)v 
dcvOpw7twv FttÜQEV, ovnw Toic tv Tcj 
naQabekxp bIaLT(4LCvoK C7ttv6Tlto oü7tw oivoTooial, 01671w 
rwoOva(ai, oUX ova Töv vovv 
bueoAoi Tdv AvOpwnLvov. 
47 Deut. 15,9; in LXX only the verse opens with'IIQ6a¬XE aeau%Y. Hom 3. 
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important issues are given here in a very laconic form; each definition is 
remarkably short and lucid. 
One of the most outstanding features of the sermon is that Basil puts 
forward a scheme of language, a scheme that is entirely anthropological. He 
proceeds from the assumption that man has a communicative nature; therefore, 
human beings need to reveal their wills and sincere wishes to one another. For 
this reason God provided us with the power of communication: 
God, our creator, has given the use of reason (AoyovTq' v 
xQtirnv bebwic¬v i tiv), in order that we might reveal the 
deliberations of our hearts to one another, and each person 
might impart something to his or her companion by virtue 
of what is common to human nature, as if speaking forth 
the deliberations from some inner chambers, from the 
hidden regions of the heart479. 
To communicate, however, does not necessarily mean to speak. Hom. 3,23; 5-6 is 
of special interest for the inquiry into the priority of the thinking process over 
speech. The power of speech is thought to be a secondary phenomenon caused 
by the carnal nature of humankind: 
If we were living with an open soul (yvµvi Tfl, *uXi ), we 
would have been able to understand each other just by 
thoughts (äitö uov vors µLa rwv)480. But since the soul, 
hidden under the veil of the flesh, produces thoughts (ri 
xpuX 'car, Evvoia; ¬QyaCvraL), it requires verbs and names 
(0%La, rwv bei'rai ical övoµäu v) with a view to making 
public the things stored in its depths. So then whenever our 
thinking takes to itself a semantic vocal sound, as if being 
conveyed by speech as a kind of ferry, crossing through the 
air, it arrives from the speaker to the hearer. 
"n transi. of this passage is taken from D. Robertson, op. cit., p. 126. 
4w my transl. of 23; 5-6; the rest of the passage is taken from 
ibid., 126-127. 
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Hom, 3,23; 5ff. 
The rest of the homily elucidates further Gregory's train of thought in 
full: Basil speaks of arts and crafts invented by human intellect (32; 22-34; 6), he 
likens the anatomical structure of the human body to the phonetic character of 
the human language (36; 8-37ad fin. ) and exclaims: 'KaTt4aOc TýS yMci'rTqS'rjv 
(Ovc tv'; this slogan will be taken up with enthusiasm by later Byzantine 
scholars481. The distinction made by Basil here between thought and spoken 
word is our particular concern. D. Robertson's explanation of the text is as 
follows: 'There is no notion here of inner speech conceived as a silent monologue or 
debate, for the soul is just preoccupied with private thoughts'; also, he makes an 
interesting comparison here with the Stoic idea that 'Providence endows humans 
with a distinctive nature which is equipped for rational inner thought and its expression 
through speech'482. I suggest, however, that what Basil really means here is a 
theological theme of the non-verbal communication of angels, rather than a 
philosophical problem of inner and outer speech. Although, as shown below, he 
still calls angelic communication a language, we now come across the most 
enigmatic aspect of the Cappadocian linguistic theory. Language is determined 
by our carnal nature, its phonetic character is caused by our anatomical 
structure, while thoughts are immaterial, or one might say have a 'TO' Tov 
aiwvos' existence. Nonetheless, whether vot µata, E'vvoLaL, 4)avraaiaL, icrA. 
481 cf. Meletius, De natura hominis, 80; 17. 
482 D. Robertson, op. cit., p. 127. D. Robertson then draws a parallel between Basil and the 
treatment of the matter in the modern philosophy of language - loc. cit., n. 40. 
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are expressed by prjµä-rwv xai övoµ 'tcov or not, i. e. whether inner thinking is 
uttered or not, at least in the case of human beings, a silent monologue or inner 
speech requires a concrete tongue (e. g. Greek, Latin, Coptic etc. ) rather than just 
language as such. 
Basil's remark is not adequately informative, so we cannot go further in 
treating this question safely. The solution might be found in Basil's premise 
about the communicative nature of humankind that causes the appearance of 
language, his view of human nature before the Fall, his comprehension of 
angelic entities, the distinction between the movements of reason and complete 
thoughts, etc. So, it seems reasonable to leave this problem open. Nevertheless, 
for further investigation of the matter one should pay special attention to the 
basic premise of the communicative nature of human beings: speech is a 
necessity for sharing inner thoughts with another. Thus we approach the last 
important aspect of Basil's view of speech: the generation of words. 
§ IV. 2.5 The Divine Logos and the human word: epistemological implications 
We will now turn to one of Basil's polemical passages that is in fact a 
more comprehensive variant of some of his ideas found in AE. Basil 
believes 
that the Johannine prologue is the strongest biblical argument against both the 
syllogistic and the quasi-linguistic argumentation of 
Eunomius; for this reason 
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he dedicated an independent exegetical homily to the scrutiny of John. 1: 1-2. His 
method is striking: he takes each word of the clause 'F-'v äQx1 rev 0 lloyoc' one 
by one, and sequentially excludes all possible human implications or 
associations. 'äQXTI Qo(OiaS' in Prov. 9: 10 or Ps. 111: 10 is different from the 
Johannine ' Ev äQX l' : 
This 'beginning' is different... For it is not bound up with 
anything, nor it is subordinated; moreover, it does not 
appear in relation to anything... 
Hom. 16 (PG 31,476; 4ff) 
This äQxT is an insurmountable point of human intellectual search, it is the 
ultimate and everlasting limit of discourse; our attempts to overcome this limit 
are doomed to failure (Ibid. 476; 9-18). Similarly, 'i v' takes the matter out of 
time or hierarchical sequences of any kind (Ibid. 476; 22 - Basil opposes this 'i'jv' 
to the classical Arian "Hv ito're, O rE ovx fjv'). Finally he arrives at the notion of 
Logos; the passage represents some difficulties, because Basil juggles with 
numerous meanings of the Greek word logos - word, thought, and expressed 
word, language, speech and the Divine Word, etc.: 
Does your mind seek to know, who was in the beginning? 
'The Logos', he says. What kind of logos? The language of 
men (o avOQ nLvoc Al yoc; )? Or rather the speech of angels 
(o rd)v ayyiAcov Al yoc; )? For in fact, the Apostle has 
indicated to us that the angels speak in their own tongue 
(ibiav Exövtwv yA cQav)... But also there are two 
meanings of 'logos' which can be distinguished. For one 
sense of the term means the logos which is expressed by 
means of vocal sounds, the speech which dissipates in the 
air after being uttered; and another sense of the term means 
the speech which is inward, located in our hearts, the 
speech which is involved in thought. And there is another, 
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the expertise that is employed in the arts. Observe the 
senses of the term carefully, that the homonymy of the 
word does not mislead your. For how could a human logos 
be 'in the beginning', if man received his existence much 
later? Animals preceded man, cattle preceded man, and all 
reptiles, all of whom inhabit land and sea, the birds of the 
air, stars, sun, moon, grass, plants, earth, sea, sky. 
Therefore, it was not a human logos that 'was in the 
beginning'; nor it was the logos of angels, because every 
creature is posterior to the ages (xaTcw't Qa TWv aicwvcov 
EQrri) and received its coming-to-be ('n v'V TOD civai. 
Aaßoüoa) from the Creator. But even our inner logos (ö bE 
Ev xaQbia Aoyoc) of thing is still posterior to the thing 
itself. 
Hom. 16 (476; 4-477; 19) 
Having excluded all the possible wrong implications and associations of 
the term logos, Basil puts forward his own interpretation of the Johannine 
prologue; he insists on only one possible understanding of the Logos which is 
only appropriate to the divine (OEonQe twc): it is an absolutely non-linguistic 
understanding of the logos: 
On what account does John use the term logos? In order that 
it might be made plain, that he issues from the mind. Why 
logos? Because he was generated without passion. Why 
logos? Because he is the image of the one who generated 
him, making known the one who generated as a whole in 
himself, being no partition from him, although he exists in 
his own perfection'- 
Ibid. 
403 transl. of D. Robertson, op. cit., p. 132. 
40 transl. of D. Robertson, loc. cit. 
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The Son is titled the Logos regardless of our human logos; the reason why it was 
so called is to demonstrate the unique mode of the everlasting generation of the 
Son by the Father: 
He uses the term 'Logos', in order that he might set the 
passionless generation of the Father before you, and speak 
theologically to you of the perfect reality of the Son, and 
through these things indicate to you the timeless union of 
the Son with the Father. 
The final formula of the human word appears in Basil as follows: man's word is 
perfect in every respect and in every language; he even goes on to compare this 
perfection with the Logos486. We have already seen above his association of 
word with ferry in Hom. 3,23; 5ff.; now he argues that whatever man thinks, his 
verbal expression reflects the matter adequately: 
So also our logos represents our thought as a whole. That 
which we conceive in the heart, we express in speech, and 
that which is spoken is the image of the thought in the 
heart. For from the outflow of the heart, logos is brought 
forth, and our heart is like a source, while speech when 
spoken forth is like a stream, which flows from this source. 
So great is the outflow, so much also is that which is 
referred back to the origin; and of what is hidden, so great 
also is that which appears in the open... In fact our speech 
is the offspring of the mind, begotten without passion, for it 
is not severed, nor is it divided, nor is it effluent ['effluent' is 
sewage! I am sure that is not what you mean]; rather, the mind 
as a whole remains in its own nature, emitting speech 
which is whole and complete. And the logos which issues 
outwards contains in itself the meaning in its entirety of the 
mind which generates it's''. 
40 trans!. of D. Robertson. 
* Hom. 16 (PG 31,477; 32f) 
40 trans!. of D. Robertson. 
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Hom. 16 (PG 31,477; 34ff) 
This comprehension of words has nothing to do with Plato and Aristotle. 
Perhaps Basil's epistemology of his view of essence is a good example of that. 
His well-known example that the names of Peter, Paul or anybody else are 
different, while ovaia be rräv'rcwv tia488has been discussed by scholars often 
enough, so I deliberately omit it here489. The reason for this is twofold: first, it is 
clearly the most unsuccessful exposition of the term oüaia, only suited for the 
popular mind in order to demonstrate that one essence does not necessarily 
presuppose one person and therefore name. Second, it is to some extent 
contradictory of what Basil really thinks the essence of things, human nature 
and rationality to be. 
We have already encountered his view of the cognition of things by 
means of perception and by means of rational analysis. AE i, 12-13 in spite of it 
obvious extreme polemical preoccupation, seems to be a good example of 
Basil's own view on cognition; the passage opens as follows: 
'On the whole, what pride and what vanity to assume that 
the very essence of God of all has been revealed! ' 
In fact he intentionally leaves aside Eunomius' non-epinoic concept of 
unbegotten (logical truth), and focuses on the statement about cognition of the 
96 V. AEii, 4. 
QFJ To all appearances, Basil borrowed this example from the classical treatment of proper names 
in Stoic grammatical studies: for a compact outline of the arguments v. B. Sesboüe in SC, 299, 
pp. 76-83; the question received a very thorough analysis in D. Robertson, op. cit., pp. 
34-57. 
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Deity as such (the factual criterion). Thus, he asks Eunomius how he has reached 
such knowledge: if he did so by means of a common sense notion, i. e. natural 
revelation (6x Tr xoivf c ývvoiac), Basil remarks that in this case we are told 
that He exists rather than what He is490. If Eunomius maintains that he obtained 
this knowledge from divine revelation (tx (; bibaaxaAias 'roü rIvEiuµaTOS), 
Basil's question is which of the prophets or apostles revealed this knowledge to 
him, and where is it in the Bible? 
Once again, Basil leaves aside the philosophical question about the value 
of logical truth; he now attacks Eunomius' conclusion. His argument is 
ingenious: he suggests focusing on much less complicated subjects than the 
divine essence: 
I would gladly ask them about the earth which they stand 
upon and which they are made of: what would they say 
about it? What would tell us its essence (oiaia) to be?... 
Therefore, what is the essence of the earth, and what is the 
way for cognition of it (rcoio(; TQörzoc 'rS Matt EWS; )? 
If it is ridiculous to assume that one can comprehend the essence of the earth by 
means of perception, Basil suggests examining the very method of Eunomius, 
i. e. cognition by means of name: 
Thus, no option is left but to assume that the essence is 
revealed by word (Tw A6y4) (ýöUK¬ Lv aütoic TT )v ovviav 
a&rric tverxevaL491); so, by which sort of word? Where it is 
490 AE, i, 12; 9: AM' avTq Ta FtvaL Tav ®Föv, Of) Td ci rtvaL fiµiv 6710ßäM L 
491 In AE, i, 12-13 the use of 6 A6yoc is easily confused. The French translation gives 'la Parole, 
which in fact does not fit the context: Eunomius could only mean the cognition in word that 
Basil is arguing against here - cf. SC 299, p. 217; the reservation made on ibid., p. 214, n. 1 in 
respect to AE, i, 12; 44-48 is not convincing. 
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in the Scriptures, or who amongst the saints has passed it to 
us? 
Philosophically, Basil provokes his opponent into discussing much more 
sophisticated matters than amateurish lemmatic puzzles: since Eunomius spoke 
of essence, Basil confronts him with the most complex problem of philosophy in 
corpore: what is the essence of e. g. the earth? In my opinion, this is a special 
section of the AE; what is even more intriguing is the way Basil solves the 
problem himself. Our perception provides us with knowledge of qualities or 
attributes, because what we perceive in the earth by means of our five senses is: 
colour, or volume, lightness or heaviness, etc. But none of these qualities in any 
way represent the essence of it, which is plain even to simple people. Taking 
into account his distinction between the two ways of cognition, his 
philosophical concern is easily restored: the notion (logos) tells us nothing about 
the essence; the number of qualities492 can be easily multiplied ad infinitum, and 
therefore fail to bring us to the cognition of the thing, or its essence. It should be 
mentioned that this is a kind of 'external' argument that demonstrates that 'we 
do not know the nature of the earth that we trample on'493; similarly, we do not 
know what is inside us - i. e. 'internal' argument - v. AE, iii, 6; 5-24 about the 
nature of the thinking process and eyesight. In both cases, Basil ties this 'true 
knowledge' to divine revelation. In the case of, for example, eyesight, he 
expects to comprehend its nature in the afterlife. As for the nature of the earth, 
cf. SC, p. 216 n. 1. 
AE, i, 13; 22f. 
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he does something exactly the same: we are not told about the essence of the 
earth: 
He (Moses) who narrated told us of the creation only 
taught us that 'In the beginning God made the heaven and 
the earth. But the earth was unsightly and unsettled, and 
darkness was over the deep, and the Spirit of God moved 
over the water' (Gen 1: 1-2). He assumed it was sufficient to 
say Who has created and settled the earth; as for [the 
question] of what was its essence, he did not take pains to 
narrate, for the matter is vain and idle for the audience. 
Therefore, the essence of the earth is strictly speaking incognisable. It would be 
an error, however, to suppose that his position is close to philosophical 
agnosticism; Basil is far from that. I think that the last remark of the above 
quotation points to soteriology as well as to the question of the extent to which 
we can know things in this 1ife494 . 
§ IV. 2.6 Appearance of new agenda 
In the writings of Irenaeus we have already come across the idea that 
man's language reflects the carnal nature of human beings, and its limitations 
for expressing our thought (AH 2.28.4). Intriguingly, Basil's view of language 
494The question about what one, nevertheless, knows about a thing 
brings us back to Basil's 
preamble about the communicative nature of humankind. 
Due to the lack of information, any 
attempt here to reconstruct his view is hardly plausible. 
An attempt, however, has already been 
made by A. Losev, who adopts a very similar view 
in his A. 0. Voces, cDuuocog5ux umenu 
(Moscow 1927), and Canoe canto and Beu4b u ww+ (the dates of composition are unknown, 
first 
published in 1993, Moscow in 'bamue, H mA, 
KocMoc'. 
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takes exactly the same line. In his writings this idea becomes a focal point, and 
receives a thorough treatment. In fact, his preoccupation with linguistic issues is 
a fundamental one. It is plain that Basil's view of language has no relationship 
with the standard language theories of the time: compared to Plato or Aristotle 
the problem is posed in a totally different way. Name is not connected to 
essence ontologically, for many reasons; first of all it is said to be posterior to 
thought. Nor is it established by convention - Basil's metaphorical example of 
the ferry demonstrates that well enough. So, both theories are unacceptable for 
Basil. 
In his detailed analysis of Stoic influences upon Basil's thought, D. 
Robertson arrived at a similar conclusion: the supposition that Basil is working 
with standard ideas about the relationship of speech to thought represented in 
the philosophical traditions known to him are incorrect495. It seems, however, 
that the problem D. Robertson is pointing to is more significant than he 
assumes. The results of his analysis are impressive; in fact in the final part of his 
dissertation he concludes that 'Basil's view of language and thought borrows 
nothing from the Peripatetic tradition, and any Stoic echoes are rather faint'496. 
Nevertheless, I think that Basil's comprehension of the nature of language 
including a number of questions that appear immediately (such as, for instance, 
human rationality) can scarcely be explained as 'Stoicising Christianity' even 'in 
D. Robertson, op. cit., p. 133. 
D. Robertson, op. cit., p. 138. 
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a very weak sense' (D. Robertson4g'). As can be observed from our analysis of 
Origen, Basil's point of view differs dramatically not only from Origen498, but 
from the Alexandrian tradition that adopted the agenda of the Cratylus. Our 
initial presumption about classical Greek and Patristic interests in linguistics are 
still correct in respect of Basil; at the same time, one should note that Basil 
seems to be the first thinker who with his 'xatäµa6¬ 'rr S yAc32ýS ýv I)üvLv' 
reformulated the question in a remarkable way. His acquaintance with Stoic 
philosophical and grammatical studies is beyond doubt, but none of the 
theories appear to determine Basil's own thought. It should also be taken into 
account that his view cannot be classified as a 'biblical view of language'. In fact 
it is Gregory who adopts Basil's theory for the exegesis of Biblical texts. As for 
Basil, he says in AE, i. 13 that there is no doctrine of language in the Scriptures. This 
statement, taken in the context of various attempts to deduce a 'correct' theory 
of language from the book of Genesis seems to be remarkable; his theory is not 
even based on a philosophical exegesis of, for example, Gen. 2: 19-20, such as 
Clement and Origen made after Philo. Rather, his theory is based on something 
substantially new: a theological view of human nature in relation to the divine 
oikonomia of salvation. Furthermore, in the writings of Basil this agency is 
clearly the most influential one: it appears in all philosophical (e. g. the problem 
of rationality, the relationship between thought and uttered word) and purely 
scientific (e. g. the nature of thinking process and eyesight) questions. 
As we 
497 D. Robertson, op. cit., p. 130. 
498 as D. Robertson suggested - op. cit., p. 130. 
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shall see in the next section, Gregory of Nyssa has demonstrated how this 
theory solves secondary questions, such as the problem of primordial tongue, 
variety of languages, exegesis of Gen. 2: 19-20, etc. 
To what extent was it the Eunomean controversy that encouraged both 
Basil and Gregory to go this way? This question should, I think, be examined 
separately, because it requires more precise historical analysis. At first sight, 
however, it seems that the dispute with Eunomius had relatively small 
significance, at least for Basil. There is evidence to affirm that Basil's interests in 
such fascinating questions as the human thinking process, the nature of time, 
and eyesight, are wider and went far beyond the controversy. 
IV. 3 Eunomius' response to Basil: the Apologia Apologiae. 
Eunomius' reply to Basil's criticism of his theory of names reflects an 
original analysis of linguistic issues in comparison with what we have seen of 
his first treatise, where the matter was merely mentioned. Nonetheless, even 
though the three books of the Apologia Apologiae (AA) were conceived to clarify 
his philosophical apparatus, it is evident that in the course of composing the 
AA, Eunomius found no difficulty in modifying and reformulating his initial 
doctrinal position. Thus, for instance, in his earlier writings he developed a 
ONOW dM3IJ 
view that it is the unbegotten Father, who has created all things (and, therefore, 
names), whereas in the final form of his teaching, when the discourse took a 
more moderate turn, Eunomius reformulated his position as follows: the divine 
creative activity is associated with the Son. 
'We affirm that the Son is not only existent, and above all 
existent things (ov µövov ov-ra xai üree rcäv ra 'rä ov-ra), 
but we also call Him Lord and God, the Maker of every 
being, sensible and intelligible'. 
CE iii, 9; 47-48 (J ii, p. 281)49 
If now the Son is said to bring all things into existence, the divine providence 
(rcQövota) is therefore 'entrusted' (ýrrLTETparrTaL) by the Unbegotten Father to 
the only-begotten: 
,... in the creation of existent things He (the Son) has been 
entrusted by the Father with the construction of all things 
visible and invisible, and with the providential care over all 
that comes into being, inasmuch as the power allotted to 
Him from above is sufficient for the production of those 
things which have been constructed' 
Ibid. 
Nevertheless, these changes, a prima facie considerable, did not dramatically 
affect his linguistic theory. In other words, it is unimportant for Eunomius and 
his theory who should be assumed as the creator of all things (and therefore of 
their names), i. e. the Father or the Son; his view of the nature of language 
remains the same. 
4' NPNF, ser. ii, vol. v., English transl. of CE - William Moore & Henry Austin Wilson. The text 
of Contra Eunomium, ed. W. Jaeger, Gregorii Nysseni opera (Leiden, 1960). 
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One should bear in mind, however, that in spite of a seeming elaboration 
of the linguistic issues, the main preoccupation of Eunomius' AA was still to 
insist on two main statements, viz. that a difference in names designates a 
difference in essence, and that the name 'unbegotten' is a unique and absolute 
divine name. Theologically, Eunomius' theory of names, in spite of its novelty, 
was not a unique argument for the Christological problem: the Arian theology 
of the Son was evolved and defended regardless of the philosophical treatment 
of language before and after the appearance of the Apologies; furthermore, his 
polemical ideas did not overstep the limits of his church party. On the contrary, 
as shown in the third chapter, the I)natc-theory of names (e. g. Clement or 
Origen - especially in the light of his the latter's decisive refutation of the 
Aristotelian and Epicurean O oic-hypothesis) did not necessarily presuppose 
an Arianist conclusion about the nature of the Logos. In other words, general 
theological argumentation for or against the divine status of the Son was held 
regardless of linguistic theories. 
As our concern is now with Eunomius' theory of names, which emerged 
in more or less comprehensive form in the books of his AA, let us examine his 
claim that the adoption of the cýüvq-theory inevitably presupposes a 
generate/created nature of the Son. As has already been pointed out, Eunomius' 
view on language at first sight reminds us of a number of Platonist elements, i. e. 
on the basis of some expressions and terms it can even be classified as a 406vK- 
hypothesis. At the same time, it would be an error to suppose that in the case of 
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Eunomius one is merely dealing with philosophical speculations inspired by 
the Cratylus, or based on a philosophical school such as the Stoa that was closed 
to the standard Platonist linguistic position. In this section I shall attempt to 
demonstrate that in spite of the seeming closeness of some expressions, 
including a direct accusation of Gregory, there are no secure and definite 
parallels between the standard linguistic theories of the time and Eunomius' 
treatment of language. So then, what was his theory of language all about? 
§ IV. 3.1 Eunomius' theory of names and the origin of language 
The theory of Plato was to some extent based on a number of 
anthropomorphist suppositions (the gods' language, an original superhuman 
name-giver, the distinction between correct and incorrect names, etc. ); in 
Eunomius' theory, we come across something that seems to be the same. God or 
the Son create things together with their names, Adam in his original perfection 
has guessed at and discovered these original correct (non-epinoic) names as 
distinct from epinoic and, therefore, misleading words 'that disappear with 
pronunciation'. These apparent similarities made Gregory of Nyssa (and the 
majority of modern scholars) suppose that the real source of Eunomius' theory 
is Plato's Cratylus (? ) the Seven letter (? ). But does Eunomius really employ the 
ideas of Plato? Gregory himself was not fully confident about that; at least, his 
arguments are hardly persuasive. The following classical passage from his 
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Contra Eunomium, often taken as a proof that Eunomius merely adopted Plato's 
view, can appear in a different light: 
Having perchance fallen in with Plato's Cratylus, or hearing 
from some one who had met with it, by reason, I suppose, 
of his own poverty of ideas, he attached that nonsense 
patchwise to his own, acting like those who get their bread 
by begging. 
CE ii, 404; 13ff (j i, 344). 
As a matter of fact, this guess is based on only one terminological similarity 
between Tai( (ývQEQi, Kath oiaiv and Cratylus' 4 uic-theory of names. 
Moreover, Gregory is really eager to represent Eunomius as one who turns 
secular philosophy (e. g. Plato's theory) into 'a doctrine of the Church'-100; this 
similarity still seems to be unconvincing. 
So, to what extent is Gregory's accusation of Platonism relevant? Of 
course, for Gregory, as well as for us today, Eunomius' position emerges as 
ridiculous anthropomorphism: 
Now his (i. e. Eunomius') whole treatise is an ambitious 
attempt to show that God speaks after the manner of men... 
'CE ii, 343,1ff (J i, p. 326) 
But to give him his due, Eunomius often insisted on the exclusion of 
anthropomorphic ideas from the doctrine of the Supreme Deity such as the 
900 cf. CE iii 8; 17f (J ii, p. 217) where Gregory points to a verbal quotation made by Eunomius 
from Philo, Legum allegoriarum, iii, 175; in CE iii 33; 8-34; 10 (J ii, p. 227) he accuses Eunomius of 
misuse of the Phaedrus, 245c. In neither case, however, is there any sign of anything significant: 
although Gregory presumes that his opponent is influenced by later Judaic tradition (CE iii, 
8; 26f J ii, p. 217), it seems that he merely develops an old idea of Basil's; Eunomius' 
6 Oeöc 
atei tS lbiac bvvä w is just one of many unclear and primitive theological expressions - 
CE iii, 7,9; 6f J it p. 218). 
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generation of the Son, which even in his First Apology was said to be foreign to 
anything human501. Moreover, his central arguments for the absolute and sole 
divinity of the Father were based on the fact that the Son is 'only-begotten'. 
Overall, Gregory's accusations of anthropomorphism are based on a 
philosophical analysis of Eunomius' theory, while Eunomius himself either did 
not see or did not believe that his expressions led inevitably to an 
anthropomorphist position. But strictly speaking, Eunomius' original/general 
theological premises are far from anthropomorphism in the classical sense of 
the term-902; such a characteristic element of classical anthropomorphist doctrine 
as biblical theology is one the weakest aspects of Eunomius' theory. However, 
what allowed Gregory to make these accusations? 
Eunomius' hypothesis of language allowed him to assume a very special, 
mysterious status of words; therefore, when he portrayed God as using names 
before the existence of man, there was nothing anthropomorphic about this - at 
least in his view - because words are said to be of supernatural and therefore inhuman 
origin. Although Gregory repeatedly emphasises that if the Creator of all things 
has provided them with suitable names, this position inevitably leads to an 
anthropomorphist doctrine, Eunomius' theory evolves in a diametrically 
opposite way: the ontological appearance of non-epinoic words takes priority 
over the creation of man; therefore, it is not Eunomius' anthropomorphic God 
301 v., for example, his 'theology' of the names 'Father' and 'Son' given 
in Liber Apol., 16-17 (R. 
Vaggione, Eunomius' apologies, pp. 52-57) 
502 cf. G. van der Leew, Anthropomorphismus RACh 1446-450, 
C. von Schönborn, L'icöne du Crist 
(Fribourg 1976). 
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who speaks after the manner of man, but divine Providence, which in the 
course of creation first brings into existence all things together with their names: 
'Before the creation of man God named germ, and herb, 
and grass, and seed, and tree, and the like, when by the 
word of His power He brought them severally into being'. 
CE ii, 197: 20ff (J i, p. 282) 
Therefore, Eunomius believes (and this is one of his unfounded arguments) that 
'A law of our nature, ' he replies, 'teaches us that, in naming 
realities, the dignity of the names depends on the objects 
themselves and not on the will of those who employ them 
(oüx ev 'tcOv övoµaCöv'tciv Cýovaia xeiaOat Trjv u&v 
övoµä'rwv ä iav)'so3, 
CE, ii, 545 (J i, p. 385) 
If so, in Eunomius' opinion the phonemes of non-epinoic words have been 
designed or determined and consequently attached to the created objects by the 
Son. Next, he argues that one (i. e. Basil) who disagrees with this position denies 
divine Providence and falls into atheism. Piety forces us to consider a 4)üQLg- 
connexion between the original (non-epinoic) phoneme and an object: 
'a holy thing, and most closely connected with the designs 
of Providence, that their sounds should be imposed upon 
realities from a source above us'5'04 
' transl. is slightly modified. 
'°' CE ii, 546; 5f (J i, p. 386): bvnöv (PTIaty elvaL xal t4 , rqS Ttpovoiac v6 R4) 7rQoc4veanaTov 
avwe¬v bimeia6aL Toi, nQdkyµac n r6(; cxwv&S. ibid.: '... as Eunomius says ... it is certainly an 
unholy thing, and an unfitting thing, that these names should 
have been fitted to the things that 
are by any here below'. 
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Eunomius' explanation of how this theory works is no less than a culmination 
of his linguistic hypothesis, and at once allows us to define the extent of his 
learning. He says that all names lie in human nature like 'seeds': 
'But the universal Guardian, ' he says, 'thought it right to 
engraft these names in our minds by a law of His 
creation'-105. 
Ibid. 
For the sake of space, it does not seem reasonable to summarise here Gregory's 
refutation of this view; one of his central arguments is that Eunomius' theory 
simply does not work when examined in a standard philosophical way (the 
variety of tongues, invention of new words, change of names in the Bible et 
alia). 
It is indicative that Eunomius' speculations are still limited by a confined 
list of divine epithets (unbegotten, etc. ); in his AA Eunomius' hypothesis is 
formulated as (ýüo tc-theory, but the lack of real examples on the one hand, and 
purely 'theological' argumentation on the other, does not allow us to identify his 
doctrine as philosophy; so, what is his theory of names all about? 
We now come across one of the most audacious suggestions of the 
dissertation. In what follows I shall argue that the real background to 
Eunomius' speculations about the nature of language and names has many 
features in common with what has already been observed in Gnostic writings, 
viz. a mythic, non-philosophical and (if one can say so) mystical perception of 
sm CE ii, 548; 18f (I i, p. 386): MA' b'thvtwv icribERcbv, 4wviy b11µuouQYLas mµ4) Tai(1 tettpaK 
iyKataCMCiQaL PuXais ibuwk 7E. 
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language. Taking into account the complexity and novelty of this suggestion, it 
seems plausible to scrutinise more thoroughly some aspects of Eunomius' 
theological system as it appears in Gregory's quotations. Let us now analyse 
Eunomius' preoccupation with biblical texts in order to inquire to what extent 
his interpretations follow exegetical tradition. 
§ IV. 3.2 Eunomius' interpretation of biblical texts 
In contrast to the First Apology, the three books of the AA contain much 
more biblical quotation, but the lack of erudition on the one hand and ignorance 
of the traditional exegesis on the other is striking. As we can guess from the 
numerous passages of the CE506, Eunomius' suggestion was that in Gen. 1: 19-20 
Adam gave names to the creatures in conformity with what was already in his 
mind in the form of 'seeds'. Y. Edelshtein rightly pointed out that: 
'For Eunomius, Adam as name-giver stands out against the 
background of entire human history; the depths of divine wisdom 
revealed to him are unapproachable for ordinary human beings. 
Therefore, the appearance of names is a phenomenon of hoary 
antiquity, because it is caused by the perfect condition of Adam, 
who lived in paradise, rather than the conditions of human nature 
determined by the Fall'S07. 
e. g. CE it 547-549 (1 i, p. 386ff). 
N 10.3AeAbWTelkK 17po6Av. ut A. ibixa, p. 192. 
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Nevertheless, Y. Edelshtein makes an error when he tries to represent 
Eunomius' theory of names as in some measure held in common with 
Arianism508. 
Being extremely enthusiastic about rhetorical figures, Eunomius commits 
elementary errors of biblical theology, which make us assume that his 
knowledge of the Scriptures was less than satisfactory; the following accusation 
of Gregory is pertinent: 
'Now if', says he, 'one of the Apostles or Prophets could be 
shown to have used these names of Christ, the falsehood 
would have something for its encouragement'. To what 
industrious study of the word of God on the part of our 
opponent do not these words bear testimony! 'None of the 
Prophets or Apostles has spoken of our Lord as Bread, or a 
Stone, or a Fountain, or an Axe, or Light, or a Shepherd'! 
CE ii, 347 (J i, p. 327) 
It is obvious that at the stage of composing AA, Eunomius was merely 
ignorant of the titles applied to Christ in the corpus of the New Testament. In 
relation to his philosophical preoccupation the situation is somewhat similar. 
" ibid. In particular, Y. Edelstein's main mistake is that he does not see a substantial difference 
between Eunomius' theory of names and purely Platonic approach to the problem given by 
Eusebius and some other writers who followed Alexandrian tradition (Clement and Origen). As 
a matter of fact, in adopting of (06c c-theory there was nothing specifically Arianist. 
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§ IV. 3.3 Eunomius' linguistic views and classical philosophical theories. 
To begin with, the most dramatic aspect of Eunomius' discourse is that in 
spite of a smooth rhetorical style, Eunomius sounds very unclear for a 
philosophically prepared disputant or reader; furthermore, he was a theologian 
difficult to understand in the negative sense of the word. Thus, he often speaks 
of irrelevant matters, so that, for instance, Gregory often inquires what this or 
that speculation is about: 
'What this newly-imported dictum of his has to do with his 
preceding argument, neither we nor any one else amongst 
reflecting people are able to understand'-109. 
Eunomius' acquaintance with the philosophical agenda amounted to nothing 
more than a knowledge of names and some terms. In the exposition of his 
theory of names Eunomius never explains himself by means of standard 
philosophical terms. Analysing his expressions, one can discover that the only 
term employed by Eunomius to designate the relationship between name and 
object is raig (püo Ecn51o or rtQoQTvCjS51'. He enjoys employing various 
philosophical and scientific terms like three-dimensional space, classical 
categories, and traditional logical notions, et alia, but apart from the 
Im These remarks are extremely frequent in both Basil and Gregory's writings; cf. 'I would not, 
however, have mentioned this at all, if it had not placed a necessity upon me of proving our 
author's weakness both in thought and expression. As for all the passages from the inspired 
writings which he drags in, though quite unconnected with his object, formulating thereby a 
difference of immortality in angels and in men, I do not know what he has in his eye, or what he 
hopes to prove by them, and I pass them by' - CE ii, 590 (j i, p. 398). 
310 CE ii, 408; 4 (J i, p. 345). 
511CEii409; 23Qi, p. 345). 
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undisputable claim that all these should be excluded from the concept of Deity, 
his point is difficult to grasp. In his CE Gregory comes across the same problem 
as Basil: he quotes his opponent and recounts Eunomius' view of the nature of 
names, but he cannot really identify what kind of philosophical background is 
behind the speculations of his opponent. One of the clearest axioms of the AA is 
that name is related to object naturally; or in his own words, TO' rceocrd uS 
ovoµa512. 
Interestingly, in reply to Basil's attack Eunomius appears to repeat an 
accusation of Origen made against Celsus, that his opponent follows Aristotle 
and Epicurus513. But it does not really mean that he himself knowingly defends 
Plato's theory, as Origen seemed to do. Mutual accusations of the use of 
Aristotle514 appear only in relation to the doctrine of Providence i. e. regardless of 
his linguistic theory! 
His knowledge of Epicurus515 could only provoke the derision of 
Gregory - co rcc&S EvöT1aE'röv 
'ETLLKOUQOV516. I think that it is impossible to trace 
any secure connection between Eunomius' theory of names and the various 
secular philosophical schools of the time. First of all, his theory of names that 
512 CE ii 407; 3 (J i, p. 345). 
513 R. Vaggione, Eunomius' apologies, p. 108. 
514 R. Vaggione, loc. cit.; CE ii 411; 4ff (j i, p. 346). 
sus R. Vaggione, loc. cit.; presumably, what Eunomius could only mean is Epicurean idea of 
human power to develop primordial dialects of original language - cf. Epist. to Herodotus § 43- 
44. 
516 CE ii, 410; 29 (J i, p. 345). Eunomius point is dear: he believed that Basil's idea that human 
soul has power to embody thoughts into words is derived from Epicurean theory. 
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appears in AA ii517 is grounded on quasi-theological considerations: words 
existed before the creation of human beings because, first, the Scriptures 
portray God as speaking; second, because this linguistic position and this 
position only, in his opinion, does not contradict divine Providence518. 
Next, his general knowledge of philosophical science is surprisingly 
poor; although he often employs the word 'essence', the impression is that he 
does not understand its meaning: how can an essence be perfectly cognised by 
rational discourse? Gregory spent numerous pages in defining the matter for 
his opponent, and in demonstrating that Eunomius' expressions about the term 
'essence' do not stand up to elementary analytical thinking. Eunomius appears 
to be unable to operate with material (e. g. body), immaterial (e. g. soul) and 
abstract (e. g. fear) entities; for this reason Gregory reproaches his 
epistemological optimism with basic philosophical inquiries. Hence, he repeats 
the ideas already spelled out by Basil, and presents them in a more 
comprehensive form. First, Eunomius in spite of his logical studies does not 
always clearly distinguish nature (4natc) from differentia specifica (ywoQL'aµa)5'9; 
second, his epistemology does not work in the sphere of material, immaterial, 
and abstract entities. Gregory poses a question about the nature of emotions: 
whether, for example, fear or passion has substance, or is unsubstantial, and 
517 R. Vaggione, Eunomius' apologies, pp. 10&115. 
318 R. Vaggione, ibid., p. 106. 
119 cf. CE ii, 104-105 (J i, p. 257): the term 'unbegotten' cannot per se designate essence, because it 
is an attribute. 
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what the mode of their existence is in the human soul520? For Gregory it is 
evident that his opponent is ignorant of analytical thinking; moreover, he even 
takes pains to teach Eunomius elementary dialectic: 
For if any one has made a mental analysis of that which is 
seen in its component parts, and, having stripped the object 
of its qualities, has attempted to consider it by itself, I fail to 
see what will have been left for investigation. For when you 
take from a body its colour, its shape, its degree of 
resistance, its weight, its quantity, its position, its forces, 
active or passive, its relation to other objects, what remains, 
that can still be called a body, we can neither see of 
ourselves, nor are we taught by Scripture. But how can he 
who is ignorant of himself take knowledge of anything that 
is above himself? And if a man is familiarized with such 
ignorance of himself, is he not plainly taught by the very 
fact not to be astonished at any of the mysteries that are 
without? 
CE ii, 115ff (J i, p. 259f) 
Eunomius' speculations appear very bizarre whenever he comes across 
philosophical matters; at the same time, there is a strong impression that he 
simply did not understand Basil's philosophical argumentation (an example 
with the word 'grain', definition of 'epinoia', etc. ). Moreover, the problem of time 
and aeon is very illustrative. Eunomius' original view of time as caused by the 
'motion of the stars' was rebutted by Basil on the basis of Gen. 1: 14-15: stars 
came into existence after the creation of grass, herbs, and trees; how then stars 
52° CE ii, 112ff (J i, p. 259): 'For if these have an independent subsistence, then, as I have said, 
there is comprehended in ourselves not one soul, but a collection of souls, each of them 
occupying its distinct position as a particular and individual soul. But if we must suppose 
these 
to be a kind of emotion without subsistence, how can that which 
has no essential existence 
exercise lordship over us, having reduced us as it were to slave under whichsoever of 
these 
things may have happened to prevail? And if the soul is something that thought only can grasp, 
how can that which is manifold and composite 
be contemplated as such, when such an object 
ought to be contemplated by itself, independently of these 
bodily qualities? ' 
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can cause time? The impression is that Eunomius did not have anything to say 
in reply, and tries his strength in the sphere of the much more complex problem 
of aeon. His expressions about the theological problem of 'aeons' demonstrate 
that he simply does not comprehend Basil's distinction between ordinary time, 
the intermediate aeon, and the absolute timelessness of God, and accuses Basil 
in somewhat incredible makes no sense whatever521: 
Moreover, he says that we divide the ages ('roü(; aic-vac) 
into two parts, as if he had not read the words he quoted, or 
as if he were addressing those who had forgotten his own 
previous statements. 
Ibid. 
His own treatment of aeon is polemical rather than philosophical. First, 
there is no connexion with standard concepts (e. g. with Plato or Aristotle522); 
secondly, as Gregory points out, Eunomius is clearly unaware of the biblical use 
of the word523. Instead of a definition, Eunomius bring forth a lemma in favour 
of the name agennetos: 
For if (says he) you say that they (i. e. aeons) are eternal, you 
will be Greeks, and Valentinians, and uninstructed: and if 
you say that they are generate, you will no longer be able to 
ascribe ungeneracy to God. 
CE ii, 464; 7ff (J i, p. 362) 
The list of examples of Eunomius' treatment of philosophical notions 
that reveal his amateurish knowledge of the matter can be multiplied. In 
s2i V. CE ii, 455; 19ff (j i, p. 359): rcaQä Twv a'u: )vwv nnQOF, evei BaCIAewc uatä nävwwv ccov 
YevvrlTCjv Typ e tä 7tQFaßeia. 
m cf. e. g. Timaeus 37d, 38a, De cealo I, 279a, 25-27; Met. A, 1072b, 29ff. 
3CEii, 460-463(j i, p. 361). 
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relation to linguistic matters, the most evident and cogent argument is that of 
Gregory of Nyssa, who opens his criticism with an outline of the classical 
puzzles spelled out in the Cratylus. The reason why Gregory could apply such a 
simple remark as variety of tongues means that Eunomius' idea of the natural 
ontological connexion between name and essence was very far from standard 
Platonic theory; furthermore, it makes us think that Eunomius could hardly 
read Plato's dialogue. At any rate, his possession of information about the 
agenda of the Cratylus is as poor as his knowledge of the Epicurean theory. 
Otherwise, how could such an elementary argument as the following have been 
made against him? 
For we call it o6QavöS, the Hebrew calls it samaeim, the 
Roman coelum, other names are given to it by the Syrian, 
the Mede, the Cappadocian, the African, the Scythian, the 
Thracian the Egyptian: nor would it be easy to enumerate 
the multiplicity of names which are applied to Heaven and 
other objects by the different nations that employ them. 
Which of these, then, tell me, is the appropriate word 
wherein the great wisdom of God is manifested? 
CE ii 406; 27ff (j i, p. 344) 
Gregory could call Eunomius' theory of names 'solemn and profound 
philosophy' only ironically: his doctrine of names was in no way a 'philosophy', 
and this is why his theory represents a substantial difficulty for modern 
scholars. Intriguingly, Eunomius' view of names and language emerges in the 
AA not in a scientific form: his narration is far from an elementary critical 
analysis and in this sense has nothing to do with the standard agenda. Rather, 
%M00 
he gives an account of his theory in the form of short speculative statements 
and claims that it is something commonly shared amongst Christians. It would 
be an error, however, to consider his teaching as something crucially important 
for his theology. One should bear in mind that the theory of names is given in 
response to Basil's attack on the name 'unbegotten'. The real purpose of the AA 
was therefore an attempt to argue for the uniqueness of names in general, and 
thereby for the uniqueness of the term agennetos in particular. Perhaps, 
Eunomius realised the lack of prospects for this theory, and avoids the 
discussion in his last Ekthesis. 
§ IV. 3.4 A theory of names or a pre-philosophical mythology of language? 
To sum up these numerous and incoherent utterances about names, let 
us now outline what we do know about Eunomius' view. Leaving aside 
meaningless definitions of divine names and qualities like 
'Being incorruptible without beginning, He is ungenerate 
without end, being so called absolutely, and independently 
of aught beside Himself 
CE ii, 537; 10f (j i, p. 383) 
I would like to draw attention to the most crucial idea of his theory. First of all 
the names are considered to be imprinted in the human mind in the form of 
mysterious 'seeds'. The names, therefore, pre-existed the creation of Adam, 
who is thought to be a passive reproducer of the determined sounds. Next, as 
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shown above, Eunomius separated all the words of human language into two 
groups. In the AA he proceeds from the premise that all the non-epinoic words 
of human language are given by God in the act of creation ex nihilo: 
But by these, says he, as by laws publicly promulgated, it is 
shown that God made names (nouns) exactly suited to the 
nature of the things which they represent (2ö Töv 0EÖv 'rac 
ýMQCQL mQE7Iovcrac xa1 xa ray A Aovq rco«iaOat raq 
xMcreti ). 
CE ii, 408; 12Ji, p. 345. 
Therefore, one who denies this premise at once should reject the dogma 
of creation ex nihilo - what Eunomius means here is nothing but the phonetic 
appearance of a word: 
Eunomius, however, adds to his previous statement that 
the beginnings of creation testify to the fact that names (-rag 
(O(iväc) were given by God to the things which He created; 
but I think that it would be superfluous to repeat what I 
have already sufficiently set forth as the result of my 
investigations; 
CE ii 443 (J i p. 356) 
According to the reconstruction of R. Vaggione, as a case in point Eunomius 
referred to, but rejected, the commonly held view that ancient poets gradually 
enriched human speech with new words. Similarly, if the saints are not said by 
the Scriptures to have invented new words, one should admit that the 
appearance of words was inseparable from their creation; otherwise, how was 
God able to communicate with his servants? 
But, says he, since God condescends to commune with His 
servants, we may consequently suppose that from the very 
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beginning He 
aQXfjc las 
71QO(TI'OQiac). 
enacted words appropriate to things (E& 
r(QOMcU S 'rQ rceäyµaTi TEOEicOat 
CE ii, 417; 6-10 (J i, p. 348) 
Taking into account his attitude to pagan philosophy, which was in 
every respect negative, one should note that Eunomius' approach to the matter 
is from the beginning an amateur attempt to define the nature of names. The 
conclusive distinction proposed by J. Danielou about 'scientific' (Gregory and 
Basil) and 'mystical' (Aetius and Eunomius) merely fails to explain the matter. 
In the first instance, in Eunomius' theory one can see an eclectic synthesis of an 
unambiguously mythological perception of names (when the lack of exactness 
is added to the notion of Providence) and a purely rationalist comprehension of 
the general theological agenda: 
'But we, in agreement with holy and blessed men; affirm 
that the mystery of godliness (EVQE1Eiac µvmr' QLov) does 
not consist in venerable names, nor in the distinctive 
character of customs and sacramental tokens (EO iv Kai 
pI TTIKWV ouµip Awv), but in exactness of doctrine 
(boyµäuOv ax 4(3Eia)' 
CE iii, 8,54; 20ff Q ii, p. 284) 
Secondly, the position of Basil and Gregory is often for a much more mystical 
treatment of divine names and the mysteries of the Church. My suggestion is 
that the distinction 'scientific' - 'mysterious' is inadequate because in the case of 
Eunomius we seem to be dealing with a much more complex hypothetical 
construction. 
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Gregory often states that in Eunomius' circles the firm belief that the 
divine essence is grasped and cognised in the name agennetos was in fact set off 
against the traditional liturgical practice of veneration of the divine name524. 
This unaccountable contradiction of Eunomius' theology should be taken into 
consideration more seriously for the general analysis of his doctrine. But due to 
the limitation of our agenda here, it should be pointed out that his theory of 
names is attached to the first, viz. non-rationalist sphere of his discourse, and 
therefore, should be treated here accordingly. 
What has been found in Eunomius' theory of names has almost nothing 
to deal with standard philosophical views on the nature of names, which 
Eunomius appears to be totally unaware of. It is astonishing that in Eunomius' 
teaching on the nature of names, the main arguments strongly remind us of the 
treatment of language in the Gnostic schools. Just as in the Gnostic works the 
question about the nature of language is posed regardless of elementary 
philosophical inquiries: the variety of tongues, different phonemes for the same 
things, the problem of synonymy, etc. Similarly, he eliminates language as a 
phenomenon; his speculations revolve around names or to be more precise 
phonemes, but once again regardless of so crucial a fact as the variety of 
phonemes in different tongues. 
We already discussed the remark of J. Damclou about the relations 
between Aetius and the philosophical school of Iamblichus (Julian the 
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Apostate). However, Aetius and Eunomius' involvement in Gnostic circles is 
much better indicated by the sources. In addition, there are many more 
theoretical parallels between Eunomius' teaching on names and the Gnostic 
mythic perception of language. The systematic neglect of variety of tongues, 
which we can only note rather than explain, is a common feature to both the 
Eunomius and Gnostic schools. Similarly, the typical rationalist pathos that led 
some early Gnostic authors to docetism, and later on considered martyrdom for 
the name 'Jesus' as a theological absurdity (which Origen argued against) can 
be still traced in Eunomius' treatment of liturgical rites and the sacraments. 
Another claim that in the teaching of Eunomius one can trace distinct Gnostic 
influence is related to the very scheme of argumentation given by Basil and 
spelled out by Gregory of Nyssa. Before turning to the last part of this chapter, I 
would like to draw attention to the following facts. Gregory of Nyssa presents a 
very coherent, well-conceived theory of language, whose main concern is to 
rebut his opponent; but the very structure of his arguments strongly reminds 
one of Irenaeus and his anti-Gnostic chapters. Let us not focus on the response 
of Gregory. 
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IV. 4 Gregory of Nyssa: elaboration of Basil's theory 
a bE rjµeic v7 0MA t ävoiEV rcEpi 'rlic 'r v övoµävwv 
Xe11vECwc, EV TOLS xaTÖTILV ELQ1IKa'tEV, &TL Tc; v nQaYµäTwv 
EXövTWV CJc EXEL ýÜUECJS Tä( E(JµflvEVTUCLS TWV ÖVT6N 
(OcwväS i <£v>'rEO EiQa rcapä Tov 9 Eov Try OvQE L rIµcov 
Aoyu 1 bvvaµLS EvQaTO. 
CE ii, 395; 28ff (J i, p. 341-342) 
Gregory of Nyssa and the doctrine of language that emerges in his 
writings has already been examined by modern scholarship; the most thorough 
examination of the subject is by B. Salmona in his Ontologia e logic il tema del 
linguaggio in Gregorio di Nissa. It has already been mentioned in the 
'Introduction' that in spite of a remarkable and thorough examination, B. 
Salmona represents Gregory's linguistic teaching as an independent theory of 
his own, i. e. with no relation to Basil. I attempted above to reconstruct the extent 
of Basil's interest in linguistic matters; as for Gregory and his magnum opus the 
Contra Eunomium, one should bear in mind that Gregory's main aim was to 
defend Basil's Adversus Eunomium rather than to put forward a new theory of 
his own (as often presupposed by scholars). Even when the discussion shifts to 
relatively new topics (e. g. the problem of an original tongue), Gregory's 
argumentation appears as an integral part, or rather an inference from, Basil's 
numerous drafts. Although B. Salmona in his analysis covers almost all the 
works of Gregory of Nyssa that have relevance to linguistic issues, the question 
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of the origin of the theory as well as its significance and outstanding novelty for 
the time seems to be left open. 
In this section I shall focus on the material found in the various books of 
the CE, because one of my concerns will be to sketch the extent of his 
dependence on the ideas of Basil. We already observed that in a general way 
Eunomius' teaching was already shown to be, philosophically speaking, a very 
dissatisfactory theory. Here I shall outline Gregory's theory with minimal 
references to his opponent; the main reason for doing so is that in his CE 
Gregory of Nyssa has demonstrated an interesting and rare tactic: he not only 
argues against the premises that have already been put forward for discussion, 
but often scrutinises Eunomius' expressions in order to guess beforehand, and 
refute in advance, all possible quasi-philosophical conclusions and references to 
the Scriptures, which he anticipates might be used in support. It is likely that 
this tactic comes from his use of rhetoric, and the ploy of disarming an 
opponent by being always one step ahead. In a passage opening with 'perhaps, 
our new Demosthenes will appeal to 'And God said, Let there be light' or 'In the 
beginning was the Word' or 'we could have said much more about so profound a 
subject, but unfortunately our concern is to refute this nonsense, however... ', 
Gregory often shifts from the dispute to a positive investigation of the subject. 
In fact, this passage reveals his enormous contribution to the theory of 
language, which I suggest could be defined as the Cappadocian theory. 
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There are two initial premises with which Gregory of Nyssa begins. First 
of all, a view of human speech as a distinctive feature of man's nature525 : 
If, then, the creation is of a later date than its Creator, and 
man is the latest in the scale of creation, and if speech is a 
distinctive characteristic of man (ibtov be Tot) äv6QcJltov ö 
Al yo(; ), and verbs and nouns are the component elements 
of speech, and 'ungeneracy' is a noun... 
CE ii, 164 (J i, p. 272) 
The second postulate is of special significance. A word as such is nothing 
but an exclusive phenomenon of human existence and presence. We have 
already encountered Basil's speculation as to what kind of communication 
people would have if they were not corporeal; Gregory repeats this idea, and 
even enlarges the principle: in his thought, any possible philosophical or 
mythological deviation from an anthropological view of words, either into the 
sphere of a 'correct divine language' (Plato's Cratylus) or to the pre-mundane, 
pre-cosmic names, or such a vexed point of the Eunomean controversy as non- 
epinoic words assigned by Providence, is nothing but ij ypa bbrýS µüOoc rý 
xeaL7callc3VTWWV övC: LQoc526. Words, and therefore language, exist for one reason 
-125Y. Edelshtein (IIpo&te i . 9juKa, p. 1630 considered this 
Patristic theme merely as an 
adoption of a Classical philosophical (Stoic) idea, which in its turn belongs to more general 
view on the hierarchy of beings (material things, plants, animals, humans, etc. ). The latter 
couple of relates to each other as following: on comparison to animals, human distinctive 
characteristic is speech. It seems, however, that these relatively similar conclusions come 
from 
different background; for Christian theology this structural ascension appears to be based on 
the first chapter of the Genesis, which portrays God to create man after plants and animals and 
in 
accordance with his image and likeness (the idea of human personhood is always emphasised - 
cf. Greg. Nyss., De opilcio hominis, 8; Nemesius, De natura hominis, 1). 
sm 'an old wives' fib or a dream of not sober' - CE ii, 290; 8 (j, i p. 312). 
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and one reason only, that otherwise human beings cannot share their thoughts 
with each other: 
But if it were in any way possible by some other means to 
lay bare the movements of thought (Tä 'rf (; bLavoiac, 
xavi taTa), abandoning the formal instrumentality of 
words, we should converse with one another more lucidly 
and clearly, revealing by the mere action of thought the 
essential nature of the things which are under 
consideration. But now, by reason of our inability to do so, 
we have given things their special names, calling one 
'heaven', another 'earth', and so on, and as each is related 
to each, and acts or suffers, we have marked them by 
distinctive names, so that our thoughts in regard to them 
may not remain uncommunicated and unknown. 
CE ii, 391; 19 (J i, p. 340) 
§ IV. 4.1 Word as an exclusively human artefact 
Normal human speech consists of words; nouns, verbs, etc. are supposed 
to be articles of speech. Gregory is very clear about the distinction between 
inarticulate thinking (which has not yet become inner speech) and ordinary 
speech that has been uttered. But whichever word is taken for analysis, 
regardless of what the word (name) designates, regardless of the manner 
in 
which it is manifested (uttered or written), regardless of which tongue or 
dialect 
it belongs to, etc. it is necessarily and unconditionally a human artefact, rather 
than something that comes from above. There are no words of any other 
kind 
or, put differently, there are otherwise no words at all, words are 
impossible. 
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Gregory's view of words is complex; nevertheless, the distinction 
between thought and utterance, inner word and outer word, spoken word and 
written word, etc. is defined with remarkable philosophical lucidity and 
precision. Perhaps, on the basis of 2 Cor. 3: 6 ('for the written code kills')527Gregory 
considers the phoneme as a primary mode of manifestation and the graphical 
appearance of word as a secondary one, but this classification is not very 
significant for hims28. Thus, a word is in the first instance something 
phonetically given in its perfect and complete form; but there are some 
conditions for a word to be uttered phonetically. All of them belong to the 
complexity of our nature; bodily factors are of special significance: 
For our speech is uttered by the organs of speech, the 
windpipe, the tongue, the teeth, and the mouth, the 
inhalation of air from without and the breath from within 
working together to produce the utterance. For the 
windpipe, fitting into the throat like a flute, emits a sound 
from below; and the roof of the mouth, by reason of the 
void space above extending to the nostrils, like some 
musical instrument, gives volume from above to the voice. 
And the cheeks, too, are aids to speech, contracting and 
expanding in accordance with their structural arrangement, 
or propelling the voice through a narrow passage by 
various movements of the tongue, which it effects now with 
one part of itself, now with another, giving hardness or 
softness to the sound which passes over it by contact with 
the teeth or with the palate. Again, the service of the lips 
contributes not a little to the result, affecting the voice by 
527 cf: CE ii, 199, -6 j i, p. 283. 
5n in general, for Gregory of Nyssa spoken and written words are roughly speaking similar, 
because they are embodied into 'material' (sounds or graphical symbols). 
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the variety of their distinctive movements, and helping to 
shape the words as they are uttered. 
CE ii, 200; 13ff Q i, p. 283)529 
To sum up his numerous remarks about the appearance of words, we 
can outline the following essential conditions. First, there must be two human 
beings, a speaker and a hearer. As they are both intellectual creatures, one can 
share his thoughts (the main purpose of speech) with the other by means of 
material phenomena, either by means of sounds, or by means of writing. Each 
mode of expression in its turn requires conditions of the natural world 
determined by the space-time continuum, e. g. in the case of sounds one needs 
air, time, three-dimensional space and so on. It should be, perhaps, noted that 
Basil's main point still obtains: the sole purpose of language is the function of 
communication. What Gregory does, however, is to make a philosophical 
generalisation: the expression of thoughts linguistically (i. e. by means of uttered 
or written speech) is a sole, perfect, and self-sufficient way. Apart from that, he 
remarks, under certain conditions one can express thoughts even by glance or 
gesticulation; the glance or gesture in this case imitates ordinary verbal 
expressions: 
Rather let us say, that as we indicate to the deaf what we 
want them to do, by gestures and signs, not because we 
have no voice of our own, but because a verbal 
m The criticism of Eunomius"words without sound, and declaration without language, and 
announcement without voice' is omitted for being rather uninteresting. 
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communication would be utterly useless to those who cannot hear. 
CE ii, 242; 2f fai, p. 297) 
But according to his philosophy, this way of communication is not yet 
'language'; it is only a reflection or imitation of language, its existence is 
determined by the presence of the original 'masterpiece': 
But just as we cannot call a man deaf who converses with a deaf man by means of signs, - his only way of hearing, - so 
we must not suppose speech in God because of His 
employing it by way of accommodation in addressing man. 
CE ii, 421 (J i, p. 349) 
Being man's artefact, language reflects complex human nature in full; 
therefore, the limitations of man's nature inevitably emerge in linguistic 
phenomena. This theme is an interesting instance of how Gregory's theory 
differs from standard secular philosophical science. Language is not conceived 
as descending in a line from the divine tongue to human dialects and, 
consequently to animals, plants, etc. Strictly speaking, celestial entities 
communicate without language at all, because they exist in aeon and they share 
their thoughts in silence530. The sounds uttered by some (terrestrial) animals, as 
*30 cf. CE ii, 390; 15ff (J i, p. 340): ... nor can the incorporeal nature of supramundane powers 
name God by voice and tongue. For, in the case of immaterial intellectual nature, the mental 
energy is speech which has no need of material instruments of communication. For even in the 
case of human beings, we should have no need of using words and names if we could 
otherwise inform each other of our pure mental feelings and impulses. But (as things are), 
inasmuch as the thoughts which arise in us are incapable of being so revealed, because our 
nature is encumbered with its fleshly surrounding, we are obliged to express to each other what 
goes on in our minds by giving things their respective names, as signs of their meaning'- 
v. adicn.. In fact, Gregory merely repeats Basil's ideas. 
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well as verbal exposure of man to them are not language, even though one can 
use human words to direct cattle: 
For we ourselves are accustomed to direct brute beasts by 
clucking and whistling and the like, and yet this, by which 
we reach their ears, is not our language, but we use our 
natural speech in talking to one another, while, in regard to 
cattle, some suitable noise or sound accompanied with 
gesture is sufficient for all purposes of communication. 
Ibid531. 
Although some animals, which are gifted with a 'more perfect soul', 
can express their psychic movements by means of sounds, they are still 
considered to be dumb (äAoyoi) without exception, because an animal is not a 
human person (made ad imaginem et similitudinem of the Creator), it cannot 
understand the meaning of words by definition, it is directed by human word 
just as it can be directed by a whip. Inasmuch as an animal does not 
comprehend words, our words appear to be empty sounds that only affect and 
stimulate its acquired instincts. Human sounds can be repeated by some birds, 
such as starlings, ravens, or parrots; nevertheless, it is a simulation of speech; 
just as a 'dancing' monkey or a bear 'dressed as a judge' can be trained to 
simulate human behaviour. 
53' For summary of Patristic view on animal communication, v. Edelshtein, 
Y. Ilpo6Aeubl MUM 
p. 176f. 
532 cf. Basilius, Homiliae in hexaemeron, 8; 1 (ed. S. Giet, Basile de Cesaree Homilies sur 
l'hexahniron, 
SC 26 (Paris 1968). 
w3cf. his story about a monkey seen in the Alexandrian circus (Ad Armonium, 1); a very similar 
passages with interesting story about a 'smart and crooked-beak parrot' - 
Greg. Naz., Praecepta 
ad virgins (PG 37,627: 11ff); birds do not speak, they just filch (xAin rouaty) our sounds so 
amazingly that 'a parrot can even trick our ear'. 
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The example of the parrot is especially interesting; for the Cappadocian 
Fathers a topic such as the articulation of human speech (in comparison with 
the inarticulate noises of animals) was bound up with the concept of 'majestic 
dignity' (TO Trj(; (3ac A (aS ä" µa) of man, whose bodily form was designed 
by the Creator 'to release' man's acoustic organs to generate articulate sounds 
of speech5m. Later on in this section we shall return to this theme while treating 
his exegesis of Gen 2: 19-20 and his most notorious theological formula that: 
... neither did Adam make the animals, nor did God name 
them, but the creation was the work of God, and the 
naming of the things created was the work of man. 
CE ii, 412; 17f(Ji, p. 346) 
However, it appears clear that the linguistic position of Gregory differs 
from Plato and all the variants of the cOai-theory. At the same time, it would 
be an error to assume, as scholars often have, that Gregory merely followed the 
Aristotelian position; the following passage might appear Aristotelian: 
Wherefore all things that exist substantially are from God; 
but, for our guidance, all things that exist are provided with 
names to indicate them. And if any one say that such names 
were imposed by the arbitrary usage of mankind, he will be 
guilty of no offence against the scheme of Divine 
Providence (raüTa be Kara Tö äQtrncov Tai; r(Dv 
tkv6Qthitwv auvIl0Eiair, yivFV6ai TLr, Ehhtd v ovbev Eir, 'tbv 
jc 7tQovoiac TtA: qµµEArjceL Aöyov. ). For we do not say 
that the nature of things was of human invention, but only 
their names. 
CE ii, 283; 26ff 0 i, p. 309) 
94 v. Greg. Nyss., De opificio hominis, 1-11. 
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However, the extent of his disagreement with Aristotle in the context of 
Gregory's comprehension of the human thinking process appears even more 
marked. 
§ IV. 4.2 Language and the thinking process: the words xaOäite a1UIavrQ& 
TLva and coQigq amat 'r v 7teayµhtwv 
The roots of his account of the human thinking process in relation to 
language can only be understood in the context of the Basil's Homilia in illud: 
'Attende tibi ipsi': the philosophical inquiry into the nature of thoughts is faced 
with an insoluble problem, viz. how thoughts come in to existence in our soul, 
which is of a twofold nature (i. e. it is split between aeon and time)? How can one 
distinguish 'movements of thought' from a formed perfect idea, which is said to 
exist in time? This epistemological distinction appears in CE in an interesting 
way. First, Gregory rejects Eunomius' concept of words-as-seeds imprinted or 
implanted in the human mind; our knowledge of things comes neither from 
these 'seeds', nor from words themselves, because in this case our cognition of 
the natural world would have been similar to language study, and the 
God of 
the Bible would have been portrayed as a tutor who taught 
Adam and Eve 
grammar. The absurdity of this position appears immediately 
if one follows it 
logically: if, epistemologically, knowledge come from words, 
it would have 
Sm CE ii, 392ff 0 i, p. 340ff. 
q1c 
been absolutely impossible for man to know something unless he studied in the 
manner one learns Hebrew, Greek or Latin words. Strictly speaking, insists 
Gregory, our cognition of things is realised regardless of words, because it can 
come from faculties - i. e. visual perception, etc.; ultimately, however, the matter 
is concerned with the phenomenon of human rationality as a divine gift: 
But we maintain that He Who made all things in His 
wisdom, and Who moulded this living rational creature, by 
the simple fact of His implanting reason in his nature, 
endowed him with all his rational faculties. 
Inasmuch as the governing factor of cognition exists inside us rather than 
outside (as for example words), theoretically we do not need words to acquire 
the knowledge of things, because each of us already has what Gregory calls, the 
'domestic criterion'537 . 
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that Gregory underestimates 
the epistemological role of words, and argues for their absolute irrelevance. On 
the contrary, his comprehension of the human thinking process is doubly 
impressive; he employs one of the principle dialectical axioms that before any 
kind of operation with something one should distinguish this 'something' from 
something else, or what Plato would call the 'one' and ' the other' ('ö Te Ev Kai 
CE ii, 400; 7f (I i, p. 343): T ItEic bi (P%mv STt 6 Tä näv'ta tv ao4ig you' aac uai Tö 
1loryucäv 
ToUTO 7tAävµa 4)onAavrýaac µ& 4) Typ C(pFivaL cri (PüCFL Töv Aöyov näaav 
tv bvvaµw v 
Aoyudiv EvaniOrro. 
Sw CE ii, 401; 19f p. 343): obcoOev lXovtec ixavrov rc iv scat' a aOT aLv 
EyyivoµtvWv jµiv 
to KQLCIQIav. 
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, r&kAa)-538. The epistemological function of words that the human intellect forces 
them to have is simply to distinguish one notion from another (ultimately, to 
distinguish 'to Ev from TJIAAa); this process takes place as follows: 
And so, again, we maintain that the intellectual faculty, 
made as it was originally by God, acts thenceforward by 
itself when it looks out upon realities, and that there be no 
confusion in its knowledge, affixes some verbal note to each 
several thing as a stamp to indicate its meaning539. 
In the opinion of Gregory of Nyssa this is exactly what the biblical text of Gen. 
2: 19-20 tells us about the naming of animals. Gregory's accusation is that his 
opponent bases his arguments only on syllogisms, whereas for Basil, and for 
Gregory himself, the real criterion is that the teaching of the Scriptures; this is 
not so, however. Although, this remark makes some sense in the context of the 
early stage of the controversy (in relation to the Syntagmation and the First 
Apology), the details of the latter stage of the dispute (the AA and the CE ii) 
testify to something totally different. It seems that Eunomius had more appeals 
in his polemical arsenal to the authority of the Bible than Gregory of Nyssa540. 
We have already observed that Eunomius' attitude to the secular philosophical 
treatment of language was worse than negative; his knowledge of it was 
v. e. g. Parm., 135d-166c. 
CE ii, 401; 20f (J i, p. 343): o )'t 4aµev uai Týv bLavoq r ijv tf *uxf c bvvaµuv Tota&cgv 
7taQä TOO 9eov yevoµtvrly i iauT j; Td Aos7t6v KLveiaOaL xai. nQäc Tä npc y iaTa MiReLV 
Kai we äv µrlbeµiav a yXuviv rl yv(DaK nähOoi, KaOäntp oT 1LavTp6 Tiva Täc buk Tcvv (swvc v 
i7tLa l. tEUbveK &AuT 4)tawv TtpayRdccov n43äAAety. 
° Exegesis of the biblical texts, touched upon in the course of the Eunomean controversy 
received a good and through treatment in one of the chapters of A. Meredith's thesis; so it is 
hardly reasonable to examine the texts over again here. A few general remarks should, 
however, be made. 
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similarly superficial. With the exception of schoolboyish lemmas and 
syllogisms, he predominantly relied on the literal-141 interpretation of biblical 
passages such as 'xai ¬trr¬v ö 6cöc', 'Kai kxtAcv¬v 0 OEöc' KTA. Clearly, it was 
easy for Gregory to refute Eunomius' purely anthropomorphist interpretations 
in the sense that the Supreme Deity cannot be portrayed as speaking like a man; 
similarly, the discussion of John 1: 1 is of no interest. 
The exegesis of Gen. 2: 19-20, however, is an interesting case: Gregory 
shows a much more philosophical approach than his opponent. In CE ii, 402 (J i, 
p. 343) he gives his own theological version of Gen. 2: 19-20, viz. Adam in 
paradise affixes verbal utterances to each different animal as a stamp to indicate 
its meaning. The text of Gen. 2: 19-20 was obviously hotly disputed by both 
sides. We can now learn from the reconstruction of Eunomius' texts that he 
argued for something that provoked Gregory of Nyssa to accuse him of 
following Plato, and the Cratylus in particular. The extent of Eunomius' 
knowledge of Plato's dialogue has already been discussed: it is highly unlikely 
that Eunomius was actually influenced by the Platonic theory of language to a 
determinable extent. He could probably insist on two things: the divine origin of 
his non-epinoic words, and a cpvu; -nexus between övoµa and of iia. The core 
of the disagreement is intriguing: although it is impossible to determine 
whether Eunomius actually follows the Philortic exegesis of Gen. 2: 19-20, 
his 
train of thought still reminds us of the Alexandrian classical variant, which was 
ýý Taking onto account his Alexandrian background, this fact is especially unexpected. 
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observed (of course, in a much more sophisticated form) in Clement, Eusebius 
and some other authors. What Gregory of Nyssa does is something 
diametrically opposed, perhaps deliberately-542 rejecting the Alexandrian 
traditional interpretation of Gen. 2: 19-20. The exegesis he puts against 
Eunomius is remarkable and surprising in every respect. There is no connexion 
between the primordial, perfect nature of Adam and the 'natural correctness' of 
names he gave to the animals. Rather, Adam names animals just as bath-house 
attendants name their newly invented tools; his power to name animals is equal 
to our power to name things - any sacral implications are, in fact, removed. 
Ultimately, Adam appears to be neither the real 'inventor' of language, nor is he 
identified with Plato's superhuman övoµa'rovQyöc; nor he is represented as 
one who has grasped and comprehended the sense of the objects that he was 
naming. 
There is a strong impression that Gen. 2: 19-20 did not play a very 
insignificant role for Gregory. He just reinterprets the text so that it could fit the 
hypothesis of language he holds, and easily casts aside the commonly held 
interpretation of this biblical passage; his exegesis of Gen. 2: 19-20 is just one of 
so cf. his general distrust and disagreement with Philo CE iii, 7: 8-9 
Q ii, p. 217). 
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many examples of the new method which appears everywhere in CES. 
Although the question of his exegetical methodology seems to be sufficiently 
clear, it would be an error to suppose that the application of this new method 
was limited only to the sphere of biblical exegesis. 
Let us, turn back, however to Gregory's view of the human thinking 
process. First of all, Gregory makes a distinction between the sphere of thinking 
and the sphere of its verbal utterance. His main point is that Eunomius 
confounds these two spheres; all his 'ontological' applications, therefore, are 
determined by this confusion. Human ideas exist only between two intellects, 
whereas their verbal utterances are of secondary significance. Otherwise (i. e. 
without an audience), words are nothing but rending the air: 
For we do not keep undissolved, like those who make pots 
or bricks, what we utter with our voice in the mould of the 
speech which we form once for all with our lips, but as 
soon as one speech has been sent forth by our voice, what 
we have said ceases to exist. 
CE ii, 44; lff(Ji, p. 239) 
m3cf. for instance his interpretation of Ps 109: 1 in CE ii, 394; 16ff (j i, p. 341): 'But supramundane 
and immaterial nature being free and independent of bodily envelopment, requires no words or 
names either for itself or for that which is above it, but whatever utterance on 
the part of such 
intellectual nature is recorded in Holy Writ is given for the sake of the 
hearers, who would be 
unable otherwise to learn what is to be set forth, if it were not communicated 
to them by voice 
and word. And if David in the Spirit speaks of something being said 
'by the Lord to the Lord', liii 
David himself who is the smoker being unable otherwise 
what is meant except by interpreting by voice and word 
the mylkdes 
sdven him by Divine inspiration. 
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Just as for our own thinking process formed words are distinguishable 
'stamps' (rnj µavTQa), they are vehicles of meaning for our audience. Only 
materialised in sound (or written symbol) can a mental concept reach a hearer. 
... even if without speech we describe in writing our mental 
conceptions (2äS 'rfic ux c Evvo, q), it is not as though 
the substantial objects of our thoughts (Tä ptv ü4EuTC&na 
'r v vors hT(ov) will acquire their significance from the 
letters, while the non-substantial will have no part in what 
the letters express. For whatever comes into our mind, 
whether intellectually existing, or otherwise, it is possible 
for us at our discretion to store away in writing. And the 
voice and letters are of equal value for the expression of 
thought, for we communicate what we think by the latter as 
well as by the former. . . For in the case of all speech uttered 
by means of sound, the passage of the breath indeed which 
conveys the voice is towards its kindred element, but the 
sense of the words spoken is engraved by hearing on the 
memory of the hearer's soul, whether it be true or false. 
CE ii, 46; 16-49; 1 (J i, p. 239f) 
Consequently, words do not exist 'ontologically' beyond human 
communication, or independently of the human thinking process. Furthermore, 
there is no philosophical reason for Eunomius' classification of words by their 
origin (epinoic or non-epinoic) - every single word, whether significant or 
meaningless, is always the result of our differential thinking process; they 
merely reflect our ideas, both correct and incorrect. 
Gregory's epistemological view is entirely based on the two axioms 
spelled out very clearly by Basil. The sphere of human cognitive function 
has a 
number of limitations; thus, any knowledge of something is always relative. 
The first class of limitations are, as one might say, of an external character; 
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according to Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa, when we maintain that we 
know what is, e. g. the sun, it simply means that we first know something about 
the object, and are able to tell it from anything else, e. g. the moon or the earth. 
Moreover, in the course of the observation (incidentally, visual perception) and 
rational analysis we can increase and specify our 'knowledge' of the sun; the 
way to perfection of our knowledge is endless and perpetual. In other words, 
we shall never exhaust the problem, and we shall never reach final and ultimate 
knowledge of the essence of the sun, at least in this lifer''': 
But, boasting as they do that they know these things, let 
them first tell us about the things of inferior nature; what 
they think of the body of the heavens, of the machinery 
which conveys the stars in their eternal courses, or of the 
sphere in which they move; for, however far speculation 
may proceed, when it comes to the uncertain and 
incomprehensible it must stop. 
CE ii, 72ff (J i, p. 248) 
Similarly, (and this is, so to speak, an internal limitation) one cannot 
claim absolute knowledge of the sun or expect to reach it, because we are also 
ignorant of the nature of our thinking process, or of nature, or of eyesight, etc., 
that our soul is responsible forte: 
For who is there who has arrived at a comprehension of his 
own soul? Who is acquainted with its very essence, 
5* CE ii, 67-71 ad fin. (J ii, pp. 245-248). 
Due to the polemical context this epistemology was basically to argue against 
Eunomius' 
absolute cognition of the Supreme Deity in the name agennetos. 
In the limits of this section I 
cannot discuss more thoroughly all major philosophical inferences that 
follow from the 
Cappadocian theory of the relative cognition of an object; suffice it to say that this 
is an 
outstanding and unique theory which stands out against the philosophical 
background of the 
time - cf. an interesting treatment of 
is-copula ('isness') and its unknowability in CE ii, 57-64 Q ii, 
pp. 181-184), given by R. Mortley, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 180f. 
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whether it is material or immaterial, whether it is purely 
incorporeal, or whether it exhibits anything of a corporeal 
character; how it comes into being, how it is composed, 
whence it enters into the body, how it departs from it, or 
what means it possesses to unite it to the nature of the 
body; how, being intangible and without form, it is kept 
within its own sphere, what difference exists among its 
powers, how one and the same soul, in its eager curiosity to 
know the things which are unseen, soars above the highest 
heavens, and again, dragged down by the weight of the 
body, falls back on material passions, anger and fear, pain 
and pleasure, pity and cruelty, hope and memory, 
cowardice and audacity, friendship and hatred, and all the 
contraries that are produced in the faculties of the soul? 
Observing which things, who has not fancied that he has a 
sort of populace of souls crowded together in himself, each 
of the aforesaid passions differing widely from the rest, 
and, where it prevails, holding lordship over them all, so 
that even the rational faculty falls under and is subject to 
the predominating power of such forces, and contributes its 
own co-operation to such impulses, as to a despotic lord? 
CE ii, 107ff (J i, p. 258)-546 
We have already come across these epistemological settings in the 
writings of Basil; Gregory simply repeats them word for word. Overall, 
however, both Basil and Gregory were far from setting a semi-agnostic view- 
point against their over-optimistic opponent. What they both suggested was in 
fact a very special theory of knowledge, based on the general axiom of relative 
cognition. How, then, does Gregory understand the human c6 Aoyucöv or 
capacity of knowledge (rö krcLo'n tfc bvvrtvöv)? 
Turning back to his philosophical paradigm", the very essence (oicia) 
of a (let us say for more clarity) material, concrete thing is assumed to 
be 
5" v. ad CE ii, 118 (1 i, pp. 258-260). 
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unknowable and unapproachable (ä QaQ2oc); we are in effect operating with 
'works' (Cd evEQYELat) which are posterior to the essenceM8. Thus, man grasps 
something by means of his senses and then enters an understanding of the object 
having learned - the above-mentioned limitations of our thinking should be 
born in mind - the sense of the thing from its energies. Only after having 
grasped it can man really name something, i. e. produce a phoneme. It turns out, 
therefore, that the name as phoneme (övoµa) is neither primary (as Eunomius 
contends for his non-epinoic words in general and for agennetos in particular), 
nor is it even a secondary vehicle of meaning, but tertiary in relation to its 
epistemological validity. Hence, name is nothing more than just a shadow: 
... are we not clearly taught that the words which represent 
things are of later origin than the things themselves, and 
that the words which are framed to express the operations 
of things are reflections of the things themselves (cov7tEQ 
rnctai 2c)v rzpayVaT(Ov EkQiv ai 4covai)? 
CE ii, 150; llf (J i, p. 269) 
Moreover, full-fledged, ordinary words designate, symbolise or express 
energies, which are, philosophically speaking caused by the essence; but names 
do not reveal or express the essence itself: 
Now what do these words tell us? Do they indicate 
operations, or nature? No one will say that they indicate 
aught but His operationsTM9. 
-%7 CE, ii, 149; 28ff (j i, p. 268f). 
5a because ova(a is, obviously, prior to the energies - CE, ii, 150; 2 (j i, p. 
269): ei be 
7LQoi4to'rrpce r@ v EVBQyEIL V 1) OÜQIa... 
349 CE it 151; 20f (j i, p. 269): Tama To(vuv Ti 11tyouaty; JvEQ'yEiac FXeLV Tr v oriµaaiav 
fi 
c$aEwc; OÜK AV T! c dMO TL TtaQa T1 V 
eVt'yEUZV E171OL 
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This paradigm emerges again, when the theme of divine titles is touched upon; 
our concern is now with the mechanism of producing words. 
The words of our speech are said to be invented neither by God, nor by a 
mysterious name-maker, whatever the understanding of this övoµaTOUpyoc 
can be. At the same time, it is impossible for nouns and verbs to be determined 
by the Aristotelian convention (formerly in hoary antiquity), because an 
ordinary human being is hic et nunc name-giver and name-inventor. He speaks, 
borrows, adopts, invents and under some circumstances forgets his övöµara; in 
a word, he acts freely, just as one who has power over the articles of his speech 
- this is a central point for Gregory. Nonetheless, he also admits that we cannot 
interchange names for 'horse' and 'man'; however, the reason for this is neither 
the ontological nexus, nor the force of habit or ancient convention, but the 
human inner intellectual regulations designated by both sides of the 
controversy as epinoia. 
§ IV. 4.3 Epinoia and its linguistic application 
Compared to Basil's treatment of the notion, Gregory of Nyssa does not 
say anything new about epinoia; however, he sheds more 
light on the term and 
its validity for the discourse. Hence, Gregory assumes that although we 
are 
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dealing with an important phenomenon of the human power of 'inventiveness', 
the title as such is rather arbitrary, even insufficient", '. Though on the whole he 
follows Basil's construction of epinoia, it is relatively unimportant for Gregory 
whether one denotes it as epinoia or by some other term, because the question 
remains: where did this 'inventiveness' come from, how does it work, and what 
is the sphere of its application? Indeed, his main concern is to demonstrate that 
it is epinoia that is responsible for generating and using all the words of our 
language without exception. Epinoia, is therefore in his opinion nothing but 
human creativity, based on intelligence, taken in its various manifestations. 
Gregory rejects Eunomius' classification of words as epinoic and non-epinoic, 
simply by questioning the philosophical reasons for doing so; perhaps, it was 
the easiest issue of the controversy to be refuted. Nevertheless, the theme of 
epinoia received a much more interesting examination than might appear at first 
sight. 
For Eunomius everything that is xa'r' inivotav matters is always bad-"', 
but epinoic names are always good. First - and in this he agrees with 
°I believe that under different circumstances both Basil and 
Gregory would have employed 
much more appropriate terminological apparatus rather than unintelligible 
and abstruse 
epinoia. 
551 cf. CE ii, 179 (J i, p. 276): 'After thus reducing the force of the term'epinoia' 
to its lowest value, 
our clever friend will allow it, you see, no further extension. 
He says that it is without sense and 
meaning, that it fancies the unnatural, either contracting or extending 
the limits of nature, or 
putting heterogeneous notions together, or juggling with strange and monstrous 
combinations'. 
z0M 
Eunomius552 - it is an entirely human feature; second, and this is the very point 
of his disagreement with Eunomius, epinoia is an umbrella term that designates 
the sphere of human intellectuality. This power is divinely given to man; 
therefore, regardless of whether one uses or abuses it, epinoia as a function 
remains the same: 
But why encumber our argument by multiplying instances? 
As in the above-mentioned cases no one would deny that 
he who has learned to practise an art for right purposes can 
also abuse it for wrong ones, so we say that the faculty of 
thought and conception was implanted by God in human 
nature for good, but, with those who abuse it as an 
instrument of discovery, it frequently becomes the 
handmaid of pernicious inventions. But although it is thus 
possible for this faculty to give a plausible shape to what is 
false and unreal, it is none the less competent to investigate 
what actually and in very truth subsists, and its ability for 
the one must in fairness be regarded as an evidence of its 
ability for the other. 
For that one who proposes to himself to terrify or 
charm an audience should have plenty of conceptions to 
effect such a purpose, and should display to the spectators 
many-handed, many-headed, or fire-breathing monsters, or 
men enfolded in the coils of serpents, or that he should 
seem to increase their stature, or enlarge their natural 
proportions to a ridiculous extent, or that he should 
describe men metamorphosed into fountains and trees and 
birds, a kind of narrative which is not without its attraction 
for such as take pleasure in things of that sort; - all this, I 
say, is the clearest of demonstrations that it is possible to 
arrive at higher knowledge also by means of this inventive 
faculty. 
CE ii, 189; 15ff a i, p. 279) 
n2CE ii, 187; 26f (J i, p. 2780: 'Nor do I deny the objection made by our adversaries, that 
lying 
wonders also are fabricated by this faculty. For their contention as to 
this makes for our own 
side in the argument. For we too assert that the science of opposites 
is the same, whether 
beneficial or the reverse; e. g. in the case of the arts of healing and navigation, and so on'. 
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This direct relationship between epinoia on the one hand and the development 
of arts and scientific knowledge on the other can be multiplied. What is really 
intriguing here is that the reason why 'it is impossible to interchange the names 
for horse and man' is related to this very connexion. Roughly speaking, epinoia 
causes the generation/invention of words; moreover, Gregory argues for a wide 
range of its functioning - epinoia in its totality is responsible for all the scientific 
advances of human civilisation: 
What, then, was the origin of our higher branches of 
learning, of geometry, arithmetic, the logical and physical 
sciences, of the inventions of mechanical art, of the marvels 
of measuring time by the brazen dial and the water-clock? 
What, again, of ontology, of the science of ideas, in short of 
all intellectual speculation as applied to great and sublime 
objects? What of agriculture, of navigation, and of the other 
pursuits of human life? How comes the sea to be a highway 
for man? How are things of the air brought into the service 
of things of the earth, wild things tamed, objects of terror 
brought into subjection, animals stronger than ourselves 
made obedient to the rein? Have not all these benefits to 
human life been achieved by conception? For, according to 
my account of it, conception is the method by which we 
discover things that are unknown, going on to further 
discoveries by means of what adjoins to and follows from 
our first perception with regard to the thing studied. For 
when we have formed some idea of what we seek to know, 
by adapting what follows to the first result of our 
discoveries we gradually conduct our inquiry to the end of 
our proposed research. 
CE ii, 181; 7ff (J i, p. 277) 
Clearly, this theory of epinoia was already observed in Basil; Gregory 
merely spells it out and gives examples of it. Thus, if epinoia 
is said to be the 
cause of the articles of our speech just as it is of human 
learning, the discourse 
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arrives at the idea of man's creativity, and consequently Gregory's brilliant 
formula'neither did Adam make the animals, nor did God name them'. 
Inasmuch as man is not in the full sense of the word a creator, his 
creativity is based on adoption and the use of already created things. For this 
reason, man's creativity and inventiveness is limited and restricted by, for 
example, the 'laws of nature'. Epinoic functioning, then, is to discover these 
objective regulations and employ them on various scientific projects. It is now 
relatively unimportant whether we use our learning for good or bad, for our 
benefit or for our harm - at any rate, epinoia functions in accordance with a 
determined formula. 
If the generation of words is similar to the development of all branches of 
learning, the classical puzzle about names for horse and man is solved by 
Gregory's theory in a very simple way: the reason why one cannot interchange 
names for horse and man is twofold. That is because the names 'horse' and 
'man' were not originally absolutely arbitrary attachments. Rather, their origin 
was determined by the chain essence-energies-human perception-epinoia- 
appearance of name, which is in turn an equation with two unknown 
quantities (the incognisable essence and unknown mechanism of the human 
thinking process). But since once this chain gave the name 'horse', and another 
time it gave the name 'man', these names cannot be interchanged by request. It 
would, however, be wrong to believe that this chain always works properly: 
In this, though it is often possible to have achieved the task 
in both ways, when thought does not fail to hit the mark, 
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and utterance interprets a notion with the appropriate 
word, yet it may happen that we may fail even in both, or in one at least of the two, when either the faculty of 
comprehension or the capacity to interpret is carried beyond the proper mark. There being, then, two factors by 
which every term is made a correct term, mental exactitude 
and verbal utterance, the result which commands approval 
in both ways will certainly be the preferable-'51. 
What is truly remarkable about this Cappadocian theory of language is 
its broad sphere of applications for e. g. further philosophical and theological 
inquiries and biblical exegesis. Epinoia is the greatest divine gift implanted into 
human nature that discovers the instrumentality of all things and provides 
knowledge for our service and benefit. From this perspective one can easily 
reconstruct numerous further solutions, including the difference between 
naming an abstract and a concrete entity: 
But then the whole world of realities is divided into two 
parts; that is, into the intelligible and the sensible (2¬ Tö 
vorl2öv xai ataO712öv). With regard to sensible phenomena, 
knowledge, on account of the perception of them being so 
near at hand, is open for all to acquire; the judgment of the 
senses gives occasion to no doubt about the subject before 
them. Differences in colour, and differences in all the other 
qualities which we judge by means of the sense of hearing, 
or smell, or touch, or taste, can be known and named by all 
possessing our common humanity; and so it is with all the 
other things which appear to be more obvious to our 
apprehension, the things, that is, pertaining to the age in 
which we live, designed for political and moral ends. But in 
the contemplation of the intelligible world, on account of 
that world transcending the grasp of the senses, we move, 
some in one way, some in another, around the object of our 
search; and then, according to the idea arising 
in each of us 
about it, we announce the result as best we can, striving to 
m3CEii, 574; 29 J1,393f). 
get as near as possible to the full meaning of the thing thought about through the medium of expressive phrases. 
CE ii, 572; 17ff (J i, p. 393) 
If naming is in the power of man, we are in a position to name a new- 
born child; this does not mean that we fully comprehend its nature (because we 
do not even possess a complete knowledge of ourselves), rather, we name 
something or somebody in order to distinguish it from the 'other', and 
thereafter to operate with it, and this comes from our epinoia. Otherwise, asks 
Gregory, why did the venerable Moses receive an Egyptian name for Pharaoh's 
daughter? Why were the Old Testament patriarchs named by their mothers, A? 
Next, Gregory goes on to say that divine names and titles are of the same 
nature. This linguistic hypothesis turns Eunomius' speculations over the name 
agennetos into dust. If we are unable to cognise the essence of the simple 
material things that we name, how can we claim to cognise the divine nature in 
name, whatsoever valuable, unique or supreme it is? Whatever word we use to 
designate or invoke God is still of our epinoia, and still subordinated to the 
above-given chain: 
For God is not an expression, neither has He His essence in 
voice or utterance. But God is of Himself what also 
He is 
believed to be, but He is named, by those who call upon 
Him, not what He is essentially (for the nature of 
Him Who 
alone is unspeakable - &4 acotoc), but 
He receives His 
 CE ii, 284-288 ad f n. Q i, p. 310f). 
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appellations from what are believed to be His operations in 
regard to our life. 
CE ii, 148; 24ff Q i, p. 268) 
When we speak of God and call Him OEÖS, we consider Him as 
overlooking and surveying all things (OF-o. tm). As elsewhere, His essence 
(oüaia) is prior to His energies; man can grasp and comprehend these energies 
by his senses and then express the result of this relative comprehension in 
words 'as we are best able': 
For if we stay to interpret any of the attributes of God till 
we understand them, and we understand them only by 
what His works teach us, and if His power precedes its 
exercise, and depends on the will of God, while His will 
resides in the spontaneity of the Divine nature, are we not 
clearly taught that the words which represent things are of 
later origin than the things themselves, and that the words 
which are framed to express the operations of things are 
reflections of the things themselves? 
Ibid. 
It is in this sense and this sense only that one should interpret various 
allegorical expressions of the Scriptures, where God is, for example, said to 
teach man or to speak like a mangy. According to his interpretation of the 
biblical texts, when God speaks from above (e. g. in the events of Epiphany or 
Sw v. e. g. CE ii, 184; 3f (j i, p. 278): 
'And in saying this I am supported by job's teaching, where 
he 
represents God as answering His servant by the tempest and 
the clouds, saying both other 
things meet for Him to say, and that it is He 
Who has set man over the arts, and given to 
woman her skill in weaving and embroidery 
(Job 38: 36). Now that He did not teach us such 
things by some visible operation, Himself presiding over 
the work, as we may see in matters of 
bodily teaching, no one would gainsay whose nature 
is not altogether animal and brutish. But 
still it has been said that our first knowledge of such arts 
is from Him, and, if such is the case, 
surely He Who endowed our nature with such a 
faculty of conceiving and finding out the 
objects of our investigation was Himself our 
Guide to the arts'. 
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Transfiguration), this should be understood in the sense that God 
condescended to weak human nature, and therefore, acted in accordance with 
what that nature is designed for: 
Now that voice (i q)(wvrj) was fashioned by God, suitably to 
the understanding of the hearers, in airy substance (EV T (i 
äcyicp acs iaTL), and adapted to the language of the day 
(TOTE Tciv q)O¬)ryoµEVCwv uuvi Ocuav y¬voµz vrl). 
CE ii, 249; 29f (J i, p. 299) 
Nevertheless, Gregory's linguistic preoccupations were far from being 
limited by purely theological implications. To all appearances he was one of the 
later Patristic writers, whose acquaintance with the treatment of language in 
secular science was truly excellent. Gregory understood that in order to give an 
exhaustive and comprehensive picture of linguistic theory, one needs to answer 
a number of the classical questions posed by the standard theories of language; 
the problem of proper names556 was just a minor example. In the course of his 
investigations Gregory often makes reference to the classical linguistic puzzles, 
which, as we have already observed, were touched upon by Clement and 
Origen. What we find in the CE is something radically different in comparison 
to the Alexandrian school. Let us focus on two major problems. 
sm cf. Socrates' joke about the name'Hermogefes' 
in relation to one of his disputants. 
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§ IV. 4.4 Primordial language and variety of tongues 
Seemingly, Eunomius' theory does not stand up to the critical question 
about a primordial tongue in the sense that the term agennetos comes from 
Greek, (rather than from 'sacred' Hebrew), and is not an 'original' language; an 
argument Irenaeus used elsewhere against Marcus. Nevertheless, Gregory 
prefers a more radical examination of the problem. We are not told whether 
Eunomius (ever) distinguished the notion of a primordial tongue from the 
variety of modern languages; similarly we are not told whether he ever touched 
upon the question of Hebrew and Hebrew names. Just as in Gnostic literature, 
Eunomius easily speaks of Greek words and language, and makes no attempt to 
explain why the term agennetos was Greek and not, for instance, ancient 
Hebrew. 
Like Clement and Origen, Gregory of Nyssa naturally depends on the 
Bible. However, the extent of this dependence seems to be equally limited (or 
rather, minimal: Both the Alexandrian theologians and Gregory of Nyssa 
employed only a few unambiguous premises, which one cannot ignore. Further 
philosophical elaboration of the matter as well as the conclusion, seriously 
differs from the Alexandrian theological proposition. If Clement and Origen 
fashioned biblical material into a Platonist hypothesis of 
language, 
methodologically, Gregory of Nyssa does exactly the same, 
but in favour of the 
new Cappadocian theory of language. 
He admits that from the time of Adam 
and Eve to the Confusion of tongues people spoke 
one language. This 
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primordial language, according to Gregory was in no way 'perfect' or 'correct' 
or 'better' (as the Alexandrians assumed) compared with modern languages; 
rather, it was a standard ordinary tongue without anything supernatural or 
extraordinary, because it was produced, developed and used by the first 
humans (Gregory does not make play of the original perfection of Adam's 
nature). Furthermore, he thinks that the primordial dialect could not be Hebrew: 
But some who have carefully studied the Scriptures tell us 
that the Hebrew tongue is not even ancient like the others, 
but that along with other miracles this miracle was wrought 
on behalf of the Israelites, that after the Exodus from Egypt, 
the language was hastily improvised for the use of the 
nation. And there is a passage in the Prophet which 
confirms this. For he says, 'when he came out of the land of 
Egypt he heard a strange language' (Ps 80: 6). If, then, Moses 
was a Hebrew, and the language of the Hebrews was 
subsequent to the others, Moses, I say, who was born some 
thousands of years after the Creation of the world, and who 
relates the words of God in his own language - does he not 
clearly teach us that he does not attribute to God such a 
language of human fashion, but that he speaks as he does 
because it was impossible to express his meaning otherwise 
than in human language, though the words he uses have 
some Divine and profound significance? 
CE ii, 256; 7ff 0 i, p. 301) 
In Gregory's opinion, it is not only the PaOoc of stupidity to assume 
that 
the Supreme God prefers speaking some particular tongue 
(e. g. Hebrew); it is 
equally a grave theological error to 
believe that His word might be addressed to 
the people in language that is 
different from their own, because the words of 
Revelation would then fail to reach the audience they are addressed to, which 
would have meant that the very purpose of Revelation was invalidated: 
For to suppose that God used the Hebrew tongue, when 
there was no one to hear and understand such a language, 
methinks no reasonable being will consent. We read in the 
Acts (2: 6) that the Divine power divided itself into many 
languages for this purpose, that no one of alien tongue 
might lose his share of the benefit. But if God spoke in 
human language before the Creation, whom was He to 
benefit by using it? 
Ibid. 
There are several comments to make on this. First, Gregory's concept 
dramatically disproves the hypothesis of Clement and Origen. In fact, it turns 
out that the validity of a name does not depend on its relationship to the 
primordial tongue (i. e. Hebrew, as was commonly thought by the Alexandrian 
theologians); any name is equally valid when used in its appropriate linguistic 
environment, viz. by one nation. Gregory goes on to say that divine names and 
epithets should be regarded as absolutely equal in terms of their objective 
validity - just as the words for 'sky' sound 
different in 'Greek, Latin, Syriac, 
Mede, Cappadocian, African, Scythian, Thracian, Egyptian or Hebrew', the title 
'God' (as well as other divine names) can also vary 
depending on the dialect of 
a nation: 
7 This explains his wide use of the allegorical 
interpretation of those numerous biblical texts 
that portray God as naming stars, etc. which are of no si 
l 
thcan tandard Christian 
sm This conclusion, however, does not appear 
to n view on the 
translation of some venerable proper names 
into other languages. For a fuller discussion 
1" 
Dillon's article. 
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And there is this one sure piece of evidence in our favour, that the Divine Being is not named alike by all, but that 
each interprets his idea as he thinks best. 
CE ii, 397; 13f a i, p. 342) 
Overall, Gregory's scientific guesswork in relation to the problem of 
primordial tongue is doubly impressive. Indeed, on the basis of Gen. 11: 1 
Gregory proceeds from the principle of the original monolingual situation. It 
should be pointed out that Gregory of Nyssa has proposed something that 
became a commonly shared scientific view only in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century. Linguistic theories, from the beginning of the Middle Ages 
until their radical reconsideration in the nineteenth century, considered Hebrew 
to be the primordial tongue. Only in the nineteenth century (!! ) were all 
attempts to derive modern languages from Hebrew recognised as hopeless. But 
this is exactly what the fourth-century theologian pointed out, without the 
benefit of any scientific analysis, or comparative linguistic studies. It is still 
hotly disputed by modern linguists whether all languages derive from one 
original archetype, or whether there were several 'lingual areas'. 
Although on 
the basis of Gen. 11: 1 Gregory proceeds from the idea that originally people 
spoke one dialect, according to his general theory 
it does not mean that all 
modern languages could really be derived 
from this original dialect: we are not 
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told about the original tongue of Adam and Eve&". Moreover, we can only 
guess whether this original tongue was somehow preserved and survived after 
the Confusion. In fact, it is absolutely unimportant for his theory of language, 
because man (under certain circumstanceso) generates words and adopts them 
for his speech hic et nunc. 
Another comparison with modern linguistic science seems to be relevant. 
If all languages in their variety originally come from one ancient common 
archetypical masterpiece, to what extent, if at all, it is possible to trace it? 
Gregory of Nyssa provides us with interesting ideas about it when his concern 
shifts to the problem of variety of tongues and exegesis of Gen. 1: 11-19. The 
Cappadocian hypothesis of language inevitably leads to a substantially new 
view on the variety of tongues, and thereby to the new theological 
comprehension of the Gen. 11: 1-9 and Acts. 2: 2-12, etc. With the exception of 
cf. CE, ii, 254; 18f (J i, p. 300): 'For from the beginning, as long as all men had the same 
language, we see from Holy Scripture that men received no teaching of God's words, nor, when 
men were separated into various differences of language, did a Divine enactment prescribe how 
each man should talk. But God, willing that men should speak different languages, gave human 
nature full liberty to formulate arbitrary sounds, so as to render their meaning more 
intelligible'. 
560 Y. Edelshtein, in his Paxxecpeaneeexoeue yuenux, p. 178 identifies an interesting problem; he 
argues that some Patristic writers (Basil, Gregory, Augustine and Jerome) on the basis of the 
distinction between 'to have potentially' (buvä LEt) and 'to be factually' (ivcVyiiq) - (Y. 
Edelshtein refers to Jerome, PL 23,502 b) make the supposition that the power of speech is 
implanted into human nature in potentia: 'Thus, the power of speech is inherent to every man in 
potential, but if one has never heard human speech before, he never speaks'. Indeed, the question which 
is touched upon is intriguing: the matter is concerned with one of the most 
dreadful linguistic 
experiments in the history of linguistics reported by Herodotus (ii, 
2); a similar experiment was 
undertaken in India (v. W. Allen, op. cit., p. 46). Psammetichus and 
his experimental results 
(which are in fact misinterpreted by Y. Edelshtein: Psammetichus 
found the first uttered word 
'ßexöc' to be the Phrygian for beard) were discussed and reinterpreted 
by grammarians (e. g. 
Suda, Lexicon, v. entry for IFKWtATlve 229; 1 ff), but I 
have found no sign of interest in the story 
amongst Greek Christian authors, nor in the question of why a child who 
has never heard 
human speech is unable to speak. It is not difficult, 
however, to imagine how the Cappadocian 
theory could work out the problem, but it would 
be too speculative to discuss it here. 
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Epicurean philosophising (Epicurus assumed that the different tongues of 
mankind were something liable to further development), it was commonly held 
that the number of human tongues is fixed. As we have already observed, 
Clement even could speculate about an ultimate number of languages (the 
amount varied between seventy two and seventy four); for Gregory of Nyssa 
the very standpoint adopted by the Alexandrian School is totally misleading 
and wrong, it is all 'trifling and mere Jewish folly, far removed from the grandeur of 
Christian simplicity'. Things came into existence by the divine will, while names 
are produced and used by humankind; he thinks that the variety of tongues is 
one of the best arguments against 4)iucts-theory. His general assumption that all 
languages are equal in their power to express our thoughts is in fact a 
philosophical refutation of the Platonist 'way-out'-hypothesis of 'spoiled' 
modern tongues. Let us exemplify how his formula 'neither did Adam make the 
animals, nor did God name them' works: 
For as the natures of the elements, which are the work of 
the Creator, appear alike to all, and there is no difference to 
human sense in men's experience of fire, or air, or water, 
but the nature of each is one and unchanging, working in 
the same way, and suffering no modification from the 
differences of those who partake of it, so also the 
imposition of names, if applied to things by God, would 
have been the same for all. But, in point of fact, while the 
nature of things as constituted by God remains the same, 
the names which denote them are divided by so many 
differences of language, that it were no easy task even to 
calculate their number. 
CE ii, 251; 20f (j i, p. 299f) 
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Thus, Gregory poses the question about an ultimate number of human 
languages (nations) in a way entirely different from the historical science of his 
time-', 61. His interpretation of Gen. 11: 4-11 totally conflicts with that held by Philo 
or Clement. His main point is that it was not a 'divinely given' language or 
'sacral Hebrew', or whatever enigmatic language we have already observed in 
the Christian literature that was confounded by God at Babel; rather, it was a 
primordial tongue that was absolutely and unconditionally of human origin. 
God did not design and provide humankind with more tongues, but confused 
the primordial dialect that they already had: 
And if any one cites the confusion of tongues that took 
place at the building of the tower as contradicting what I 
have said, not even there is God spoken of as creating 
men's languages, but as confounding the existing one, that 
all might not hear all. For when all lived together and were 
not as yet divided by various differences of race, the 
aggregate of men dwelt together with one language among 
them; but when by the Divine will it was decreed that all 
the earth should be replenished by mankind, then, their 
community of tongue being broken up, men were 
dispersed in various directions and adopted this and that 
form of speech and language, possessing a certain bond of 
union in similarity of tongue, not indeed disagreeing from 
others in their knowledge of things, but differing in the 
character of their names. For a stone or a stick does not 
seem one thing to one man and another to another, but the 
different peoples call them by different names. So that our 
position remains unshaken, that human language is the 
invention of the human mind or understanding. 
Ibid. 
-%' For Gregory Nazianzen the idea of a 
fixed number of human tongues was already totally 
foreign; some languages already exist, while other languages are to come - 
Gregorius 
Nazianzenus, Contra Julianem Imperatorem 1 (orat. 4): 6mouaaTc, Aaot, 4vAa4 yAcwvaat, nay 
ytvoc ävOQwnc iv, vai 1 Auüa rräaa, Soot TF vüv ivTF, Kai 
bvoL yEVTCEOE... (PG 35; 532a). 
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To summarise his various opinions and expressions, it should be emphasised 
that in the case of Gregory of Nyssa we are dealing with a new, complete, and 
independent theory of language. To what extent did it depend on the standard 
secular theories of the time? Apparently, hardly at all: Gregory of Nyssa merely 
directs his efforts toward the standard agenda and attempts to answer the 
question which normally appeared in the course of the controversy between 
adherents of q)vQLq and OEQtc theories. At the same time, he shows a sustained 
interest in the biblical material; although the latter is determined by the 
Eunomean controversy, his exegetical preoccupation should not be 
overestimated. What is truly outstanding about his writings is that he does not 
follow the exegetical tradition of his time, but proposed a substantially new 
exegesis of the relevant biblical passages, based on and inferred from the theory 
xa6' avtrjv. 
The standard view that Gregory followed the doctrine of the Scriptures 
or theology of the Church, while his opponents were guided by Plato's Cratylus 
or a 'Neoplatonized form of Aristotelianism' %2 fails to define and explain the 
matter. Analysis of his theory demonstrates that for Gregory of Nyssa the 
relevant biblical passages were not the premise or referent condition. 
Moreover, 
the role of the exegesis of these passages in the general context of 
argumentation is relatively small, compared to fundamental theological and 
W cf. R. Mortley, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 132; v. also his tenth chapter on the 
Eunomean controversy, 
whose content follows from the title: 'Theology versus philosophy'. 
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philosophical considerations about nature of language in relation to the 
Supreme Deity, humankind and the apparent world. 
A critical examination of the CE and Gregory's numerous references to 
Basil's works make us think his main preoccupation was to develop, exemplify 
and fulfil the ideas of his brother. Above all, Gregory's confidence is amazing: 
he easily rejected and refuted a number of the most fundamental linguistic 
postulates of his time, and never claims to be suggesting anything new. What 
he is doing, in his opinion, is simply defending the correct teaching of his great 
mentor. The hypothesis of language found in the CE arises from the more 
general purely philosophical model often labelled 'the Cappadocian synthesis'. 
The appearance of such notions as i o, aIa, ai evF-QYEIaL in the most crucial 
philosophical formula-chain for word-appearance seems to be only la pantie 
visible de l'iceberg in comparison to the philosophical meaning of Basil's two 
premises, of the principle incognisability of the human thinking process and the 
incognisability of every single essence. 
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Conclusion 
The Christian theological comprehension of language is extremely 
prominent and stands out against the various ancient mythological intuitions of 
language. Broadly speaking, all known ancient speculation treated language as 
an incomprehensible enigma, and this is why mythological thinking always 
considered the human power of speech as a divine product; regardless of its 
numerous manifestations, human language was believed to be a human 
borrowing from deity or deities. The Biblical narration about Adam naming the 
animals is a unique exception; and from what we know, one cannot find a 
parallel idea in the mythological material or trace a secure origin of this idea. 
Though this uniqueness per se is intriguing, clearly, in the book of Genesis 
there is still no philosophy of language. In the course of the investigation of the 
Greek Patristic literature even this a prima facie obvious concept received diverse 
interpretations, which appear sometimes to be diametrically opposed. Thus it 
would be an error to represent the formation of the Christian theological view 
on language as a confrontation between 'Athens and Jerusalem' or, more 
specifically, between Greek philosophy and information derived from the 
Pentateuch. The truth is more profound. 
*IAQ 
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1. Negative results of the research 
The agenda of secular linguistic science with the two major language 
doctrines designated in the thesis as qüvnc and 6EQic-theories as well as further 
attempts to find a balance between them has affected Christian speculations 
about language. The extent of this influence, however, does not appear to be as 
determining as was commonly agreed amongst some scholars; nor does it seem 
to exceed the influence of the information derived from the Bible. Indeed, the 
most prominent Patristic writers, viz. the Alexandrian and the Cappadocian 
Fathers, were aware of this agenda. They elaborated their theories of language 
and in the course of this elaboration they tried to experiment with the major 
questions, which secular linguistic science asked in relation to language. 
Similarly, they took into account numerous biblical passages and proposed 
corresponding exegetical solutions. Overall, however, the comprehensive 
picture of the Christian view on language appeared to be irreducible either to 
traditional linguistic theories, or to the teaching derived from the Bible. From 
what we have observed, there is only one exception, which can and should be 
determined as a balance or rather synthesis of 'Athens and Jerusalem', of 
philosophical theory and biblical intuition. The theory of language proposed by 
Clement and Origen was based on Plato and his I)i c tc-theory. Of course, as 
was shown in the third chapter, in spite of some minor disagreements and 
dissimilarities both Alexandrian theologians made great use of the Cratylus. 
Their comprehension of Gen. 2: 19-20 and other texts in the sense that Adam was 
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a Platonic name-maker, and that Hebrew was 'primordial', 'perfect', 'the most 
ancient', 'correct', 'sacral', original tongue of humankind, falls splendidly into 
the pattern of the Alexandrian tradition, which comes from rabbinic 
speculations to Joseph Flavius and Philo. Nevertheless, this theological line 
reached a deadlock. 
§ 2. Positive results of the research 
The writings of Justin and Irenaeus provide us with evidence that when 
Christian theology shifted from a biblical concern with name, divine names, 
and name-theology and turned to the question of the nature of language, it was 
Christian anthropology that determined both the agenda and the line of 
investigation. As for the agenda, it immediately became limited, and these 
limits were of human nature. Justin and Irenaeus were the first to bind up the 
question of language and the corporeal human complexity. Therefore, human 
speech was said to bear such constituent characteristics of man's nature as soul 
and body. In spite of some lack of clarity about the course of word-appearance, 
both Justin and Irenaeus insisted that language in its apparent manifestation i. e. 
concrete articulated speech is 'carnal'. Although in the works of Apologists one 
cannot find polished dialectical paradigms of inner and outer aspects of speech, 
the major aspects of the language theory were already touched upon and 
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defined with surprising almost prophetical pragmatism. Broadly speaking, 
Justin and Irenaeus came across the problem which became quite fundamental 
in further Patristic speculations about language: how to explain numerous 
biblical expressions that come from the ancient Hebrew name-theology? The 
problem of the Logos of the Johannine prologue was the first instance to focus 
on. Thus, Irenaeus' formula that the Logos must in no way be treated as a word 
of human language anticipated the theological investigations of the subject 
found in Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa. 
Analysis of the Cappadocian theory of language leaves no doubt that 
Basil and Gregory worked out a substantially new linguistic theory. This theory 
is based on the Christian theological view of man (who consists of a material 
body and an immaterial soul) and considers all the complexity of the human 
power of speech as derived from complexity of the human nature. All the 
philosophical premises as well as a preliminary outline are given by Basil the 
Great. Gregory of Nyssa entirely followed this way and fulfilled it. While doing 
so, both Basil and Gregory took into consideration the vast majority of 
'linguistic' puzzles brought forward by the Classical philosophical grammatical 
investigations of language. Gregory of Nyssa has exemplified how his theory 
solves these problems. As a matter of fact, his well known formulae (e. g. 
'neither did Adam make the animals, nor did God name them', etc. ) as well as 
his general exegetical approach is related to the Cappadocian theological 
system. Simple references to the Bible fail to explain the matter. Therefore, the 
IAA 
%X-XV 
Cappadocian linguistic theory should be regarded as inferred from the main 
postulates of the theological system such as: the concept of the Supreme Deity, 
cosmology, ontology, complexity and the incomprehensibility of the human 
soul, the thinking process that originates inner speech, 'movements of soul' that 
are crystallised into notions, the anatomical structure of the human body, the 
embodiment of the 'movements of soul' into verbal utterances. This theory 
allowed the Fathers to determine a consistent view of the general linguistic 
problems (primordial tongue, variety of languages, etc. ) in a way so satisfactory 
that it substantially exceeded the standard known theories of their time. A 
further aspect of the Cappadocian hypothesis was that it was conceived and 
realised as an integral part of a whole theological system. One of their most 
significant contributions was bringing to the forefront the phenomenon of 
human personhood and the integration of this principle into a linguistic 
hypothesis. The significance of this development must not be underestimated. 
In fact, this approach allowed them to overcome the traditional philosophical 
and grammatical perception of word as a dead entry in a lexicon, and to regard 
it as a living word of real human speech. The best example of this revolutionary 
transition from a somewhat static perception of language to a dynamic one is 
Gregory's principal idea of man as name-giver hic et nunc. Were they were 
really influenced or inspired by the writings of Justin and Irenaeus? This 
interesting question requires an independent and thorough textual analysis, but 
regardless of the final answer, one cannot underestimate the originality of the 
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Cappadocian theory of language for both Patristic theology and the history of 
linguistics. This is the primary result of the research. 
The secondary results of the investigation are these. Theological interest 
in the problem of language was not caused by the hot disputes held in the 
secular grammatical and philosophical circles of the time. The main agency that 
stimulated Patristic writers to treat the matter was the controversy with the 
Gnostics. Although an attempt has been made to demonstrate that Gnostic 
speculation over names and words was non-philosophical, the question of 
general Gnostic methodology as well as the real origin of their name-theology 
still remains open for discussion, because ultimately it depends on what one 
means by the term 'philosophy'. Nevertheless, the Gnostic movements left 
determinable imprints upon almost all Greek Patristic writers who were 
preoccupied with the problem of language. Though the theologians of the 
Alexandrian School were shown to be the most consistent followers of Plato's 
Cratylus, such a central figure as Origen originally elaborated and modified the 
picric-theory of name in order to set it against the Gnostic view on martyrdom 
for the name of Jesus Christ. 
Similarly, in the course of analysis, the suggestion was made of 
reconsidering the traditional view of Aetius and Eunomius as consistent 
stalwarts of Plato's hypothesis of names. Their philosophical 
background 
mainly consisted of Aristotelian logic, and their competence 
does not overcome 
the agenda of the Categories. This is, however, not enough to categorise 
them as 
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Peripatetic philosophers. At the same time, some expressions about the 'natural' 
nexus between name and word are shown to be too insufficient and even scanty 
to argue for a more or less satisfactory dependence on Platonism. As a result, an 
attempt was made to withdraw such definitions as of Eunomius' theory as a 
'Neoplatonized form of Aristotelianism' or an 'Aristotelian form of 
Neoplatonism', etc. A critical examination has shown that just as in the 
speculations of Gnostics, in Eunomius' writings one finds no proper theory, 
which corresponds to a common standard, i. e. attempts to answer a number of 
practical philosophical and grammatical questions. On the one hand, we found 
no sign that Eunomius ever tried to show how his theory considered, for 
example, Hebrew and Greek, why the Greek name agennetos is the supreme 
divine name that pre-existed the creation of the apparent world, how his theory 
about pre-existed phonemes and sounds imprinted by divine Providence 
should be comprehended in the different linguistic environment? On the other 
hand, his teaching about names as seeds implanted in human souls was more 
strongly reminiscent of Gnostic name-speculation than any known 
philosophical theory of the time. 
§ 3. Christian theological view on language 
Gregory of Nyssa spelled out the very mechanism of word-appearance 
in the form of the following chain: 
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Essencecenergies chuman perceptioncepinoiabappearance of name 
This is to some extent an equation with two unknown (underland) 
quantities, in that both Basil and Gregory assumed essence of thing and human 
thinking process as incognisable phenomena. Thus, this formula works from 
left to right (when man generates a word to designate an object) and from right 
to left (when he is a hearer). 
Therefore, human speech appears to be similar to a subterranean river 
that emerges from the earth, flows and goes back underground. At some points 
this river seems to us to be just an ordinary stream; nevertheless, we are still 
unaware of where it comes from, and where it goes to. Again, all that we can 
know and learn about language - the preoccupation of, for instance, 
grammarians - is just a limited brief extent of the phenomenon. In doing so, one 
is doomed to reach a stage that ends the investigation: e. g. how the movements 
of our soul produce fixed and formed ideas; how, in spite of thorough studies, 
the essence of thing remains incognisable, et multa alia. Basil the Great believed 
this knowledge would only be found in the afterlife. 
However, why is the Cappadocian linguistic hypothesis presumed to be 
the Patristic theory? In the course of our analysis we have observed that some 
Christian theologians adopted classical theories of language, but only in the 
case of the Cappadocian theologians can we speak about a new ecclesiastical 
view on language. Moreover, the theory of Basil the 
Great is a unique 
breakthrough, and if I am not mistaken the Christian preoccupations with 
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language that followed never exceeded both his linguistic theory and his 
general philosophical premise. 
As for the latter, i. e. as for his intriguing answer to the greatest 
philosophical question about the nature of the human thinking process, the 
issue has yet to receive a proper analysis. In fact it has neither been properly 
studied nor critically scrutinised, nor applied to the main 'dogmas' of modern 
'philosophical theology'; but this is the very point or inquiry with which I 
would rather finish this thesis. 
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